Controversy over the Pinnacle Islands Revisited

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Controversy over the Pinnacle Islands Revisited. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. Student: Erick Gutierrez Macias Advisor: Teng Chung-chian. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 中華民國 101 年 6 月 June 2012.

(2) Controversy over the Pinnacle Islands Revisited 研究生：谷呈陽指導教授：鄧中堅. Student: Erick Gutierrez Macias Advisor: Teng Chung-chian 國立政治大學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程碩士論文. 政治大. 學. ‧ 國. 立. A Thesis. Nat. National Chengchi University. n. al. er. io. sit. in Asia-Pacific Studies. y. ‧. Submitted to International Master’s Program. C. i n U. v. h e n g c of In partial fulfillment h ithe Requirement For the degree of Master in Asian Studies. 中華民國 101 年 6 月 June 2012.

(3) Acknowledgement. First of all, I would like to dedicate this work to my wife, Naomi, thank you for always being with me and encouraging me in all the aspects of my life. I also would like to thank my mother and the rest of my family for their continuous support to achieve my goals.. 立. 政治大. I express my sincere gratitude to my adviser, Professor Teng Chung-chian, Dean of. ‧ 國. 學. the College of International Affairs at the National Chengchi University for his guidance. Finally, I would like to thank to Professor Yuan I, Research Fellow of the. ‧. Institute of International Relations at the National Chengchi University, and Professor. y. Nat. Tsai Tung-chieh, Dean of National Chung Hsing University’s Graduate Institute of. n. al. er. io. this research.. sit. International Politics for their suggestions and constructive observations to develop. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.

(4) Controversy over the Pinnacle Islands Revisited By Erick Gutierrez Macias. Abstract The persistent Pinnacle Islands controversy has been often. 治政 entitlements, territorial sovereignty prerogatives, maritime 大立 rights to exploit natural recourses, and strategic affairs. The observed from several perspectives, such as historical. ‧ 國. 學. importance of this dispute lies in the contextual necessities and interests of the governments from China, Japan, and. ‧. Taiwan. Likewise, the United States implications and. sit. y. Nat. interests beneath the dispute have also been manifested. In. io. er. this case, the Japan-U.S. strategic alliance serves as a framework fora the Washington policy maintenance in East. n. v i lmeantime, n C h International Public engchi U. Asia. In the. Law as an. alternative to solve the Pinnacles controversy has failed. Under those circumstances, an armed conflict among the parties is possible, yet the United States military presence can prevent them.. Keywords: Sovereignty, Pinnacle Islands, China, Japan, Taiwan, United States.. 2.

(5) TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER ONE 1. Introduction ··················································································· 6 1.1. Preamble ··················································································· 6 1.2. Methodology ·············································································· 7 1.3. Primary literature review ································································ 9 CHAPTER TWO 2. Background and development of the dispute ·········································17 2.1. Bases of controversy ····································································17 2.2. Overview of the involved parties’ positions and claims ···························24 2.2.1. China’s prerogatives ·······························································24 2.2.2. Taiwan’s prerogatives ·····························································25 2.2.3. China and Taiwan joint statements ··············································26 2.2.4. Japan’s prerogatives ·······························································27 2.3. Historical references analysis ·························································29 2.4. International Public Law sources analysis ···········································40. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. CHAPTER THREE 3. Theoretical framework and analysis····················································50 3.1. Neorealist paradigm ····································································50 3.1.1. Balance of power theory ··························································52 3.2. Theory applied to the dispute ··························································54 3.3. Parties’ economic and strategic necessities ·········································61. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. i n U. v. CHAPTER FOUR 4. The U.S. implications and intentions in the dispute ·································66 4.1. Washington’s lawful implications ····················································66 4.2. The U.S. pragmatic diplomacy ························································69 4.3. Washington’s strategy beneath the Pinnacles case ·································75. Ch. engchi. CHAPTER FIVE 5. Conclusions···················································································80 References ·······················································································84 Appendix·························································································92. 3.

(6) LIST OF FIGURES. Figure 1: Location of the Pinnacle Islands ·························································· 92 Figure 2: Pinnacle Islands’ vicinities ································································ 92 Figure 3: Pinnacle Islands’ territorial expansion ··················································· 93 Figure 4: Overlapping claims in the East China Sea gas fields ··································· 93 Figure 5: Zhouhai Tubian map by Hu Songxian 1556············································· 94 Figure 6: Full map of the Three Kingdoms by Shihei Hayashi 1785 ···························· 95. 政治大. Figure 7: Zhongshan Chuan Xin Lu map by Xu Baoguang 1721 ································ 96. 立. Figure 8: The fake deed of Empress Cixi ··························································· 97. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 9: Islands lying between 119º-120º longitude east and 23º-24º north latitude ········· 98. ‧. Figure 10: Letter of gratitude from the ROC Consul in Nagasaki 1920 ························· 99. sit. y. Nat. Figure 11: Chinese Renmin Bao referring to the Pinnacles as Senkaku Islands 1953 ········· 99. io. al. er. Figure 12: World Map Atlas published in 1960 by Beijing Map Publishing Co. ············· 100. v i n C textbook for nationalUjunior high-schools 1970 ···········102 Figure 14: Taiwanese Geography h engchi n. Figure 13: Ryukyu Islands in World Map Album Vol. 1 East Asian Nations 1965 ·········· 101. Figure 15: Classified Chinese map with the Japanese term for the Pinnacles ················· 103 Figure 16: Marker erected on Uotsuri/Daioyu Island by Ishigaki City 1969 ·················· 104 Figure 17: Warning sign built by the Ryukyu Islands government 1970······················· 105 Figure 18: PLAN maneuvers along the East and South China Sea ····························· 106 Figure 19: Minjinyu 5179 incident time and location ············································ 107 Figure 20: USCAR-27’s geographical borders ···················································· 108 Figure 21: Leasehold agreement for U.S. military purposes ····································· 109 Figure 22: The Pinnacle Islands’ coordinates······················································ 110 4.

