South Korea's Best Strategy against China: US Ballistic Missile Defense

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(1)國. 研究. 大. International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. y. Nat. South Korea’s Best Strategy against China:. n. al. er. io. US Ballistic Missile Defense. Ch. engchi. Student: 康. i Un. v. (Seok-ho Kang). Advisor: Professor. 國 99 年 7 July 2010. (Ming Lee).

(2) South Korea’s Best Strategy against China: US Ballistic Missile Defense. 研究. ：. 導教. 康. Student: Seok-ho Kang. ：. 立. Advisor: Prof. Ming Lee. 國治大政大. 研究. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. a. er. io. sit. y. Nat. A Thesis. n. v Submitted to International Master’s Program l n i in Asia-Pacific Studies Ch. engchi U. National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in Taiwan Studies. 國. 99 年 7. July 2010.

(3) Acknowledgement First of all, I would like to convey my sincere gratitude for my advisor Professor Lee Ming. His guidance and warm words of encouragement have helped me to complete this rather daunting task of thesis writing over the course of the most difficult time I faced in Taipei. Second, I would like to thank Professor Hwang Jae-ho for providing me this opportunity to study in Taiwan.. 政治大 countless difficulties in all that I had to do in beginning my studies in a 立 foreign land. Without the help of two people, Ms. Carol Hsieh of IMAS Coming to Taiwan in 2008 without speaking a word of Mandarin, I faced. ‧ 國. 學. and Ms. Allison Ho of the OIC, I am unable to imagine the life I was. ‧. awarded in Taiwan. I would like to thank especially Ms. Carol Hsieh for her passion to look after her students and her abilities to resolve. y. Nat. sit. complicated problems students faced, both inside and outside the. er. io. academic life at the National Chengchi University.. I have been. n. fortunate to be at athe l receiving end of heri vassistance on numerous occasions.. Ch. n engchi U. And of course, I cannot forget the intelligent conversations and insights Professor Broto “Itok” Wardoyo shared with me over the course of my studies here in Taiwan. He has been a very good friend, a supporter, and an advisor. Finally, without the support of my family, my father and mother, I would never have made it this far. The past 28 years of their encouragement and love have propelled me to reach a point that I have arrived on this fine and scorching summer day of Taiwan in 2010. i.

(4) Abstract South Korea’s Best Strategy against China: US BMD South Korea should join the US BMD in Northeast Asia. Application of Offensive Realism clearly shows that China is a potential threat to South Korea, and Seoul requires an alliance partner in order to counter the threat from the west. The immense latent power and offensive military capabilities of China, coupled with its nuclear strategic weapons render China as a potential threat to South Korean national security.. 政治大. No. independent action from South Korea would be sufficient to balance. 立. against China, hence the need for an ally.. ‧ 國. 學. The United States is already engaged in relative power maximization. ‧. against China. In addition, its role as an offshore balancer and status as. y. Nat. a regional hegemon in the western hemisphere makes the US the most. er. io. sit. ideal alliance partner for South Korea.. n. a lUS to balance against China The alliance with the i v cannot be built upon n. C. h e nbecause the existing ROK-US alliance, g c h i theU current status of the alliance has deteriorated. One of the key causes of alliance deterioration could be attributed to the unilateral American security assistance to South Korea. Seoul’s participation in the US BMD would solve the non-reciprocating role of South Korea found in the existing ROK-US alliance. Because the benefits from South Korea’s participation in the US BMD are great for Washington, Seoul would be able to secure the US as an alliance partner to balance against China. Keywords: US, South Korea, China, Ballistic Missile Defense, ROK-US Alliance, Offensive Realism. ii.

(5) TABLE OF CO TE TS Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………...i Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..ii Table of Contents………………………………………………………………….….iii List of Tables………………………………………………………………………… .v List of Figures……………………………………………………………………….. .v. 政治大. List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………………...vi. 立. 學. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1 1.1 Research Method and Limitations……………………………………………..2 1.2 Necessity of Research and Literature Review…………………………………6. ‧. ‧ 國. 1. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 2 Background Information: South Korea and the US BMD……………………….20 2.1 Conceptualization Stage of the BMD…………………...……………………20 2.2 Deployment Stage of the BMD……..………………………………………..21 2.3 Possible Reasons for South Korean Government’s Inaction…………………24. Ch. i Un. v. 3 Theoretical Framework: Offensive Realism……………………………………..26 3.1 Introduction of Offensive Realism…………………………………………...26 3.2 Distinction among International Relations Theories…………………………28 3.3 Definition and Behavioral Characteristics of Great Power…………………..31 3.4 Balancing and Alliance in Offensive Realism………………………………..34. engchi. 4 China as a Potential Threat to South Korea……………………………………...37 4.1 China as a Potential Threat to South Korea: Theoretical Analysis.………….39 4.2 China as a Potential Threat to South Korea: Empirical Analysis....………….47 4.3 South Korea vs. China: Seoul’s Need for an Alliance Partner……………….50 5 BMD as Power Maximizing Agent Against China…………..…………………..54 5.1 Brief History of the US Ballistic Missile Defense Program…………………54 5.2 The BMD as a Relative Power Maximizing Agent…………..……………...59 iii.

(6) 6 South Korea’s Requirement for an Alliance Partner…………………………..…68 6.1 US as the Most Ideal Alliance Partner for South Korea against China………69 6.2 Current Status of the ROK-US Alliance…………………………………...…71 6.3 Benefits of South Korea’s Participation in the BMD for the US…………….76 6.4 Potential Disadvantage for South Korea in Joining the BMD……………….81 7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..84 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….87. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iv. i Un. v.

(7) LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1. Specification and Status of the North Korean Ballistic Missiles…...........8. Table 3.2. Differences & Similarities between Defensive & Offensive Realisms...31. Table 4.1.1 Latent Power Comparison in Northeast Asia…………………………..40 Table 4.1.2 Actual Power (no. of personnel) Comparison in Northeast Asia………41 Table 4.1.3 Actual Power (no. of offensive weapons) Comparison in NEA……….44 Table 6.3. 政治大. Approx. Distances from Japan based AN/TPY-2 Radar…………….…77. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. a l LIST OF FIGURES iv n Ch engchi U. Figure 1.1. The North Korean Ballistic Missile Range Circles by Type………….....8. Figure 3.1. The Basics of Offensive Realism………………………………………26. Figure 6.2. The USFK Relocation Plan…………………………………………….73. Figure 6.3. SM-3 (Aegis BMD) Interception Phases………………………………79. v.

(8) LIST OF ACRO YMS ABL. Airborne Laser. ABM. Anti-ballistic Missile. ASAT. Anti-Satellite. BMD. Ballistic Missile Defense. BMDR. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. BPI. Boost Phase Intercept. CAS. Close Air Support. CTBT. DMZ. Demilitarized Zone. Department of Defense, US. Defense Support Program. FMS. Foreign Military Sales, US. GPALS. i n C U IntercontinentalhBallistic e n g cMissile hi. sit er. al. n. IRBM. Economic Exclusive Zone. io. ICBM. y. EEZ. Nat. DSP. Counter-Special Force. ‧. DoD. 學. C-SOF. ‧ 國. CONUS. 政治大 Continental United States 立 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. v. Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. JCS. Joint Chiefs of Staff. KEI. Kinetic Energy Interceptor. KIDA. Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. KINU. Korea Institute for National Unification. KORCOM. Korea Command, US. LRS&T. Long-Range Search and Track. MAD. Mutually Assured Destruction. MCRC. Master Control and Report Center. MIRV. Multiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicle. MKV. Multiple Kill Vehicle vi.

