美國、臺灣與中國大陸之專利侵權民事損害賠償實證研究

科技法學評論，6 卷 1 期，頁 1（2009）

專題：智慧財產保護實證研究

美國、台灣與中國大陸之

專利侵權民事損害賠償實證研究

*

王俊凱

a1

_、王文杰

a2

_、李友根

a3

陳群顯

a4

、陳建宏

a5

、劉尚志

a6

摘 要

本文針對專利侵權損害賠償制度之設計及實務上所採行的計算，進行實

證研究，用以檢視制度之實施，並對相關現象提供解釋。

美國、台灣與中國大陸的法律與法院，在損害賠償計算的原理上相近，

但在實務運作上有相當大之落差，其關鍵在於訴訟當事人對損害舉證的要求

與法院採信的程度而定。美國專利訴訟判決自 1980 年至 2000 年之間，以所

失利益（lost profit）為主要的計算方式（83%）。然而，自 2000 年以降，採

* 本文增修前曾以「美國、台灣與中國大陸之專利侵權民事損害賠償實證研究」發表 於 2008 第三屆全國法學實證學術研討會，劉尚志、王俊凱、李友根、陳群顯、陳建 宏、王文杰，第三屆全國法學實證學術研討會論文集，頁 3-42，交通大學科技法律 研究所，新竹，2008 年 5 月。 投稿日：2008 年 12 月 15 日；採用日：2009 年 1 月 28 日 a1 _{國立交通大學科技法律研究所博士班研究生、台灣科技法學會秘書長。} a2 _{國立交通大學科技法律研究所副教授兼所長、中國法制中心主任。} a3 _{中國南京大學法學院院長。} a4 _{國立交通大學科技法律研究所博士候選人、瑞智法律事務所合夥律師。} a5 _{國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士班研究生、精曜科技股份有限公司經理。} a6 _{國立交通大學科技法律研究所教授、台灣科技法學會理事長。}

－ 1 －

用合理權利金（reasonable royalty）之案件反而成為主流（65%）。台灣現行

所採的「差額說」與「利益說」，因為舉證不易，司法實務上過份倚重證據

來源與客觀性，賠償數額也有偏低的情形。中國大陸的判決則幾乎都是由法

官依據法定範圍酌定其賠償額度。

本文之結論為：1.專利糾紛的損害賠償，在不同管轄範圍內，由於法院

的經驗、專利權利範圍與市場影響的不確定，以及產業經濟與企業財務的基

礎環境差異，而有不同的判決。美國法院的經驗與財經基礎環境都較為成

熟，判決較具說服力；台灣與中國大陸的法院對於當事人之舉證，通常認為

未能達到足以確信的程度；2.負舉證責任的一方，對於證據被法院採信的機

率難以確定，以及財務與經營資料作為證據之提出，有洩漏營業秘密之顧

慮，因此縱然所失利益之計算可以期待較高之賠償金額，因而實務上傾向以

市場中通常之交易情形，例如美國的合理權利金，或兩岸由法院酌定之賠償

額；3.台灣與大陸以小額損害賠償為絕大多數，高額損害賠償非常少見，裁

定的金額有偏低的現象；4.大陸對於發明專利損害賠償之判決數量極其有

限，以國內廠商間之實用新型及設計專利侵害之案件為絕大多數。外國廠商

的專利訴訟則以市場的佔有為主要考量，包括以行政查處及邊境保護防制侵

權產品的內國與國際銷售，並非以取得法院酌定之賠償為其訴訟之目的。

關鍵字：實證研究、專利侵權、專利訴訟、損害賠償、所失利益、合

理權利金

Cite as: 6 Tech. L. Rev., Apr. 2009, at 1.

An Empirical Study on the Damage Award of

Patent Infringement in the U.S.,

Taiwan and China

Jun-Kai Wang, Wen-Chieh Wang, Yau-Kan Lee,

Chun-Hsien Chen, Chien-Hung Chen, Shang-Jyh Liu

Abstract

This paper performs an empirical study on the regulatory frameworks and

prac-tical measures of the court decisions of patent damages among US, Taiwan and

China.

The basic principles employed in assessing patent damages seem similar among

the above jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the outcomes of court decisions vary

signifi-cantly due to the burden and standard of proofs of losses suffered by the patentees.

Since 2000, the approach of reasonable royalty has overtaken the lost profit as the

dominant measure of damage awards in the U.S. 65% of awarded damages were

based on the measure of reasonable royalty, as contrast to 83% of lost profits

dur-ing 1980 to 2000. It is also found that the difficulties of provdur-ing the amount of

ac-tual loss of patentees, as well as the cause-effect relationship directly caused by the

infringing conducts, the damages decided by the courts of Taiwan and China are in

general much lower than expected. In China, most of the compensations are

determined with the statutory damages ranged from RMB 5,000 to 500,000, and

more than 98% are lower than RMB 300,000.

It is concluded that: (1) Court decisions indicate the differences of the legal

in-frastructures, the experience of judges, the enforceability of patent types and

mar-ket structures among different jurisdictions. The U.S. courts are more inclined to

recognize the evidences on a relatively broad and reasonable basis, nevertheless,

the courts of Taiwan and China are considered less experienced in such decisions.

(2) The party bearing the burden of proof finds the uncertainty of convincing

evi-dence and also the risk of disclosing proprietary information, thus it results that the

damages are primarily statutory provisions in China. Furthermore, Taiwan’s courts

tend to utilize objective, though may not be proper, financial data as the base for

damage measures. (3) Small damages are commonly granted in the courts of

Tai-wan and China. (4) In China, most of the patent lawsuits occurred among domestic

companies with the new model and design patents, only very limited cases are

as-sociated with invention patents. So far as most international firms are concerned,

instead of seeking monetary compensations, their litigations are mainly focused on

acquiring the market shares by preventing the distribution of infringing products in

China, and in the meantime, reducing the exportation of infringing products from

China. It therefore leads to the frequent use of administrative enforcement,

injunc-tions and boarder measures, in lieu of the damage claims in the judicial courts.