(7) ABBREVIATIONS. ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. CCP. Chinese Communist Party. DPJ. Democratic Party of Japan. EEZ. Exclusive Economic Zone. FDI. Foreign Direct Investment. ICJ. International Court of Justice. IR. International Relations. JMSDF. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force Japan’s Self-Defense Force. Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party). ‧. PAC-3. ‧ 國. KMT. 立. 學. JSDF. 政治大. Patriot Advanced Capability-3. Nat. PLAAF. People’s Liberation Army Air Force. PLAN. People’s Liberation Army Navy. PRC. People’s Republic of China. R&I. Research and Innovation. ROC. Republic of China. UN. United Nations. UNCLOS. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UNECAFE. United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. UNSC. United Nations Security Council. US. United States. USCAR 27. United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus - Proclamation 27. USFJ. United States Forces in Japan. Ch. engchi. sit er. n. al. y. People’s Liberation Army. io. PLA. i n U. v. 5.

(8) CHAPTER ONE 1. Introduction. 1.1.. Preamble The Pinnacle Islands1 are located in the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyu Archipelago),. Japan in the East China Sea, Western Pacific Ocean (see Appendix, Figure 1). All the islands together have an estimated area of seven square kilometers. The Pinnacles are. 政治大. 170 kilometers north of Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan; 186 kilometers northeast of Jilong (Keelung) harbor, Taiwan; 380 kilometers from China’s east coast,. 立. and 410 kilometers west of Okinawa Main Island [1, 2]. For maps, see Figures 2 and. ‧ 國. 學. 3 in Appendix. The Pinnacles consist of five islands: Kuba Jima 久場島; Taisho Jima 大正島; Uotsuri Jima 魚釣島; Kita Kojima 北小島; and Minami Kojima 南小島. In. ‧. conjunction, these are three small islets: Okino Kita Iwa 沖の北岩; Okino Minami Iwa 沖の南岩; and Tobise 飛瀬 [3, 4].2. sit. y. Nat. Currently, the Pinnacle Islands are administrated by Ishigaki City, Okinawa. io. n. al. er. Prefecture in Nansei Shoto, Japan. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). i n U. v. and the Republic of China (ROC) “Taiwan”3 have been intensively claiming for these. Ch. engchi. islands since 1972 [1]. Through this investigation, it will be clarified that the parties’ positions and allegations in such a controversy would be better defined under postwar arrangements applied to the scope of International Relations (IR) theory.. 1. This is the English term for Senkaku Retto 尖閣列島, Senkaku Shoto 尖閣諸島 or Senkaku Gunto 尖閣群島 in Japanese, and Diaoyutai Qundao in Chinese Mandarin; 釣魚台群島 traditional written form and 钓鱼台群岛 simplified written form. I use the English term throughout this investigation for reasons of transliteration, uniformity, and impartiality. The English term “Pinnacle” for the islands originated from the time when British sailors explored the islands and named them “Pinnacle Islands” in 1843. The Japanese name was called after the English term [14]. 2 Following the same order, are the islands’ names in Chinese Mandarin with hanyu piyin transliteration, as well as their traditional and simplified characters: Huangwei Yu 黄尾嶼 - 黄尾屿; Chiwei Yu 赤尾嶼 - 赤尾屿; Diaoyu Dao 釣魚島 - 钓鱼岛; Bei Xiaodao 北小島 - 北小岛; Nan Xiaodao 南小島 - 南小岛; Da Bei Xiaodao 大北小島 - 大北小岛; Da Nan Xiaodao 大南小島 - 大南小岛; Fei Jiao Yan 飛礁岩 - 飞濑岛 [3, 4]. 3 Historically, Taiwan is also known as “Formosa”, which derived from “Ilha Formosa” Beautiful Island in Portuguese.. 6.

(9) Since the end of the World War II, nationalist and territorial controversies have addressed the instability of the International System. Many of these disputes among Nation-States have ended in confrontations or even in armed conflicts. Although the Pinnacle Islands controversy is held among China, Japan and Taiwan, the United States (U.S.) still plays an important role as a “balancer of power” in the dispute. From this perspective, the argument includes two difficulties: firstly, the controversy over the Pinnacle Islands’ sovereignty among China, Japan, and Taiwan along with the maritime rights in the East China Sea, which risks security in the region; and secondly, since the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed in 1960, the U.S. government has obligated to defend the territory under Japanese administration.. 政治大 concerning to the Pinnacle 立Islands’ territorial sovereignty.. Thereby, the United States carries certain obligations in this dispute, especially. ‧ 國. 學. 1.2.. Methodology. ‧. Based on these arguments my hypothesis is planted: the dispute over the. y. Nat. sit. Pinnacles sovereignty is a precondition for the United States to maintain its. al. er. io. supremacy in East Asia. To support my hypothesis, a series of research questions. n. listed below are addressed so that we have a better understanding of the dynamics of power in such dispute.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1) What is the role of the United States in the Pinnacles controversy? 2) Are the involved parties’ national interests overcoming the United States’ balance of power in East Asia? 3) How can the United States utilize the Pinnacles dispute as a means to preserve its power in the region? The Pinnacle Islands controversy is considered as one of the most precarious and challenging disputes in East Asia. As a matter of fact, on September 7th, 2010, the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with two Japanese coastguard ships intensified the Pinnacles dispute. The aim of this study is to analyze the recent tensions among the nations involved, and to evaluate the presence and role of the U.S. in the quarrel. 7.

