Newly Found Democracy in Indonesia:
Religion and Electoral Behaviour
Aris Ananta
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore
(aananta@iseas.edu.sg)
Introduction
“Is my religion the best religion and does it have the only truth, that other religions and faiths are wrong and the followers are sinners?”
The answer to this question has been long debated within many, if not all, religions, especially those following the Abrahamian traditions. This question has become a source of tensions within one religious community and/ or among different religious
communities. For example, one group may argue that there was only one God, that is the God worshipped by their religion, and the gods worshipped by others are not God. Therefore, their religion is the best religion. It is in their faith, that other religious followers are sinners, because these followers worship those other than their God.
The other group believes on relative truth--the Truth itself. “My religion is the best for me, but not necessarily so for you. Your religion is the best for you, but it may not be for me.” This group can be referred to those who believe in religious pluralism. They are relatively easy to adjust to the changing social and economic environments.
The first group may not be as tolerant as the second, but there are at least two sub-groups in the first group. One is those who believe that their religion is the best one, but they let other people have their own religion. They do not bother about others. At most, they may share their believe with others. They inflict no violence and they are
compatible with democratic values, and they are closer to the religious pluralism. Another is those who believe that their religions is the best one and they work hard to make others follow their religion or their interpretation of the religion. Some use non-violence ways to make others following their religions or interpretations of the religions, others are more inclined to use violence. This sub-group, whether using
violence or non-violence approach, may make others uncomfortable. This sub-group may aim for an eventual religious homogeneity. They are relatively more conservative and difficult to adjust to the dynamic environment.
Yet, as explained in Partridge (2004), religions and their interpretations, have never been static. They follow the process of evolution, shaped by changing social, economic, and political environments. It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout the history of religion in all societies, people have made reforms to the existing concepts and rituals, and there had been revival of old concepts and rituals. People have made new emphases. Indeed, in the 1950-2000 there had been a surge of new religions, sects and alternative spiritualities in the world, partly as a result of globalisation.
This phenomenon of globalisation may have worried some Islamic leaders in the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia—Indonesian Ulema Council). On 26-29 July 2005 the MUI issued 11 fatwa (edict). Some of the fatwa have made religious pluralism as
haram, against the teaching of Islam. The MUI may have produced a standard
interpretation of Islam, and others are not allowed to have different interpretations. MUI wants to be the sole authority to define what Islam is. This is contrary to the fact that there are many other interpretations of Islam, and Indonesia is a country full of many different interpretations, including the various interpretation of syariah.i
Not surprisingly, the fatwa is not without strong resistance. Some well known figures such as Gus Dur (the fourth Indonesian president) and Azyumardi Azra (a scholar) have argued that the MUI should withdraw its fatwa. Hasyim Muzadi, the
chairperson of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the largest Islamic social organisation in Indonesia, also attacked the MUI. Indonesia is a heterogeneous country and, they argue, people should be allowed to have different interpretation in their religions.
Regarding this controversial fatwa, Osman (2005) reported that the NU and MUI have contested to win the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims. Such a contest may become more common in Indonesia as the people have learnt to enjoy democracy, shown by the relatively peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004 as well as the current elections of the regional heads. Will Indonesia develop into a religious authoritarian Islamic state as defined by the MUI, or choose a more pluralistic society as suggested by the NU? Will the Indonesian society make the decision peacefully and
maintain the trend of emerging democracy? Partridge (2004) argued that a society can have a long run religious homogeneity only if the state maintains it with its power.
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to answer such a question. Rather, the objective of this paper is to discuss the conditions of religious diversity in Indonesia in relation to the political development, particularly, electoral behaviour in Indonesia. It starts with an examination on religious freedom in Indonesia. It then discusses the regional composition of religious followers, and some of its political implications. The discussion on regional composition is very crucial because of the fact that Indonesia is a large archipelagic country having the world fourth largest number of population with more than 1000 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups.ii The importance of this regional variation has been strengthened with the implementation of regional autonomy since 2001, where the local governments at the district level have acquired much larger power.
Next, the paper examines electoral behaviour, especially as related to the battle between pluralism and homogeneity. The discussion in this section is built upon Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata (2004, 2005). A novel demographic approach is utilised to anticipate behavioural changes toward a more democratic values. The use of the demographic approach has been made possible with the availability of estimates and projections of Indonesian fertility and mortality by ethnicity and religions (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar, 2005).
The fourth section of this paper presents a case study in the province of Riau Archipelago, studying the relationship between religion and electoral behaviour in the era of the newly found democracy. The presentation of the case study does not
necessarily imply that what happen in this province represents what happen in other parts of Indonesia. It is simply an illustration of the relationship between religion and politics, by examining in details the relationship between religion and ethnicity as well as some social and economic variables. Such a study is the first not only for the province of Riau Archipelago, but also for other provinces and Indonesia as a whole.
The paper is concluded with a possibility of rising pragmatic politics and independence of individual in their voting behaviour in Indonesia.