Keywords: empirical study, patent infringement, patent litigation,

1. 前言與研究方法

專利權是國家基於獎勵發明人揭露其創造與發明之目的，賦予其在一定

期間內享有一定範圍的獨占權

1

。任何人未經專利權人同意或授權或未有任何

阻 卻 侵 權 事 由 而 實 施 專 利 權 利 範 圍 （ claim ） 所 構 成 之 標 的 （ subject

matter），將構成專利權之侵害，專利權人除得請求排除侵害，並得請求損

害賠償（compensatory damages）。

損害賠償之功能在於「彌補」與「填平」受害人（權利人）之損害，不

足或過度賠償皆不妥適。賠償受害人「所受損害」及「所失利益」成為損害

賠償的基本法則。亦即，「有所損失，斯有賠償」是請求損害賠償之基本原

則。

任何人未經專利權人同意而實施專利權利範圍所構成之標的，將構成專

利權之侵害。專利權人除能請求排除侵害，並得請求損害賠償；受害人並需

證明其請求之損害賠償與侵權有關。

專利權與其他智慧財產權之性質不同：專利技術從概念產生到產品的製

造、修改、量產，乃至於產品的行銷，皆需投入相當的心力與資源。侵權人

所能獲得之利益不全然來自於專利技術，亦有可能來自於侵權人本身之市場

開發、行銷能力、對產品或專利技術增附功能，或將專利技術用於不同產業

或產品上。侵權人所投入之心力與資源所創造之市場效果，有時遠大於專利

技術本身，而這些資源與努力難以用金錢來予以衡量；至於商標、著作、外

觀設計等其他智慧財產之權利人或侵權人所得之利益，則是直接反射於顧客

1 專利權人所擁有之獨占權一般認為是消極之排他權，例如台灣專利法（2003 年 2 月 6 日修正公布）第 56 條第 1 項規定：「物品專利權人，除本法另有規定者 外，專有排除他人未經其同意而製造、販賣、使用或為上述目的而進口該物品之 權。」；第 2 項：「方法專利權人，除本法另有規定者外，專有排除他人未經其 同意而使用該方法及使用、販賣或為上述目的而進口該方法直接製成物品之 權。」

對商品外在的表徵、型態或呈現之感受。此類智慧財產權被侵害的結果，往

往造成附有該智慧財產之商品（標示商標之產品、具有原創性之著作，或具

有新式外觀設計之產品）使用或銷售減少，因此以侵權人的利益直接作為損

害賠償，較無爭議。

美國專利制度發展至今已逾二百年，相關案例判決內容多且精闢，法官

在各個案例所作成之判決，往往促成專利制度之改革，而學術論著探討亦甚

為豐富。這些判決與論著皆可作為研究台灣專利法之借鏡；此外，美國為科

技大國，專利保護措施完善，其所建立之專利制度往往影響其他國家。因

此，本文首先由比較研究法觀點，瞭解美國專利制度在損害賠償規範上之最

新動態，從理論與實務方面比較美國與台灣及中國大陸在專利損害賠償之相

關規定與見解之差異，進而說明現行專利法在損害賠償相關規定上之問題與

爭議。

其次，本文針對現階段專利侵權損害賠償制度設計與促進產業研發、競

爭之角度著手，檢視制度設計中法院判決與當事人認知落差之原因，分析法

院、專利權人、潛在侵權行為人間因此一制度設計所面臨之困擾與不利益，

並以實證研究探討美國、台灣與中國大陸地區法院關於專利侵權訴訟中對於

損害賠償的判決，觀察目前法院判決中所採取的原則以及所面臨的難題，並

試圖針對相關現象提供合理解釋。

本研究所蒐集之資料類型包括兩大部分：

1.美國、台灣與中國大陸之專利侵權相關法院之判決資料，以及

2.與中國大陸南京地區司法實務法官及律師、學界人士之座談討論。

本文採取下列三種法學實證研究方法

2

，並簡述研究過程如下：

2 關於法學實證研究方法，參劉尚志、林三元、宋皇志，「法學實證研究之發展：詮 釋 法 學 的 侷 限 與 突 破 」 ， 第 一 屆 全 國 法 學 實 證 研 究 研 討 會 論 文 集 ， 頁 3-39 （2006）。

1.1 量化研究

在選取一段期間或主要地區之法院判決文書原始資料或援引其他研究之

二手資料後，使用社會科學之統計方法進行分析，以獲取量化研究之結果，

進而驗證學說，甚至質疑或推翻假說。

美國訴訟資料之統計係引用由會計事務所 PricewaterhouseCoopers 所做

的 2007 年專利與商標案件之損害賠償調查報告中，選自 1980 年起至 2006 年

6 月間的 2,193 件聯邦地方法院訴訟案件以及 350 件聯邦巡迴上訴法院訴訟案

件作為分析對象。研究美國之專利侵權案件數、損害賠償金額、原告勝訴

率、專利管轄法院間之原告勝訴率、專利損害賠償計算方法等議題。

台灣訴訟案件資料統計是以司法院之「法學資料檢索系統」資料庫為研

究範圍，針對已公開在資料庫所有地方法院判決進行檢索，檢索時間設定在

1999 年 8 月 1 日起至 2008 年 3 月 31 日為止，首先篩選出關於專利侵權訴訟

中，原告聲明損害賠償請求之案件，計 430 件，其中 331 件係駁回原告之

訴，僅 99 件全部或一部准許原告損害賠償訴訟之請求。研究台灣之專利侵權

案件類別、損害賠償金額、原告勝訴率、專利損害賠償計算方法、舉證責任

等議題。

中國大陸之訴訟案件統計，係以最高人民法院之「中國知識產權裁判文

書網」資料庫為研究範圍，針對已公開在資料庫所有法院判決進行檢索，閱

讀判決之時間範圍為 2007 年 11 月 1 日起至 2008 年 4 月 28 日為止，共計

400 篇。包含中國大陸各主要地區中級法院與高等法院對專利侵權案件所作

之判決與裁定。研究資料庫記錄判決之管轄法院、當事人國籍、專利類型、

背景事實、原告之請求、判決摘要、法院判賠金額依據、賠償金、被告是否

舉發專利無效等內容。

1.2 質性分析

質性分析透過研究者與受訪者之間的對話以蒐集資料並檢驗作者的先驗

觀察，從而認識問題及瞭解問題。

本文撰寫過程中，經過與三位中國大陸之南京高級、中級人民法院專庭

法官，三位訴訟實務律師、一位國家知識產權局專利審查員，以及南京大學

法學院教授們舉行關於專利侵權損害賠償座談會，共同討論美國、台灣與中

國大陸之專利侵權損害賠償制度與實際判決現狀，並比較三地實際專利技術

類型與水準、案件當事人、賠償金額之計算方式、舉證責任與法官心證形成

之考量因素等議題。

同時，本文撰稿期間適逢中國大陸專利法於 2008 年 12 月 27 日完成第

三次修正，對條款順序作相應調整，重新公布

3

。是以，本文有關中國大陸專

利法之條號悉依新法為依歸。

1.3 模型化研究

模型化研究一般是先以理論建構出一個模型或公式，再以量化之資料輸

入或驗證該模型或公式，藉以印證或修正之。

本文依據現行專利侵權損害賠償的體系及制度設計，試圖以促進訴訟經

濟及提高法院判決可預測性以降低社會成本作為核心基準，建構出符合「訴

3 中國大陸專利法第三次修正，在 2008 年 8 月全國人大常委會進行第一次審議，並於 2008 年 12 月 27 日完成修正。隨著中國以及國際形勢的發展，中國大陸專利法律制 度確有進一步完善之必要：一是中國大陸為提高自主創新能力、建設創新型國家的 目標，國務院制定《國家知識產權戰略綱要》。為此，需要通過修改、完善專利 法，進一步加強對專利權的保護，激勵自主創新，促進專利技術的實施，推動專利 技術向現實生產力轉化，縮短轉化週期。二是世界貿易組織多哈部長級會議通過了 《關於與貿易有關的知識產權協定與公共健康的宣言》，同時世界貿易組織總理事 會通過了《修改與貿易有關的知識產權協定議定書》。《宣言》和《議定書》允許 世貿組織成員突破《與貿易有關的知識產權協定》的限制，在規定條件下給予實施 藥品專利的強制許可。據此，需要對現行專利法做必要修改。三是《生物多樣性公 約》對利用專利制度保護遺傳資源做了規定，中國作為遺傳資源大國，需要通過修 改現行專利法，行使該公約賦予的權利。 專利法修正草案全文及說明，請參見中國人大網：http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/ zlfxzaca/2008-08/29/content_1448023.htm（最後點閱時間：2008 年 12 月 29 日）。