(9) MND. Ministry of National Defense, ROK. MOOTW. Military Operations Other Than War. MRBM. Medium Range Ballistic Missile. MSDF. Maritime Self Defense Force, Japan. NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NMD. National Missile Defense. NPR. Nuclear Posture Review. OPCON. Operations Control. OPEC. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. PAC-3. Patriot Advanced Capability-3. PLA. People’s Liberation Army. PPP. Purchasing Power Parity. PRT. Provincial Reconstruction Team. PSA. Patent Secrecy Agreement. ‧ 國. SALT. Revolution in Military Affairs Regional Missile Defense. ‧. RMD. 學. RMA. 立. 政治大. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Nat. SLOC. Sea Lines of Communication. SMA. Seoul Metropolitan Area. SRBM. Short Range Ballistic Missile. SSBN. Ballistic Missile Submarines. THAAD. Theater High Altitude Area Defense. TMD. Theater Missile Defense. UEWR. Upgraded Early Warning Radars. UNCLOS. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. UNFICYP. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. USFJ. United States Forces Japan. USFK. United States Forces Korea. WMD. Weapons of Mass Destruction. y. SDI. sit. Security Consultative Meeting. io. Strategic Defense Initiative. n. al. Ch. engchi. vii. er. SCM. i Un. v.

(10) Chapter 1. Introduction The intent of this thesis is not to survey implications of South Korea’s1 ballistic missile defense strategy.. The intent of this thesis is to examine whether South. Korea’s participation in the Washington-led Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 2. 政治 The analyses 大. program could enlist the United States as an alliance partner for Seoul against a potential threat of the future, China.. 立. would show that Seoul’s. participation in the US BMD would provide an opportunity for South Korea to play. ‧ 國. 學. an integral role in the protection of the United States. As a result, the alliance between Seoul and Washington would be stronger than as it stands today, in which. ‧. Seoul reaps the majority of the benefits from the alliance. Such a strong alliance would allow South Korea to have a reliable and powerful alliance partner like the US. y. Nat. er. io. al. sit. to counter the future potential threat from China.. n. In order to avoid possible challenges to the objectivity of the argument, the analyses. Ch. i Un. v. found in this thesis would be based on a well grounded international relations theory. engchi. of Offensive Realism. The theoretical analysis are able to render a conclusion that China is a potential threat to South Korea even without engaging in hostile acts over a period of time on a regular basis. An assessment of the perceptions by the South Korean elites and general public on the potential China threat buttresses the theoretical conclusion.. 1. 2. In this thesis, instead of the diplomatic legal name the Republic of Korea, South Korea would be used for the sake of simplicity. The same standard would be applied to other nations to be mentioned or discussed in this thesis, such as the People’s Republic of China as China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as North Korea, and the Republic of China as Taiwan. The designation of the ballistic missile defense program under the current Obama Administration is Ballistic Missile Defense or BMD. For the sake of simplicity, the term BMD would be used to refer to American ballistic missile defense programs in general, which comprehensively include the current BMD, National Missile Defense (NMD), Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, when referring to a program under a specific administration, the precise term, such as NMD, would be used. 1.

(11) Another theoretical analysis shows that the US BMD is a power maximizing agent against China and an American effort to achieve nuclear hegemony. The role of the ballistic missile defense system and the utility of ballistic missiles for China render this defensive program as an indisputable threat to Beijing. The fact that China requires counteractions in response to the US BMD is sufficient to establish that the US BMD is a power maximizing agent and that Washington is engaged in power competitions against China. However, Chinese perceptions on the US BMD also confirm that the US BMD seriously jeopardizes the security of China, decreasing China’s relative power vis-à-vis the US.. 政治大. The final theoretical analysis shows that the US is the most ideal candidate for South Korea to enlist as an alliance partner against the potential threat of a regional great power.. 立. And one of the means that South Korea could maintain a strong alliance with. ‧ 國. 學. the US is to play a critical role in providing protection for the Americans, in other words minimizing “buck-passing” within the alliance. Participation in the US BMD. ‧. would provide Seoul with an opportunity to catch more “buck” and preserve a strong alliance posture with Washington.. er. io. sit. y. Nat 1.1 Research Methoda and Limitations. n. iv l C n hengchi U As the objective of this thesis is to examine the possibility of a role the US BMD could play in buttressing the alliance between Seoul and Washington, the most important aspect of the analyses would be strict adherence to the theoretical framework based on the Offensive Realism.. In order to show that the Offensive. Realism is a comprehensive international relations theory, a whole chapter would be devoted to introduce the relevant aspects of the theory to the analyses found in the thesis. For example, the theory’s concept of “Calculated Aggression” provides an explanation to the continuation of peace and absence of hostility, while preserving outbreak of conflict and war in the future a real possibility.. A limitation to be placed on the application of the Offensive Realism for this thesis is 2.

(12) the evaluation on the stability of a given system.. The theory discusses which type of. a system, for example a balanced multipolarity, would be the most stable and would most likely face least amount of hostilities and conflicts. As the objective of this thesis is not to evaluate the likelihood of war in Northeast Asia, discussion of this theoretical aspect is unnecessary.. After having established a theoretical foundation to support the argument, practical data such as perception of the elites and publicly available government reports would be discussed to buttress the argument. Use of publicly available government reports, such as the Congressional Research Reports, are preferable as these reports provide rough but accurate reflections of matters related to the issue, from which government. 治 In addition, data from the Jane’s 政 Information Group and International Institute for 大 Strategic Studies would be used as measuring tools for the 立 military capabilities of a given state. These data would fill in decision makers often base their decisions.. ‧ 國. 學. the gap of the specifics that are left out by the government reports.. ‧. This approach of employing practical data only after completion of theoretical analyses is specifically adopted in this thesis as failure to establish a theoretical basis. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. would be vulnerable to challenges in the objectivity of the argument.. n. Specifically in the case of proving that China is a potential threat to South Korea,. Ch. i Un. v. application of Offensive Realism and then providing practical data, such as perceptions, is critical.. engchi. This approach is a deductive approach, where certain. inherent characteristics of China are identified and these variables lead to a conclusion that Beijing indeed poses a potential threat to South Korea.. Such a deductive. approach is most preferable as no intelligence official or academics would be able to discern, with absolute certainty, what are the intentions behind China’s actions today. For example, China’s repeated proclamation to the adherence to its own concept of peaceful development, on the surface, reflects the Chinese elites’ intent to preserve the peace and stability despite China’s growing economic and military power.. However,. until long into the future when the current Chinese leadership has released memoires in retirement and relevant state documents are declassified, no one would be able to understand the true intentions of China today.. 3.

(13) The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and the USSR is a case in point. Despite the gigantic intelligence apparati and espionage capabilities for the two superpowers, neither Washington nor Moscow has been able to identity the true intentions and the limits of accommodation the other side was prepared to negotiate. Only in recent years, approximately half a century later, when the state documents are declassified and memoirs of the leaders involved are released was one finally be able to begin understanding the intentions and rationales behind the actions in the 1960s following an inductive approach.. As no such insightful data exists to decipher the intentions and rationales behind China’s actions today, the deductive method based on theoretical framework has been. 政治大. chosen for this thesis. And a limitation that inductive method is unreliable, hence of no use, is placed.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. This thesis would begin with a background chapter on the South Korea’s actions with regard to the issue of joining the American BMD. This section would show that. ‧. South Korea has kept as much distance as it could with regard to the American BMD.. y. Nat. sit. In Chapter 3, Offensive Realism would be introduced. As the focus of this thesis is. al. er. io. to analyze the Chinese threat and balancing coalition of South Korea and the US, as. n. stated above, Offensive Realism’s discussion on the three types of international. Ch. i Un. v. system and likelihood of war would not be discussed in this section. Rather, the. engchi. definition and behavioral tendencies of the Offensive Realism’s term “great power” would be introduced to examine whether China and the US in 2010 matches this description of the theory.. In addition, the theory’s explanation and necessity of. balancing coalition concept would be discussed, which would be used in the later section to assess the optimal candidate alliance partner for South Korea and the best means to maintain the alliance.. Chapter 4 would show that China in 2010 is a threat to South Korea.. In a deductive. approach, the examination of China’s great amounts of latent and actual power would suffice to render a conclusion that China is a potential threat to South Korea. However, to further buttress the theoretical conclusion, practical data as South Korea’s perception on the potential China threat would also be discussed. This 4.