Religious Freedom
Indonesia is not a country based on religion, nor Islam, though the Muslims is the majority (88.2%) of the population. The state ideology is the so called Panca Sila (Five Principles). The first principle is the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, meaning believe in the One-ness of God, regardless the religion and faith. In this sense, the Panca Sila
guarantees religious freedom to the Indonesian people and Indonesia can be a society of religious pluralism, where everybody can choose their own religion and decide on what interpretations and rituals they want. Indeed, it can be similar to what is now happening in most Western countries, where Christianity is still the largest religion. However, the Christianity is no longer the dominant one. There have been many other religions, other than Christianity, and/or different and new sects within Christianity itself, currently found anywhere in the western countries (Partridge, 2004, p.10).
Yet, despite the first principle of the Panca Sila, Indonesia recognizes only six official religions, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Confucianism. Other religions are not officially recognized. People must have a religion and choose from the available six religions only. In this sense, there is limited religious freedom in Indonesia, because people are not allowed to have religions other than those six religions.iii Confucianism, for an example, had not been recognized as a religion in the period of 1979-1999. During this period, people who followed Confucianism had to sdeclare that they followed another religion, and mostly said they were Buddhists.
It is no wonder that the existence of Ahmadiyah is now being debated, with the MUI issuing a fatwa to ban the Ahmadiyah.iv Ahmadiyah, argued by the MUI, is not Islam; it is a different religion and not recognised by the Republic of Indonesia and therefore it must be banned.
However, the government of Indonesia decided to reject the the MUI’s demand to dissolve Ahmadiyah. The government said that if the MUI still wants to ban the group, the MUI must file the case to the court. Interestingly, because of this controversial fatwa, some experts have recommended the government to officially acknowledge religions outside the current six official religions. (Saraswati, 2005).
In addition to the six official religions, there are many different sects within each religion, especially among the Muslims and Christians. In each religion there are those who are more conservative and those who are more liberal and pluralistic. There are those who follow pluralism or close to pluralism, and there are those who aim at homogeneity. The difference can also depend on where they live or what ethnic group they belong.
An illustration is the Javanese Muslims, especially those who live in East Java, who are often known as the “traditionalists”, strong supporters of the PKB, a Pancasila party with the Muslims as the basic constituents. The “traditionalist” here does not necessarily imply “traditional”, but it simply refers to the Muslims, who have adjusted to local (Javanese) culture, including some of the Hindus and Buddhist traditions. These traditionalists are also the basic constituents of the NU, the largest Islamic social
organisation in Indonesia and the main supporter of the PKB. The traditionalists are very likely follow pluralism.
The Javanese Muslims can be different from the Minang or Malay Muslims. Most Minang or Malay Muslims are the “modernists”, where “modernist” does not necessarily mean “modern” either. The “modernist” simply refers to those who do not want to adjust the Islamic rituals to the local (especially Javanese) traditions. The modernists attempt to purify the tradition of Islam.v They are the basic constituents of the Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic social organisation in Indonesia, with Yogyakarta as the home town. The Muhammadiyah, and the modernist, are the most important voters for the PAN (a Pancasila party which often perceived to be closer to an Islamic party) and PKS (an Islamic party) The modernists, nevertheless, are not necessarily against pluralism Some of them do not support the establishment of an Islamic state and even the legal
implementation of syariah. A group of Muhammadiyah such as the “Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah” [Network of Muhammadiyah Young Scholars] is an example of “liberal” modernists.
There have been numerous studies on different aliran (sect) in Islam in Indonesia, though there has been no equivalent number of studies on sects in Christianity in
Indonesia. The traditionalist and modernists are simply two of the many aliran in Indonesia. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss each aliran or even
sect in each officially recognised religions in Indonesia. For a quick summary of some
aliran, readers are referred to Woodward (no date).
Regional Variation
Indonesia has the largest number of Muslims in the world, followed by Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Iran, and Egypt. Though Muslims constituted the majority of the Indonesian population, the Indonesian population is not exclusively Muslim. Pakistan and Iran’s population were almost exclusively Muslims, with more than 95.0% of their population were Muslims. Indonesia, along with Bangladesh and Egypt, has less than 95.0% of its population as Muslims. In India, with the third largest number of Muslims in the world, Muslims constituted only 11% of the total Indian population.
Because Indonesia is a very large and heterogeneous country, the concentration of Muslims also varies by province and district. Some provinces were almost exclusively Muslim, with the province of Gorontalo having the highest concentration (98.15%). The province of Gorontalo borders with the province of North Sulawesi, where the Muslims constituted only 29.48%. Yet, the two provinces used to be one province of “North Sulawesi”—it split into two provinces after reformasi because of the difference in religions.
A split had also occurred in the formerly known province of Maluku into a new Maluku and North Maluku. These are two most restive areas in Indonesia during the
reformasi. The Muslims in Maluku formed 49.05% of the population, while they formed
a high percentage of 85.25% in the North Maluku. The concentration of the Muslims in the “old” province of Maluku would be about 62.0%. As shown, the split has resulted in more “segregation” of the Christian and Muslims.
In the last six years we have often heard of “religious” conflicts in Maluku. The conflict has been more severe in the “new” province of Maluku where the number of Muslims and non-Muslims (mostly Christians) are almost the same. “Similar” conflict occurred in the regency of Poso (Central) Sulawesi, where the Muslims constituted just a little bit than half of the total population. Seemingly, “religious” conflict can be more
easily provoked in regions where the number of Muslims is almost equal to that of the Christian. If one of the religious group is relatively small in number, there will not be any retaliation and the unrest will not sustain.
