改革派還是激進派？台灣基本收入運動的論述與策略之研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)1. 國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Reformists or Radicals? A Study of the Discourse and Strategy of the Basic Income Movement in Taiwan 改革派還是激進派？台灣基本收入運動的論述與策略之研究. er. io. sit. y. Nat. a. n. iv l CTyler Prochazkan羅泰 Student: h e nWei, i U 魏玫娟博士 Advisor: Mei-Chuan g c hPhD. 中華民國 107 年 7 月 July 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(2) 2. Reformists or Radicals? A Study of the Discourse and Strategy of the Basic Income Movement in Taiwan 改革派還是激進派？台灣基本收入運動的論述與策略之研究. 研究生：羅泰指導教授：魏玫娟博士. Student: Tyler Prochazka Advisor: Mei-Chuan Wei, PhD. 政治大. 國立政治大學. 立. 碩士論文. 學. ‧ 國. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. er. io. sit. y. ‧. Nat. A Thesis. Submitted to International a Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. n. iv l C n i U NationalhChengchi e n g c hUniversity. In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master of Arts. 中華民國 107 年 7 月 July 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(3) 3. Abstract Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a cash grant that contains no means test and no work requirement. With the acceleration of income inequality, automation, and precariousness, UBI has become a serious policy consideration around the world. Based on the level of development of the country, the considerations behind basic income are different, from solving poverty to simplifying welfare administration. Thus far, the Asia Pacific has largely been overlooked in the global basic income discussion. Taiwan poses an interesting case in the global UBI movement because. 政治大. of its unique political history and international status. After Taiwan’s successful. 立. land-reforms, this idea of equal division of dividends from natural resources. ‧ 國. 學. gradually faded from public view. In July 2016, Taiwan officially joined the largest international basic income organization Basic Income Earth Network. ‧. (BIEN) as UBI Taiwan. Since that time, Taiwan’s activists have engaged in a multi-prong strategy to facilitate discussion of basic income. Taiwan’s basic. y. Nat. sit. income activists have been split between technical-based discourse, that. er. io. emphasizes feasibility analysis and experimental frameworks, and a value-based. n. a l ethics of UBI. Despite relative discourse, that emphasizes the i v openness to the basic C. n. income concept, many Taiwanese h view e nbasic income h i U through the lens of traditional. gc. welfare and remain skeptical that Taiwan could feasibly implement such a scheme. Keywords: Basic Income, UBI, Taiwan, Unconditional Basic Income, Universal Basic Income, automation, social movements. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(4) 4. 摘要無條件基本收入（UBI）是一種政府發放的現金補助，不包含財富檢查以及工作的條件。隨著收入越來越不平等，自動化和社會不穩定性的加速，UBI 已成為全球認真考慮的解決方案。因為每一個國家的發達程度都不同，所以基本收入背後的考慮也都不一樣，從解決貧窮問題到簡化社會福利的官僚。到目前為止，亞太地區忽略基本收入的全球討論。由於其獨特的政治歷史和. 治政大成功實行之後，這種從自然資源中平等分配紅利的觀念逐漸消失。 2016 年 7 立國際地位，台灣在全球 UBI 運動是一個值得研究的案例。在台灣的土地改革. 月，台灣正式加入最大的國際基本收入組織：基本收入全球網（Basic. ‧ 國. 學. Income Earth Network）。從那時起，台灣的 UBI 活動人士就計較策略來促進. ‧. 台灣對基本收入的討論。台灣的基本收入活動人士分為強調可行性分析和實驗框架的改革論述，以及強調 UBI 道德價值觀的論述。儘管台灣人對基本收. y. Nat. io. sit. 入的概念相對開放，但許多台灣人通過傳統社會福利的視角看待 UBI，並對. n. al. er. 台灣可以切實實施這一計劃持懷疑的態度。. Ch. e. i. i n U. v. ngch 關鍵詞：基本收入，UBI，台灣，無條件基本收入，全民基本收入，自動化，社會運動. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(5) 5. Acknowledgements I would like to first thank my thesis advisor Professor Mei-Chuan Wei for the continued support and advance she has provided me over the last nearly two years. This thesis would not have been possible without her continued support and the knowledge she provided to me. It was a very long process and Professor Wei made me feel that I have someone who understands the importance of the topic, and who knows how to bring out the relevant information to readers. Next, I want to thank those participants who were willing to provide their time for. 政治大 used for reference in this thesis.立 No one had to give me their time, but I was fortunate that. interviews, as well as those individuals who helped provide some of the activist materials that I. ‧ 國. 學. enough people were willing to take time to help make this thesis a reality. Certainly, I would like to thank all of the professors who gave me advice on my UBI. ‧. research along the way and helped me understand this topic from many perspectives. It is. sit. y. Nat. important that I mention that Sarath Davala has provided an enormous amount advice on. io. al. er. researching basic income, and his presence as one of my mentors has been a source of great. iv n C Finally, thank you to the friends h andefamily who encouraged n g c h i U me along the way while n. relief as I completed this thesis and other research projects.. writing this thesis. Such a long project can be frustrating, and the encouragement from friends was a big boost especially as I neared completion.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(6) 6. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction. 7. 1.1 Research Background. 7. 1.2 Research Purpose & Questions. 12. 1.3 Research Motivation. 14. 1.4 Research Methods. 15. Chapter Two: Literature Review. 19. 2.1 UBI Theory and Discourse. 19. 2.2 UBI Movements and Experiments. 25. Chapter Three: Context of UBI in Taiwan. 30. 政治大. 3.1 People’s Livelihood, Democratization and Welfare State Development. 30. 立 3.3 Development of AI and its Impact on Taiwan’s Socioeconomy. 37 40. 學. ‧ 國. 3.2 Rising Socioeconomic Inequality. Chapter Four: Discourse and Strategy of UBI in Taiwan 4.1 Origins of UBI in Taiwan: Entering the International Network. ‧. 4.2 Survey of Taiwan’s UBI Attitudes 4.3 Discourse and Strategy of UBI in Taiwan. y. sit. io. Appendix. n. al. er. References. Nat. Chapter Five: Conclusion: ‘Living not Surviving’. Ch. engchi. i n U. 44 44 53 65 99 106 121. v. Table of Figures Figure 1 General Support (Wave Two, Unweighted) ................................................................................. 58 Figure 2 Support with Tax Increases (Wave Two, Unweighted) ................................................................ 59 Figure 3 Research Exposure Support (Wave Two, Unweighted) ............................................................... 63 Figure 4 Pilot Program Survey.................................................................................................................... 87 Figure 5 TZM Taiwan Materials on UBI .................................................................................................... 66. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(7) 7. Chapter One: Introduction Research Background Interest in Universal Basic Income (UBI) policies, reached a fever pitch over the last decade, with serious discussion taking place among government officials, academics, and the public around the world. UBI is a cash transfer (from the government) that is given to all citizens. 治政大 defines basic income as “a Standing 2017, 3; Keene 2013, 15). Basic Income Earth Network 立 periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test without any work requirements or behavioral conditions (Parijs and Vanderborght 2017, 8; 1. ‧ 國. 學. or work requirement” (“What is Basic Income”). The definition of basic income has been. ‧. contentious for some UBI supporters, particularly regarding the inclusion of “sufficiency” of the payment to meet certain needs. In some countries, scholars and government officials have. y. Nat. er. io. sit. referred to other similar proposals as basic income, including minimum income guarantees (cash payouts that gradually phase out based on income) and negative income tax (NIT) proposals. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. (refundable tax credits that phase out based on one’s income). These proposals differ from. engchi. BIEN’s definition of basic income which explicitly rejects means testing but are still often referred to as “basic income” (McFarland 2017c). To retain clarity between these differing concepts, this thesis will utilize BIEN’s definition of basic income. There are two forms of basic income ideology, stemming from right and left-wing proponents. Even within these ideological poles, there are a host of disparate rationales and. 1. Basic Income Earth Network was established in 1986 as the Basic Income European Network and is the world’s largest international basic income advocacy and research institution. The organization includes chapters from around the globe, including Taiwan (Standing 2017, 249-251).. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(8) 8. methods for implementation. Philippe Van Parijs, one of the most famous living proponents of basic income, bases his support on the idea that UBI produces “real freedom” in the truest sense of the word. Van Parijs is arguing that individuals have the right to pursue their desires in theory and should be guaranteed by the government to pursue these desires and opportunities in practice as well (Keene 2013, 16). In this sense, basic income maximizes opportunities for as many people as possible by giving them the financial means to pursue said opportunities, thus enhancing the true freedom for those individuals as a practical matter. There is also a popular. 