(14) chapter would render an additional conclusion that South Korea would not be able to balance against the potential Chinese threat on its own, hence requiring an alliance partner of a great power, the US.. In Chapter 5, the US BMD would be discussed.. By showing that the US BMD is an. effort by Washington to achieve nuclear superiority, the term as used by Mearsheimer, it would reflect that the US is trying to maximize its power against China.. In further. detail, exactly how the US BMD would maximize power against China would be documented.. Finally, after having shown that China is a potential threat to South Korean national. 政治大. security and that the US is already engaged in relative power maximization competition against China, this final chapter would argue that South Korea should. 立. become a member of the US BMD and secure Washington as its ally.. ‧ 國. 學. The thesis would be organized as the following:. ‧. Introduction. y. Nat. 1.1 Research Method and Limitations. n. al. er. io. 1.2 Necessity of Research and Literature Review. 2.. sit. 1.. Ch. i Un. v. Background Information: South Korea and the BMD. engchi. 2.1 Conceptualization Stage of the BMD 2.2 Deployment Stage of the BMD. 2.3 Possible Reasons for South Korean Government’s Inaction. 3.. Theoretical Framework: Offensive Realism 3.1 Introduction of Offensive Realism 3.2 Distinction among International Relations Theories 3.3 Definition and Behavioral Characteristics of Great Power 3.4 Balancing and Alliance in Offensive Realism. 4.. China as a Potential Threat to South Korea 4.1 China as a Potential Threat to South Korea: Theoretical Analysis 5.

(15) 4.2 China as a Potential Threat to South Korea: Empirical Analysis 4.3 South Korea vs. China: Seoul’s Need for an Alliance Partner. 5.. BMD as Power Maximizing Agent against China 5.1 Brief History of the US Ballistic Missile Defense Program 5.2 The BMD as a Relative Power Maximizing Agent. 6.. South Korea’s Requirement for an Alliance Partner 6.1 US as the Most Ideal Alliance Partner for South Korea against China 6.2 Current Status of the ROK-US Alliance 6.3 Benefits of South Korea’s Participation in the BMD to the US. 政治大. 6.4 Potential Disadvantages for South Korea in Joining the BMD. 立. Conclusion. 學. 1.2 Necessity of Research and Literature Review. Nat. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 7.. sit. A new research on a rationale for South Korea to join the US BMD is necessary.. n. al. er. io. While a number of literatures discuss about the ballistic missile defense and South. v ni. Korea, these literatures are problematic in three ways.. Ch. engchi U. First, the basis of the. rationale for asserting that South Korea should have ballistic missile defense capabilities is predominantly focused on the ballistic missile threat from North Korea. While it is true that the North Korean ballistic missiles pose a significant threat to South Korea, it is not the only threat South Korea faces in 2010. Additionally, the BMD is not only a mechanism to intercept incoming ballistic missiles, but also has many other functions including alliance enhancement.. Such a one dimensional. analyses on a complex issue leaves large space for a further research to fill.. Second, these literatures do not make a clear argument on whether South Korea should join the US BMD or not. The recommendations that South Korea partially join while fielding an independent defensive system are simply implausible. As would be discussed in detail later in this section, Seoul’s participation only in the 6.

(16) research level is not a possibility for the case of the US BMD. Therefore a clear reason for obtaining a full membership into the US BMD is necessary.. Third, as the existing literatures do not make a clear assertion that South Korea should join the US BMD, as a result the discussion on how South Korea’s participation in the US BMD would enhance the alliance between the two countries are absent.. Therefore, this thesis would fill these three holes in the existing literatures regarding South Korea and the US BMD. And the following discussion examines in detail the three problems or holes aforementioned.. 政治大. Majority of the literatures dealing with South Korea and the ballistic missile defense focus on the North Korean ballistic missile threat.. 立. The North Korean ballistic. missile threat is analyzed by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND). ‧ 國. 學. on a regular basis, and the resulting information published in its Defense White Papers serves as the foundation in the debates on the ballistic missile defense.. In. ‧. addition to the ROK Defense White Paper, the incumbent Commander of the ROKUS Forces’ annual reports to the US Congress provides details what are not found in. y. Nat. sit. the South Korean publications. The officially published results of the analysis and. n. al. er. io. information from the US congressional testimony are as follows.. Ch. i Un. v. Since the 1970s, North Korea has focused on indigenous development of ballistic. engchi. missiles, which resulted in successful development of the Scud-B (range 300 km), Scud-C (range 500 km) and Rodong (range 1,300 km) missiles. 3. With the. deployment of the Rodong missiles, the entire South Korean territory fell under the range of North Korean ballistic missiles originating from any location within North Korea.4. Beyond the Korean Peninsula, North Korea possesses an Intermediate Range Ballistic. 3. 4. Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2008 English Version (Seoul: ROK MND Defense Policy Division, December 2008), p. 38. Refer to Figure 1.1 The North Korean Ballistic Missile Range Circles by Type. The distance from the northern most point Onsong (온성: 47°57΄22.05΄΄N, 129°59΄35.67΄΄E) to the southern most point Marado (마라도: 33°07΄03.93΄΄N, 126°16΄04.43΄΄E) of the two Koreas is only approximately 1,150 km. 7.

(17) Missile (IRBM) with a range beyond 3,000 km, able to reach the American territory of Guam where key US military assets are based.5. And the Taepodong-1 and 2. missiles are the long-range ballistic missiles, which the latest version is estimated to have a range of 6,700 km.6. The strike range of Taepodong-2 includes Alaska and. northern Australia.7. Table 1.1 Specification and Status of the orth Korean Ballistic Missiles. 治政大 Source: ROK MND Defense White Paper 2008, p. 329. 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 1.1 The orth Korean Ballistic Missile Range Circles by Type. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Source: ROK MND Defense White Paper 2008, p. 39.. 5. 6 7. General Walter L. Sharp, Statement of General Walter L. Sharp, Commander, United 'ations Command; Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement for Testimony to the US Senate Armed Service Committee, 19 March 2009, accessed 26 May 2010 [available: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Sharp%2003-1909.pdf], p. 7. ROK MND, Defense White Paper 2008, pp. 38-39. Refer to Figure 1.1 The North Korean Ballistic Missile Range Circles by Type. 8.