(10) Although nowadays the United States supremacy in the world is declining, it still remains as the main power in this dispute; and yet it is the only actor that can deter the involved parties from military intervention, rather than to provoke them. Certainly, the Washington’s intention is to come back to East Asia, with the purpose of safeguarding and maintaining its interests with its Asian allies, Japan and Taiwan. Historical references and International Public Law sources are important to understand the development of the dispute and to analyze the parties’ claims from a descriptive point of view. However, they are not sufficient to tell us how the involved actors have been behaving based on their objectives and necessities. For that reason, the position of the concerned actors (China, Japan, Taiwan, and U.S.) will be evaluated in such a quarrel by following the balance of power theory from the Neorealist paradigm of IR.. 立. 政治大. Additionally, this case study examines the evidence that the parties present to. ‧ 國. 學. defend their positions in the controversy by carefully examining the historical facts and chronological events. Hence, the data used in this study is collected from relevant. ‧. bibliographic sources, periodicals, and electronic sources. Finally, an analysis of the. Nat. y. controversy, its challenges in order to be solved, and possible outcomes from the. sit. dispute will be discussed in this study.. n. al. er. io. This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter concentrates on the. iv n including U. controversy preamble, methodology, and literature review. The second chapter. Ch. engchi. contemplates the description of the dispute,. a rigorous examination. regarding to the bases of the controversy in addition to a retrospective of parties’ claims. The third chapter focuses on the theoretical framework applied to this dispute. The fourth chapter covers an analysis of the United States’ role in the Pinnacle Islands case. Lastly, the final chapter corresponds to the findings and conclusions of the controversy. Most of the terms in Chinese Mandarin are cited in the Romanization hanyu-pinyin form.. 8.

(11) 1.3.. Primary literature review The controversy over the Pinnacle Islands has been studied from different. angles and perspectives, in which the positions of the involved nations are identified. For the first instance, the Pinnacles’ case has been a contiguous determinant in the Sino-Japanese relationship, and also it has challenged how both nations should handle this territorial dispute. In the meantime, Taiwan has also asserted its sovereignty over the islets during the last years. International Public Law sources, historical events, economic interests, nationalism, and political frictions have also played important roles in the power of dynamics and interactions among Beijing-Taipei-TokyoWashington relationships. Therefore, it is essential to understand the different studies and approaches of this polemic issue.. 治政大 that can explain the actors’ There is an extensive and varied IR literature 立 positions and policies, which apply to the Pinnacle Islands territorial dispute. Classic ‧ 國. 學. works made by Joseph M. Grieco [5], Robert Jervis [6], and Kenneth Waltz [7, 8] offer a complete scheme from the Neorealist perspective related to the bases of this. ‧. controversy. Basically, the Neorealist theory defines the essential factors of the Nation-States’ existence and their interaction with other actors in the International. y. Nat. sit. System. According to this paradigm, States are predisposed to achieve power, security,. al. er. io. national interests, and strategic alliances for their own survival. Consequently, war. n. and conflicts among States may be inevitable and justifiable. From this standpoint,. Ch. i n U. v. Kenneth Waltz [8], Hans Morgenthau [9], and Abramo Fimo K. Organski [10] narrow. engchi. down the Neorealist perspective under the balance of power theory considering its benefits and critics. This theoretical approach has been manifested in the economic and geopolitics interests attached to the Pinnacles case among the involved parties. Several works have examined the Pinnacles’ dispute in concrete. Among those studies, the followings are the ones which focus more on the perspective of History and International Public Law: Daniel J. Dzurek [3], Kimie Hara [11], William B. Heflin [12], Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky [13], Steven W. Su [4], Han-yi Shaw [14], Unryu Suganuma [15], and Mark J. Valencia [16]. Investigations made by Jason Blazevic [17], Richard C. Bush III [18], Reinhard Drifte [19], M. Taylor Fravel [20], Hitoshi Tanaka [21], Krista E. Wiegand [22], and Peter K. Yu [23] analyze the dispute from a more IR perspective. Chien-peng Chung [24], and Jing Zhao [25] 9.

(12) explore the nationalism’s role immersed in the Sino-Japanese development of the Pinnacles dispute. Regarding to the United States’ implication to the controversy, Richard C. Bush III [18], and Go Ito [26] define and explain the complex role and responsibility of the United States in East Asia. They also point out that China’s rising power has spread not only to economic matters but also to military power and modernization. In fact, China lately has conducted military exercises in the East and South China Sea. Based on a report made by the International Institute for Strategic Studies [27], China led its most belligerent naval power ever from the East China Sea to the South China Sea on April 10th, 2010. China directed naval exercises not once but twice through Okinawa’s waters, probably intending to intimidate the Japanese authorities, while the Chinese fleet arrived to the South China Sea to confront. 政治大 Richard C. Bush立 III [18] reveals that social and military relations in China and. Vietnamese vessels around the Spratly Islands.. ‧ 國. 學. Japan are delicate and influenced by fever nationalism. On one side, China’s military has enjoyed too much autonomy in the region; while Japan has not played a major role in this aspect. He also emphasizes that the Chinese and the Japanese governments. ‧. should be able to reach an agreement in geostrategic matters as well, in order to avoid. y. Nat. a military conflict between them, and at the same time to maintain the security in the. io. sit. East China Sea. In addition, the two militias should be able to expand exchanges and. n. al. er. dialogues, and both governments should make more efforts to reach a political. i n U. v. consensus for mutually exploring the energy resources in East China Sea.. Ch. engchi. The United States’ lawful implication in the Pinnacles’ case is precisely examined by Jean Marc F. Blanchard [28], Richard C. Bush III [18], Kerry Dumbaugh, David Ackerman, Richard Cronin, Shirley Kan, and Larry Niksch [29], Daniel J. Dzurek [3], James H. Kawakami and Victor Okim [30], Hiromichi Moteki [31], and Larry Niksch [32]. Principally, these authors focus on the political and security developments of the United States, as well as its pragmatic position and policy in the region. They also describe that the Sino-Japanese ties have been aggravated over territorial disputes and maritime resources. In addition, they argue for the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as well as other legal documents and their implications with the Japanese administration of the Pinnacles.. 10.