On the other hand, the province of East Nusa Tenggara had the lowest
concentration of Muslims (8.80%). Most (87.67%) of its population was Christians. This is the poorest province in Indonesia, located in Eastern Indonesia. It bordered in the east with the former province of East Timor, with Christians as the majority, and in the west with the province of West Nusa Tenggara, which was almost exclusively Muslims (96.57%). West Nusa Tenggara is also a poor province, but still better than East Nusa Tenggara.
The Muslims concentration varies more at the district level. At the provincial level, there was no province with exclusively Muslim population (at least 99.0%), but there are exclusively Muslim districts found in some provinces. First is the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, in the northern tip of Sumatra, a restive area, and famous as the
Serambi Mekkah of Indonesia, and had been granted the right to implement syariah.
Seven out of ten regencies in this province were exclusively Muslims. The only two municipalities were almost exclusively Muslims. It should be noted that this province has been devastated by Tsunami in December 2003.
Other provinces with many exclusively Muslim districts were: West Sumatra, West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, and South Sulawesi.
On the other hand, the districts with lowest concentration (less than 1.0%) of Muslims were found in Eastern Indonesia, particularly in the natural resource rich province of Papua (3 districts), the poor province of East Nusa Tenggara (2 district), and tourist area province of Bali (1 district).
The second largest religious group is the Christian (comprising both Protestantism and Catholicism). It formed 8.92% of the population in 2000. It is a minority group in the Muslim majority country. However, in some provinces the concentrations were very large, though there was no exclusive or even almost exclusively Christian province. The largest concentration of Christian (87.67%) was found in the poor province of East Nusa Tenggara, followed by the natural resource rich province of Papua (75.51%), the
(50.19%). All of these provinces are located in the Eastern Indonesia. In other words, there were greater percentages of Christians and non-Muslims in the Eastern Indonesia than in Western Indonesia.
The third largest was a tiny minority, the Hindus, comprising only 1.81% of Indonesian total population. Most of the Indonesian Hindus were found in the Island of Bali (86.13%), but Bali is not exclusively Hindus and neither almost exclusively Hindus. The concentration of Hindus in Bali was only 87.44%. Central Kalimantan was the next largest concentration of Hindus (7.87%).
Another tiny minority was the Buddhist, forming only 0.84% of the total
Indonesian population. The largest concentration was only 7.23%, found in the province of Bangka-Belitung and West Kalimantan (6.41%). This can be partly related to the existence of the Chinese in these two provinces (11.54% in Bangka-Belitung and 9.46% in West Kalimantan).
Electoral Behaviour
Indonesia has stride in along journey toward democracy. In terms of electoral behaviour, Indonesian started its first democratic election in 1955. After that, there were many elections, but all of them were “engineered” by the government and everybody had been able to know the results of the election even long time before the elections were
conducted. The second one only took place in 1999, under Habibie, the third president of Indonesia. The third, comprising both parliamentary and presidential elections, was held in 2004 under Megawati, the fourth president, and this was also the first time Indonesia had a direct presidential election. Earlier, the president and vice president were elected by the parliaments. The fourth, which is currently still going on, is the general elections for heads of regional governments—governors and mayors.
Religious homogeneity versus pluralism
In the 1955 election, there were four major parties: PNI (Indonesian National Party), gaining 22 %; Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), 21%; Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Islamic Scholars), 19%; and PKI (Indonesian Communist Party),
17%. The majority of PNI and PKI voters were non Muslims, and secularists and pluralists. NU and Masyumi were Islamic parties, strong proponents for an Islamic state based on syariah. Clearly, there was a contest of , roughly, two opposing groups: the one who wanted the state being separated from religion (particularly Islam) and those who argued that state and religion could not be separated.
In the terms used in the introduction of this paper, the contest was between those who favoured religious pluralism, represented by PNI and PKI, against those who preferred religious (Islamic) homogeneity, represented by NU and Masyumi. (NU under the leadership of Gus Dur has drastically changed its stance and has become a strong proponent of the separation of state and religion.) Though around 85% of the Indonesian population was Muslims, the percentage of voters choosing Islamic parties was much smaller than 85%, indicating, that religious loyalty was weak, if it existed. The results also showed that more voters preferred the parties with religious pluralism. The NU and Masyumi together were chosen by only 43.5% of the total voters.
In the 1999 election, the parties which officially claim Islam as their ideology suffered a decline in the support. They only earned 17.7% of the total vote, much smaller than 43.5% in 1955. However, the PKB and PAN, two of the Pancasila parties, were often perceived as Islamic parties. Most of the constituents of the parties were Muslims, though PKB is seen as more inclined to pluralism than the PAN. Even if these two parties were included as Islamic parties, arguing for religious homogeneity, the groups demanding religious homogeneity only gained 37.4% of the total vote, still lower than that in 1955.
A study by Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004) on 1999 election showed that religion was an important factor in 1999 electoral behaviour. However, it was not always the most important behaviour. The religion (Islam) was the most important electoral behaviour only for the Golkar in the Island of Java and the PPP and PBB in the Outer Islands. Both the PPP and PBB explicitly mentioned that they are Islamic parties. Golkar is a Pancasila party, but in 1999, the Golkar was perceived to be closer to an Islamic party. For other parties (there are seven parties in each of the Island of Java and Outer Island in their study) religion (Islam or not) was important but not the most important variable.