(18) The ROK defense white paper does not provide information on how many ballistic missiles North Korea has. However, though not a precise figure, General Sharp’s most recent testimony to the US Senate states that North Korea is “maintaining several hundred missiles in its active force.”8. Without a doubt, it is a substantial. number of offensive strategic weapons with capabilities to be armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) warheads.. The North Korean ballistic missile threat to South Korea is real and significant.. In. addition to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea possesses chemical and biological agents. 9 The most effective delivery mechanism for these WMD at Pyongyang’s disposal would be the ballistic missiles.. Therefore, deployment of. 政治大. ballistic missile defense system for South Korea is an important and pressing issue.. 立. In consideration of this North Korean ballistic missile threat, the former ROK Air. ‧ 國. the ballistic missile defense issue for South Korea.. 學. Force officer Dr. Cho Hong-jae comprehensively, though not academically,10 reviews In his book Missile Defense and. ‧. Korea published in 2007, Dr. Cho first traces the history of the American BMD, including issues related to the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and updates some. y. Nat. sit. of the technological advances the US has made in the recent years.. In chapter four. al. er. io. of the book, Dr. Cho lays out the details of the North Korean ballistic missile. n. development and testing history, which are introduced as the threat South Korean. Ch. missile defense should counter.. engchi. i Un. v. In the final two chapters, Dr. Cho analyzes the possibility of South Korea’s joining the American BMD.. He provides two important conclusions. First, Dr. Cho states that. Seoul’s joining of the American BMD would be in the national interest of South Korea, because it would defend against the real and credible North Korean ballistic missile threats,11 and would cut-off North Korea’s efforts to further develop nuclear 8 9 10. 11. General Walter L. Sharp, p. 7. ROK MND, Defense White Paper 2008, pp. 39-40. This book does not have proper citations to support the arguments. One such example among many, in chapter four, despite readily available government and other reliable data on the subject, Dr. Cho cites contents from a South Korean internet blog to introduce North Korean missile development history. 조홍제 (Cho Hong-jae), 미사일 방어와 한국의 선택 (Missile Defense and Korea), (Seoul: Hanuri Media, 2007), p. 192. Dr. Cho states it is difficult to regard the Chinese and Russian ballisitic missile capabilities to be real and probable threats to the South Korean national security. Cho, op. cit., p. 236. 9.

(19) weapons and missiles.. 12. Second, he concludes that South Korea cannot. independently field effective ballistic missile defense system, and therefore the South Korean system must be linked to the American system.13. As Dr. Cho states in his introduction, his book was not written to assert a certain argument in an academic fashion, rather the purpose was to assist in South Korean general public’s better understanding of the missile defense.14. Simply put, it is a. mere survey of the relevant issues with a suggestion that Seoul should join the American BMD because it is in the national interest of South Korea.. Two literatures, also focused on the North Korean ballistic missile threat, provide. 政治大. more than a statement of support for South Korea’s joining of the US BMD. A journal article written by a professor at the Kookmin University Dr. Park Hui-rak first. 立. documents the ballistic missile threat South Korea faces from North Korea. He. ‧ 國. 學. proceeds by refuting the arguments of the opponents to the ballistic missile defense system, which are adverse effects on the inter-Korean relations, affordability, and. ‧. feasibility issues of fielding the missile defense.. y. Nat. sit. On relations with North Korea, he states that while sustaining good inter-Korean. al. er. io. relations is preferable, South Korea should not consider the objections from. n. Pyongyang, and possibly subsequent deterioration of relations between the two in. Ch. i Un. v. fielding the ballistic missile defense system, because it was North Korea that provided. engchi. a sound rationale for South Korea to consider the defensive measure.15. Regarding. the expected high costs for Seoul to field missile defense systems, thus affordability, he cites a Japan’s case in which to save costs, Tokyo made an arrangement to share the US military’s X-band radar rather than fielding its own. Professor Park asserts that Seoul’s careful negotiations with the US would be able to generate an arrangement that would minimize South Korea’s financial burden.16. In terms of the. feasibility of ballistic missile defense, while acknowledging that Patriot Advanced. 12 13 14 15. 16. Cho, op. cit., pp. 236-237. Cho, op. cit., p. 242. Cho, op. cit., p. 14. 박휘락 (Park Hui-rak), “한국의 미사일 방어: 방향과 과제” (South Korea’s Missile Defense: Direction and Task), 군사논단 (Gunsa Nondan), Vol. 58 (Summer 2009), p. 44. Park Hui-rak, op. cit., p. 49. 10.

(20) Capability-3 (PAC-3) would have some problems providing defense coverage for the South Korean territories as a whole, he states the PAC-3 could provide protection coverage to a number of selected critical sites.. And addition of sea-based interceptor. systems would be able to provide defense coverage to the southern part of South Korea against North Korean ballistic missiles. Hence the system would be effective, though limited in scale.17. Professor Park concludes his journal article by recommending that the South Korean government raise public awareness for the necessity of ballistic missile defense, establish infrastructures as a first step in fielding the defense system, initiate substantive negotiations and cooperation with the US, and engage in creative. 政治大. diplomatic measures to minimize the ballistic missile threat from North Korea.18. 立. Another literature focused on the North Korean threat is written by the incumbent. ‧ 國. Mr. Hwang retired as a ROK Army. 學. ROK National Assemblyman Hwang Jin Ha.. Lieutenant General and even served as the head of the Force Command of the UN. ‧. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Of his seven strong reasons that Seoul should field a ballistic missile defense system, Assemblyman Hwang cites the case of. y. Nat. sit. Israel’s Arrow missile defense system as a counterargument against the opposition’s. al. er. io. assertion that no defense system is capable of defending South Korea from the North. n. Korean ballistic missile due to the proximity of the launch site from the target.. Ch. i Un. v. Because the distance between the launch sites of the ballistic missiles targeting Israel. engchi. is even shorter than the case of South Korea against the North Korean ballistic missiles, he states Seoul is able to field an effective missile defense for terminal stage intercept.19. In terms of Seoul’s membership in the American BMD posing a threat to other states in the region,20 Mr. Hwang states that these very states are increasing their ballistic. 17 18 19. 20. Park Hui-rak, op. cit., p. 48. Park Hui-rak, op. cit., pp. 49-53. 황진하 (Hwang Jin Ha), 주변국 미사일위협 분석과 한국의 미사일방어체계 구축에 관한 연구 (Analysis on Missile Threats from Neighboring Countries and Research on Deployment of South Korean Missile Defense System), The Office of ROK National Assemblyman Hwang Jin Ha (2007), pp. 46 and 48. It is easy to infer that Assemblyman Hwang is referring to China since Japan is already a member of the American BMD, Seoul’s actions would not have much negative impact on Taiwan, and 11.

(21) missile capabilities and South Korea, as a strong economic power with major interests in the international affairs and security, should take proactive steps to protect itself against ballistic missile threats.21. Another literature on the subject of South Korea and ballistic missile defense, while also focused on the North Korean ballistic missile threat, deals with the China issue on a limited scale. A Ph.D. dissertation written in 2008 provides an economically feasible model for South Korean ballistic missile defense system against North Korea. In addition, it discusses the potential backlash from China on the ROK-PRC trade relations should Seoul chose to join the US BMD.. 政治大. The then doctoral candidate at the Sung Kyun Kwan University Kim Sung-gul concludes that Seoul should be able to field the defense system against the North. 立. Korean ballistic missile threat should it cost less than eight to ten billion US dollars.22. ‧ 國. 學. Dr. Kim provides a mathematical model that would cost only between USD 4.7 to 6.7 billion in fielding an independent ballistic missile defense for South Korea against The proposal utilizes the already deployed PAC-2 GEM batteries. ‧. North Korea.23. with indigenously developed M-SAM that is soon to be operational in order to. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. maximize cost savings.. n. With regard to China, Dr. Kim states that the concentrated deployment of US Navy. Ch. i Un. v. Aegis ships in the Pacific could be viewed by Beijing as America’s intention to. engchi. counter not only the North Korean but also the Chinese ballistic missiles.24. As a. result, China views Seoul’s participation in the American BMD to be affecting its national security to deteriorate further than in the case of US-Japan BMD.25. The. ROK-US and ROK-PRC relations with regard to joining the American BMD are viewed in a zero-sum manner, in which by becoming a member of the BMD, Seoul could expect enhanced relations with the US and adverse relations with China, and. 21 22 23. 24 25. Russia is primarily concerned with the American BMD in Europe, not the possibility of SeoulWashington cooperation on BMD in Asia. Hwang Jin Ha, op. cit., p. 45. Currency conversion based on an assumption that 1 USD = 1,000 Korean Won. 김성걸 (Kim Sung-gul), 한국의 미사일 방어 (South Korea’s Choice on Missile Defense), Ph.D. Dissertation, Sung Kyun Kwan University-South Korea, Feb. 2008, pp. 214-216. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., p. 202. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., p. 108. 12.