(13) James J. Przystup [33, 34] and Peter K. Yu [23] explain that despite the certain stability in East Asia and the economic interdependence between China and Japan, there are still unsettled security issues, such as the Pinnacles case. These authors address how the China’s rising power has changed the foreign policies agendas of its neighbors and at the same time challenged the U.S. policy in the region. Additionally, they discuss that nationalism and strategic interests are the key factors that can explain the policy making process in East Asia. They claim that economic relations are important, but economic exchange does not represent an ultimate scenario in the region. Therefore, the foreign policy of the East Asian Nations and their interaction with each other will determine whether Asia is moving toward the stability or instability. Furthermore, Peter K. Yu [23] concerns the possibility whether or not. 治政大 given the circumstances it is will be solved by military intervention. Nevertheless, 立 difficult how the involved parties can work out their differences, especially concerning the maritime rights in the East China Sea.. 學. ‧ 國. Japan will defend the Pinnacle Islands. Rationalism can determine if the controversy. Similarly, Hitoshi Tanaka [21] argues that under the increasing economic. ‧. interdependence between China and Japan, there are still political differences that can. y. Nat. escalate to a major confrontation. He emphasizes the importance of settling a more. io. sit. reliable foreign policy between China and Japan. He mentions that the previous Kan. al. er. administration mishandled the Chinese fishing boat incident, and that China should. n. v i n C that the controversy over thehPinnacles e n g crequires h i Uspecial attention, where only an. act with more prudence to deal this dispute with Japan. Hitoshi Tanaka [21] argues. effective diplomacy between China and Japan can dissuade a belligerent intervention. He believes that there is still an uncertainty to redesign the strategy of the foreign policy of Japan. Meanwhile, the Pinnacles case demonstrates the Chinese assertive power in the East Asia, raised by the relative decline of the presence of U.S. power in the region. Both nations should work in their mutual and beneficial ties and integration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the security of the region. Meanwhile, Masahiro Akiyama [35] stresses that the Pinnacle Islands issue is a matter of Japan’s national strategy. Thereby, the Japanese government has to be careful with China’s ambitious strategies. For Masahiro Akiyama [35] Japan cannot be marginalized; it has to defend the Pinnacles. At the same time, Japanese leaders should know how to perceive the Chinese foreign policy driven by its rising 11.

(14) power in the region. Mark J. Valencia [16] points out that the development of oil and natural gas has been affected by decades of territorial disputes and boundaries among China, Japan, and Taiwan. The competition between China and Japan for natural resources has been more obvious during the last years and has been debilitating the improved relations. Nevertheless, under a mutual economic interdependence, China and Japan have tried to reach a joint development of exploration of hydrocarbons in the East China Sea. However, Chinese and Japanese governments have different interpretations about the geography over the area supposed to be jointly developed. Reinhard Drifte [19] analyzes the Pinnacles controversy based on the IR outlook under the legal, military, political, and economic spheres. He evaluates the dispute beneath two possible scenarios “the military confrontation” and “the strategic. 政治大 and Japan, and their mutual 立 development of natural resources diminished by different. cooperation.” These scenarios are focused on the economic interest between China. ‧ 國. 學. geographical boundaries deliberations. At this point, China’s ambitions over a wider maritime border along the East China Sea have raised political struggles, and. constrain a settlement for more equal exploitation of economic resources. Reinhard. ‧. Drifte [19] states that a proper political environment is a precondition to reach. y. Nat. economic agreement, and then to prevent a catastrophic escalation over the Sino-. er. io. al. sit. Japanese disagreements.. n. Chien-peng Chung [24] examines the purpose and actions of the different. Ch. i n U. v. nationalist forces in China, Japan, and Taiwan concerning how their actions have. engchi. affected the negotiations and the dialog among the parties. Chien-peng Chung [24] provides an extensive explanation on the context of the periodical nationalist incidents that have gone through on the parties’ sides. He highlights that the importance of the dispute lies on its correlation of the sovereignty claims and the exploitation on natural resources (fishery, gas, and oil). This fact indicates that the dispute is influenced by the involved nations’ interests and that how the raised frictions are used by their nationalist groups and political factions for achieving their own objectives instead of settling down the struggles for maintaining the economic ties and stability in the East Asia region.. 12.

(15) M. Taylor Fravel [20] evaluates the development in the Pinnacle Islands controversy from a wider scope. He argues that a prominent armed conflict among the parties is still minimal. Although China pursues to change the status quo, the costs of a military intervention will be substantial since the Japan-US Security Treaty deters any Chinese direct aggression to seize the disputed islands. At this point, the United States’ obligations on the territories under Japanese administration stipulated in the Article V of the Japan-US Security Treaty should not be ignored. Nevertheless, China and Japan have somehow prevented the controversy from escalating to a major issue in their foreign policies outlooks. Certainly, the stability has overcome within the Pinnacles dispute, which also is reflected in the region. However, such stability is fragile and cannot be taken for granted. The persistent confrontation raises the. 治政 As a matter of fact, the Pinnacles territorial dispute大 can be seen as rivalry among the 立 involved Nation-States for competition on hydrocarbons. Consequently, the ambitions possibility of an armed conflict, especially because of the interest in natural resources.. ‧ 國. 學. over the islands could increase in the future if the Sino-Japanese relations are deteriorated or if the presence of the U.S. in East Asia decreases. Therefore, the. ‧. controversy requires a constant attention. For instance, several nationalist incidents and demonstrations have raised the frictions in the controversy. China and Japan. y. Nat. sit. should reaffirm their relations on more functional issues, such as a mutual cooperation. er. io. over natural resources. In that sense, a strategic mutual collaboration can decline the importance over the islands’ sovereignty. For example, in June 2008 China and Japan. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. reached a certain agreement to develop natural resources. Although the agreement. engchi. clearly did not focus on the Pinnacle Islands sovereignty, it created a framework for a future mutual exploration on both sides. Thus, the mutual agreement signifies a decrease of the tensions over the Pinnacles’ sovereignty dispute. M. Taylor Fravel [20] states that China and Japan should reduce their military presence nearby the Pinnacles. China should also restrict its naval or civilian vessels from entering to the waters around the disputed islands. In the meantime, even though Japan controls the Pinnacles, it should not develop the islets or imposed a military presence over there, so it will not provoke a Chinese reaction. In relation to the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington cooperation, as long as the confrontation can be avoided, the trilateral relationship can develop not only in strategic matters but also in other fields. The maintenance of stability in the controversy must continue so that it will not 13.