In 2004 parliamentary election, the Islamic parties had gained 21.2% of the total votes, an improvement of 17.7% in 1999. If the PKB and PAN were included in these Islamic parties, the percentage becomes 39.4%, also an increase from the 1999 figure, though still lower than that in 1955. Part of the improvement of the Islamic parties was the emergence of the PKS, a “new” Islamic party, which has marketed themselves more as a peaceful, cleaned party, rather than advocating the establishment an Islamic state and implementation of syariah. The PKS was the only Islamic party which gained in
performance, compared to that in 1999.
However, the success of the Islamic parties in the 2004 parliamentary election was not followed by another success in the presidential election in 2004. Three out of the five presidential candidates were from Pancasila party, if we include Amien Rais
(nominated by the PAN) in the Islamic party. Indeed, the PKS did not want to nominate its own candidate. Further, the results of the first round of the election showed that the candidates nominated by the Pancasila parties obtained the largest three percentages. Amien was number 4, and Hamzah (nominated by an Islamic party) was number 5. It should be noted however, that Hamzah’s poor performance may also be attributed to many other factors, other than his party official ideology. The failure of Amien was partly because of his indecisiveness whether he should concentrate in getting the votes from the pluralist or those who prefer religious homogeneity. His constant changes of orientation has confused many of his potential supporters and many had then doubted his
determination and shifted to other parties, either to Golkar, PDI-P, or PD, with a clear Pancasila orientation, or the PKS, with an explicit Islamic orientation.
The winner in the second round of the election was obviously from the Pancasila party. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the new president.
An interesting phenomenon is the creation of two “opposing” coalition facing the second round of the presidential election. The incumbent president Megawati was backed up by the National Coalition, comprising three Pancasila parties (42.24%) and one Islamic party (8.15%). Yudhoyono, the other finalist, was supported by the People’s Coalition, consisting of two Pancasila parties (8.71%) and two Islamic parties (9.96%). One Islamic party (the PBR gave its moral support to the National Coalition while two
perceived Islamic parties, the PKB and PAN, gave their moral support to People’s Coalition).
Therefore, the division between Pancasila and Islamic party, or those who favour pluralism and religious homogeneity may be blurred by pragmatism. When, later on, Yusuf Kalla became the vice president along with the president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf managed to be elected as the Golkar’s chairperson, Golkar suddenly shifted its alliance to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
Emerging democracy at the grass root
Another interesting result is that the voters of the presidential election did not follow the party line or even the recommendation and fatwa of their (religious) leaders. Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata (2005) have clearly shown that the votes gained in the parliamentary election were not necessarily translated to voted for the candidates nominated by the party. SBY is the most obvious example. The number of votes for the parties nominated him was clearly much smaller than the voted he actually gained during the first and second rounds of the election. The 2004 elections can also indicate the end (or coming to an end) of the importance of political and religious leaders in influencing the final results of general elections—a clear sign of emerging democracy at the grass root level, that individual decisions are no longer much dictated by the elites.
The recent debate on the fatwa of MUI, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, again reflects the hidden tension between those who favour religious homogeneity and those who favour religious pluralism. Will the lay persons buy the religious
homogeneity or religious pluralism? Will the fatwa much influence the way of thinking of the Muslims? Will the individuals dutifully follow what the political and religious elites say? Experiences from the 2004 elections and perhaps the current elections of regional head may indicate that the elites have lost much of the power on the individuals, as the wheel of democracy keeps running.
One novel way to anticipate changes in behaviour is through the utilization of the concept of second demographic transition, pioneered by Van de Kaa (1987), where the behaviour of individuals in the second demographic transition, featured with fertility
level below replacement level, is much less influenced by the social and institutional norms, but more by individual values. The second demographic transition is featured with the rising individualisation, implying that social and institutional norms have become less and less important in determining individual behaviour. The new behaviour give more weights to the interest of the individual. The accentuation of individual autonomy and self-actualisation has been the most basic features of the second demographic transitions. The second demographic transition may also coincide with rising aspiration for
democracy. vi
Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar (2005) calculated that in the period of 2000-2005 the Christians had the highest fertility rate (TFR = 2.7), followed by the Muslims (2.3) and Others (Hindus, Buddhist, and “others“—TFR = 2.0). The Muslims were just at the replacement level of fertility, and hence the Muslim just started entering the second demographic transition. In the period of 2000-2005 Others were already below replacement level, implying that Others had experienced the second demographic transition earlier than the Muslim—that Others may have started change in behaviour from social and institutional norms to individual interest earlier than the Muslims. On the other hand, in 2005, the Christians were still above the replacement level. The behaviour of the Christians were still much influenced by social and institutional norms. They projected that the Christians will be the last to start changing the behaviour from those influenced by social and institutional norms to individual needs. The Christian will start the change as late as 2015-2020 if fertility declines slowly and as early as 2005-2010 if fertility declines quickly.
What ever the scenario of fertility decline people from all of the three religions will appreciate individual values more than social and institutional norms, implying, among other things, that they are more likely to reject fatwa or any other instructions from the authority. They may be forced to accept the fatwa, but they will be frustrated and they will try to challenge the fatwa. Some groups of young Muslims such as “Pusat
Studi Agama dan Peradaban (PSAP)” and “Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM)” have shown this tendency. Indeed, they are the groups the MUI are most
worried about. Nevertheless, with the continuing second demographic transition among the Muslims, such a tendency among the young Muslims cannot be stopped.