訟經濟」之立法目的，同時推論在追求社會成本極小化之前提下，法院如何

搭配民事訴訟法中相關證據法則、證據妨礙對他造主張事實之推定，以及法

院於認定困難審酌相關情狀後自行獲得心證等方式，修正對專利侵權損害賠

償之計算。

2. 美國對專利權損害賠償之計算

美國現行專利法關於損害賠償僅規定：一旦法院判決原告（claimant）

勝訴時，應該判給原告 1.足以彌補其被侵害之賠償，該賠償不得少於侵權人

使用該發明之合理權利金，以及 2.法院所確定的利息和訴訟費用

4

。美國最高

法院在 General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.案中表示，該損害賠償之規定是完

全賠償專利權人所受之任何損害

5

。

2.1 所失利益判斷準則

美國最高法院在 Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.

案中表示，損害賠償是彌補專利權人因被侵害而遭受之金錢損失（pecuniary

loss），不論侵權人是否獲有利益。因此，決定損害賠償所須詢問之問題

是，專利權人因被侵害而遭受之損害有多少，亦即若無侵害發生，專利權人

可以獲得哪些利益

6

。依據美國案例，請求所失利益（lost profits）之損害賠

4

35 U.S.C. § 284, “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant dam-ages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”

5

General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp. 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983), “In 1946 Congress excluded consideration of the infringer’s gain by eliminating the recovery of his profits, …. At the same time, Congress sought to ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full compensation for ‘any damages’ he suffered as a result of the infringement. … Accordingly, Congress expressly provided in § 284 that the court ‘shall award the claimant damages ade-quate to compensate for the infringement.’”

6

償，專利權人必須證明侵權人事實上有對其造成經濟上的損害

7

，也就是「若

無侵害發生，專利權人可以有更多銷售量」之合理可能性

8

，此判斷方式稱為

「若無測試法」（but for test）。因此，當專利產品價格較一般非侵權產品

高，專利權人通常很難證明，若無侵害發生，侵權人之顧客有轉而購買專利

產品之合理可能；專利權人無法負此舉證責任，就不能請求所失利益之損害

賠償。

“But the present statutory rule is that only ‘damages’ may be recovered. These have been defined by this Court as ‘compensation for the pecuniary loss he [the patentee] has suffered from the infringement, without regard to the question whether the defendant has gained or lost by his unlawful acts.’ [citation omitted]. They have been said to constitute ‘the differ-ence between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.’ [citation omitted]. The question to be asked in determining damages is ‘how much had the Patent Holder and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question [is] primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?’ [citation omitted].”

7

See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1996), “To recover lost profits, however, the patent holder must show that the infringer actually caused the economic harm for which the patentee seeks compensation.”

8

See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 21 (Fed. Cir. 1984), “Section 284 does not instruct a court on how to compute damages: the only congressional intent expressed ensures that a claimant receive adequate damages, not less than a reason-able royalty. … Whenever determining the quantum of a damage award adequate to com-pensate a patent holder for infringement, the district court may consider the profits the pat-ent holder lost as a result of the infringempat-ent. In particular, the award of lost profits is proper when it can be demonstrated that ‘but for’ the infringement, the patent holder would have made the sales.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995), “To recover lost profits damages, the patentee must

show a reasonable probability that, ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have made the sales that were made by the infringer.” King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996), “The patent owner bears the burden to pre-sent evidence sufficient to show a reasonable probability that it would have made the as-serted profits absent infringement.”

所失利益係指，專利若未被侵害，專利權人原可得到之利益，而該利益

必須是客觀上的損失，而非推估之可能損失；專利權人不僅需證明有該客觀

上損失的可能性，亦必須證明所失利益的大概額度，惟舉證責任僅須具備優

勢證據（preponderance of evidence）即可

9

。

因 專 利 被 侵 害 得 以 請 求 之 所 失 利 益 的 類 型 有 ： 1. 銷 售 量 損 失 （ lost

sales ） ； 2. 價 格 減 損 （ price erosion ） ； 3. 預 期 利 益 減 少 （ projected lost

profits）；4.商譽的受損（injury to business reputation）；5.額外成本的支出

（increased costs）

10

。專利權人只要證明其降低產品銷售價格或提供折扣，

或原本要提高而沒提高產品價格之原因，是為了與侵權產品競爭，即可獲得

價格減損之損害賠償

11

。專利權人不僅須證明其能提高產品價格，且須證明

有提高產品價格之計畫。因為價格的降低往往會使銷售量增加，從而可能彌

補了價格減損所失利益

12

；相反的，提高產品價格，會使專利權人的顧客轉

9

Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991), “We agree with the district court that the amount of a prevailing party’s damages is a finding of fact on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”

10

J. SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE, § 2.2, at 2-6 (1999).

11

See Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “J-M（侵權 人）argues that Lam（專利權人）did not reduce its prices solely to meet J-M’s competi-tion. The district court, however, found that the market had only two suppliers, and that Lam reduced its prices to meet J-M’s competition. Although there were other competitors in this market, as evidenced by the 1980 reduced-price sales, they were insignificant.” See

also Boesch v. Graff 133 U.S. 697, 706 (1890), “When, however, a plaintiff seeks to

re-cover because he has been compelled to lower his prices to compete with an infringing de-fendant, he must show that his reduction in prices was due solely to the acts of the defen-dant, or to what extent it was due to such acts. There must be some data by which the actual damages may be calculated.”

12

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978), “The district court upheld as not clearly erroneous the master’s finding that: “Any loss in [Pan-duit’s]（專利權人）profits due to the price reduction was more than compensated by the gain in profits due to the increase in plaintiff’s sales volume because of the price reduction.