(16) deteriorate their relationship. Nonetheless, given the persistent economic interests and competitiveness, it might be difficult to guarantee the stability in the region. Concerning to the International Public Law resources, Kimie Hara [11], Seokwoo Lee [36], Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky [13], and Mark J. Valencia [16] provide comprehensive views over the Pinnacles case. They also explain the legal parties’ arguments for claiming sovereignty over the Pinnacle Islands, as well as maritime rights in the surrounding waters. First, they cite international establishments that in some cases are indefinite, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in which both China and Japan are parties, excluding Taiwan. The Law of the Sea regulations cannot easily be applied to the Pinnacles controversy due to the particular undersea geology of the East China Sea. The main difficulty is that the. 政治大 driving the parties to prove 立 and proclaim exclusive maritime rights over a series of Pinnacle Islands controversy definitely has been aggravated by Law of the Sea,. ‧ 國. 學. insignificant islets with eminent natural recourses attached.. In relation to the historical facts and evidences, Hiromichi Moteki [31] and. ‧. Yutaka Takahana [37] explain the antecedents, chronological events, economic, and political developments of how Japan achieved sovereignty over the Pinnacle Islands.. y. Nat. sit. They argue that since 1895 the Pinnacle Islands have been legally seized as Japanese. al. er. io. territory under the principles of International Public Law for occupation, and. n. acquisition. Since then, no objections to Japanese sovereignty over the Pinnacle. Ch. i n U. v. Islands were raised by Qing Dynasty when it ruled in China, later neither by the. engchi. succeeding governments of the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. In other words, none of the Chinese governments claimed sovereignty over the islands for more than half a century. In fact, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan – Formosa) recognized the Pinnacle Islands as Japanese territory several times. Nevertheless, during the second half of 1971, the Republic of China and then the People’s Republic of China abruptly began to raise claims for the Pinnacles as their own territory. It was most likely because a survey conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) informed the possible existence of undersea deposits of natural gas and oil in the Pinnacle Islands’ neighboring waters.. 14.

(17) Furthermore, Satoshi Hara [38], Hiromichi Moteki [31], and Yutaka Takahana [37] provide and illustrate five pieces of irrefutable evidence that prove Chinese recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Pinnacle Islands: the letter of gratitude from the Chinese Consul in Nagasaki (1920); the People’s Daily newspaper article, which was revised by the Communist Party of China (January 8th, 1953); the World Atlas map issued by the Beijing Map Publishing Co. in 1960; the World Atlas, Vol. 1: The Nations of East Asia published jointly by the National Defense Studies Institute and the Chinese Institute for Geoscience (both located in Taiwan) in 1965; and the classified map made by the People’s Republic of China in 1969 (from the Washington Times, September 15th, 2010 edition). In all those pieces of evidence, the Pinnacles are displayed with the Japanese name and located inside the Japan maritime territory.. 政治大 and Steven W. Su [4] support 立 the historical claims held simultaneously by China and. On the other hand, Hungdah Chiu [39], Zhongqi Pan [40], Han-yi Shaw [14],. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan. They stress that China has demonstrated enough evidence to assert sovereignty over the Pinnacles before Japan did. These authors cited early Chinese records of the Pinnacle Islands made during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), as well. ‧. as maps indicating that the islands were annexed into the Ming Dynasty and Qing. y. Nat. Dynasty (1644–1911) maritime natural barriers. They also mention that according to. io. sit. Imperial records, Chinese sailors discovered and described in detail the geographical. n. al. er. characteristics of the Pinnacles. At that time, the islands were used as navigational. i n U. v. shelters and Chinese fishermen frequently visited there. Afterwards, China integrated. Ch. engchi. the islands into its maritime defenses in 1556.. Additionally, China and Taiwan claim their usage of the islands to plant herbs for medicinal purposes. They also mention that a couple of Japanese scholars have recognized the Pinnacle Islands as a part of China based on the historical records. Subsequently, according to Zhongqi Pan [40] and Steven W. Su [4] the First SinoJapanese War involved the sovereignty transfer of the Pinnacle Islands to the Japanese government. Thereby, Japan should have given up the Pinnacles’ sovereignty after the end of the World War II. These authors stress that Pinnacles had been under China’s administration and jurisdiction as a part of Taiwan before Japanese occupied the islands.. 15.

(18) On the contrary, John Tkacik [41] proposes a critical analysis over the Pinnacles dispute. He examines the parties’ positions and evidence as well as how their unstable domestic and foreign politics have begun to deteriorate their relationship in some spheres. John Tkacik [41] remarks that China’s claims are unreliable, contradictory, and inappropriate. In addition, China has constantly pressured Japan and Japan’s allies for their own interests. Beijing indirectly provokes Tokyo, and it certainly welcomes the Taiwan’s sovereignty claims over the Pinnacles. At this point, China tries to stimulate the dispute not only by its own but as a matter of Chinese overseas interest. It seems that Beijing’s strategy is to isolate Japan from its allies by putting them against it. In this sense, the Pinnacles controversy jeopardizes the friendship between. 政治大 relationship. The role 立 of the United States’ policy in the region could diminish the Japan and Taiwan. It also has a potential in draining the Japan-U.S. strategic. ‧ 國. 學. tension between China and Japan as well as maintaining the interests of the U.S. in the long run. John Tkacik [41] deduces that it would not be beneficial if Washington lets Beijing vacuum its power in East Asia. The standing points of the Japan-U.S.. ‧. Security Treaty are clear regarding the Japanese administration of the Pinnacle Islands.. y. Nat. Washington would be more consistent in the Pinnacles dispute as an ally of Japan if it. n. al. er. io. sit. takes its obligations and asserts a firm foreign policy in the region.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 16.