治政大 concerns (Murphy 2016). production and consumption with a greater emphasis on environmental 立 sentiment on the left to utilize UBI as a mechanism for “degrowth”, that is discouraging. ‧ 國. 學. On the right side of the ideological spectrum, Charles Murray has advocated for basic income because he believes individuals will spend the money better for themselves than. ‧. government bureaucrats who choose how to spend the money for recipients (Keene 2013, 24).. sit. y. Nat. The famous right-wing economist Milton Friedman advocated for Negative Income Tax (NIT) in. io. al. er. his book Capitalism and Freedom on the idea that guaranteeing an income floor would produce. iv n C that others will as well, thus justifying ah government guarantee e n g c h i U (Zwolinski 2013). Other n. positive externalities for society, but individuals may not voluntarily provide it without assurance. libertarian-leaning proponents have discussed basic income under a Georgist2 framework, as a method to redistribute resources that are not the product of an individual’s labor, such as natural resources and land, thus opening the capitalist market for more participants (Zwolinski 2014).. 2. Georgist economic philosophy is based on the work of economist Henry George, who advocated for taxing land values in order to redistribute the benefits of nature (“An Introduction to Georgist Philosophy & Activity”). George’s writings on distributing the dividends from land and natural resources form the left-libertarian tradition for the justification and implementation method for basic income (Borovali 1998).. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(9) 9. The different justifications among left and right supporters of basic income produces far different methods for implementation. Left-leaning supporters, such as Guy Standing, stress that UBI can exist as a “floor” that co-exists with “other needed public services and benefits” (Standing 2017, 113), rejecting the idea that complete abolition of other social services is necessary to implement basic income. Under this framework, UBI would be added on top of other social services as a supplement. Many right-leaning proponents of UBI, exemplified by Murray, often believe that UBI is a more efficient substitution for many welfare services,. 治政 renders many other in-kind programs redundant, such as food大 stamps, and eliminating these 立 including health care subsidies (Murray 2016). These right-wing proponents state that UBI. redundant programs could provide revenue for UBI. This is one of the main administrative. ‧ 國. 學. differences between left and right supporters: whether basic income supplements or substitutes. ‧. other existing social services. The degree to which either side concedes on the amount of existing services that would be eliminated under UBI varies to the extent that the services are seen as. er. io. al. sit. y. Nat. irreplaceable by simple cash transfers.. iv n C subject led by Enno Schmidt . The referendum rejected by 77 percent of swiss (Minder h e nwas gchi U n. UBI gained global prominence after the Swiss organized a national referendum on the 3. 2016), but Schmidt said at the 2017 Basic Income Asia Pacific conference that the referendum was a success because nearly one in four Swiss voted in affirmation of UBI. This was the first referendum on UBI in any country in history (“Switzerland's voters reject basic income plan” 2016; Martin 2016). The wording of the referendum did not contain specific amounts for the UBI, but supporters did offer suggested amounts (“Switzerland's voters reject basic income plan” 3. Enno Schmidt is the initiator of the 2016 Switzerland basic income referendum after collecting 126,000 signatures in 2013, the culmination of a decade of advocacy. He helped organize the referendum campaign, subsequently becoming a prominent global supporter of basic income (Prochazka 2016). In late 2016, Schmidt began cooperating with this author on establishing the first Basic Income Asia Pacific international conference in 2017.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(10) 10. 2016). The political parties in Switzerland largely opposed the measure, stating that the cost would be too large to manage, requiring 25 billion Swiss francs a year to fund 2,500 Swiss francs to each adult and 625 francs for children under 18 if the plan that referendum supporters put forward was implemented. Advocates for UBI in Switzerland did not provide specific financing details, creating uncertainty among the public and the political class about where the revenue for UBI would come from (Minder 2016). Subsequent to the Swiss referendum, much of the global discussion on UBI has been. 政治大 completed) pilot programs. Each of these areas are testing diverse types of basic income 立. concentrated in North America, Europe, India, and East Africa as these areas pursue (or already. ‧ 國. 學. programs, each with components that emulate elements of basic income (to varying degrees based on BIEN’s definition). Experiments purporting to test basic income have provoked much. ‧. discussion around the world. Such experiments can help answer some of the primary. sit. y. Nat. controversies surrounding basic income, namely whether cash transfers induce laziness among. io. al. er. recipients. Three prominent experiments are currently taking place in Finland, Canada, and. iv n C scholarship of UBI research as they work U of such a program in htoeevaluate h ifeasibility n g c the n. Kenya (McFarland 2017a). Each experiment has its own limitations, but they can each add to the. different countries and economic contexts. The inherent limitation of all basic income experiments is the lack of permanence of the program. As such, the behavior of recipients will not necessarily reflect a permanent program since they know it will inevitably come to an end. As such, critics of basic income pilot programs maintain that the short duration of the experiments and their lack of universality limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the results because many of the proposed benefits from UBI come from its universality and. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(11) 11. permanence, such as social solidarity and reduced stigmatization against recipients of government assistance (Lewis 2017a). A UBI is often touted by proponents as a new form of development, that separates income from “work” in the formal sense, allowing individuals to pursue their passions, rather than pursuing what makes the most money. Some argue that due to automation, an increasing share of wealth will flow towards those individuals that own capital, particularly robotic equipment and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology (Guerreiro, Rebelo, and Teles 2018),. 政治大 between income and formal labor, UBI is seen by many advocates as an essential element in the 立 which may necessitate a basic income to redistribute wealth. Challenging the connection. ‧ 國. 學. future of work. As technological advances undermine the traditional institutions of labor, UBI could be a method to allow individuals to pursue meaningful activities in a market that does not. ‧. provide a sufficient number of formal jobs for the entire population. Another element of basic. sit. y. Nat. income advocacy comes from feminists who see basic income as a possible liberating policy for. io. al. er. women. Feminist UBI advocates note the possibility for basic income to allow women to leave. iv n C and remunerate unpaid work that is disproportionately h e n g c hdone i Uby women, such as parenting and n. abusive relationships, provide women greater latitude to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities,. caregiving (Schulz 2017). Largely overlooked in this basic income debate has been the Asia Pacific. The Asia Pacific may be particularly vulnerable to the “automation cliff,” a large and sustained disruption to employment due to robotic and AI development, because of the high rate of robotic installations in Asia Pacific countries. Taiwan has a high number of robotic installations relative to its population, ranking as having the sixth highest density of robotic equipment in the world (“The growth of industrial robots” 2017). If Taiwan faces its own automation cliff, Taiwanese. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(12) 12. may face an even more challenging labor market, as AI systems and robotic equipment compete with humans for jobs. In the coming years, if there are perceived strong negative effects from automation on Taiwan’s employment situation, it could put a spotlight on Taiwan’s strict social welfare policies and inform the discourse of social movements calling for strengthened welfare protections. Taiwan has suffered from stagnant wages for many years despite a rising GDP (Lin, Chang and Lu 2014; Chen and Guo 2014; Chen 2013), rising income inequality (Chang, Wu and. 政治大 and Wu 2016), owing to competition with mainland China, imbalanced power relations between 立. Hsiung 2014; Fahn 2007), and some of the longest working hours in the world (Huang 2018; Yu. ‧ 國. 