而購買其他替代產品。因此，在決定價格減損之損害賠償，法院會考慮產品

之交叉彈性需求（elasticity of demand），亦即，提高專利產品價格是否會使

原有顧客轉而購買其他產品，換言之，顧客對產品價格是否相當敏感

13

。相

對 而 言 ， 效 用 較 強 之 專 利 （ strong patent ） 產 品 ， 市 場 力 量 較 高 ， 彈 性

（elasticity）較低，提高產品價格不易影響其需求

14

。專利權人若能證明其專

利產品的交叉彈性需求低，較易請求因侵害所造成價格減損之損害賠償。

未來預期利益之減少係指，專利侵害雖已停止，然專利權人之產品銷售

量與價格，卻因先前專利侵害糾紛而受影響，致使銷售量無法回升至侵害發

生前之水準。由於影響專利權人未來預期利益之因素甚多，包含市場環境因

素、顧客需求的改變，及是否有其他新競爭者加入相關市場，因此美國法院

在考慮是否給予未來預期利益減少之損害賠償，是非常慎重的

15

，而專利權

Thus, the price reduction resulted in a net increase in profit to the plaintiff.”… Having ac-cepted the master’s evaluation, that the testimony of Stahlin’s（侵權人）accounting and economic experts was more credible and persuasive than that of Panduit’s, we are bound, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, to accept as not clearly erroneous the master’s finding that the price reduction in this case produced a net increase in Panduit’s profits.”

13

See BIC Leisure Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993), “The record in this case does not evince a reasonable probability that Windsurf-ing（專利權人）would have made its pro rata share of BIC’s（侵權人）sales had BIC not been in the market. During the period in question, at least fourteen competitors vied for sales in the sailboard market with prices ranging from $ 234 to $ 837. BIC’s boards sold for $ 312 to $ 407; Windsurfing’s boards sold for $ 571 to $ 670…. The record contains untradicted evidence that demand for sailboards is relatively elastic. The record further con-tains uncontradicted evidence that the sailboard market’s entry level, in which BIC com-peted, is particularly sensitive to price disparity. By purchasing BIC sailboards, BIC’s cus-tomers demonstrated a preference for sailboards priced around $ 350, rather than One-Design boards priced around $ 600. Therefore, without BIC in the market, BIC’s customers would have likely sought boards in the same price range.”

14

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 2.15 to § 2.18, at 2-23 to 2-27.

15

人所需負之舉證責任也較其請求實際所失利益時為高。

目前美國法院尚未有一絕對標準，用來決定所失利益之損害賠償計算方

法，惟法院通常採用「若無測試法」。美國第六巡迴上訴法院在 Panduit

Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works 案中建立了四項要素，目前已被廣為使用

作為專利權人得以請求所失利益之損害賠償的測試方法，此方法簡稱為

「Panduit 測試法」

16

。依據此方法，專利權人欲請求所失利益之損害賠償，

應證明在專利侵害期間

17

：

2.1.1 有專利產品之需求量（demand for the patented

prod-uct）

18

顧客對專利產品之需求量是基於專利產品之特徵。專利權人可以藉由下

列證據，說明市場上有專利產品之需求量

19

：1.專利權人商業上的成功，且

該成功與專利發明有關（nexus）；2.專利權人的市場佔有率；3.專利產品在

侵權期間之銷售量；4.侵權人以專利技術特徵作為廣告，吸引顧客，以銷售

侵權產品。

16

美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院（Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuits, CAFC）雖然廣泛使 用 Panduit 測試法，但也認為此測試法並非是判斷專利權人是否得以請求所失利益之 損害賠償的唯一絕對標準。

17

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).

18

從專利品之需求量可以進一步確認隨著專利品一起出售之週邊產品與備料之數量， 從而請求非專利產品銷售損失之損害賠償。

19

2.1.2 並 無 可 代 替 之 非 侵 權 物 品 （ absence of acceptable

non-infringing substitutes）

20

此要素是用來證明，若無侵害行為，侵權人一部或全部顧客是否會轉而

購買專利產品。所謂「可代替之非侵權物品」，必須是在侵權期間可以獲得

（available）或在市場上出現（on the market）。欲證明並無可代替之非侵權

物品，專利權人須指出 1.市場上的一般顧客是基於專利產品之優點而購買

之，或 2.侵權人的特定顧客是基於侵權物品上具有專利產品之優點而購買

之

21

。市場上雖存有與專利品競爭之裝置或物品，但若缺少專利品之優點

（例如解決顧客長久之需求），則該競爭裝置或物品無法成為可代替之非侵

權物品

22

；侵權人知道市場上有非侵權產品而仍侵害專利，則該非侵權產品

並非是可替代的（acceptable）

23

；即使專利權人與先前其他侵權人發生專利

20 市場上若有可替代的非侵權物品，專利權人很難主張若無專利侵害發生，專利權人 可以得到其主張之銷售量，參見 Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996), “A non-infringing alternative in the…market would make it less likely that the patentee would have made the sales to [infringer’s] customers without the infringement.” 然而，專利權人若能提供可信的市場佔有率之資料，並證明顧客對 專利特徵或其所提供之優點有所需求，仍可請求因專利侵害而喪失市場佔有率的損 害賠償，參見 SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 2:42, at 2-65 to 2-68。

21

Standard Havens Products., Inc. v. Gencor Industries., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992), “Thus, to prove that there are no acceptable non-infringing substitutes, the patent owner must show either that (1) the purchasers in the mar-ketplace generally were willing to buy the patented product for its advantages, or (2) the specific purchasers of the infringing product purchased on that basis.”

22

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1162 (6th Cir. 1978), “A product lacking the advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a substitute ‘accept-able’ to the customer who wants those advantages.”

23

TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900, 901-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986), “Mere existence of a competing device does not make that

device an acceptable substitute. The special master committed no error in noting that none of the alleged substitutes had all beneficial characteristics of the patented device. That

find-糾紛而和解，亦不會使原本是侵權物品，轉變成為可代替之非侵權物品

24

。

雖然聯邦巡迴上訴法院（Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuits, CAFC）認

為，可替代之非侵權物品價格不能比專利產品高，或具有與專利產品不同的

顯著特徵

25

，然而，侵權物品與專利產品的價位明顯不同、顧客群不同，即

ing supported the determination that there were no acceptable substitutes. ‘A product lack-ing the advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a substitute ‘acceptable’ to the cus-tomer who wants those advantages.’ [citation omitted]. Moreover, Dura（侵權人）ignored those substitutes while it sold the patented invention and thus its acceptable substitute ar-gument “must be viewed of limited influence.”