On the other hand, the accentuation of individual needs may also manifest in the existence of a certain young, talented, energetic persons who feel they have the
“destructive” rights to purify the world by, for example, inciting violence and carrying out suicide bombing.
The discussion on this section may be at the risk of over generalisation because we have not gone deeper into each aliran or sect. However, it may be useful as an initial guide toward understanding possibility of behavioural changes among different religious followers.
More studies should be done on what happens among the Christians and Others, especially the younger generations. It should also be noted that the rising need to enjoy “democracy” among those who have gone through the second demographic transition may also manifest in having the rights to have different attitudes with the majority of the community, including the destructive rights, for example, of inflicting violence and carrying out suicide bombing.
Province of Riau Archipelago: a case study
Putra daerahvii
Riau Archipelago is a new province, officially started on 1 July 2004, though it had been legalized since 24 September 2002. It used to be part of the “old” province of Riau, which then split into the “new” province of Riau and the province of Riau Archipelago. The province of Riau Archipelago borders with Singapore. Until now, the province was governed by an acting governor.
Historically, the “old” province of Riau (comprising both the new province of Riau and the province of Riau Archipelago) has been the province of the “Bumi Lancang Kuning”, the “Earth of Lancang Kuning”, referred to “the earth belonging to the
Malay”.viii However, 20.67% of the population in 2000 did not live in the province of Riau Archipelago in 1995, implying that about one fifth of the population was migrants from outside the province. Out of the 20.67%, 0.19% was migrants from outside
Indonesia. Furthermore, 43.28% of the population was not born in the province. In other words, Riau Archipelago is a province of migrants. Most of the migrants are
inter-provincial migrants, that is migrant from outside the province of Riau Archipelago, regardless the ethnicity or religion. Then, a question may arise whether it is still relevant to talk about putra daerah, literally meaning the “indigenous son” or the “host”.
The Malay, as mentioned before, constituted only 37.44% of the population, though they formed the largest ethnic group in this province.ix Measured with recent migration,x most (93.39%) of the Malay was non-migrants and, hence, this may justify the Malay as the putra daerah. However, the Chinese, the third largest ethnic group in the province and comprising 9.73% of the total population in the province, was also very likely to be non-migrants. xi Indeed, 94.36% of the Chinese was non-migrants. With this indicator, the Chinese should be included in the putra daerah. Nyat Kadir surely did not include the Chinese as the putra daerah because some (or many) Indonesians still perceive that the Chinese is pendatang (visitor), regardless how long they have been staying in a particular area in Indonesia.
These two groups, the Malay and the Chinese, altogether comprised 47.17% of the population and they are actually the “host”—if migration is the criteria. The
percentages for the Malay and Chinese in Riau Archipelago were relatively very high compared to only 4.45% for the Malay and between 1.5% and 2.0% for the Chinese in Indonesia as a whole.xii Other ethnic groups have much lower percentages of
non-migrants. The percentage of non-migrants among the Javanese (the second largest ethnic group) was only 68.37%; the Minang (fourth largest ethnic group), 63.59%; and the Batak (fifth largest ethnic group), 55.35%. Obviously, with migration as the criteria, the Javanese, Minang, and Batak were pendatang.
The home provinces of the Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, was the provinces of Yogyakarta, Central Java, and East Java—all in the Island of Java. It is worth mentioning here that though the Javanese is the majority in Indonesia and found in all provinces, Javanese language is not the national language of the Republic of
Indonesia. Instead, the Republic of Indonesia has decided that the Malay language, which has been the lingua franca for business in the archipelago for centuries, becomes the national language. However, Javanese culture has been perceived to have much influenced the “national” culture and politics, especially during the Soeharto era. xiii
The home province of Minang was the province of West Sumatra; and the Batak, North Sumatra. (The Riau Archipelago is also “located” in the Island of Sumatra.) The Minang and Batak are also famous for its merantau traits—tradition of men leaving the home areas to earn money before they one day return to their home areas.
The putra daerah is also often meant to be a Muslim. The Malay in Riau
Archipelago is almost exclusively Muslim, with 98.29% of its population is Muslim. However, only less than half (45.59%) of the Muslims in this province was Malay. The rest were the Javanese (26.68%), Minang (11.38%), Sundanese (3.10%), and many other smaller groups in this province.
The Muslim is the largest religious group (80.72%) in the province of Riau Archipelago, followed by the Buddhist (8.90%), Catholic (7.38%), Protestant (2.46%), Hindus (0.37%), and Others (0.17%). However, the Buddhist had the highest percentage of non-migrants, with 94.70% of the Buddhist was non-migrants. It should be noted here that 92.68% of the Buddhist is Chinese and, as mentioned earlier, the Chinese had a very high percentage of non-migrants. A tiny minority group, the Hindus, also had a high percentage (85.41%) of non-migrants. It can be noted that 68.93% of the Hindus was Chinese and 20.42% was “others”. The percentage of non-migrants among the Muslims (79.95%) was lower than those among the Hindus and especially the Buddhist. It is the Catholic, who had the lowest percentage of non-migrants (57.68%). It can be mentioned here that 76.70% of the Catholic was the Batak. In other words, in terms of migration status, the Buddhist may be more eligible to be considered as putra daerah in the province of Riau Archipelago.