(19) CHAPTER TWO 2. Background and development of the dispute. 2.1.. Bases of controversy In the International Public Law realm, territorial conflicts can be analyzed in. terms sovereign entitlements over territorial borders, islands, atolls, and coral reefs. On the other hand, a controversy of maritime sovereignty is a divergence of exclusive rights over the waters, particularly Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) as expressed in. 政治大 covers the exclusive rights based on the geological characteristics. These conventions 立 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS. acknowledged the different maritime zones where coastal Nation-States may use their. ‧ 國. 學. rights to exercise their sovereign power or exploit natural resources as they convene [29, 20, 42, 40, 13, 16].. ‧. 1) Territorial sea is the sea line that is contiguous to a State’s coast. The. Nat. sit. y. Territorial Sea may prologue to 12 miles (approx. 20 kilometers) from the coast. In. io. er. this sea line the State may exercise full sovereignty over the sea, undersea, and overflight. 2) Contiguous zone is defined as the adjacent area to the territorial sea of a. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Nation-State. In this zone the State cannot exercise complete sovereignty, but it may. engchi. enforce its authority to prevent law infringements as well as exercise its regulations and sanitary controls in its territorial sea. This zone may extend up to 24 miles (approx. 38 kilometers) from the coast. 3) Exclusive Economic Zone is the State sea line up to 200 miles (approx. 322 kilometers) from its coast. In this zone the NationState is allowed to implement sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil. 4) Continental shelf is the natural prolongation of a Nation-State coast to the continental margin’s external edge, in this area a State may control and exploit its natural resources. The continental shelf cannot surpass the 350 miles (approx. 515 kilometers) from the coast. 5) Equidistance principle is endorsed to the UNCLOS in order to settle maritime disputes, in which the frontier of neighboring coastal States overlaps with a contiguous continental shelf, as in the Pinnacles case. This principle remarks that Nation-States’ maritime 17.

(20) boundaries should adopt a median line equidistant from the neighboring States’ shores. In this way, neighboring coastal States may exploit natural resources more equitable [19, 29, 42, 30, 43, 44, 13, 16]. Differing from internal waters, Nation-States do not have complete sovereign rights in maritime zones under their jurisdiction, as they must exercise the freedom of passage and transit to foreign ships and over-flight. However, there are some limitations concerning to the foreign navigation and over-flights. For instance, foreign ships have the right to navigate the territorial sea of a coastal State; excluding internal waters. The passage of foreign ships must be “innocent in nature”; which means that it should not disturb peace, order, or security of the coastal State. Moreover, every coastal Nation-State may impose different regulations on its territorial sea, which. 政治大 allowed with the authorization 立 of the coastal Nation-State [29, 44].. foreign ships must follow. Likewise, over-flying of foreign aircrafts will be only. ‧ 國. 學. It is important to mention that maritime sovereignty cannot be used to demand a territory; while territorial sovereignty is able to claim maritime rights. Thereby,. ‧. maritime sovereignty is more susceptible than territorial sovereignty. To some extent, maritime disputes tend to be less precarious than territorial ones [20, 13]. However, it. y. Nat. sit. is less probable to reach a total cooperation even in maritime sovereignty claims. er. io. among China, Japan, and Taiwan due to the economic interests that are compromised into the Pinnacles’ territorial sovereignty dispute. In addition, UNCLOS states that the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. EEZ and continental shelf rights may be proclaimed only in habitable islands with. engchi. upheld economic life. Therefore, the rights may not be exercised on uninhabited islets. However, these conditions of habitability and economic viability are not totally compulsory, and in most of the cases, islands or islets tend to be used to acquire a larger EEZ or extend the resources of continental shelves [20]. Another point is that International Public Law urges the legal demonstration of sovereignty for territorial acquisition, and it denunciates Nation-States for incurring occupation of a territory in a neighboring State, especially between competitors as China and Japan. When territorial disputes are sustain in a context of fever nationalist as in the Pinnacles case, asserting sovereignty is more possible than reaching an arrangement. Additionally, the deficiency of the International Customary Law simultaneously permits the parties to appeal international legal norms, which in 18.

(21) almost all cases are taken to complement their own benefits, yet deterring the parties for attempting to solve the controversy under more impartial legal bases. Therefore, ambiguity of the existing legal principles has allowed China, Japan, and Taiwan to justify their sovereignty claims by referring to International Public Law in order to assert sovereignty over the Pinnacles. Nonetheless, neither party has expressed their willingness to take the controversy to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Furthermore, the periodical frictions and confrontations by Chinese and Japanese over the dispute notably deject the ICJ mediation [13]. This is how the International Public Law has shown ineffectiveness in order to solve prominent disputes in which natural resources are involved, as in the Pinnacles case. Another difficulty here is that the all involved parties must concordantly submit. 政治大 agree in allowing the 立 ICJ to determine the final judgment of the dispute, the trial. the controversy to the ICJ’s resolution. In other words, if one of the parties does not. ‧ 國. 學. cannot be led. Moreover, if one of the involved States does not adhere to the final sentence, the other parties may present the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). At this point, the controversy can remain unsolved, if any of the. ‧. five permanent members of UNSC decides to obstruct a further initiative [45]. Hence,. y. Nat. China as a member of the Security Council is able to arbitrarily veto4 any instance or. io. sit. even the final resolution over the Pinnacle Islands. Another crucial point is that Japan. n. al. er. and especially China do not recognize Taiwan as a Nation-State. In fact, Taiwan is no. i n U. v. longer a member of the UN. Therefore, it cannot be represented as a legal party over a. Ch. engchi. territorial controversy under the ICJ [24, 42].. Regarding the Pinnacles’ sovereignty dispute, an essential legal matter is who initially discovered and occupied the islands. In a particular case of uninhabited territories, historical, geological, and geographical evidence does not necessarily constitute a valid claim to assert sovereignty. In fact, international judicial and arbitral bodies have often based their resolution on discovery along with occupation to solve uninhabited territorial disputes. Primarily, China claims that the Pinnacles have been a. 4. China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In addition, there are ten non-permanent members, who are elected by the United Nations General Assembly for a two-year period; non-permanent members are not eligible for immediate re-election. Each Council member has one vote. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the fifteen members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including and concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is the rule of “great power unanimity”, usually referred to as the “veto power” [124].. 19.