24

Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, 66 F.3d 1211, 1222-23 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997), “The district court, applying this guideline, held that the Cuno mem-branes were ‘acceptable noninfringing substitutes’ for the Pall memmem-branes. Pall（專利權 人）states that this is incorrect, that the Cuno membranes were the subject of ongoing in-fringement litigation until May 1990, when they were licensed. … During the period before the Cuno products were licensed their presence in the marketplace did not defeat Pall’s enti-tlement to lost profits damages for all of MSI’s infringing sales, for the Cuno products were not ‘noninfringing substitutes.’ [CAFC held that] It was not necessary for Pall to continue the Cuno litigation to judicial decision of the issue of infringement, as MSI argues. The voluntary settlement of litigation does not retrospectively transform an accused infringing product into a ‘noninfringing substitute.’”（註：系爭專利發證時間是 1982 年，1983 年 侵權人推出其產品，專利權人於 1986 年提起訴訟。）

25

Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (Fed. Cir. 1991), “To be deemed acceptable, the alleged acceptable noninfringing substitute must not have a disparately higher price than or possess characteristics significantly different from the patented prod-uct. … The powered prestretch machines（侵權人聲稱的可替代非侵權物品）were not fully developed or accepted in the market until certain improvements were added to the machine. These improvements were not made until 1982, which is at the end of the in-fringement period. Thus, powered prestretch was not an acceptable purchase option during the infringement period. On the other hand, film-driven prestretch（專利技術）machines were effective and ‘much more simple in design, construction and operation than powered prestretch machines.’ Furthermore, powered prestretch machines were more expensive to purchase and operate than the film-driven machines. A technology that was immature and

可反駁專利權人關於「並無可代替之非侵權物品」之主張

26

。專利權人所製

造的其他產品，1.若有受其他專利保護，該產品就不是可代替之非侵權物

品；2.若沒受到其他專利保護，則有可能成為可代替之非侵權物品

27

。此

外，專利侵害發生多年後，侵權人才生產可替代非侵權物品，但若能證明其

在侵害發生前，已能獲得該非侵權物品，侵權人不選擇實施該非侵權物品的

唯一理由是該物品之成本在當時較專利產品高，則侵權人此時所生產的非侵

權物品是可以被認定為「可代替之非侵權物品」

28

。根據 CAFC 最新判決，

侵權人在判決後再行主張，專利侵害發生前已有可替代非侵權物品，僅因在

more expensive than the patented technology during the time of infringement cannot have been an acceptable noninfringing substitute. … Neither of the alleged substitutes possessed all the beneficial characteristics of the patented device, and the powered prestretch machine was found to be more expensive than the patented film-driven machine. Therefore, we con-clude the finding of the district court that the conventional and mechanical prestretch ma-chines were acceptable noninfringing substitutes during the period of infringement is clearly erroneous.”

26

BIC Leisure Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, Inc. 1 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Panduit 測試法四項因素之分析基本上要求專利產品與侵權物品須處於同一 市場（以相近之價位銷售給相同之顧客）。專利產品與侵權物品若未處於同一市 場，即難以證明，若無侵害發生，侵權人全部或一部之顧客會轉而購買專利產品。

27

See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co. 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995), “Here, the only substitute for the patented device was the ADL-100, another of the patentee’s devices. Such a substitute was not an ‘acceptable, non-infringing substitute’ within the meaning of Panduit because, being patented by Rite-Hite, it was not available to customers except from Rite-Hite. Rite-Hite therefore would not have lost the sales to a third party. The second Panduit factor thus has been met. If, on the other hand, the ADL-100 had not been patented and was found to be an acceptable substitute, that would have been a different story, and Rite-Hite would have had to prove that its customers would not have obtained the ADL-100 from a third party in order to prove the second factor of Panduit.”

28

See Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

審判中無法提出有效的市場統計資料以資證明，則侵權人此項主張是無法要

求法院重新計算損害賠償，因為是否為可替代非侵權物品之證明，不須有確

定的市場統計資料，專家證人證明亦可

29

。

2.1.3 專 利 權 人 開 發 該 需 求 量 所 具 有 的 製 造 與 行 銷 能 力

（manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit

the demand）

需求量包含專利權人本身銷售量全部與侵權物品全部或一部銷售量之總

和

30

。該需求量不一定須全部由專利權人製造，亦可透過授權方式為之

31

。

29

See Fiskars Oy Ab and Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co., 279 F.3d 1378, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2002), “While sales data showing market acceptance of a non-infringing alterna-tive may provide significant evidence that the alternaalterna-tive was acceptable to consumers, such evidence is not the sole means for demonstrating acceptability. Accused infringers rou-tinely rely on witness testimony to show that a non-infringing alternative is acceptable be-cause customers do not seek the patented features absent from the substitute product. … Al-though the parties must support their positions with sound economic proof, absolute cer-tainty is not required, for reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market is ‘by definition a hypo-thetical enterprise’ based on the evidence introduced at trial. In view of the hypohypo-thetical na-ture of the damages determination, we agree with the district court that the fact that evi-dence arising nearly two years after trial may have cast some doubt on the accuracy of the trial evidence does not create the extraordinary circumstances necessary to invoke Rule 60(b)(6). Hunt could have offered at trial what it considered to be its best evidence that Fis-kars was not entitled to lost profits, including the existence of any acceptable non-infringing alternatives.”

30

See Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).

31

See Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988).

2.1.4 所失利益的額度（the amount of the profit it would

have made）

計算所失利益有兩個步驟

32

，第一步驟是決定因專利被侵害而受影響之

銷售量數額，包含：1.銷售量減少的數額；2.以較低價格銷售之數額；及 3.未

來銷售減少的數額。第二步驟是計算受影響銷售量數額之所失利益。所失利

益計算方式是原本可銷售數量之營收毛額，減除變動成本；固定成本不須從

營收毛額中扣除，因為這些成本假定已被先前專利權人所銷售之產品分攤

了

33

。當市場上僅有專利權人和侵權人，且彼此互相競爭，專利權人即可推

論侵權產品銷售數量相當於其原可銷售專利產品之數量

34

。

Panduit 測試法所提供的四項因素，可以用來檢測專利權人是否可請求所

失利益之損害賠償，但此方法並非是唯一的

35

。當專利權人無法通過 Panduit

32

See SKENYONET AL., supra note 10, § 2:47, at 2-76, 2-77.

33

Id. § 2:46, at 2-73. See also Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir. 1984), “The incremental income approach to the computation of lost profits is well established in the law relating to patent damages. … The approach recog-nizes that it does not cost as much to produce unit N + 1 if the first N (or fewer) units pro-duced already have paid the fixed costs. Thus fixed costs－those costs which do not vary with increases in production, such as management salaries, property taxes, and insurance－ are excluded when determining profits.”

34

Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F. 2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

35

See Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 141 (1986), “This court ac-cepted the Panduit guidelines in Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578, n.5, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 494, (Fed. Cir. 1983), as a permissible way to establish entitlement to lost profits. It is not, however, the exclusive standard for determining enti-tlement to lost profits.” State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990), “A standard way of proving lost profits, first announced in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works …, is for the patent owner to prove: ‘(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfring-ing substitutes, (3) his manufacturnoninfring-ing and marketnoninfring-ing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.’ The district court relied heavily on this test and we have accepted it as a nonexclusive standard for determining lost profits.”