Therefore, did the diverse population of the province of Riau Archipelago really care about the issue of putra daerah?
Pragmatic voters
On 30 June 2005, the population of the province of Riau Archipelago went to the poll to vote for the governor and vice governor of the province. As in other provinces and districts in Indonesia, it was the first direct election of its governor-vice governor, under the emerging democratic era in Indonesia. The outcome of the election showed that the
pair of Ismeth Abdullah – HM Sani was the winner. The results have also been supported by the court and the pair will soon be officially inaugurated as the new and first governor and vice governor of the province of Riau Archipelago.
There were three pairs of candidates: Rizal Zein – Firman Bisowarno; Ismeth Abdullah – HM Sani; and Nyat Kadir – Soerya Respationo. The first pair (Rizal-Firman) was backed by the PKB, a Pancasila party with Muslims as most of the constituents, and coalition of 12 political parties. The PKB only earned 3.85% of the vote in 2004
parliamentary election, and therefore it needed to make a coalition with many parties. As a result, these parties altogether earned 58.2% of the total vote in the 2004 regional parliamentary election.xiv If the voters had followed the party lines, this pair would have won the election. The reality was that even during the campaign period, polling always showed that this pair was always the least preferred, and even much below the other two. This phenomenon clearly indicates the absence of party loyalty at the provincial level, which was already shown at election of the president and vice president in 2004.
The next two pairs were the two most potential pairs and they showed an interesting similarity and dissimilarity. The pair of Ismeth Abdullah – HM Sani was supported by Golkar (Pancasila party) and the PKS (Islamic party). This pair was well accepted among the migrant population. The pair of Nyat Kadir – Soerya Respationo was nominated by the PAN and PDI-P, both were Pancasila parties. The PAN is similar to the PKB, in the sense that most of its constituents were Muslims, but the PAN is perceived to be closer to an Islamic party.
Both Golkar and the PDI-P share similar constituents and both occupied the first two largest number of votes in the province of Riau Archipelago during the 2004
parliamentary election. Golkar was the winner (15.90%), while the PDI-P was the second (14.39%). Initially, as mentioned earlier, during the campaign toward the second round of presidential election in 2004, Golkar and PDI-P formed the National Coalition. With the shift of Golkar after Yusuf Kalla became the new vice president of Indonesia, Golkar has become a strong competitor for the PDI-P. It is natural that the two did not work together in the election of the governor. Golkar backed Ismeth; and the PDI-P, Nyat Kadir.
The PAN and PKS also share similar constituents: the Muhammadiyah,
“modernists”, and urban, educated Muslims. They have also become rivals and the rise of the PKS has been at the expense of the PAN. The PAN earned 11.47%, while the PKS, 10.87%.
Therefore, it is also neither surprising that the two competed in the election of the governor-vice governor. Altogether, the pair of Ismeth-Sani should have earned at least 26.77% of the vote if all supporters of Golkar and the PKS supported this fair.
Interestingly, the pair of Kadir-Soerya expected almost same percentage (25.86%) if all voters for the PDI-P and PAN supported this pair. Both brought the mix of Pancasila and Islam. Clearly, they did not want to be seen as siding to either those preferring for a pluralistic society or those aiming for a religiously homogeneous society.xv Further more, the coalition was not based on ideology (whether pluralistic or religious homogeneity), but on how to get the most votes. They worked just like business persons marketing their products to produce the largest profit. In other words, the politics in this province was very pragmatic.xvi See Table 1 for more detailed information on what the parties earned in 2000 parliamentary election.
Table 1
Results of Parliamentary Election:
Province of Riau Archipelago, 2004
Party Official
Platform Number of Votes Percentage
Golkar Pancasila
90,034
15.90
PDI-P Pancasila
81,447
14.39
PAN Pancasila
64,941
11.47
PKS Islam
61,565
10.87
PDS Pancasila
38,509
6.80
PD Pancasila
36,802
6.50
PPP Islam
34,092
6.02
PKB Pancasila
21,777
3.85
PBB Islam
17,550
3.10
PBR Islam
13,965
2.47
Others 105,444
18.63
Total
566,126
100.00
Source: compiled and calculated from Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2005), Appendix 3.1.
Despite this similarity, the two were often distinguished in the term of putra
daerah. One of the obvious slogans of Nyat Kadir was that he was a putra daerah. He
stressed the importance that Riau Archipelago was governed by a putra daerah, though he also said that the putra daerah should pay attention to other groups in the province. (Riau Pos, 2005.) So far, he argued, the province had been lead by non-putra daerah. (Ismeth, a non-Malay and a migrant from the Island of Java, was the acting governor of the province before he stepped down because of being a candidate for the governor. Ismeth is also head of BIDA, an institution which has been known to successfully develop Batam, currently the most important and promising city in the province of Riau Archipelago.
The fact that this pair did not finally win the election indicates that the issue of
putra daerah was not that important. In addition, if by putra daerah is meant to be the
Malay, as believed by Nyat Kadir, this pair had made a mistake in their campaign. The Malay only comprised 37.44% of the population. By emphasising the greater importance of the Malay, this pair had shown lower priority for the larger majority, the non-Malay, who formed the majority (62.56%) of the population in the Riau Archipelago.