(22) part of China based on historical records; while Japan sustains that the Pinnacles were terra nullius5, before it annexed them to its territory. Certainly, during 1885 to 1895 the Japanese authorities did not find any evidence of human settlements [19, 36, 46]. However, by means of Customary International Law, which is considered a source of International Public Law, the discovery per se is not enough to declare the sovereignty principle over a territory. A proper sovereign designation can be only achieved throughout an effective demonstration of intent to occupy a territory. This action is known as animus occupandi in International Public Law [13]. The effectiveness of sovereignty can be understood under two principles: the intention to act as a sovereign power and the real exercise of sovereign control or authority. International courts and arbitrators have also acknowledged different. 政治大 instances, minimal levels 立of government activity can be justified in less populated or. degrees of governmental action are applicable to different kinds of territory. In some. ‧ 國. 學. uninhabited areas. Moreover, several governmental acts have been recognized as indication or effectiveness degree of sovereignty: patrolling by military or law enforcement bodies, granting scientific surveys or studies, regulating trade,. ‧. investigating criminal activity, maintaining jurisdiction, registering certificates of. y. Nat. property, building infrastructure, conducting census registry, upholding navigational. io. sit. markers, exploiting natural resources, or engaging in any other economic activity. In. al. er. those aspects, only governmental intervention can be appealed as evidence of. n. v i n Ch U substantial even though it is regulated In light of International e n gbyc the h i government.. sovereignty. Private commercial initiatives by national citizens might not be. Public Law, sovereignty over a territory may be also acquired through the principle of. cession, whereby the sovereign title is conveyed from one State to another by a treaty or agreement [44, 13]. China, Japan, and Taiwan have been immersed in several territorial disputes since the end of World War II. Although these controversies are not related directly to the Pinnacles issue, the China’s, Japan’s, and Taiwan’s positions in other divergences can influence how these nations act in their own territorial disputes. For example, China is still struggling in the internal disputes in Xinjiang and Tibet among others provinces besides the endless dilemma about Taiwan’s political status and their 5 In Latin, “Land belonging to nobody”. The term is used in Customary Intentional Law as a territory belonged to no sovereign power or nation [13].. 20.

(23) reciprocal counterclaims of other territorial disputes [20]. The Chinese government claims Taiwan as its inherent territory even though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never ruled in Taiwan, and the island has exercised all conditions of a proper State for over six decades. Furthermore, the Chinese irredentism has caused tensions with India and Bhutan over land borders, as well as with South East Asian countries and Taiwan concerning the Paracel and Spratly Islands, in which maritime rights in the South China Sea are included [40, 47]. Although China has claimed several territories against its neighbors since 1949, in most of the cases natural resources are involved, the CCP has kept the majority of these disputes within certain passive means [20]. Meanwhile, Taiwan still maintains its position, stressing its sovereignty over. 政治大 ROC has released several 立reports and evidence concerning its sovereign power over. the Paracel and Spratly Islands as well as the South China Sea basin. Since 1947, the. ‧ 國. 學. those claims. In 1995, regardless of the persistent territorial claims made by China and South East Asian countries, the ROC government, now established in Taiwan, started to develop infrastructure in the Spratly island of Itu Aba. It is important to. ‧. remark that the Taiwanese government does not intend to assert its sovereignty by. sit. y. Nat. force over the islands, islets, and reefs of the South China Sea [48].. al. er. io. Simultaneously, Japan still faces the consequences of the ambiguity from post-. n. World War II arrangements with its neighbors. Since 1945, Japan and the Russian. Ch. i n U. v. Federation have disputed the sovereignty of the Northern Territories (Chishima Retto. engchi. for Japanese or Kurile Islands for Russians), which have been occupied by Russia since the end of the World War II. In addition, Japan demands sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima in Japanese or Dokdo in Korean), which are currently administrated by South Korea [20, 42, 49, 11, 40, 50]. The Chinese and Japanese governments are also in conflict in two other maritime sovereignty arguments. The one refers to the extension of maritime rights in the East China Sea. In order to ease tensions over the maritime rights of the area with China, Japan has tried to reach an agreement in mutual development of the gas fields. Curiously, Japanese firms invested in the Chinese gas and oil extraction projects in the zone [47]. In 2008, both nations tentatively decided to jointly develop the Shirakaba (Chunxiao in Mandarin) undersea gas field (see Appendix, Figure 4). 21.

(24) Nonetheless, this agreement is unsettled and it is ambiguous regarding to the mutual communication for the activities in the overlapping zone [51, 22]. This became evident when a group of Chinese vessels organized undersea surveys without the prior notification to the Japanese government. In order not to compromise the previous accords, the Japan’s Foreign Ministry did not officially disapprove the incident [29]. Previously in 1992, China approved the “Law on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas of the People’s Republic of China.” Six years later, China promulgated a “Law on Economic Waters and the Continental Shelf,” and in 2001, the “Law on Management and Use of Sea Areas.” Throughout these edicts, China has bolstered its intentions to secure its economic interests across the East China Sea and South China Sea. The zone claimed by China here is extensive; it contemplates. 政治大 conveying within the adjacent 立 Pinnacles waters [17, 19, 13, 16, 47].. 800,000 square kilometers, of which about 20,000 square kilometers of EEZ are. ‧ 國. 學. In the particular case of the East China Sea, the Chinese government has constantly refused Japan’s attempts to recognize that “joint development” in the. ‧. Shirakaba/Chunxiao field is based on Japanese maritime sovereignty entitlement. Japan declares that the EEZ median line of demarcation, which is based on the. y. Nat. sit. equidistance principle, should determine the maritime rights in those waters. While. al. er. io. China insists on their demands to the continental shelf principle, this prerogative. n. technically extends Chinese sovereignty to Taiwan, the Pinnacles, and to the whole. Ch. i n U. v. Shirakaba/Chunxiao gas field as well as other developing areas [35, 17, 52, 19, 53, 54,. engchi. 43, 40, 34, 51]. Although neither Japan nor Taiwan had established official negotiations over the Pinnacles sovereignty, previously both governments initiated an informal exchange of views concerning to the exploration of the natural resources in the East China Sea. In fact, the Japanese government also proposed that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan should cooperate in developing the undersea resources of the East China Sea without affecting their respective maritime claims [39, 24, 19, 29, 16]. The continental shelf principle and the median line equidistant are validated by the UNCLOS. However, the International Court of Justice normally does not rely on the continental shelf or other geological features to solve territorial disputes except the median line equidistant principle. This characteristic advocates that the Pinnacles controversy should not be depended on substantial deliberations based on geological 22.