測試法，只要其仍能證明若無侵害發生，其可銷售相當於侵權物品數量一定

百分比的專利產品，該相當數量即可能作為所失利益計算基礎。通常該數量

相當於（侵權物品×專利權人市場佔有率）

36

。

2.2 合理權利金之計算

專利權人若無法證明其所失利益，根據美國專利法第 284 條與相關案例

法之規定，其僅能請求合理的權利金（reasonable royalty）

37

。依照 CAFC 的

觀點，權利金之給予所須考量之問題並非是如何計算權利金，而是該權利金

是否能足夠彌補專利權人所受之損害

38

。權利金計算並非基於侵權人所獲

得之利潤，美國案例法亦無一準則要求該額度不能高於侵權人所獲得之利

潤

39

。至今為止，CAFC 尚未採納單一方法以計算權利金，決定損害賠償額

36

State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.

de-nied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).

37

See Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “There are two methods by which damages may be calculated under this statute. If the record per-mits the determination of actual damages, namely, the profits the patentee lost from the in-fringement, that determination accurately measures the patentee’s loss. If actual damages cannot be ascertained, then a reasonable royalty must be determined.”

38

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3:2, at 3-3.

39

See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “The amount of the lump-sum royalty is appropriately left to be determined by the trial court. For its guidance, however, we expressly reject Heublein’s premise that the royalty fee must be less than the price of an HUB-2000.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995), “Furthermore, the fact that the award was based on and was a significant portion of the patentee’s profits also does not make the award unreasonable.” State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 1573,1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989), “The determination of a reasonable royalty, however, is based not on the infringer’s profit margin, but on what a willing licensor and licensee would bargain for at hypothetical negotiations on the date infringement started [citation omitted]. There is no rule that a royalty be no higher than the infringer’s net profit margin.”

度的地方法院亦不須受限於專利權人或侵權人所提出之計算方法

40

。雖然如

此，CAFC 所認可之權利金計算方式大致可分為兩大類

41

：

2.2.1 解析法（analytical approach）

在專利侵害發生時，侵權人內部文件記錄著銷售侵權物品可獲得之預期

毛利（projected gross profit），文件也顯示了侵權人願意接受產業標準之權

利 金 。 法 院 可 以 將 該 預 期 毛 利 扣 除 侵 權 人 經 常 支 出 成 本 （ overhead

expenses）與該產業標準之權利金，作為侵權人應支付專利權人的權利金

42

。

2.2.2 假設性合意磋商（hypothetical willing-licensor-willing

licensee approach）法

所謂「假設性合意磋商之權利金」係指，在專利侵害發生時，假設專利

權人與侵權人雙方願意磋商所得之權利金。專利侵害發生後所決定之權利金

與真正授權談判權利金額度是不一樣的：法院所判決給予的權利金，有時會

比在專利侵害發生前，專利權人願意提供授權之權利金高

43

，或比產業標準

40

See Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991), “A district court is not limited to selecting one or the other of the specific roy-alty figures urged by counsel as reasonable.” [citation omitted]

41

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3:4, at 3-6, § 3:5, at 3-10.

42

See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also id. § 3:4, at 3-7, 3-8.

43

See Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1554, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “IH（侵權人）referred to various licenses in the farm equipment field, including a license covering the Schreiner patent granted in 1977 by Deere（專利權人）to White Motor Cor-poration, a competitor of Deere’s which had held 3% or less of the market during the rele-vant period. … IH also presented evidence of two offers by Deere, made, respectively, in 1973, before IH commercialized the infringing IH 800 series, and in 1977, after Deere commenced the present action, to license the Schreiner patent to IH at a royalty rate of ap-proximately 1%. … The district court expressly identified numerous factors to be consid-ered in determining a reasonable royalty, including increased profitability and cost savings, which were the subject of extensive investigation at trial. The district court also expressly

之權利金高。

採用「假設性合意磋商法」決定合理權利金，法院大都採用

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.案所建立之十五項考量因素，包

含

44

：

found that Deere was making, and stood to make in the future, a profit on the net selling price of its corn head in excess of 30%, a figure for which the record below provided sup-port. The record similarly supported the district court’s finding that Deere, facing limits on its own corn-head production, would have been willing to license ‘a substantial manufac-turer’ at something less than 35% of the licensee’s sales price, and that IH, recognizing ‘the dismal future’ of its own corn head and ‘the bright future of the infringing 800 series,’ would have been willing to pay a royalty comprising ‘a very substantial percentage of [IH’s] net sales.’”

44

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), mod. and aff ’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971), “A comprehensive list of evidentiary facts relevant, in general, to the determination of the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a conspectus of the leading cases. The following are some of the factors mutatis mutandis seemingly more per-tinent to the issue herein:

1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.

2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit. 3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or

non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.

4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monop-oly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.

5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inven-tor and promoinven-tor.

6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the li-censee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his

1.權利人事實上有無授權，可否提出有關權利金存在之證明。

2.其他存在之類似專利權利金。

3.授權的性質或範圍，例如專屬授權抑或非專屬授權、授權區域範圍

等。

4.專利權人之企業政策和行銷計畫。

5.專利權人與被授權者之間的商業關係，係合作或競爭

45

。

non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.

7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.

8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial suc-cess; and its current popularity.

9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.

10.The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the in-vention.

11.The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence pro-bative of the value of that use.

12.The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.

13.The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distin-guished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or sig-nificant features or improvements added by the infringer.

14.The opinion testimony of qualified experts.

15.The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasona-bly and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent li-censee－who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention－would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.”

45

6.專利對被授權人之產品銷售上的貢獻，以及對專利權人相關非專利商

品銷售上之幫助。

7.專利所剩有效期間和授權期間。

8.專利產品已獲之利益、商業成功性和銷售狀況。

9.專利技術對於原產品所增進之功效或市場優勢

46

。

10.專利技術商品化之特性。

11.侵權人對於專利技術利用的程度，及其使用的價值。

12.在相同或近似產業中，使用該專利或類似專利在產品價值上或利潤上

可能占有之比重。

13.侵權人在其他方面對侵權物品價值所為之貢獻，例如來自於非專利元

件、製造程序、商業風險、或侵權人所增加之重要特徵元件或所改進的部

分。

14.專家證言。

15.授權人與被授權人對於該專利可能達成之合理價位。

上述所列的十五種考量因素中，一般認為是以第一項「有關權利金存在

之證明」（established royalty）為最重要的

47

，惟必須有足夠多的被授權人接

受該既定之權利金的授權方案，該權利金方能被認定是合理；僅有一次授權

事件是不足的

48

。美國法院亦認為，「有關權利金存在之證明」僅是合理權

power）。 46

CAFC 在 Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering Inc., 95 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)案 中，同意地方法院判被告須給予原告權利金為銷售額的 20%，其理由包含 1.被告與 原告競爭（市場尚無其他供應者）；2.專利侵害發生時，被告有次級產品；3.市場上 並無可代替之非侵權物品；4.被告本身認為原告的發明與現有產品相比是重大進步； 5.該產業具有很高的利潤；6.被告使用了原告的發明之後，收入增加可觀。

47

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3:10, at 3-22, 3-23.