(22) vice-versa. 26. He recommends that South Korea, while not fully joining the. American BMD, field its own ballistic missile defense system. Under this scenario, the Chinese objections and possible adverse effects on South Korea-China economic relations would be minimized to a point that the decision to field a ballistic missile defense system has a net-benefit effect on South Korea’s national interest.27. There are three problems in Dr. Kim’s dissertation.. First, the government research. report Dr. Kim cites as the basis in calculating the approximate cost of fielding independent South Korean ballistic missile defense does not deal with ballistic missile interception.. Methodology Case Study on the Required Quantity of the M-SAM. System from the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) published in 2006. 政治大. calculates the optimal number of M-SAM launchers and missiles required by South Korea based on the missile’s capability to shoot down incoming North Korean. 立. aircrafts. The report assumes the target aircrafts to be specifically MiG and Sukhoi. ‧ 國. 學. type North Korean aircrafts flying at low-altitudes with speed of 250 m/sec, and IL-28 type bombers to be flying at mid-altitudes with speed of 250 m/sec.28. Ballistic. ‧. missiles travel at a speed much faster than the aircrafts, and certainly at a higher speeds than the 250 m/sec. figure used by the KIDA study.29. Nat. y. Given that ballistic. sit. missiles are much more difficult to intercept than aircrafts, and would eventually. al. er. io. require additional missiles to be launched at, it is logical that Dr. Kim’s South Korean. n. ballistic missile defense model is inadequate in number of interceptors to be deployed,. Ch. and hence also the financial requirements.. engchi. i Un. v. Dr. Kim’s assertion that South Korea field an independent ballistic missile defense system is based on the economic affordability.. It is this economic feasibility that. does not require Seoul to become a member of the US BMD.. As there is no study. on the number of M-SAM interceptors required to counter the incoming North Korean 26. 27 28. 29. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., p. 109. Dr. Kim Sung-gul differentiates the two relationships by stating the South Korea-US relations is based on diplomatic and military relations while the South KoreaChina relations is based on economic relations. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., p. 205. 김종국 (Kim Jong-guk) and 이무성 (Lee Moo-sung), “M-SAM 체계 소요결정을 위한 방법론 사례 연구” (Methodology Case Study on the Required Quantity of the M-SAM System), 국방정책연구 (Kookbang Jungchaek Yeongu), Vol. 71 (April 2006), p. 164. See Paul Zarchan, “Ballistic Missile Defense Guidance and Control Issues,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 8 (1998). Zarchan uses an incoming ballistic missile speed of 6,000 ft/sec. (p. 114), which is 1828.8 m/sec, more than 7.3 times the figure used by the KIDA study. 13.

(23) ballistic missile, it is not possible to calculate how many more M-SAMs are required in addition to the 2,000 interceptor number that Dr. Kim used.30. However, with. absolute certainty, many more would be needed and the cost would proportionally increase, putting into doubt Dr. Kim’s argument on the economic feasibility of the independent system and the absence of necessity to join the US BMD.. Second, laying aside the problem found in citing the KIDA study, the fact that Dr. Kim’s ballisitic missile defense system solely relies on low-altitude terminal phase interceptors casts yet another serious doubt on the effectiveness of the proposed defense system.. The terminal phase intercept is the most difficult stage of the. ballistic missile flight trajectory.. The most critical issue that complicates. 政治大. interception in this phase is the fact that “the ballistic target is not as predictable because asymmetries within the target structure may cause it to spiral” as it falls back onto Earth.31. 立. That is the reason why the US and Japan have developed GBIs (US. ‧ 國. 學. only) and SM-3 interceptors for the exo-atmospheric engagement (much more predictable target flight path) for an added layer of defense above the PAC-3’s edo-. ‧. atmospheric engagement zone.32. y. Nat. sit. In addition, North Korea is expected to mount its ballistic missiles with chemical. er. io. warheads; under this circumstance sole reliance on low-altitude terminal phase. al. intercept system would not render protection for South Korea as the chemical agents. n. v i system n would require addition C h Therefore, Dr. Kim’s U i e h n SM-3 c missiles in order to provide effective altitude interceptors such as g. would still reach the surface.33 of high. 30 31 32. 33. Kim Sung-gul, pp. 214-216. Zarchan, p. 99. Procuring and deploying Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) could be considered, as this system has its own radar systems for detection, tracking and cueing capabilities. But the high cost of the system would be a problem. A US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) package announced in September 2008 included THAAD sales to the UAE. The three units with 147 THAAD missiles were set at USD 6.95 billion (Bettina H. Chavanne, “DSCA Announces Billions In Military Sales to Middle East,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, Vol. 227, No. 51, p. 5). On page 214, Dr. Kim Sung-gul specifically mentions that South Korea would have difficulty in fielding ballistic missile defense should the costs be around USD 8 to 10 billion, no matter what strategic safety it would provide. Given that THAAD system for the UAE already costs nearly 7 billion alone, even if Dr. Kim Sung-gul comes out with an innovative idea to reconfigure the number of his PAC-2/3 and M-SAM procurement, the costs would spiral out of the acceptable range. 박은주 (Park Eun-ju), 한국적 미사일방어에 대한 ABL의 효용성에 관한 연구 (A Study on the Utility of Airborne Laser for the Korean Missile Defense), Master’s Dissertation, Republic of Korea National Defense University (December 2008), p. 80. 14.

(24) ballistic missile defense for South Korea.. And the fact that these high altitude. interceptors require advanced tracking and cueing capabilities, unlike the terminal phase systems,34 South Korea’s cooperation with the US is inevitable. Dr. Kim’s suggestion of limited participation in the US BMD only as a research and development partner for radars and missiles,35 is no longer a possibility should his defense system is to have any meaningful level of effectiveness against North Korea.. In evaluating the cost-benefit analysis of Seoul’s joining the US BMD and Chinese reactions, Dr. Kim does not make a clear statement whether or not China is a threat to South Korea. 36. China is introduced as a critical trading partner. 37. While he. discusses China’s increasing military capabilities, both strategic and conventional, Dr.. 政治大. Kim explains the rationales behind China’s growth in strength to be in response to American efforts to check China and to prevent Taiwan’s independence.38. 立. Therefore,. according to Dr. Kim’s logic, China is not a threat to South Korea. The reason China. ‧ 國. 學. objects to South Korea’s fielding of ballistic missile defense is because it is concerned with the enhancement in the capabilities of the US BMD.39. ‧. Finally, Dr. Chun Sung-hoon of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)’s. y. Nat. sit. report titled US-Japan’s TMD Concept and South Korea’s Strategic Choice published. al. er. io. in 2000 comes across as the existing literature that discusses the two major issues of. n. this thesis: China threat, and the necessity of the US as an alliance partner for South Korea.. Ch. i Un. v. However, as the objective of Dr. Chun’s report is to provide a broad analysis. engchi. of the dynamics in Northeast Asia with regard to the then proposed US BMD, issues of China threat along with the US as an alliance partner are not dealt with in detail. Additionally, the nature and origin of China threat is contradictory to the analysis of 34. 35. 36 37 38 39. The terminal-phase intercept systems PAC-3 and M-SAM both have its own radar systems, and both are independent systems not requiring data links to any external system to intercept ballistic missiles. Kim Sung-gul, p. 217. While Dr. Kim Sung-gul uses the word “participate” [참여], in 2010 when the US BMD systems have reached deployment or advanced testing stages, it is difficult to consider joint-research on radars and other equipments as “participation.” As in the case of Japan and Poland, stationing of American BMD assets on the territory and operating a combined command and control system would be considered as “participation.” Unless, of course, South Korea is able to conduct joint research and development of exo-atmospheric kill vehicles with higher success rate than the ones used on GBI, SM-3 and THAAD, which is highly unlikely. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., pp. 116-127. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., pp. 109-111. Kim Sung-gul, op. cit., pp. 99-108. Even on this issue, Dr. Kim Sung-gul does not specify exactly how South Korea’s joining the US BMD would enhance the American defenses against Chinese ballistic missiles. 15.