(25) characteristics [38, 55]. Despite the negotiations, the Japanese leaders are indignant because the Chinese allegation in this issue will permit to extend its maritime rights and even extract natural gas and oil from the Japanese EEZ [34, 16]. This argument is different from the Pinnacles’ controversy, in which only territorial sovereignty over the islands is involved but maritime sovereignty is not. The second argument is centered over Okinotori-shima, a coral reef that remains more than 1,740 kilometers to the east of Tokyo. Although China does not demand sovereignty over the reef, it has objected that the Japanese can establish a larger EEZ in the West Pacific Sea. China claims that Japan cannot appeal for an EEZ in neighboring waters under UNCLOS because Okinotori-shima is a coral reef and not an island [19, 20, 56, 33]. Despite the fact that the United States does not intend to assert claims to any. 政治大 an important actor in East 立Asia. Therefore, the positions of the U.S. in these conflicts. of the territories disputed by China, Japan, and Taiwan, the United States remains as. ‧ 國. 學. are based on a complex multilateral relationship. Indeed, the foreign policy of the Washington can indirectly affect the development of the Pinnacles controversy as well as its ties with Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo. Basically, the United States’ policies. ‧. toward the Pinnacle Islands are centered on impartial terms for a decisive sovereignty. y. Nat. judgment, and also with the maintenance of a peaceful resolution that avoids the use. n. al. Ch. er. io. the Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty:. sit. of force. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that the Pinnacles fall in the scope of. i n U. v. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security [57].6. engchi. Since the Pinnacle Islands are under Japanese administration, the United States is committed to militarily support Japan if China or Taiwan ever takes the disputed islands by force [18, 19, 20, 16]. After days of the Chinese fishing boat incident, the. 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America," 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. [Accessed 7 July 2011].. 23.

(26) declaration of the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was quite positive to the Japanese administration over the Pinnacle Islands’ and its relation concerning to the Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Afterwards, the U.S. Department of State later expressed, “any territorial dispute over these islands should be solved by the parties involved” [58].. 2.2.. Overview of the involved parties’ positions and claims 2.2.1. China’s prerogatives. 政治大 assertive article on Beijing Review, accusing the Japanese intransigent efforts to “steal” 立 China’s resources along with South Korea and the ROC government, what they The PRC semi-officially first stated its position over the Pinnacles in an. ‧ 國. 學. referred as “Chiang Kai-shek’s gang.” The CCP also denunciated the U.S. Imperialism and the Japanese government pursuing excuses for incorporating the. ‧. Pinnacles as well as surrounding waters to Japan’s territory. Afterwards, on December. y. Nat. 30th, 1971, an official statement was made by the PRC Foreign Ministry accusing Sato,. sit. the then-Prime Minister of Japan, for ignoring the historical facts that indicated. al. er. io. China’s ownership over the Pinnacle Islands. The PRC also disapproved the. v i n which annexed and invadedCthe to the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, U h islets. i e n gRegarding h c the United States arbitrarily included the Pinnacle Islands sovereignty transfer. The n. collaboration of the U.S. to relinquish the Pinnacles’ administrative rights with Japan,. CCP affirmed that this was a major infringement upon China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and Chinese people would not tolerate this action [39, 40, 14]. The PRC official statement claims that Chinese first discovered the Pinnacles before the Japanese did. According to China during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the Japanese “stole” the Pinnacle Islands. Furthermore, in April 1895 the Meiji government forced the Qing Dynasty to conclude the war through the unequal “Treaty of Shimonoseki” by which Taiwan, together with all islands belonged to Taiwan along with Penghu Islands (the Pescadores) were ceded. The PRC also underlines that after World War II, the Japanese government illegally handed over the Pinnacles to the United States. As a result, the U.S. illicitly enjoyed “administrative rights” over 24.

(27) these islands. Moreover, the Chinese government affirms that the American and Japanese governments have once again made an illegal transfer between themselves regarding to the Pinnacle Islands sovereignty through the Okinawa Reversion Treaty on June 17th, 1971. According to the CCP, the United States and Japan cannot alter the Chinese sovereignty [59, 42, 56, 40, 14, 23]. At least, the Chinese leaders emotionally stressed that the PRC would recover and liberate Taiwan and all territories belonged to China, including the Pinnacles and other islands [39].. 2.2.2. Taiwan’s prerogatives. 治政 indicated that in 1943 the Republic of China (now大 in Taiwan), the United States, and 立Allied Powers) jointly proclaimed the Cairo Declaration and the United Kingdom (the. On July 1st, 1971, Taiwan’s official statement to claim the Pinnacle Islands. ‧ 國. 學. the subsequent Potsdam Declaration in 1945. Under those stipulations, the Allied Powers indicated that Japan’s sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu,. ‧. Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as they determine. Therefore, the Ryukyu Islands sovereignty should be established by the Allied Powers. Afterwards,. Nat. sit. y. based on these accords the Peace Treaty with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty) was. io. er. signed on September 8th, 1951. The Article III of this treaty has a legal connotation regarding the sovereignty status of the Ryukyu Islands and their future stances that. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. previously had been agreed on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations.. engchi. In this matter, Taiwan affirms that as the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations were arranged among the Allied Powers, the final disposition of the Ryukyu should have been consulted to the ROC government as the ROC forces had fought against the Japanese during the World War II [60]. The ROC strongly opposes to the U.S. unilateral sovereignty transfer of the Pinnacle Islands along with the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. According to the ROC leaders, based on the geographical location, geological structure, historical association, and long term use of the citizens of Taiwan, the Pinnacles have been associated to Taiwan and constituted a part of the Republic of China domain. Therefore, it is the obligation of the ROC government to safeguard its national integrity and territory [39, 60, 14].. 25.