學. labor and employers, and structural changes in the Asia Pacific labor market. Many Taiwanese youth are considering leaving the island because of dwindling well-paying employment. ‧. opportunities (Smith 2017; “Global Talent 2021” 2012). Considering these conditions, polling. sit. y. Nat. from Academia Sinica has suggested 40 percent of Taiwanese are open to supporting basic. io. al. er. income (Lin 2017, 135). Whether the concept can enter mainstream discourse in Taiwan, let alone affect policy making, will be determined by the framing of such a policy by Taiwan’s basic. n. iv n C income activists who are the early shapers of the basic income he n g c h i U discussion. This thesis will. explore the development of the discourse and strategy of the basic income movement in Taiwan largely from the perspective of Taiwanese activists advocating basic income, and how basic income fits within the broader context of Taiwan’s economic and social structure.. Research Purpose & Questions This thesis aims to be a comprehensive overview of the discourse and strategy of the basic income movement in Taiwan. That is, how do Taiwan’s basic income activists present their. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(13) 13. values, ideology, and goals in their pursuit of UBI in Taiwan? In the process of formulating the basic income movement, how do activists perceive the factors that influenced the development of the UBI movement on the island? Further understanding the discursive projection of the values of Taiwan’s UBI movement can allow for interrogation of the contextual uniqueness (or similarities) of Taiwan’s discourse and its international counterparts. Such an understanding is especially relevant because basic income movements in the Asia Pacific have recently started to emerge relative to their European counterparts, meaning the context of UBI movements in this. 治政大 of such a discourse Taiwan’s UBI movement allows for future research into the feasibility 立. region are likely less well understood. Moreover, first understanding the discursive framework of. entering mainstream discussions in Taiwan.. ‧ 國. 學. The second element is the strategic construction of the plans and activities of Taiwan’s. ‧. UBI movement. What are the short-term and long-term goals of the movement, and what strategic steps have activists taken to reach these goals? Additionally, this thesis will analyze the. y. Nat. er. io. sit. strategies that were abandoned or altered and the possible motivations behind these strategic alterations. In the process of unpacking activist strategies, it is important to highlight the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. connections between Taiwan’s movement and other emerging basic income movements to. engchi. determine the level of influence from foreign movements on Taiwan’s case. How have Taiwan’s activists connected with more well-established UBI activists and scholars, and to what extent have they incorporated foreign discourse and strategy into the UBI movement in Taiwan? From this research foundation, it can be better understood how the UBI movement in Taiwan has emerged and how it will evolve in the future.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(14) 14. Research Motivation The author’s motivation in pursuing this project was because of the dearth of information regarding Asia Pacific’s basic income movements. I came to Taiwan knowing I would research basic income in the Asia Pacific. I started on this project when I arrived in Taiwan in 2016 as a research subject, but the lack of research and activity in Taiwan led me to organize a basic income conference in Taipei to spark a discussion on the topic. The conference was the basis for the formation of a Basic Income Asia Pacific organization and establishing the structure for UBI. 政治大. Taiwan with help from Enno Schmidt and Ping Xu4, as well as other early members and. 立. supporters of the organization Sarath Davala, James Davis, and Julio Linares. My involvement as. ‧ 國. 學. a participant grew deeper as I continued to research basic income in Taiwan and the Asia Pacific. This thesis is meant to reflect on the movement as it has emerged in its initial stages with this. ‧. author as a participant. The thesis will retain a critical eye to its subject while reflecting some of. y. Nat. io. sit. my perspective as a direct participant.. n. al. er. Taiwan is a unique case internationally because of its unclear political status as a. Ch. i n U. v. province of China or as a sovereign country. This has seemingly stunted the development of the. engchi. Taiwanese identity, but also pushed Taiwan to differentiate itself from mainland China. Through the introduction of democracy, freedom of press and speech, human rights, adherence to international conventions, and most recently Taiwan’s moves to recognize marriage rights for non-heterosexual couples and improve its direct democracy referendum law, Taiwan has often led the Asia Pacific in democratic progression. Democratic developments helped drive Taiwan’s. 4. Ping Xu helped the UBI group in Taiwan led by Juku Shenguang apply for recognition at the BIEN conference in Korea in 2016 with the name UBI Taiwan. Xu is an activist in The Zeitgeist Movement (TZM) in the United States and Kaohsiung, Taiwan, which led to her support for basic income.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(15) 15. introduction of its universal healthcare system in the 1990s, which is often touted globally for its low cost and high quality of care. These dramatic progressions were implemented over a relatively short-period of time and have shown the viability of a liberal-democracy flourishing in a Chinese-speaking country. Taiwan provides evidence that western-derived concepts of democracy have universal value even in Asia, where authoritarian approaches often prevail. Moreover, due to its cultural linkage to Greater China, Taiwan's progress on UBI may provide a model or inspiration for the development of basic income in mainland China in the future.. 治政大in Beijing (Prochazka 2017d), the United Nations Development Program’s Patrick Haverman 立. Likewise, recent round-table UBI discussions among scholars and government officials led by. and the visit of Haverman to Taipei to discuss UBI in the Asia Pacific in March 2018. ‧ 國. 學. demonstrate the potential for mutual influence across the Taiwan Strait regarding basic income.. ‧. For these reasons, this thesis was an intriguing case for me to pursue; How does UBI, a. sit. y. Nat. western-derived concept, fit into the welfare discourse and structures in a place like Taiwan. I set. io. al. er. out to discover if Taiwan has the potential to take the lead in the region on a concept that is often. iv n C direct view of the Taiwanese advocates of their own motivation, but also an intricate h UBI e nand gchi U n. seen as radical or utopian on first-glance. As a participant in the movement, the author has a. look at how the movement evolved in its infancy. It is important this story is told, to provide reflection on why the movement developed in the direction it has thus far, and the likely direction it will take in the future.. Research Methods The discourse and strategy of the basic income movement in Taiwan is informed and shaped by the history and culture of Taiwan’s past and present welfare development and social. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(16) 16. movements. First, literature regarding the history, ideology, and experiments regarding basic income around the world was referenced to provide a foundation with which to compare Taiwan’s movement. To understand the context of Taiwan’s existing economic system, the historical development of Taiwan’s social welfare policy was analyzed by looking at literature related to Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles. The Three Principles ideological framework provides context to the early development of Taiwan’s welfare policies, as it was referenced consistently in policy-making in the early years of Taiwan’s one-party control by the Nationalist Party of. 治政 advancements and limitations will be analyzed to discern the大 starting point for the discourse 立 China, the Kuomintang (KMT) (Wells 2001, 153-154). Next, Taiwan’s social welfare. surrounding and justifying Taiwan’s modern social welfare system, including a discussion of. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan’s universal healthcare program, as this is a relevant instance of the push for. ‧. universalization of social welfare policy in Taiwan with which to compare basic income. Next, this thesis will conduct qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with. y. Nat. er. io. sit. participants of Taiwan’s UBI movement, including key actors in UBI Taiwan and other related groups to provide evidence about how the group sees its own discursive and strategic. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. development. Interviewees were selected based on their level of participation and relevance in. engchi. the basic income movement in Taiwan, including leadership in UBI Taiwan, and participation in Taiwan’s UBI-related groups such as the Taiwan chapter of The Zeitgeist Movement (TZM). Most interviews took place via online video-calling and there is a video record of the call, the rest of the interviews were submitted via text, and a text transcript was retained. Activist resources and research from UBI Taiwan will be referenced and placed in the context of the overall discourse of basic income’s ideological foundation. Discussion of Taiwan’s media publications on basic income, both on the idea and Taiwan’s movement, was included to. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(17) 17. understand initial reactions from journalists and non-supporters at the early stage of Taiwan’s discussion of basic income. This analysis will provide an understanding of how Taiwan’s basic income insiders view their own motivation to participate, as well as how basic income outsiders have constructed the concept in their own reporting and perspectives. Such qualitative unfolding of Taiwan’s basic income movement will provide a real-world context and on the ground account of the formation of the basic income idea in Taiwan. A subjective understanding of the actors involved in developing the discourse of the basic income. 治政 participants see them. To supplement the qualitative aspect as大 the core of this paper, some 立 movement can give insight into the trajectories of the institutions and strategies as the. quantitative analysis of Taiwan’s public attitudes and the effects of automation are provided to. ‧ 國. 學. give greater context to the outside conditions with which the movement is developing, creating a. ‧. feedback loop between insiders and outside. The quantitative aspects of this thesis are meant as a supplement to the qualitative focus and are not meant to be a rigorous quantitative study or a. y. Nat. io. sit. focus of this thesis. Nonetheless, UBI Taiwan’s polling of Taiwan’s public attitudes toward UBI. n. al. er. and analysis of automation’s effects on Taiwan’s wages included in this thesis can provide some. Ch. i n U. v. insight into the development and context of basic income in Taiwan.. engchi. In this paper’s qualitative analysis, three discursive paradigms are used to unpack the basic income movement’s strategy and discourse in Taiwan; discourse analysis of other basic income movements are also included as a comparison and framework for the Taiwan case. First, Political Discourse Theory (PDT) analyzes the discursive formation of social movements and how they lead to the creation of institutions and organizations (Dellagnelo, Bohm, and Mendonca, 2014). This theory will be applied to the identity, dislocation events, antagonisms,. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(18) 18. and articulation of Taiwan’s basic income movement in order to better understand the formation and growth of UBI Taiwan and other related groups. Second, this paper will analyze the extent to which “exclusion” and “inclusion” rhetoric of vulnerable populations is incorporated in Taiwan’s push for basic income and how such rhetoric fits within the broader social welfare discourse in Taiwan. Under the French Revolution’s ideology, exclusion is the product of a disintegration of social bonds between individuals and society, and the resultant crumbling of solidarity. When analyzing exclusion. 治政大the other hand, exclusion rhetoric populations through this discourse of intended integration. On 立 rhetoric, it is critical to determine the possibility for reifying the othered status of the excluded. that emphasizes negative consequences of the current social structure has the possibility to form. ‧ 國. 學. new identities and coalitions (Silver 1994).. ‧. Finally, analysis of the activities and strategy of Taiwan’s basic income movement will utilize Political Acceptance Theory (PAT) as articulated by Deva Woodly (2015). PAT focuses. y. Nat. er. io. sit. on the resonance discourse of social movements and how this discourse functions in the success or failure of their political program with which they attempt to integrate their ideas into the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. mainstream. PAT will be employed to shed light on the how the discourse and activities of. engchi. Taiwan’s basic income movement may affect its ability to be elevated as a mainstream topic in Taiwan. Moreover, this theory can help explain the motivations of activists when pursuing activities to promote basic income.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(19) 19. Chapter Two: Literature Review The modern basic income movement can be traced back to writings by Tom Paine and Thomas Spence, who advocated forms of basic income to redistribute the dividends of nature to all. In the 1960s, the famous free market economist Milton Friedman advocated the Negative Income Tax, which set off a mainstream discussion about an income guarantee in the United States. Analyzing the discourse of recent basic income movements illustrate the different contexts under which activists operate. In Denmark, activists face the dilemma of promoting. 治政 basic income as a technical solution to reform the existing system, 大 or a competing ideology that 立 provides an alternative to the existing system. ‧ 國. 學. In the past few years, concerns about automation have brought renewed attention to basic. ‧. income experiments and cash transfer research. India’s basic income trial showed promising results that countered criticisms that basic income causes laziness. Emerging trials in Finland and. y. Nat. io. sit. Kenya will provide additional scholarship to add to the global basic income debate. In Greater. n. al. er. China, Macau’s Wealth Partaking Scheme and mainland China’s dibao system both provide. Ch. i n U. v. relevant regional case studies for unconditional cash transfers to compare with the potential for a UBI.. engchi. UBI Theory and Discourse Two Eighteenth Century radicals and intellectual godfathers of the modern basic income idea were Tom Paine and Thomas Spence, both of whom based much of their advocacy for basic income on natural rights. Paine wrote in Agrarian Justice that poverty is not a natural state, but rather a consequence of civilization and private property that must be remedied. Based on a. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(20) 20. Lockean understanding on the state of nature, Paine said nature is the common property of humanity, meaning all should benefit from nature and no one should be in a worse state than they would be if there were no private property. Using rent attained from property owners, Paine proposes providing a universal and unconditional lump-sum payment to everyone attaining adulthood, as well as an annual pension to disabled individuals and the elderly (King and Marangos 2006, 60-61). This was conceived of as a right to nature’s benefits and not charity. Less well known, but far more radical than Paine, was Spence, who was influenced by. 政治大 and Paine both agreed on the principle that the benefits of land should be shared among all 立. the Bible and works such as Thomas More’s Utopia (King and Marangos 2006, 63-64). Spence. ‧ 國. 學. people, but Spence attacked Paine for the conservative nature of his proposals. Spence preferred creating common ownership of land and providing all the rent revenue to pay for governmental. ‧. services and the rest to fund a UBI (ibid., 65). Spence’s plan assumed a much higher basic. sit. y. Nat. income provision to fully eliminate poverty.. n. al. er. io. In the modern era, there were several sources that stimulated debate over basic income.. i n U. v. As mentioned above, Milton Friedman proposed a Negative Income Tax (NIT) in 1962 in his. Ch. engchi. book Capitalism and Freedom. Friedman’s NIT proposal is similar to basic income but would not be paid up front, rather it is a refundable tax credit based on an individual’s income that year. Friedman was famous for his steadfast advocacy of capitalism, which made his proposition for NIT more influential in moving conservatives to the idea of a government-guaranteed income. Another prominent neoliberal, Friedrich Hayek, also proposed a minimum income guarantee as a method to secure “real liberty”. Another powerhouse of the era also furthered this debate over income guarantees. Martin Luther King wrote in 1968 that a minimum income guarantee could “abolish” poverty. This culminated in U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Commission on. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(21) 21. Income Maintenance Programs supporting a “basic income support program,” which was essentially an unconditional minimum income guarantee in the form of NIT (Parijs and Vanderborght 2017, 84-90). Upon taking office, President Richard Nixon took this recommendation from the commission and formulated the Family Assistance Plan, which would provide cash assistance to low-income families and workers on the condition that they accept employment opportunities or job training. Senator George McGovern, who was the Democratic presidential nominee against. 政治大 plan. McGovern advocated for an annual and unconditional universal basic income during the 立. the Republican candidate Richard Nixon, proposed a far more generous program than Nixon’s. ‧ 國. 