行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告
策略性管理誘因與競爭之研究
計畫類別：■ 個別型計畫
□ 整合型計畫
計畫編號：NSC 90－2416－H－110－008－
執行期間：90 年 08 月 01 日至 91 年 07 月 31 日
計畫主持人：曾美君
共同主持人：（無）
計畫參與人員：廖啟男、吳兆棋
（碩士生兼任助理）本成果報告包括以下應繳交之附件：
□赴國外出差或研習心得報告一份
□赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告一份
□出席國際學術會議心得報告及發表之論文各一份
□國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告書一份
執行單位：國立中山大學企業管理學系
中 華 民 國
91 年 10 月
29
日
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行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告
策略性管理誘因與競爭之研究
A Study on Str ategic Manager ial Incentives and Competition
計畫編號：NSC 90-2416-H-110-008
執行期限：90 年 8 月 1 日至 91 年 7 月 31 日
主持人：曾美君 國立中山大學企業管理學系
計畫參與人員：廖啟男、吳兆棋
（碩士生兼任助理，國立台灣大學） 一、中文摘要 本研究探討在市場同時存在不同性質 之廠商的情況下，市場競爭環境變化對策 略性管理誘因之選擇所產生的影響。所謂 不同性質的廠商，在本研究中係指所有權 與經營權分離的「經理人廠商」與所有權 人自行經營的「創業廠商」二類型。對照 相關文獻，本研究所考量的寡佔情境比較 接近我國以中、小型企業為主的競爭市 場。因此，引伸出的管理意涵將可以補充 文獻之不足。 關鍵詞：策略性管理誘因、策略性授權、 寡佔 AbstractAn oligopoly model of quantity competition where managerial firms (i.e. firms with separate owners and managers) and entrepreneurial firms (i.e. firms that are owned and managed by the same person) coexist is considered. We analyze the effects of increasing competitiveness, defined by the increase in the number of managerial firms, on the choice of managerial incentives. Our study thus offers an extended analysis of strategic delegation equilibrium.
Keywor ds: strategic managerial incentives, strategic delegation, oligopoly
二、緣由與目的
Considerable attention has been focused
on the strategic implications of managerial incentives. It is noted that the separation of ownership and management provides firms the opportunity to commit to non-profit maximizing behavior. Such “distortion” is a natural outcome of firms’ profit-seeking behavior because it induces favorable responses from competing firms. In literature, it is often assumed that managers are delegated to make output decisions and are motivated by a linear incentive scheme that combines sales (volume or revenue) and profits; see, for example, Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Reitman (1993), Sen (1993), and Goering (1996). A different setting, studied by Fershtman (1985), Sen (1993), and Sen and Sikdar (1997), is to assume that firms’ output decisions are determined via (Nash) bargaining between two managers. Since in all these studies firms are assumed identical, it remains unclear how the differences in organizational structures among rivals influence firms’ strategic choices of managerial incentives. Such concerns form the basis of the present study.
The purpose of this research is to examine how the effect of competition in the product markets on the equilibrium choice of managerial incentive scheme. We analyze the choice of managerial incentives in an oligopoly consisting of both managerial and entrepreneurial firms. By an entrepreneu-rial firm, we mean a firm owned and managed by the same person. Consequently an entrepreneurial firm’s owner makes the output decision himself and
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does not engage in strategic delegation. However, the owner of a managerial firm delegates the output decision to a manager and provides the manager with proper incentives. As in the related literature, our analysis completely eschews the potential agency problems, even though they are certainly important. To simply the analysis, we also assume that the managerial incentive contracts are common knowledge and non-renegotiable (see Fershtman and Kalai (1997) for analysis of unobserved delegation).
Since the results from the literature indicate that, when firms compete in quantities the strategic use of managerial delegation allows a firm to play more aggressively, the increase in he number of managerial firms in our model may be referred to as increasing competitiveness.
This study focuses on this aspect. Namely, we aims at exploring how the number of managerial firms changes the equilibrium managerial incentives.
三、結果與討論
As noted in the literature, given the opportunity of strategic delegation, each managerial firm would give its manager an incentive to be more aggressive than in the regular Cournot equilibrium. The intuition of Proposition 1 is that, as the number of managerial firms increases, firms would like to hold back the aggressiveness to avoid lowering the market price too much. This observation is in general accordance with the result obtained in Fershtman and Judd (1987), who consider an industry consisting of managerial firms only. What is new from our analysis is that the result also prevails in the industry consisting not only of managerial firms but also of entrepreneurial firms.
The intuition of Proposition 2 is that a managerial firm benefits at the expense of the entrepreneurial firms due to its choice of higher output. However when the share of managerial firms gets very large, a managerial firm could no longer makes
higher profit than in the benchmark case. This can be seen by noting that eventually the price reduction from the increase in aggregate quantity gets so large that each firm is worse off compared with the regular Cournot firm. 四、成果自評
This study is intended only as a preliminary step in the analysis of the impact of differences in organizational structures on managerial incentives. Our analysis has demonstrated that the composition of competitors may have an important influence on the linear incentive scheme employed by the owners of managerial firms. Despite the limitations of our simple model, the insights are useful for managerial efficiency and social welfare. The results has been published in the journal of Small Business Economics (2002, 18:313-316)
五、 參考文獻
[1] Basu, K., 1995, “Stackelberg Equili-brium in Oligopoly: An Explanation Based on Managerial Incentives,” Economics Letters 49 (4),
459-464.
[2] Fershtman, C., 1985, “Managerial Incentives as A Strategic Variable in Duopolistic Environment,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 3(2),
245-253.
[3] Fershtman, C. and K.L. Judd, 1987, “Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,”
American Economic Review 77(5),
927-940.
[4] Fershtman, C. and Kalai, E., 1997, “Unobserved Delegation”, International Economic Review 38(4), 763-774.
[5] Goering, G.E., 1996, “Managerial Style and the Strategic Choice of Executive Incentives,” Managerial and Decision Economics 17(1), 71-82.
[6] Reitman, D., 1993, “Stock Options and the Strategic Use of Managerial
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Review 83(3), 513-522.
[7] Sen, A., 1993, “Entry and Managerial Incentives,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 11(1), 123-137.
[8] Sen, A. and S. Sikdar, 1997, “The Choice of Organization Form in
Strategic Context,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32(4),
539-546.
[9] Sklivas, S.D., 1987, “The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives,” Rand Journal of Economics 18(3), 452-458.
[10] Tseng, M.-C., 1999, “Organizational Form and Strategic Managerial Delegation,” in D. Kantarelis (ed.),
Business & Economics for the 21st Century – Volume III, Business &
Economics Society International, pp.36-42.
[11] Vickers, J., 1985, “Delegation and the theory of the firm,” Economic Journal,