(25) this thesis.. This policy recommendation paper first painstakingly introduces the history of the missile defense.. In addition to tracing the history of the American ballistic missile. defense from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to the year 2000, Dr. Chun discusses the views and reactions of the neighboring states and the two Koreas. Dr. Chun identifies the countries in favor of the US BMD and against it. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are characterized as those in favor of the US BMD, while Russia, China and North Korea are considered to be in the opposing side.40. With regard to China, Dr. Chun states that China has opposed the American BMD in. 治政 Another reason 大 that China opposed the US. Northeast Asia, because it perceives the defense system as a part of US-Japan containment strategy against China.41. 立. BMD is the possibility of Taiwan being included in the defense system. In addition,. ‧ 國. 學. the concern that it would have to increase spending to enhance strategic offensive capabilities to counter the US BMD, rather than increasing spending on economic. ‧. development, is another reason that China opposes the American led defense system. And should South Korea join the US BMD, the interception probability of China’s. y. Nat. sit. ballistic missiles aimed at South Korea and other countries would increase (as. n. al. er. io. opposed to the case of only US-Japan BMD), hence the opposition from Beijing.42. Ch. i Un. v. As to exactly what China43 would oppose with regard to South Korea’s potential. engchi. ballistic missile defense system in cooperation with the US, Dr. Chun states that Beijing would object to fielding of ground-based high altitude defense systems,. 40. 41 42 43. 전성훈 (Chun Sung-hoon), 미 • 일의 TMD 구상과 한국의 전략적 선택 (US-Japan’s TMD Concept and South Korea’s Strategic Choice), 통일연구원 (Korea Institute for National Unification), 연구총서 (Research Series) No. 2000-01 (2000), pp. 33-78. Dr. Chun also discusses the issue of North Korean ballistic missile threat in depth, however, the discussion is similar to that of Professor Park’s. Given that Dr. Chun’s article was written in 2000 in comparison to Professor Park’s in 2008, the latter has an up to date technological feasibility data to use in discussing the North Korean threat. Therefore, Dr. Chun’s analysis on the North Korean ballisitic missile threat is not necessary to be discussed in this thesis. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., p. 61. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., pp. 84 and 90. Note, in this analysis, Dr. Chun does not differentiate the responses between China and Russia. The study assumes that the two states would react in a same manner. However, as previously noted in the introduction, the New START between Moscow and Washington in April 2010 should indicate that today, Russia would not necessarily have the same objections as China would have with regard to the US BMD, especially in Asia. 16.

(26) because the Chinese ICBMs would be vulnerable to interception in the early stages of flight.44. Also any type of sea-based defensive systems would be opposed by Beijing,. as these systems have the distinct characteristic of being highly mobile in addition to the ICBM intercept capability, there is a high possibility that Taiwan could be covered by the sea-based systems. 45. To date, because China has not objected to the. placement of Patriot systems (terminal low-altitude system) by the USFK, Dr. Chun believes South Korea’s deployment of terminal phase low-altitude system would not draw strong objection from China.46 However, even if South Korea’s BMD cooperation47 with the US is limited to lowaltitude terminal phase intercept and the Chinese objection remains weak, Dr. Chun. 政治大. states that the very virtue of having an American defense system against China on the South Korean soil makes it inevitable that South Korea would be dragged into a. 立. potential great power war between Beijing and Washington. Therefore, in contrast to. ‧ 國. 學. Dr. Kim Sung-gul, Dr. Chun makes it clear that China would be a threat should South Korea choose to participate in the US BMD. And the cause of the Chinese threat to. ‧. South Korea is the fact that the US BMD seeks to counter the ballistic missile threats from the neighboring states (meaning China) in the mid to long-term,48 causing China. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. to feel threatened.. n. Therefore, in addition to the North Korean threat, should Seoul join the US BMD, a. Ch. threat from China would materialize.. i Un. v. At this juncture, Dr. Chun examines the. e n g cInh ai case of war against North Korea, Dr.. alliance between Seoul and Washington.. Chun state that Seoul’s participation in the US BMD would make Washington’s decision to support South Korea easier than had it not participated.49. The protection. the US BMD would supply not only to the continental US (CONUS) but also to the military infrastructures and troops in the rear area of the Korean theater works to minimize Washington’s possible reluctance to fight alongside South Korea. 44 45 46 47. 48 49. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., p. 84. Ibid. Ibid. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., p. 102. By “cooperation,” Dr. Chun states two situations, one in which the US BMD is permitted to defend against ballisitic missiles with high-altitude interceptors over the South Korean airspace, and another in which components of the South Korean defense systems (i.e. radar) provides assistance to the US interceptors located outside South Korea. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., p. 97. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 17.

(27) In another dimension, he states that Seoul’s membership in the US BMD would change the historical dynamics of the alliance. South Korea has unilaterally reaped the benefits of the alliance to date; however, by becoming a key player in the defense of the US from ballistic missile attacks, the membership could lessen Seoul’s freeriding position within the alliance.50. This of course would enhance the solidarity of. the alliance.. In the end, Dr. Chun’s conclusion is that despite the potential benefits to the strengthened alliance with the US, the costs of initiating threatening relations with China and the possibility of getting dragged into a great power war are too great and outweigh the benefits.. 政治大. Therefore, the recommendation is that South Korea. independently develop and field ballistic missile defense, but make certain that no. 立. defense system would be used against ballistic missiles not targeting South Korea.51. ‧ 國. 學. As for the US BMD, Dr. Chun advises that in order to show gratitude and appreciation for the alliance with the US, Seoul join the basic research with the US,52. ‧. which in practical terms means, involvement in the US BMD, but no physical participation.. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. While Dr. Chun’s report also addressed the China threat and the consideration of the. n. alliance with the US in Seoul’s BMD participation issue, because the China threat is. i Un. Ch. v. evaluated at a different angle, the conclusion is different from this thesis.. As. i be a threat to South Korea mainly e n g c hwould discussed above, Dr. Chun states that China due to the American containment strategy,53 one integral part of which is the BMD. The report does not state that China on its own would be a threat to South Korea. Following in this logic, there is no need for South Korea to provoke China, posing a threat through close alliance with the original provocateur, the US.. While this thesis agrees that China is a threat to South Korea, the assertion that the US containment strategy (i.e. BMD) as the reason making China to be threatening to South Korea is not agreeable. China is increasing its military strength beyond what 50 51 52 53. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., p. 102. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., pp. 99-100 and 103. Chun Sung-hoon, op. cit., p. 99. And the possibility of American involvement in the Taiwan issue. 18.