A polling by Kompasxvii showed that the economy was the issue the respondents
were most concerned with in deciding which pair to choose. Another important issue was the corruption. Putra daeah was not an important issue. Ideology was neither important. This observation is similar to that found at the national level during the 2004 presidential elections. As what happened during the 2004 elections, the voters in the recent election on the governor-vice governor in the province of Riau Archipelago seemed to be pragmatic. xviii
To better understand the relationship between religion and politics in this
province, we next examine in more detail the relationship between ethnicity and religion in this province. xix
“Fragile” religious balance?
Measured with percentage of having at most primary school education, the Buddhist (the second largest religious group in Riau Archipelago) had the worst education, with
74.10% of the Buddhist having only at most primary school education. Next from the bottom is the tiny minority, the Hindus, with 63.08% of its population had only maximum finishing primary school education. The Catholic had the best educational level, where only 27.80% having at most primary school education, followed by the Protestants (44.89%). More than half of the Muslim (58.23%) had only at most primary school education. In other words, the Christian (Catholic and Protestants) had a better educational achievement than the Muslims and particularly the Buddhist and Hindus.
The higher educational level of the Catholic is perhaps because the Batak was also the ethnic group with the lowest percentage in the primary school, while the majority of the Batak was Catholic. The Malay and Chinese had the lowest educational level, with around 72% still having at most primary school education. The educational attainment of the Batak was exceptionally high, followed by the Minang. A similar result can be made when education is measured with percentage of having at least senior education, except that the Hindus was not the worst.
The picture of employment status is similar to that on education. The Buddhist and Hindus were the worst, having the highest percentage of not in the labour force. The best is found among the Catholic and Protestant. The Catholic had the highest open unemployment rate (4.53%), indicating that they could afford being unemployed, meaning that they can be better financially.xx The proportions of the Protestant and Catholic working in non-agriculture sector were higher than that among the Muslims.
In short, the Christians might have better education and financial
number of migrants with more Christian background, the situation in the province can be “fragile”. Outsiders may find this religious balance as an easy way to create unrest to destabilise Indonesia.
Therefore, with this mix of population, it is not surprising the Nyak Kadir cannot benefit much from the issue of putra daerah and this is one of the reasons why Ismeth finally won the election. It is also a challenge for the new governor and vice governor, as well the president and vice president of the Republic of Indonesia, to reduce, or eliminate, the negative sides of this religious diversity; and, at the same time, to optimise the assets emerging from this diversity.
Closing Remarks: pragmatic politics?
It is interesting to continue monitoring and examining the contest between religious homogeneity and religious pluralism in Indonesia. The question posed in the beginning of this paper has often been answered with mutual antagonism and distrust, particularly on the political relationship between Islam and state in Indonesia (Effendy 2003)
There may be weak religious loyalty, if it existed. With the Muslims forming around 87% of total Indonesian population, the percentage of the Islamic parties should have reached around that number if there existed strong religious loyalty. The fact was that the Islamic parties gained at most 43.5% (in 1955). Furthermore, the PDS, who officially claims to be a Pancasila party but has been perceived to be a Christian party, because most of its constituents was Christian, only obtained 2.5% of the total vote, though the Christian constituted 8.92% of the total Indonesian population. Both the PKS and PDS have religions as their orientation, but in their campaign they refrained from talking religious issues. Rather, they discussed issues on development and good governance.
There have been pragmatism in the Indonesian politics. Religion has been used as a powerful weapon to get the power. However, many may easily switch the coalition to achieve the power. The “market” may not be conducive to talk about “politics”, but more on economy and corruption.
The Indonesian people have learnt fast and, sometimes costly, about democracy in the last seven years, and they know what to decide for their own best interest. They have enjoyed democracy and know the “sweet’ of democracy. There seem to be no “return” to the old authoritarian regime, and even, they may not like the religious authoritarianism.
Selected References
Ananta, Aris; Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Suryadinata. Indonesian Electoral Behaviour.
A Statistical Perspective. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004.
Ananta, Aris; Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Suryadinata. Emerging Democracy in
Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
Ananta, Aris; Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Bakhtiar. “Demographic Window by Religion and Ethnicity. Indonesia, 2000-2050”, poster presentation at the XXV International Population Conference. Tours, France: 17-23 July, 2005.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and State in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
Kompas. “Jajak Pendapat Kompas. Pilkada Kepulauan Riau, Pengalaman Mengesankan Sekaligus Tersulit” Kompas, 27 June, 2005.
Osman, Salim. “Battle for hearts and mind of Muslims.” The Straits Times, 8 August 2005, p. 10.
Partridge, Christopher (ed.). Encyclopedia of New Religions. New Religious Movements,
Sects and Alternative Spiritualities. Oxford, UK: Lion Publishing plc, 2004.
Piliang, Indra J. “Pilkada dan Diaspora Beringin” [Pilkada—Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, Elections of Regional Heads, and Beringin Diaspora], Suara Pembaruan, 9 June 2005.
Riaupos. “Nyat Disambut Ratusan Nelayan’ [Nyat welcome by Hundreds of Fishermen].
Riaupos, 21 June 2005.