48

See Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “In support of its conclusion on the weight to be given the White license, the district court cited …, apparently for the proposition that a single license, paid or secured by one,

rela-利金的底限

49

，如果專利權人能證明侵害範圍廣泛，即使有「有關權利金存

在之證明」，法院亦可提高該權利金

50

。

若以相關產業其他專利之權利金，作為計算系爭專利之權利金的依據，

必須是該其他專利產品與系爭專利產品極為類似（close），且被授權人數相

當多，足以成為產業標準

51

。相關產業其他專利之權利金計算方式並非絕對

的，法院可以拒絕使用。

當專利組件僅是機器中的一部分，若該組件是吸引消費者購買該機器的

主要原因，在計算合理權利金時，CAFC 會考慮非專利產品因專利組件效用

tively minor competitor after the onset of the complained infringement, may be rejected as a measure of damages against an infringer. We have no doubt that this is an accurate state-ment of the relevant law, nor can we find error in its application by the district court to the White license, to the extent that the court considered the probative value of the White li-cense to be vanishingly small. In the absence of any evidence indicating a general accep-tance within the farm equipment industry of a particular market value for the Schreiner pat-ent, we cannot say that the district court’s conclusion of no established royalty in this case is erroneous.” See also Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “… as the magistrate stated, ‘a single licensing agreement does not generally demonstrate uniformity nor acquiescence in the reasonableness of the royalty rate.’ For a royalty to be ‘established,’ it ‘must be paid by such a number of persons as to indicate a general acquiescence in its reasonableness by those who have occasion to use the inven-tion.’ [citation omitted]”; Trell v. Marlee Electronics Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1990), “As we noted in Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., for a royalty to be estab-lished, it ‘must be paid by such a number of persons as to indicate a general acquiescence in its reasonableness’ by those who have occasion to use the invention.” [citation omitted]

49

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3:11, at 3-28.

50

See Nickson Industries, Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1988), “Nickson （專利權人）correctly states that a royalty ‘reasonable’ under 35 U.S.C. § 284 may be greater than an established royalty. [citation omitted]. For example, a higher figure may be awarded when the evidence clearly shows that widespread infringement made the estab-lished royalty artificially low.”

51

而增加獲利的部分，提高權利金計算比率

52

。此外，專利權人基於專利發明

所獲得之利潤越高，權利金計算之比率越高。因此，即使侵權人實施該專利

技術而虧損，該抗辯理由從未被法院採認

53

。

一專利產品若滿足了長久的需求，且在市場上銷售相當成功，此時專利

權人在授權談判時，通常有較大的談判權力（bargaining power）；由於產品

獲利能力相當明顯，被授權人也通常願意支付較高的權利金。因此，被侵害

的專利若具有上述的特色，法院也會提高權利金

54

。

專利有效期限越短，並不意謂著合理權利金計算比率越低。若有其他商

業考量因素，例如該專利發明滿足了長久的需求，使該專利發明可以獲得立

52

See Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983), “In fact, the district court did nothing more or less than take into account the impact of antici-pated collateral sales of an admittedly noninfringing product line on the respective bargain-ing positions of the parties engaged in the theorized licensbargain-ing negotiations. We consider this an eminently reasonable approach to the willing seller-willing buyer analysis, …, particu-larly in this case, where the worth of the contested patent cannot be realistically divorced from the value both IH（侵權人）and Deere（專利權人）placed on their respective shares in the combine market. Recognition of this fact by the district court does not consti-tute the court’s imprimatur on a tying arrangement, implicit or otherwise.”

53

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3:15, at 3-37.

54

See Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991), “[I]t is undisputed that SKD was an unwilling licensor, and that it had never li-censed the ‘970 patent technology. Furthermore, there was other evidence that SKD’s ’970 patent achieved immediate commercial success, that it satisfied a long felt need for that technology, and that SKD intended to maintain its exclusivity of the technology comprising the ’970 patent by refusing to grant licenses under the patent. The district court correctly considered the factors enumerated in Panduit and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp. …, in finding what it considered a reasonable royalty and Helena has not persuaded this court that the 25% figure ‘is, in view of all the evidence, either so outra-geously high or so outraoutra-geously low as to be unsupportable as an estimation of a reasonable royalty.’ [citation omitted]. … In this case, the finding of 25% as a reasonable royalty based on all of the evidence is not clearly erroneous.”

即商業上的成功，即使專利侵害開始發生時，專利有效期限僅剩幾年，該項

不利因素之影響也會被降低

55

。

2.3 美國專利損害賠償案件統計

由美國會計事務所 PricewaterhouseCoopers 所做的 2007 年專利與商標案

件之損害賠償調查報告中

56

，選自 1980 年起至 2006 年 6 月間的 2,193 件聯

邦地方法院訴訟案件以及 350 件聯邦巡迴上訴法院訴訟案件作為分析對象。

其中，2,193 件聯邦地方法院案件係包含 1,367 件專利案件、797 件商標案件

以及 29 件同時涉及專利與商標案件；350 件聯邦巡迴上訴法院案件係包含

273 件專利案件、70 件商標案件以及 7 件同時涉及專利與商標案件

57

。

該報告

58

中列出以下專利訴訟案件統計之趨勢：

1.提起專利侵權訴訟案件數，自 1991 年至 2004 年間係逐年增加；但自

2005 年起，案件數卻有下降之情形

59

。

(1)專利侵權訴訟案件自 1991 年的每年 1,171 件，穩定地逐年成長至

2004 年達到每年有 3,075 件之多

60

。

(2)然而，在 2005 年時，專利侵權訴訟案件數則滑落至每年 2,720 件。這

是自 1991 年以來，首度出現提起專利侵權訴訟案件數下降之趨勢

61

。

(3)分析案件數下降原因，經過歷年來的專利訴訟之威脅下，許多公司轉

而重視專利權之保護，藉由專利授權與自行取得的方式，已逐漸建立屬於防

55

SKENYON ET AL., supra note 10, § 3:18 at 3-40, 3-41.

56

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 PATENT AND TRADEMARK DAMAGES STUDY (2007),

available at http://www.innovationalliance.net/files/2007_Patent_and_Trademark_Study_

Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).