(28) is necessary for it to overcome the American BMD, even with South Korea’s participation, and to overwhelm Taiwan. With the new DF-31 ICBMs and Type 094 SSBNs, the Chinese already have significantly enhanced the strategic offensive capabilities, which are very difficult for the US BMD to counter.54. The 2009 report. from the US Department of Defense (DoD) clearly shows that China has achieved air superiority over the Taiwan Straits, and that the PLA is “developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan.”55. More detailed analysis of. China as a threat to South Korea, regardless of the US BMD, would be conducted in the fourth chapter of this thesis.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 54 55. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Kim Sung-gul, p. 101. US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China: Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 'ational Defense Authorization Act, March 2009, pp. i and viii. 19.

(29) Chapter 2. Background Information: South Korea and the BMD 2.1 Conceptualization Stage of the BMD Washington’s invitation to Seoul that South Korea join the American ballistic missile. 政治大. defense program could be traced back to April 1985, when the then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger requested that South Korea participate in the President. 立. Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).1. This invitation was received favorably. ‧ 國. 學. from Seoul, and as a result, a group of researchers were dispatched to the US and Patent Secrecy Agreement (PSA) between the two nations were concluded in 1993; The US took another shot. ‧. however, no further government actions had been taken.2. at inviting South Korea to its ballistic missile defense program when the then Deputy. y. Nat. sit. Secretary of Defense John Deutch visited South Korea and asked the Kim Yeong-sam. er. al. Despite these two rather formal and official invitations from. n. September 1993.3. io. Administration to join the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in. Ch. i Un. v. American officials, South Korea did not take any substantive actions in joining the program.. engchi. These two invitations, which are formal in nature, should not be equated as the contemporary formal American invitations to its allies to join the BMD, as is the case of Poland.4. When South Korean officials received invitations directly from their. American counterparts in 1985 and 1993, no ballistic missile defense system was operational or even at a testing stage. 1 2 3 4. It was at a conceptual stage, and with the high. Chun Sung-hoon, p. 72. Ibid. Ibid. Judy Dempsey, “Poland to Accept U.S. Offer On Shield,” The 'ew York Times-Late Edition, 21 October 2009, p. A13. Also see 정지탄 (Jung Ji-tan), “폴란드 ‘새로운 미사일방어 제안 받았다’” (Poland, ‘Received a New Offer on US Missile Defense’), 뉴시스 (Newsis), 7 October 2009. 20.

(30) probability of technical unfeasibility, the invitations were not that South Korea join the defense program such as placing radar stations or interceptors (the case of Poland in 2010), but rather that it participate in conceptual and feasibility studies. Therefore, the formal invitations from Washington in 1985 and 1993 should not be considered as an invitation to join the defense program as in 2010.. 2.2 Deployment Stage of the BMD After it became apparent that the US had achieved a certain level of technical proficiency to intercept incoming ballistic missiles and had formulated plans to. 政治大 never received a formal invitation from Washington. The testimony of the then 立 Director of Policy Planning Division of the South Korean Ministry of National. deploy interceptors and radar sites, the South Korean government states that it has. ‧ 國. 學. Defense (NMD) Kim Seon-gyu to the National Defense Committee of South Korean National Assembly on June 19th, 2003 succinctly represents South Korea’s position. ‧. with regard to issue of joining the American ballistic missile defense: no American. y. Nat. invitation regarding participation in the MD system was received, and should the US. sit. offer an invitation, the MND would consider the North Korean threat, ROK-US. al. n. decision.5. er. io. combined defense readiness and diplomatic environment in the process of rendering a. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. While it is true that the US has never officially offered an invitation to South Korea, it has done so in indirect and unofficial ways. On a periodic basis, the incumbent Commander of the USFK6 mentions the necessity for cooperation between the US and South Korea in ballistic missile defense in a luncheon speech or in his annual testimony to the U.S. Congress. For example, in his first testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Walter L. Sharp testified that South Korea “should also continue to invest in a [Theater Missile Defense] TMD capability, which would ideally be interoperable with U.S. systems to enhance our 5. 6. National Defense Committee of the ROK National Assembly, 國 1 (Defense Committee Meeting Minutes Number 1), the 240th Special Session of the ROK National Assembly, 19 June 2003, p. 15. The Commanding General also holds the positions of Commander for the United Nations Command and Commander for the Combined Forces ROK-US. 21.

(31) combined defensive capabilities.”7. The general continued by stating “[t]he ROK. must continue to develop and field an interoperable TMD system to protect critical civilian and military command capabilities, infrastructure and population centers.”8 It should be noted that instead of choosing “join” or “participate,” the testimony utilized the word “interoperability,” which is a much more subtle expression of insinuating the South Korea’s need to join the American ballistic missile defense.. Despite the informal and indirect offer of invitation from the US, Seoul is not providing any responses, that is no response against or for joining the American ballistic missile defense.. South Korea and the United States hold a ROK-US. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on an annual basis, during which the South. 政治大. Korean Minister of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense hold meetings to comprehensively discuss security issues of the two states, ranging from operation. 立. plans to host nation support.. If the Commander of the USFK is able to openly testify. ‧ 國. 學. that South Korea should field a ballistic missile defense system that is “interoperable” with the American system, the SCM is the best setting for the US to discuss or offer a. ‧. formal invitation to South Korea.. y. Nat. sit. However, the fact that two Joint Communiqués of the SCM since the inauguration of. al. er. io. President Lee Myung-bak (the 40th and 41st Joint Communiqués) do not even mention. n. ballistic missile defense is a clear indication that South Korea does not wish to even. Ch. discuss the issue with the US in a formal setting.9. engchi. i Un. v. In addition to the incumbent Commander of the USFK’s periodic nudge to Seoul, in 2010 the Obama Administration included South Korea in its Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report. The specific language used in the BMDR referred to South Korea as “an important U.S. BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] partner” and pointed 7 8 9. General Walter L. Sharp, p. 14. Ibid. The President-elect Lee Myung-bak and his transition committee had a favorable view of joining the American BMD. While the favorable view was not necessarily to join immediately after inauguration, it was a significant step towards the membership considering that the previous two presidents had firmly opposed to participate in the BMD. Therefore the two communiqués of the SCM issues under President Lee’s tenure have been examined. See 황일도 (Hwang Il-do), “이명박 정부 MD[미사일방어체제] 참여 구상 정밀 분석” (In Depth Analysis of Lee Myung-bak’s Concept of MD [Missile Defense System] Participation) 신동아 (Shin Dong-A), Vol. 581 (1 Feb. 2008), pp. 290-299. 22.