Saraswati, Muninggar Sri. “Government Rejects MUI’s Demand to Ban Ahmadiyah” The
Jakarta Post, 11 August, 2005.
Suryadinata, Leo; Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta. Indonesia’s Population.
Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
Van de Kaa, D.J. “Europe Second Demographic Transition” Population Studies, vol. 42, No. 1, March, 1987.
Woodward, Mark R.. “Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect for Democracy”, no publisher, no date.
End notes
i
Literally syariah means “law”, but in this paper, we refer syariah as Islamic law. It is not “the” Islamic law, because there are many interpretation of the syariah
ii
A detailed statistical study on ethnicity at the national and provincial levels is referred to Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta (2003), who utilised the first data set on ethnicity collected in censuses/ surveys in Indonesia after the first one in 1930, during the colonial period. The data on Muslims at the district level is based on Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004).
iii
In reality, some people may still have no religion at all. The population censuses have always provided a column of “others” for those who do not want to be under one of the official religions. iv
Ahmadiyah follows all of the Islamic rituals, but they believe that Mirza Gulam Ahmad, who founded the Admadiyah in Pakistan in the 19th century, was a prophet who came after
Mohammad. Hence, according to MUI, Ahmadiyah is not Islam, because Islam believes that Mohammad is the last prophet. MUI therefore argued that Ahmadiyah is another religion, which is not recognized in Indonesia.
v
One example of the differences between the “traditionalists” and “modernists” is in the way they perform the rituals. The traditionalist may feel all right not to pray five times a day or not to go to the mosque on Friday; but the modernist believes that praying five times a day and
attending the mosque on Friday are un-negotiated activities. It is therefore, for instance, we can make a survey asking how many times in a day a Javanese Muslim pray and we may get an honest answer. However, such a question may offend Minang or Malay Muslims, because praying five times a day is not a choice.
vi
It should be noted here that so far the discussion on second demographic transition has focused on fertility and marriage. This concept has been applied to the study of ageing (Ananta, Arifin, Bakhtiar, 2005), but has not been extended to study on politics. Here, we apply this concept to speculate on the timing of behavioural changes among the three religious followers, utilising the currently available demographic statistics and projections on religious followers in Indonesia prepared in Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar (2005).
vii
Almost all statistics in this section were calculated from the raw data of the 2000 Population Census. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Bakhtiar in the calculation of these statistics.
viii
This is a very rough discussion on Bumi Lancang Kuning. ix
It should be mentioned here that the Malay as known in Indonesia is different from that known in Singapore and Malaysia, where “Malay” is state defined. For example, in Singapore and Malaysia some Malays may look like Javanese—their parents are Javanese and their appearance are very Javanese, yet they are called Malay in Singapore and Malaysia. In these two countries, a Malay must be a Muslim. A “non-Malay” who converts to Muslims is often called as “Malay”. For an example, a Chinese converting to Muslim will adopt a Muslim name and he or she becomes a Malay. In Indonesia, “Malay” is not state defined. A Muslim does not necessarily mean a Malay. A Muslim does not have to use a Muslim name. Most Javanese Muslims do not have Arabic names. However, the “becoming Malay” also happens in some ethnic groups, such as the Dayak in Kalimantan. The Dayak was mostly Christian, and those who became Muslims were sometimes called Malay.
x
Whether they lived in the province in 1995 or not. The same conclusion can be made when we measure migration with life time migration, that is whether he or she was born in the province of Riau Archipelago.
xi
The number of Chinese in the census may be underestimated due to the fear of admitting themselves as Chinese. Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta (2003) estimated that the percentage of Chinese for the whole Indonesia should be between 1.5%-2..0%, after taking into account the possibility of under-estimation. Hence, if we make a similar upward adjustment, the percentage of the Chinese in this province can be up to about 15.0%. However, with the relatively large number of Chinese in this province, the underestimation may be minimal
xii
The percentage for the Malay in Indonesia is cited from Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar (2005); while the percentage for the Chinese, from Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta (2003).
xiii
Suryadinata (2002) argued that Soeharto behave like a Javanese king and had “javanised” Indonesian culture and, therefore, the period under Soeharto had been seen in Indonesian politics as the battle between the Javanese versus non Javanese. With the step-down of Soeharto and the emergence of reformasi, there has been effort of “de-javanisation” and feeling of anti-Javanese can now erupt openly especially in outside Java.
xiv
See Kompas (2005). xv
Though there is a tendency for the PAN and PKS to create a religiously homogeneous society, voters for the two parties do not necessarily agree with the establishment of an Islamic state. xvi
It has been rumoured that money had played an important role during the campaign and that business interests were behind the elections. It this rumour is confirmed, the involvement of business persons has strengthened the hypothesis that politics in Riau Archipelago has been indeed very pragmatic. Religion is used only when they think it is useful to get the power. The danger is that politics may have been used to make money and policy makers may orient themselves to the interest of those who have backed them with money.
xvii
See Kompas (2005).
xviii For a discussion on the 2004 presidential elections, see Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2005).
xix
It should be born in mind, however, that the discussion on ethnicity and religion refers to the data in 2000, which may be different from that in 2004 and 2005.
xx
In Indonesia, open unemployment rate is not positively correlated with poverty. In fact, only those who can afford to be unemployed will be unemployed. In this sense, unemployment rate may be positively correlated with financial security.