57 Id. at 29. 58 Id. 59 Id. at 5. 60 Id. at 7-8. 61 Id.

衛性（defensive）的專利布局策略

62

。

(4)另一案件數下降之因素，則係因 2000 年時期，電腦軟體與商業方法

專利（business method patents）的申請與訴訟案件之風潮已過，相關案件數

量已大幅滑落

63

。

2.自 2000 年起算，專利侵權案件中經由陪審團與法官判決專利損害賠

償的兩種方式中，以陪審團判給的損害賠償金額，要高於由法官所判給的金

額

64

。

(1)由陪審團或法官判決專利損害賠償的兩種方式之比例，自 1980 年代

起，採取由陪審團決定專利損害賠償數額的比例即逐年增加

65

。

(2)1980 年代，由陪審團決定損害賠償金額的比例，僅佔所有案件的

19%；1990 年代，倍增至佔所有案件的 38%；自 2000 年起，經由以陪審團

判給損害賠償金額的方式即佔所有案件的 53%，已高於由法官判給損害賠償

的比例

66

。

(3)由陪審團或法官兩種方式核發專利損害賠償之金額做比較，發現由陪

審團判給的損害賠償金額，要高於由法官所判給的金額，而且其差距更逐年

擴大

67

。

(4)1980 年代，大多數陪審團所核發的專利損害賠償金額約為法官所判決

金額的二倍。例如，自 1980 年代至 1990 年代中期，陪審團所核給的賠償金

額之中位數（median）約為 4.8 百萬美元，而法官所核給的賠償金額之中位

數約為 1.1 百萬美元

68

。

(5)但是，目前陪審團所核發的專利損害賠償金額大多數約為法官所判決

62 Id. at 7. 63 Id. at 5, 7. 64 Id. at 5. 65 Id. at 14-15. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id.

金額的五倍之多。例如，自 2000 年起，陪審團所核給的賠償金額之中位數約

為 8 百萬美元，而法官所核給的賠償金額之中位數約為 1.6 百萬美元

69

。

(6)分析兩種方式中以陪審團判給的損害賠償金額，要高於由法官所判給

金額之原因有以下幾點

70

：

陪審團比法官更容易受到情緒性的影響，而且不會分辨專利訴訟案件

中雙方各需承擔的風險與責任，在律師常用的片面與偏頗的言詞煽動下，以

致一面倒地同情所謂遭受損害的一方；

目前的專利侵權訴訟之標的金額，隨著現代企業活動規模益發龐大，

爭議中專利技術之商業利益比起以往小規模產業的收益價值要高出許多；

由於許多動輒數十億美元的天價專利侵權損害賠償額的案例迭起，導

致陪審團對於核給損害賠償數額之敏感度下降，容易核發創紀錄的損害賠償

金額。

3.自 1995 年起算至 2006 年間，原告之總平均勝訴率約為起訴案件總數

的 35%。以即決判決（summary judgment）案件數為計算者，則原告之總平

均勝訴率約為即決判決案件數的 61%

71

。

69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Id. at 5.

資料來源：作者依註 56 資料自行繪製。

圖一 美國專利侵權訴訟原告勝訴率之逐年變化

4.自 1995 年起算至 2006 年間，在各個不同地區的專利管轄法院之間，

原告之勝訴率有顯著之差異。由平均原告勝訴率最高的 Wisconsin 州東區聯

邦地方法院之高達 63%，接著幾個原告高勝訴率的指標法院，如 Texas 州東

區聯邦地方法院、Virginia 州東區聯邦地方法院、California 州中區聯邦地方

法院、Delaware 州聯邦地方法院，一直到勝訴率最低的 Michigan 州東區聯邦

地方法院的僅有 12%

72

。

(1)最高的 Wisconsin 州東區聯邦地方法院之原告勝訴率：63%。

(2)Texas 州東區聯邦地方法院之原告勝訴率：60%。

(3)Virginia 州東區聯邦地方法院之原告勝訴率：47%。

(4)California 州中區聯邦地方法院之原告勝訴率：44%。

(5)Delaware 州聯邦地方法院之原告勝訴率：42%。

(6)最低的 Michigan 州東區聯邦地方法院之原告勝訴率：12%。

5.專利損害賠償計算方法之演變

(1)2000 年後，合理權利金法即佔多數（65%）。80 年代時，合理權利

72 Id. at 20-21. 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 原告勝訴率 年份

金法僅佔 17%，而 90 年代亦僅有 24%

73

。

(2)所失利益法則由 80 年代的 83%，減至 90 年代的 73%，最後僅佔

2000 年後案件的 32%

74

。

(3)價格侵蝕法

75

最多僅佔 3%

76

。

資料來源：作者依註 56 資料自行繪製。

圖二 美國專利損害賠償計算方法佔案件比重之演變

73 Id. at 22-23. 74 Id. at 22-23. 75

See David L. Applegate et al., A Marl, A Yen, A Buck, Or a Pound: Damages Make the

World Go Around, 949 PLI/PAT 473, 490 (2008), “Sometimes treated separately from lost profits, ‘price erosion’ refers to the profits the patentee loses on the sales it continues to make, but at lower prices because of competition from the infringer. E.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In fact, both these ‘lost price opportunity’ or ‘lost margin’ sales and the patentee’s lost profits on ‘lost sales’ are ‘lost profits’ in the sense that the patentee’s profits would have been higher from both these causes.”

76

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 56, at 22-23. 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2006 年份 所失利益法（Lost Profits） 合理權利金法 （Reasonable Royalties） 價格侵蝕法（Price Erosion）

6.所失利益法漸不受青睞之原因分析

77

(1)「所失利益」計算方法與需求資料較之「合理權利金」更複雜，原告

成功舉證不易

78

。

(2)原告舉證之資料，有洩漏自身營業機密之顧慮

79

。

(3)證據能力與證明力之問題：無法成功界定市場範圍、舉證無替代產

品、如何考量價格彈性之問題

80

。

(4)原告本身不從事製造生產（如：研發機構），缺少製造與行銷能力，

無法主張所失利益，僅能請求合理授權金作為損害賠償

81

。

3. 台灣民事訴訟法對專利侵權損害賠償計算

3.1 現行民事訴訟法體系下專利侵權損害賠償之計算方式

82

現行民事訴訟法體系下，專利侵權損害賠償計算主要是依據專利法第 85

條計算。可以分為兩種方法，一為依據民法第 216 條之規定，以填補當事人

所受損害、所失利益為原則，如有困難，得採「差額說」，亦即專利權人因

77 Id. at 24-25. 78

Applegate et al., supra note 75, at 498. “Finally, the cost of preparing a lost profits analysis is usually greater than the cost of developing a reasonable royalty-only case, because many of the issues needed to proved lost profits－in particular, the availability of acceptable non-infringing alternatives－have proved to be among the most contentious.”

79

Id. at 497. “Pursuing a lost profits case therefore calls for the patentee to produce in discov-ery sensitive financial, manufacturing, and marketing records that are typically guarded jealously even from many company personnel.”

80

See David L. Applegate et al., A Billion Here and a Billion There: Talking Real Money in

the Patent Damages Case, 910 PLI/PAT 1367, at 1387 (2007), “Many plaintiffs who com-pete in the relevant market appear to find the potential lost profits award worth the incre-mental cost of preparing a lost profits case. Even in the context of the entire cost of litigating infringement of a patent, however, this cost can be significant.”

81

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 56, at 24.

82