The views expressed within the Taiwan Perspective are that of the individual authors and are not intended to represent those of any other party, affiliation or organization.
ISSUE NO.114 Oct. 2, 2007 http://www.tp.org.tw
I
nstitute for National Policy Research
Taiwan’s Entry to the UN and Cross-Strait Relations
By Tung Chen-yuanI. The Content of the Referendum for Taiwan’s Entry to the United Nations
A. The referendum for Taiwan’s entry to the United Nations was initiated by the public; it is a democratic right of the people, and the government has no power to cancel such an act. The mechanism of the public poll cannot replace the legal effect that is bestowed in a referendum.
B. The Taiwanese people, using the most democratic methods, the most peaceful means, and in the most humble fashion wish to pursue support of international justice and cease the international political apartheid of Taiwan caused by China.
C. Using the name “Taiwan” emphasizes the justification of the country to participate in the United Nations; it is a means of representing 23 million people, neither a battle for the legitimate representation of China, nor a move to contend for a seat on the Security Council.
II. The Significance of the Referendum for Taiwan’s Entry to the United Nations A. To express the collective wish of the Taiwanese for the survival and
development of their country.
B. To stress the reality of Taiwan’s isolation by the international political apartheid.
C. To expose the lie of the “One China Policy.”
III. The Strategies and Reactions of China A. Displaying Internal Restraint
1. China’s verbal attacks and military threats to Taiwan have so far been limited.
2. Article 8 of the Anti-Separation Law has not been invoked by the Chinese government.
3. The Chinese government addresses cross-strait issues in a manner that separates economics from politics for cross-Strait political confrontation and cross-Strait economic exchange. B. Allying with Other Countries to Suppress Taiwan
1. When addressing foreign relations, the Chinese government claims that the “UN Entry Referendum poses a huge threat on peace in the Taiwan Strait”, implying that the Chinese
government “might take military action on Taiwan”. The Chinese government attempts to hijack the international community by “peace and security in the Asia pacific area”, and pushes for the international community to suppress Taiwan. 2. The Chinese government pressures the UN Secretary General
and Chair of General Assembly to return Taiwan’s bidding application letters and deliberately misinterprets the meaning of UN Resolution 2758, insisting that “Taiwan is part of the PRC”. They reject Taiwan’s application for UN entry. The Chinese government attempts to legally annex Taiwan, wanting Taiwan to waver in the face of the presented obstacles and difficulties. C. Causing Division Within Taiwan
1. Exploiting business to press politics - the Chinese government has demanded Taiwanese businessmen to spare no efforts in opposing Taiwan’s UN Bid referendum under the threat of causing serious damage on cross-strait economic exchanges and cooperation.
2. Exploiting economic inducement for cooperation: the Chinese government hopes to allow Fujian residents to travel to Penghu by the Mid-Autumn Festival and to loosen measures governing the amount of small trade between China and Taiwan.
3. Inciting the Pan-Blue Coalition and attack the Pan-Green Coalition: the Chinese government concentrates its attacks on the “UN Entry Referendum under the Name of Taiwan”, but avoids attacking the “UN Re-Entry Referendum”, hoping to unify the Pan-Blue Coalition and weaken the Pan-Green Coalition.
IV. The Strategies and Reactions of the United States of America A. Maintaining a Balanced Position
1. To Taiwan: Neither Taiwan nor the Republic of China is a sovereign state.
2. To China: The U.S. disagrees with the statement of the UN Secretary-General and Secretariat claiming that “Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic of China”.
B. Adopting a Dual Deterrence Strategy
1. To Taiwan (in opposition of independence): The U.S. does not support Taiwan’s entry to the UN; the U.S. opposes the “UN Entry Referendum”. The U.S. believes the referendum to be Taiwan’s first step in declaring independence and will lead to change of status quo across the Taiwan Strait; the referendum goes against President Chen’s promise not to change Taiwan’s national name.
2. To China (in opposition of military action): President Bush claims that Taiwan and the U.S. have an allegiance of security and supports the democracy of Taiwan. Assistant Secretary Thomas J. Christensen mentions that strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security. The U.S. has announced that they will sell 12 surplus P-3C maritime patrol aircrafts and 144 SM-2 Block 3A Standard missiles to Taiwan.
V. The Strengthening of Taiwan-U.S. Communication
A. The U.S. government’s view on the UN entry referendum shows four points of divergence between Taiwanese and U.S. standpoints.
1. The Taiwanese people’s frustration due to China’s international suppression and military threats.
2. The Taiwanese people’s strong aspiration to have representation in the United Nations.
3. Whether or not the “UN Entry Referendum” changes the status quo.
4. Whether or not the “UN Entry Referendum” changes the national name of Taiwan.
B. We call for the establishment of a high-level communications channel between the U.S. and Taiwan through which the two countries could solve
disputes, maintain alliances of security and values, promote common interests, and increase shared values. The communication and cooperation between Taiwan and the U.S. play an important role on democracy, peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.
VI. The Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations
China should have a correct understanding of Taiwan’s peaceful appeal for international participation and collective security in the international community, as well as realizing the abhorrence and pressure the Taiwanese feel due to China’s long-lasting military, diplomatic, and political suppression.
To promote the positive development in the cross-strait relations, we call for two things:
A. Since the Chinese government claims to “give hope to the Taiwanese people,” it should listen carefully to the mainstream opinions of the Taiwanese and respect Taiwan’s democracy. The Chinese government should not obstruct the Taiwanese people’s right to express their opinion by holding a referendum through the democratic process.
B. The Chinese government should give up provocations against Taiwan by its military threats and international suppression. Instead, it should take effective measures to improve the cross-strait relations; otherwise, “giving hope to the Taiwanese people” will only end up in more disappointment.
*The paper was presented at the National Policy Forum, hosted by Institute for National Policy Research on “Taiwan’s Entry to the UN and Cross-Strait Relations”. Sep. 16, 2007.
(Tung Chen-yuan is Vice Chairman of Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan.)
Institute for National Policy Research (INPR)
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