(32) out that “the United States stands ready to work with the R.O.K. to strengthen its protection against the North Korean missile threat.”10. The South Korean government made an official response to the BMDR’s reference of South Korea as “an important U.S. BMD partner,” by stating that there has not been an official invitation from Washington requesting South Korea to join the BMD, and it is difficult to interpret the language of the BMDR to be an official request.11 This response is consistent with the line of previous responses that South Korea is not in consideration of joining the American missile defense and it is also not in any discussion regarding ballistic missile defense issue with the US.. 政治大. In response to Seoul’s rather “cold” response, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, East Asia Michael Schiffer contributed. 立. an opinion article to a major South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo on March 6th, In his article, Assistant Secretary Schiffer explained how the US is to invest. ‧ 國. 學. 2010.. heavily in establishing a Regional Missile Defense (RMD) arrangement, which would In contrast to the BMD,. ‧. be more flexible and easy to be deployed than the BMD.12. which seeks to intercept ICBMs bound for American territories, the RMD would be. y. Nat. sit. “tailored” to the unique requirements of Asia in dealing with Short-Range Ballistic. al. However,. er. io. Missiles (SRBMs) and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs).13. n. even in this news article, the assistant secretary does not ask Seoul to become a. Ch. i Un. v. member of the American-led RMD. However, an article placed on the same page by. engchi. the Dong-A Ilbo interprets Assistant Secretary Schiffer’s mentioning of the RMD as an indirect request from the US for Seoul to join the RMD.14. Despite such indirect. invitations, no response in favor or against from Seoul has been made.. 10. 11. 12. 13 14. US Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010), p. 33. 김귀근 (Kim Gui-geun), “ , BMD체제 참여제의 논란” (US, Controversy over Invitation to Join the BMD System), 연합뉴스 (Yeonhop News), 3 February 2010. 마이클 시퍼 (Michael Schiffer), “[특별기고] 마이클 시퍼 미국 국방부 차관보” ([Special Contribution] Michael Schiffer, US Assistant Secretary of Defense), 동아일보 (Dong-A Ilbo), 6 March 2010. Ibid. 박민혁 (Park Min-hyuk), “ ‘한반도 새로운 지역MD’ 추진” (U.S. To Initiate a New Regional MD on the Korean Peninsula), 동아일보 (Dong-A Ilbo), 6 March 2010. 23.

(33) 2.3 Possible Reasons for South Korean Government’s Inaction While some may suspect that South Korean government’s inaction with regard to American informal invitations to join the BMD is representative of Seoul’s desire to avoid joining the American program, such a reaction, or a lack of, from Seoul should not be construed in only one way.. A non-response or inaction could be that Seoul. opposes the BMD deployment or could also be that it seeks to join the BMD behind the scenes in order to minimize other possible diplomatic repercussions.. South Korea’s procurement of two ballistic missile defense radars in September 2009 is a case in point of such a possible behind the scenes approach to quietly join the US. 政治大 from Israel with range over 800 km, which “would be interoperable with Theater 立 If Seoul Missile Operations-Cell (TMO), run by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” BMD. The South Korean government procured two Green Pine Block-B radars 15. ‧ 國. 學. were stead-fast in opposition to joining the US BMD, the government would make sure that such systems as the ballistic missile tracking radars, would be kept separate. Nat. y. ‧. and non-interoperable with the US BMD assets.16. sit. As discussed in the literature review section of this thesis, specifically the writings of. er. io. Dr. Kim Sung-gul and Dr. Chun Sang-hoon, Seoul’s decision to join the US BMD. al. n. iv n C U power like the US or Russia, and In such a case, given that SouthhKorea e n gis not c haigreat. would result in deterioration of ROK-PRC relations, especially in economic relations.. also heavily dependent on trade, Seoul must heed the adverse affects of joining the US BMD and do its best to minimize the potential repercussions. Also, behind the scenes negotiations with the US for the BMD participation provides China with some latitude to manage the ROK-PRC relations down the road. As of today, China does not have South Korean government’s decision to denounce or attack, as there are no public decisions on the BMD participation.. On the other hand, for a case that Seoul’s inaction is a result of South Korea’s opposition to the US BMD, one is able to borrow the arguments from those outside 15 16. Jung Sung-ki, “Israeli Radar Chosen for Missile Defense,” The Korea Times, 17 Sept. 2009. The TMO run by the USFK are a part of the US BMD, however, under the sole control of the US government. 24.

(34) the government who openly take the position of anti-US BMD participation. What could be considered as an academic writing by Cheong Wook-sik of the Peace Network, an NGO based in South Korea, the MD published in 2003 and revised in 2008, argues that South Korea should not join the US BMD because of three major reasons, which are: 1.) high costs, 2.) doubtful feasibility, 3.) possibility of falling victim to great power politics in Northeast Asia.17. Mr. Cheong argues the reason. Washington is pushing to deploy BMD is due to the American military-industrial complex and its search for profit.18. The arguments against South Korea’s joining the. American BMD is usually found in NGO press releases and newspaper articles, such as Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK). This South Korean NGO’s press release on May 10th, 2010 titled “U.S. Military Strategy on the Korean. 政治大. Peninsula and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia,” argues that Seoul should not join the American BMD as such an action would accelerate nuclear arms race in the. 立. region.19. ‧ 國. 學. These are the best guesses as to explain why the South Korean government has not. ‧. publicly either accepted or rejected the American indirect invitations to join the US BMD. Until such a decision has been publicly made, it is impossible to understand. y. Nat. sit. the rational behind Seoul’s current stance of ambiguity. However, as the intent of. al. er. io. this thesis is to provide a reason in favor of South Korea’s participation in the US. n. BMD, not to make a policy recommendation that Seoul join the US defense program,. Ch. i Un. v. a survey of Seoul’s positions with regard to the BMD and possible rationales behind. engchi. such positions as background information would suffice.. 17. 18 19. 정욱식 (Cheong Wook-sik), MD 미사일방어체제 (MD Missile Defense System) (Gyunggi-do, South Korea: Sallim, 2008), pp. 48-60. Cheong Wook-sik, op. cit., pp. 63-80. Ko Young-dae, “U.S. Military Strategy on the Korean Peninsula and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia,” SPARK Homepage,10 May 2010, accessed 30 May 2010 [available: http://www.spark946.org/bugsboard/index.php?BBS=s_news3&action=viewForm&uid=1178&pag e=4]. 25.

(35) Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: Offensive Realism 3.1 Introduction of Offensive Realism An off-shoot of the Realism Theory in international relations academic field, the. 政治大. Offensive Realism is founded upon five bedrock assumptions that render three resulting behaviors on great powers.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 3.1 The Basics of Offensive Realism. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. The first bedrock assumption “anarchy” is succinctly defined as “no central authority 26.

(36) [imposing] limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests” of states.1 also a founding assumption of the Defensive Realism.. This concept is. The second bedrock. assumption is the offensive capabilities of great powers. Mearsheimer states that “great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.”2 method to be certain about another’s intentions.. Third, states have no. In addition, fickle nature of. intentions, that is, it could change overnight without any prior warning, makes it even more difficult for a state to identify another’s intentions.3. Fourth, according to. Mearsheimer, the “primary goal of great powers” is survival, which means maintenance of “territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order.”4. Finally, the fifth bedrock assumption is that these great powers, or states,. 政治大. are rational actors; in other words, they calculate responses from others and weigh the pros and cons of their strategic actions for both short and long term.5. 立. ‧ 國. 學. These characteristics render great powers to adhere to three behavioral patterns. First, fear arises among great powers due to the fact that other powers possess. ‧. offensive capabilities and there is no way to know for certain what is the intention of the other power. Mearsheimer states, as a result, “[f]rom the perspective of any one. Nat. sit. y. great power, all other great powers are potential enemies.” 6. In addition, the. er. fear.7. io. possibility of “falling victim” to another power’s aggression heightens the level of. al. As a result, a state “focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities of potential. n. i v the state must prepare for a n C hUnder this circumstance, U i e h n c g worst case scenario in order to ensure its survival.. rivals, not their intentions.”8. Second, the theory explains that each state engages in self-help behavior.. Borrowing. Mearsheimer’s words, “[i]n international politics, God helps those who help. 1. 2. 3 4 5 6 7 8. Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct. 1985), p. 1. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), p. 30. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. John J. Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 32. Ibid. John J. Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 45. 27.