學. presidential campaign. He was later forced to withdraw the proposal over controversy that it would induce laziness. Nixon’s more conservative Family Assistance Plan was also defeated in. ‧. the U.S. Senate by left-wing forces who thought it was not generous enough, and right-wing. sit. y. Nat. forces who thought it was too generous (Parijs and Vanderborght 2017, 90-92).. n. al. er. io. Analysis of more recent basic income global movements have drawn on social movement. i n U. v. discourse theories while comparing their rhetoric and ideology with the institutional. Ch. engchi. representation of the policy idea. An extensive framework for a discursive analysis of Denmark’s debate on basic income is offered by Erik Christensen (2008). In this analysis, Norman Fairclough’s use of metaphors and narratives in analyzing welfare rights and obligations provides understanding for the behavior of political actors and support for specific solutions. Under this framework, the political process uses and inclusion and exclusion to produce a hegemonic discourse with which policies are evaluated (Christensen 2008, 8-9). “The function of ideas is to provide ideological meaning and motivation for action; that of paradigms, to create new knowledge and understanding; that of political discourses, to bring about political. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(22) 22. understanding and support from political actors for certain political solutions, to the exclusion of other and undesired solutions” (Christensen 2008, 21). The exclusion method labels opposing systems as “utopian” or dangerous to the extant system, forcing both proponents and opponents to modify their behavior to match their position as within or outside the system. Christensen (2008) describes basic income as the “unfinished” because it is not yet fully within or opposed to the existing system (37). Reform proponents, on the other hand often deploy the argument of the inevitable collapse of the system if the reform is not implemented. The dilemma for Denmark’s. 治政大 ideology (allowing its the current system and thus neglect its potentiality as a competing 立. basic income activists is whether to frame UBI as a technical solution that can be implemented in. absorption), or a radical idea in opposition to the current system that intends to rekindle. ‧ 國. 學. democratic society (Christensen 2008, 36-39).. ‧. In Denmark’s hegemonic discourse, “activation policy” became a method to evaluate policies, that is how to induce greater employment participation among the poor in the 1990s.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. This created a challenge for basic income activists, as they offered a direct confrontation to the activation discourse because UBI provided no conditions to induce employment, and thus it was. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. excluded from the hegemonic workfare discourse and was stereotyped as heretical to the. engchi. preeminent full employment ideology. The dominant neoliberal perspective rejected basic income in Denmark because of the disconnect between contribution and cost, and such a political environment that elevates neoliberal ideology prevents basic income as it is currently constructed from entering the mainstream political debate. Denmark’s political parties which emphasized economic growth to the greatest extent were also the most vehement opponents of basic income. As basic income exists outside the dominating political agenda, it has not yet been seized by the dominating trend, allowing the idea to exist in limbo between actors on the inside of the system. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(23) 23. while also creating a competing ideological alternative to the hegemonic discourse of the existing system. The labor wage system has a monopoly on the distribution of income, with welfare as absorbed into this system as a temporary safety net with the norm of wage labor still pervasive. Basic income can undermine such concepts of “normality,” as it dissolves the conceptual monopoly between labor and income, and welfare as a “springboard” for labor (Christensen 2008, 11-31). In Japan, the mainstream discussion of basic income is through a “neoliberal” lens. That. 政治大 benefits or drawbacks to the market system in Japan. According to Itaba, the “street activism” for 立 is, those who oppose and support it in mainstream media typically discuss it in relation to the. ‧ 國. 學. basic income draws contrast with the mainstream discussion in that the discourse of activists focus on empowerment of the marginalized, such as women, disabled individuals and rural. ‧. communities (Itaba 2016, 8).. sit. y. Nat. Namibia is a country rich in resources and wealth with high levels of growth. However,. io. al. er. the wealth and resource in Namibia do not typically reach the average person (Littmarck 2010,. iv n C discourse toward transforming the publichview of the potentiality e n g c h i U of basic income by reframing n. 3). In their presentation of basic income, the Namibia basic income movement oriented their. Namibia’s economic situation. Proponents must fight the prevailing discourse of basic income as unaffordable by redefining the locus of affordability by focusing on the vast resources available (largely in the hands of the wealthy) in Namibia rather than the level of poverty in the country. In Namibian activists’ materials, they present basic income as an emancipatory project to escape the poverty trap5 created by traditional welfare programs (Littmarck 2010, 26-28).. A “poverty trap” is created when means-tested government benefits are threatened because an individual decides to take on more work or he or she receives a raise. This rise in income can cause the individual to rise above the 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(24) 24. Littmarck (2010) describes the Namibian activist framing of basic income as the unlocking of the dignity of the poor via restoration of their social existence and engagement in civic society (31). Such dignification of the poor is framed by the activists in contrast to the dependency and distrust generated inherently in the existing social welfare system, which builds conditions as a sign of control due to the perception of general society that the poor cannot make their own decisions. Basic income as empowerment is a discursive theme of the Namibian program, where they explicitly reject the welfare label and instead embrace the transfer as. 治政 the Namibian activists insert wordings that resist the idea that大 basic income is “charity,” but 立. economic empowerment. To reconceptualize the grant away from traditional welfare ideology,. rather a “human right” (Littmarck 2010, 31-39).. ‧ 國. 學. The discourse for these global movements creates a starting point with which to. ‧. contemplate and compare the Taiwan case. Mature basic income movements and their. sit. y. Nat. experiences can provide insight into the dilemmas and potential trajectory of other emerging. io. al. er. movements around the world. Though the basic income cases, such as those outlined above,. iv n C formulate, however, various themes emerge h eacross h i Umovements around the world, such n g cdifferent n. develop in unique ways that depend on the political and economic context under which they. as the competition between radical and reformist discourse. Basic income activists must decide whether to shape their discourse of basic income as a competitive and alternative system to the status quo, or as a necessary measure to preserve the status quo system. Understanding basic. poverty line, thus he or she will lose their government assistance. In turn, some may be reluctant to pursue greater work hours or find better employment. The effects of the poverty trap are more likely to be prevalent if the size of the benefits lost outweighs the amount of income to be potentially gained by increased work hours. Means testing can also reduce take-up for the benefit which may also contribute to increased poverty (Oorschot 2002, 176-178).. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(25) 25. income discourse from this key dilemma creates a basis with which to better understand the strategies and trajectories of basic income movements.. UBI Movements and Experiments The most recent wave of interest in basic income can be traced back to 1986 with the founding of the Basic Income European Network, which would later become Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) as more countries around the globe began to join the organization. By the 2007. 政治大 as a potential solution to inequality and unemployment. Currently, some of the most prominent 立. global financial crisis, an increasing number of economists began looking at basic income again. ‧ 國. 學. supporters come from Silicon Valley, with founders and CEOs of Tesla, Facebook, eBay and Google coming forward to promote discussion of UBI (Standing 2017, 16-17). This discussion. ‧. into basic income has often translated into calls for greater experimentation into cash transfers in. sit. y. Nat. order to determine effects of these policies.. n. al. er. io. Two prominent examples of current basic income experiments that have informed the. i n U. v. global debate about UBI are taking place currently in Finland and Kenya. The Finland. Ch. engchi. experiment has received criticism for its lack of universality and its limited number of individuals who were eligible to be part of the experiment. Finland’s Social Insurance Institution Kela randomly selected 2,000 experimental recipients from a group of 175,000 individuals who were receiving unemployment benefits, providing the chosen recipients about $590 USD a month. The experiment is attempting to measure how sending the basic income without conditions affects labor market participation and income variation (McFarland 2017a). Thus, this approach seems to imply Finland is more interested in a technical reform to their existing targeted welfare system, rather than a more radical overhaul that would provide cash benefits. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(26) 26. regardless of income, because only those eligible unemployment could be part of the experiment. Budget constraints and political will are both limitations that will affect any implementation of basic income. GiveDirectly’s Kenya experiment is attempting to address the criticisms levied at other basic income trials. They are launching the largest pilot study of its kind in history, both in number of recipients and the length of time. Over 21,000 people will receive a cash transfer, and more than 5,000 will receive a long-term basic income for 12 years. The recipient villages will. 政治大 risk-taking and gender relations (“We're running the largest experiment in history”). While this 立 be compared with the control villages to determine how cash transfers affect outcomes such as. ‧ 國. 學. study will address criticisms of universality and length of time, this does not guarantee that it will persuade scholars that the results necessarily applies to contexts outside of rural Kenya.. ‧. Scholars have noted that any basic income experiment should be taken with skepticism and. sit. y. Nat. placed in its proper context (Lehto 2018, 23-24).. n. al. er. io. Previous studies on basic income and cash transfers in general have showed promising. i n U. v. results. During a basic income experiment in India, the villages that received the cash transfers. Ch. engchi. experienced increased economic activity, business creation, productivity among recipients, and education attendance relative to control villages. For women, the basic income increased their economic potential, as women started to create their own businesses and make their own financial decisions. Disabled individuals also saw increased opportunities to work in flexible activities. Importantly, villagers with a basic income saw a substantial decline in indebtedness compared to the control villages (Davala et al. 2015). This allowed villagers to avoid debt-based servitude toward wealthier individuals in the area. India’s government, which has attempted to alleviate sanitation issues, took notice at the improvements toward housing.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(27) 27. More households in target villages improved the safety and sanitation of their homes (e.g. installing toilet systems, mosquito nets, constructing home additions, and obtaining cleaner water and energy). Finally, there was an improvement in nutrition and health outcomes as well as health treatments in target villages. One interesting anecdote provided by the Indian pilot program research demonstrated how a villager borrowed a small amount in order to by necessities for the household. The interest on the loan quickly escalated, and the villager had to give up his land. The basic income paid for his family’s basic expenses and he said the “money. 政治大 A more comprehensive look at other cash-transfer programs around the globe was 立. is to us like a stick is to a blind man” (Davala et al. 2015).. ‧ 國. 學. conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). According to ODI’s analysis of 165 studies of over 15 years of different cash-transfer programs, they found the cash transfers had no. ‧. significant negative effects on work hours among recipients. On the contrary, in some of the. sit. y. Nat. research cited in the study, cash transfers were associated with increased work hours and work. io. al. er. intensity. Moreover, the studies found the cash transfer programs had an overall positive effect. n. on women’s independence, educational attendance, and nutrition (Bastagli et al. 2016).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. A pair of particularly relevant cash transfer programs for the Asia Pacific context can be found in Greater China. These can be used as a foundation for better understanding the cultural and economic context of how cash transfers function and how they are implemented in Greater China. In turn, these cash transfer cases in Greater China can act as a comparison point for the efficacy and limitations of these models. First is Macau’s Wealth Partaking Scheme (WPS) unconditional cash grant, which is paid on an annual basis, amounting to $1,200 for permanent residents and $670 to non-permanent residents in 2017 (McFarland 2017b). Bruce Kwong argues there is evidence politicians have used WPS as a political tool to appease protesters and prevent. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(28) 28. violent demonstrations (Kwong 2013, 93-94). This is not a permanent program (making it distinct from UBI in this sense and that it only provides a partial basic income), but it has been renewed every year since it was initiated in 2008 (McFarland 2017b). It appears there is relatively little academic research on this program, despite being one of the few examples of a universally distributed partial basic income. Macau’s case illustrates that a universal cash program similar to UBI can be feasible in Greater China. Although the unique nature of Macua’s economy (it relies on gambling revenue for its dividend) means that there are also limits to the. 政治大 Second is mainland China’s minimum income guarantee program. Since 1990, the 立. applicability of this model’s implementation method elsewhere.. ‧ 國. 學. People’s Republic of China (PRC) central government has instituted a series of reforms to its welfare system, particularly in rural regions of the country, including providing free compulsory. ‧. education and health services (Golan, Sicular and Umapathi 2014, 4). The most important among. sit. y. Nat. these welfare reforms is the dibao program (最低生活保障), which is a minimum livelihood. al. er. io. guarantee, or income supplement program. It provides a supplement of cash up to the dibao. n. iv n C h e nit gis not the world. Dibao is distinct from UBI because i U but it does satisfy other c huniversal,. poverty standard to recipients and is one of the biggest unconditional cash transfer programs in. elements of UBI’s definition, such as being in cash and having no work conditions, thus it can be an informative case for the functioning of cash transfers in Asia. A 2015 report by the World Bank found that for every 10 RMB spent on dibao, only 1 to 2.4 RMB reached individuals in poverty (cited in “Ham-fisted handouts” 2015). According to Golan, Sicular and Umapathi (2014), the dibao program had only lowered the poverty gap by 6.5 percent. When analyzing the income distribution of dibao recipients, only 54 percent are in the first decile of income distribution, with 20 percent in the second, 16 percent in the third, and 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(29) 29. percent in the fourth (Gustafsson and Deng 2011). This demonstrates that many of the current recipients are well above the dibao standards, showing the difficulty of targeting toward the poor. For the poor families that receive the dibao, there is a substantial benefit gap, with many households receiving much less than what they are entitled to under the program. Thus, the ability for dibao to alleviate mainland China’s poverty rate is limited, because it is often not reaching people in poverty (Gao 2017). PRC’s dibao system demonstrate the issues that can arise from targeted cash programs,. 政治大 means test under this cultural and regional context. Administrative costs of strict means tests 立 providing a context with which to compare the potential of a universal basic income with no. ‧ 國. 學. lower the amount that can reach people in poverty. The means test produces targeting errors that prevent vulnerable communities from receiving the dibao or causing them to receive a lower. ‧. amount than they are entitled to while stigmatizing recipients. UBI’s universality may address. sit. y. Nat. the factors that limit dibao’s efficacy in alleviating poverty. Although, China’s unique. io. al. er. characteristics, such as its one-party government, large population, and uneven development. v. n. throughout the country, mean the applicability of dibao elsewhere may be limited.. Ch. engchi. i n U. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(30) 30. Chapter Three: Context of UBI in Taiwan When evaluating the manifestation of the basic income movement in Taiwan, it should not be divorced from Taiwan’s historic and modern economic and social contexts. Based on this assumption, the discourse and strategy of Taiwan’s basic income activists can be framed under the development of Taiwan in these areas. As such, in order to determine why the basic income movement formed at this moment, and the direction it will take, it is helpful to understand Taiwan’s economic and societal structure, as well as their likely trends in the future.. 立. 政治大. People’s Livelihood, Democratization and Welfare State Development. ‧ 國. 學. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Nationalist Party and government located in Taiwan, was. ‧. heavily influenced by the economist Henry George in developing the Livelihood Principle. sit. y. Nat. (Wells 2001). George was a major intellectual contributor to the modern concept of Universal. io. al. er. Basic Income (Borovali 1998). Sun was a proponent of ensuring the benefits from natural resources, monopolies, and property are shared amongst all citizens, which follows closely with. n. iv n C George’s advocacy for how to fund and h distribute a universal e n g c h i Ubasic income. In his speeches. describing the Three Principles of the People, Sun demonstrated the distinction between the ideology of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that would eventually take over the mainland. Sun wanted to create harmonious relations between labor and capitalists through government interventions in the marketplace. Through these interventions, the government and businesses can cooperate to raise the standard of living for average people. Unlike the communists, Sun wanted to avoid class warfare and did not believe in a dictatorship of the proletariat. That said, Sun’s third principle, the Livelihood Principle, shared many overlapping. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(31) 31. similarities with socialism, although Sun believed in a gradual method of implementation rather than the radical and violent class struggle of the Communists (Wells 2001). The stated aim of the Livelihood Principles was adequate nutrition, inexpensive clothes, shelter and transportation for all. In exchange for such protections, Sun believed in converting idle individuals into laborers as a sort of work obligation to society. Initially, Sun had to downplay his ideology’s relationship and support of socialism because of his fear of retribution from the West. After it became clear that Western countries would not provide the necessary aid,. 治政大 to redistribute capitalistChina. By 1924, Sun acknowledged the necessity for land reform 立. he would exaggerate the relationship in order to win support from Russia in the race to unify. controlled land to peasants. To Sun, one of the core components of wealth inequality in China. ‧ 國. 學. was due to increasing land values in urban areas, which he believed could be alleviated through a. ‧. land tax. The revenue derived from the land tax could be used to pay for the programs espoused in his Livelihood Principle (Wells 2001). However, Sun’s principles were written solely. y. Nat. io. sit. regarding mainland China and make no mention of Taiwan. Nonetheless, when the KMT landed. n. al. er. in Taiwan after the loss of China’s civil war, many of the issues plaguing peasants in mainland. Ch. China were persistent in Taiwan as well.. engchi. i n U. v. Sun’s “People’s Livelihood” principle, within his “Three Principles of the People” ideology was arguably partially used as an ideological foundation for the land-reform policy implemented in Taiwan (Wells 2001, 153-154). Sharing the benefits of the land with all Taiwanese brought about equitable and rapid growth in Taiwan (Li 2015; Yueh 2009). This creates a historical stage of the stated attempt to distribute economic growth more equitably throughout Taiwan; The Three Principles ideology arguably demonstrates a historical linkage between the ideology of UBI and the founder of Taiwan’s ROC government, particularly due to. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(32) 32. Sun’s inspiration from UBI-supporter Henry George. This linkage exists in the ideological underpinnings and intentions of Sun’s Livelihood Principle and UBI. While the Constitution of the Republic of China includes sections based on Sun’s principles, including the promotion of social welfare in article 155 and the provision of a public medical service system in article 157, Hill and Hwang argue that Sun’s Three Principles cannot directly explain Taiwan’s welfare state development under the KMT prior to democratization, as they were primarily attempting to legitimize their rule (Hill and Hwang 2005, 149).. 治政大and society is the foundation regardless of their background and distribute the gains of nature 立 Ensuring that everyone’s necessities are satisfied to increase opportunity for all. with which UBI is traditionally derived, which is shared with Sun’s Livelihood Principle.. ‧ 國. 學. However, Sun’s promotion of in-kind benefits, such as shelter, provides contrast between his. ‧. ideology and that of UBI, which allows for maximum flexibility for recipients since it is provided in cash. This creates an important contrast in the implementation method of. y. Nat. er. io. sit. guaranteeing everyone’s basic necessities between UBI and Sun’s Livelihood Principle, whereas the former puts trust in the individual through unconditional cash and the latter entrusts. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. government officials to meet this guarantee by purchasing these goods for individuals.. engchi. Additionally, Sun’s belief in providing labor conditions on citizens runs counter to the unconditionality component of basic income. While both UBI and Sun’s Livelihood Principle prescriptions are often derived from a similar ideological premise that government should guarantee necessities, the more paternalistic implementation method of Sun’s Livelihood Principle contradicts many UBI proponents’ ideological principle to maximize freedom and choice through cash. Nonetheless, Sun’s core idea of ensuring universal basic livelihood does emanate one of the main ideological aspects of basic income, which is to guarantee everyone’s. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(33) 33. basic needs are met to facilitate freedom of action. While the motivations of the KMT in implementing welfare were largely to ensure its legitimacy in ruling Taiwan, the KMT’s rhetorical utilization of the Livelihood Principle provides a historical framework and a source for policy discourse that is understandable for populations in Taiwan which may have limited historical figures or ideologies to draw upon for justifying welfare policies. The road to Taiwan’s current social welfare system has been one fraught with challenges and disruptions. When the KMT fled to Taiwan after they lost mainland China to the Communist. 治政大 of familial responsibility were the social welfare needs of the Taiwanese. Traditional conceptions 立 Party, they were primarily concerned with taking back mainland China and thus often ignored. the primary method the KMT government relied on to address poverty, and the government was. ‧ 國. 學. to retain a limited role regarding the provision of welfare benefits (Liu 2006, 11). Over time, the. ‧. KMT recognized that in order to preserve their legitimacy they had to provide some safety net. In turn, they began offering limited welfare protections to core constituencies, such as the. y. Nat. io. sit. military, government officials, and teachers (Fell 2018; Qi 2013). These core groups were. n. al. er. provided the benefits to keep them under the KMT’s control and win support (Aspalter 2006,. Ch. i n U. v. 293; Fell 2018; Lin 2004; Ku 1995). Welfare expenditures to preferred groups, such as veterans,. engchi. continued to create inequities in Taiwan’s social welfare into the 2000s (Liu 2006, 24). Overtime the developmental welfare state mindset prevailed, which prioritized frugal spending on welfare to ensure maximum economic growth, as welfare spending would require growth-limiting tax increases (Qi 2013). Welfare was seen by Taiwan’s government officials as a “consumptive” and wasteful practice that limits economic growth (Liu 2006, 22; Fell 2018). In this regard, Taiwan followed along the East Asian welfare model, which deprioritizes social welfare under industrial development (Aspalter 2006, 290). The East Asian welfare model is. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(34) 34. often attributed to Confucian traditions in Western research on the region’s welfare regimes, but such a link to Confucianism may not be precise because of the differences that exist between the different countries in the region (Walker and Wong 2005, 7-11). Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980s and 1990s opened new space for civic movements for expanded welfare systems, emphasizing expanded categories for receiving aid (Aspalter 2006, 291; Ku 1995; Qi 2013). With the onset of national elections, the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) pushed for universal social welfare programs as part of its campaign, creating democratic. 治政大as one option to do so. In order to forced the KMT to prove its domestic legitimacy, with welfare 立 competition with the KMT over welfare (Liu 2006, 14). Increasing diplomatic isolation also. contend with these democratic challenges, the KMT responded with more and more generous. ‧ 國. 學. welfare policies. The initial reform to welfare by the KMT in the 1990s was not necessarily. ‧. universal programs, but often more clientele-based welfarism meant to ensure the KMT’s reelection (Qi 2013; Fell 2018).. y. Nat. er. io. sit. The 1995 implementation of universal health care in Taiwan opened the discursive space toward universal social services for the nation as a method to rectify the inequity problems that. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. arose from previous discriminatory social welfare programs. Universal health care was the first. engchi. instance of a Taiwanification of social policy, as the health care program was for all of Taiwan and delineated a Taiwanese identity in social welfare law (Lin 2004). Taiwan’s National Health Insurance program quickly gained popularity and has been cited as a global example for government guaranteed universal access to health care with short waiting times and comprehensive care (Wu, Majeed, and Kuo 2010). The 2008 global financial crisis tested Taiwan’s universal and means-tested programs. A study by Wang and Chen (2012) found that universal services were more effective than targeted. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(35) 35. benefits at assisting families exit poverty and stay out of poverty. The study argued this was because the universal services were “more comprehensive and the benefit levels were higher” than the means-tested programs which meant to target the aid to low-income individuals and households (Wang and Chen 2012). Despite the success Taiwan experienced in implementing universal health care, in many ways Taiwan severely lags behind other Western developed countries with its current welfare system. Taiwan’s low level of welfare spending stands in stark contrast to its relatively high. 治政大Germany and Sweden, and the world for its GDP per capita (IMF 2018). This is just below 立. levels of wealth and development. When adjusted for purchasing power, Taiwan ranks 19th in. higher than regional economies such as South Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, data from Taiwan’s. ‧ 國. 學. government showed in 2015, Taiwan spent $153 billion NTD ($5 billion USD) on non-medical. ‧. social welfare programs (“2015 Taiwan Health and Welfare Report” 2017), which encompasses a variety of sometimes overlapping in-kind benefits and some cash transfer programs. According. y. Nat. er. io. sit. to a calculation by Cabestan and deLisle, Taiwan spent an average of five to six percent of its GDP on social services in the last half of the previous decade, which is significantly lower than. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. the United States and many other developed countries (Cabestan and deLisle 2014, 97). OECD. engchi. statistics show that Taiwan’s social welfare spending is lower than its neighbors South Korea and Japan, and significantly lower than OECD countries, which average 21 to 22 percent welfare spending relative to GDP (Sui 2013; “Society at a Glance” 2016; “OECD Social Indicators” 2016, 109). Cabestan and deLisle blame these low levels of welfare spending on weak unions and weak proportional representation (Cabestan and deLisle 2014, 97). The welfare system in Taiwan has not kept up with rapidly changing global and national conditions. Wang Yun-tung argued that Taiwan’s “all-or-nothing” welfare system incentivizes. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(36) 36. individuals and households to remain below the poverty line in order to continue receiving their benefits (Wang 2004; Alemdar 2017). This dilemma of means testing is traditionally called a “poverty trap,” where the withdrawal of welfare benefits can create a high marginal effective tax rate meaning that recipients may lose more benefits than they gain in labor income. Means testing also increases the difficulty of applying for benefits for vulnerable groups and can create social division by stigmatizing recipients (Oorschot 2002). Leu and Wang argue that the poverty trap has been a characteristic of Taiwan’s social assistance programs. High marginal effective tax. 治政大and Wang 2011, 192-193). being low-income, decreasing their incentive to find a job (Leu 立. rates faced by low-income individuals can exceed 100 percent if they lose their qualification as 6. Wu Dongyan, UBI Taiwan’s former Public Relations Director, in his interview with this. ‧ 國. 學. author said Taiwan received much of its work-centered ideology from Japan, and the idea of. ‧. piety toward one’s family from China. He said a head of household’s ability to support their family is how society evaluates if someone is a good person. This can help explain why Taiwan. y. Nat. er. io. sit. is hesitant to expand its welfare state, because of the reification of jobs in society and the stigma attached to joblessness. At the same time, the United States has played a vital role in creating an. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. individualist bent in Taiwan among young people especially. As a result, Taiwan has become. engchi. stuck in the middle between these Eastern and Western influences while not reaching the extremes of either side, Wu said. These factors have produced the current family and work centered system in Taiwan, he argued, while also opening the possibilities for young people to push back against some of these traditions. In particular, Wu said the ideals of UBI is consistent with the emerging ideology of young women in Taiwan who wish to pursue their own desires rather than being controlled by their husband or children. As a result, Wu said he thinks. Leu and Wang conclude that Taiwan’s poverty trap issue may mean Taiwan should consider a “basic income” for every individual (Leu and Wang 2011, 192-193). 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(37) 37. Taiwanese who lean more toward the individualism of Western countries are also more likely to support UBI.. Rising Socioeconomic Inequality Over the past decade, Taiwan’s equity and property markets have soared, with $17 trillion New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) ($561 billion USD) being created over the years 2006 to 2010. During this time, almost none of this new wealth was taxed by Taiwan’s government. 政治大 status as a haven for business, emulating the low tax ratios in places like Singapore and Hong 立 (Chang 2012; Huang, Ciou, Hu, Chen and Hung 2014). Taiwan has attempted to preserve its. ‧ 國. 學. Kong. A primary cause of rising inequality and low taxation was due to globalization and the increased influence businesses have on Taiwan’s government to keep them in the country. ‧. (Huang, Ciou, Hu, Chen and Hung 2014). This situation has translated into Taiwan retaining one. sit. y. Nat. of the lowest tax burdens as a percent of GDP (estimated as 16.3 percent in 2017) in the world.. io. al. er. Taiwan’s tax burden is lower than even Hong Kong (estimated as 19.8 percent in 2017) which is. iv n C International Tax Review furthers that Taiwan’s tax revenue ratio to Gross National h e n ggovernment chi U n. notorious for its laissez faire economy (“TAXES AND OTHER REVENUES”). A report by the. Product is below 13 percent, lower than much of the developed world, including regional neighbors Japan and South Korea (Ho, Chen, Lee and Hsu 2015). Taiwan’s low tax burden has two implications. First, it demonstrates there may be a substantial amount of untaxed wealth in Taiwan that could be utilized for social welfare7. Alternatively, Taiwan’s lack of tax revenue illustrates the administrative and political limits of increasing taxes in Taiwan. Thus, while it. It should be noted that Taiwan’s low tax burden does not include pension contributions, which if included would lower the theoretical amount of wealth that could be taxed for UBI. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.

(38) 38. may be economically feasible to increase welfare spending because of the sheer amount of untaxed wealth that exists in Taiwan, it may be politically and administratively difficult to increase taxes. Taiwan’s former head of the Ministry of the Interior’s social assistance section Lee Pi-ju said increased precariousness in Taiwan was due to the increase in single-parent families and alterations in Taiwan’s economy (Sui 2013). While precariousness has increased, Taiwan’s social safety net has remained strict in its means testing for its social relief and welfare services. 政治大 and social structure in Taiwan has affected the demographics on the island. A poll of Taiwanese 立 (Chen 2001; Chen 2008, 5; Sui 2013). The insecurity produced by these shifts in the economy. ‧ 國. 學. youth reported a major reason they are not having children is because they do not have sufficient financial security to support a child (Chen 2016). Under this context, Taiwan was ranked as the. ‧. world’s third lowest fertility rate in 2017 (“Total Fertility Rate” 2017). Additionally, Taiwan is. sit. y. Nat. on track to reach super-aged society status by 2025, meaning 20 percent of Taiwan’s population. io. al. er. will be elderly by that time, and nearly 40 percent will be over age 65 by 2025 (Chen 2016;. iv n C small working-age population threatening stability of the country. Compounding the h the e ninternal gchi U n. Hsueh and Wang 2008). Such a high elderly population will leave Taiwan with an increasingly. low fertility rate is that many young people are leaving Taiwan to find opportunities in other countries due to stagnant wages in Taiwan. According to an Oxford Economics report in 2012, Taiwan will have the most acute talent deficit in the world by 2021 (“Global Talent 2021” 2012; Smith 2017). Regarding working hours, a poll of Taiwanese by 1111 Job Bank in April 2018 found that Taiwan is ranked sixth in the world for longest working hours (Huang 2018). Previously Taiwan has ranked even higher in working hours; In 2015, Taiwan’s Ministry of Labor found. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.011.2018.A07.