重新理解柏拉圖之《泰鄂提得斯》篇 - 政大學術集成

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(1) . . 國立政治大學文學院哲學系碩士論文. Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts National Chengchi University Master Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 重新理解柏拉圖之《泰鄂提得斯》篇 Reunderstanding Theaetetus. ‧. n. al. Chia-En Lin. Ch. engchi. 指導教授：彭文林. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 林加恩. i n U. v. 博士. Advisor:Wen-Lin Peng, Ph.D.. 中華民國一百零一年六月 June, 2012 .

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(3) 謝辭感謝我的父母、女友以及諸位好友這段時間的支持。撰寫、構思、討論、修改，這諸多的過程大多是孤獨的，跟過去的文本對話，跟當代的研究激盪。沒有充滿愛的環境，這樣的過程將會更難度過。感謝指導老師彭老師的悉心指導。透過他的經驗跟學識，我得以看到自己的不足，也才開始對柏拉圖研究的概況有了基本的認識。他也不斷提醒我何謂哲學討論的主軸，又該如何避免不必要思緒的干擾。也十分謝謝在大綱以及論文口試時，魏老師、何老師兩位師長所提供的寶貴意見跟鼓勵。希望自己能繼續在求學求道的道路上努力。. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(4) 摘要本文試圖藉由梳理前人對於《本文試圖藉由梳理前人對於《泰鄂提得斯》泰鄂提得斯》篇之研究觀點，重新理解此篇談論知識的對話錄之意義重新理解此篇談論知識的對話錄之意義。對話錄之意義。此文不採取過去對話錄間系統性的比較取徑，，而專注於從此文本本身發掘對話錄間系統性的比較取徑系統性的比較取徑柏拉圖所欲呈現之知識觀點柏拉圖所欲呈現之知識觀點。所欲呈現之知識觀點。藉由帶出、『普羅塔哥拉斯、『偏題藉由帶出『助產術』助產術』『普羅塔哥拉斯』普羅塔哥拉斯』『偏題』偏題』等主題，等主題，配合重新閱讀原文『』的知識定義的討論，配合重新閱讀原文『知識即感知』知識即感知治的知識定義的討論，呈現. 政. 大. 立追求知識過程中所經歷的種種心智轉在對話錄中對話錄中，對話者於追求知識過程對話者於追求知識過程中所經歷的種種心智轉. ‧ 國. 學. 變，進而描繪柏拉圖所刻畫之人與知識間的關係，進而描繪柏拉圖所刻畫之人與知識間的關係，凸顯此對. ‧. 話錄中『話錄中『內化政治』內化政治』的面向的面向以及對話錄真正核心的關懷以及對話錄真正核心的關懷。對話錄真正核心的關懷。. io. sit. y. Nat. 與其說此對話錄意圖定義知識是什麼與其說此對話錄意圖定義知識是什麼，此對話錄意圖定義知識是什麼，不如說柏拉圖試不如說柏拉圖試. n. al. er. 圖傳遞一種圖傳遞一種心一種心智教育的指引教育的指引，的指引，來引領我們引領我們轉換我們轉換跟知識追求活轉換跟知識追求活動間的關係。動間的關係。. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 關鍵字：關鍵字：泰鄂提得斯、泰鄂提得斯、助產術、助產術、普羅塔哥拉斯、普羅塔哥拉斯、偏題、偏題、知識即感知。即感知。. i.

(5) Abstract The aim of this thesis is to portray what may be the real spirit of the dialogue Theaetetus. While most of the researches focus on the systematic position of this dialogue, this dialogue seems to offer us less than it might do. While the midwifery and the digression are taken to be peripheral in other scholarly works, this thesis intends to bring out the connotation of these passages. Together with re-reading of the first part of the definition of knowledge, I tried to show the “inner-political” facet and the real concern of this dialogue.. 政治大. I suggest that, in Theaetetus, what we really get is not the result of a certain definition of knowledge; instead, what Plato tries to transmit is a mental-pedagogical guideline, informing us how to transform our relations with the pursuit of knowledge.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Key Words: Theaetetus, midwifery, Protagoras, digression, knowledge is perception.. Ch. engchi. ii. i n U. v.

(6) Table of Contents Chinese Abstract---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i English Abstract----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ii Table of Contents--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------iii Chapter I: Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Chapter II: Invitation to the Inquiry of Knowledge----------------------------------------------8 II.i Midwifery---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8 II.ii Protagoras------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14 II.iii Skepticism?----------------------------------------------------------------------------------18 Chapter III: Knowledge as Perception-------------------------------------------------------------21 III.i Theaetetus’ Choice----------------------------------------------------------------------21 III.ii Knowledge as Perception----------------------------------------------------------------24 III.iii Theodorus’ Participation and the Digression--------------------------------------28 III.iv Passage 184-187--------------------------------------------------------------------------33 Chapter IV: Excurs contra Friedländer and Tschemplik---------------------------------------36 IV.i Paul Friedländer’s interpretation-------------------------------------------------------36 IV.ii Knowledge and Self-knowledge--------------------------------------------------------41 Chapter V: Conclusion--------------------------------------------------------------------------------44 Bibliography---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------47. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v.

(7) Reunderstanding Theaetetus Chapter I Introduction: motivations of this work and some discussions of previous studies It is still arguable what Theaetetus is really about. Apparently, it is a reference to a past dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus, accompanied by the occasional participation of Theodorus. The topic is raised by Socrates, on what knowledge is; and it ends in a seemingly aporetic manner: Socrates facing the indictment that Meletus had brought against him. Socrates promised to meet again with Theodorus the following day. This ending, along with the opening and the content of Sophist, led most of the scholars 1 confirm the correlation between these two dialogues, although they were quite distant from each other. About the chronology, there are various criterions adopted by the scholars: the survey by Erler2 offers a clear overview of the methods used by far. We get relative orders concerning the internal, external, and stylistic variables. The academic history of the chronology of Theaetetus has prompted a rigorous debate, whether it is closer to the earlier groups or the later groups of the dialogue. And it is the latter which is much preferred till now. Despite the uncertainty, it seems clear that this dialogue situates its role in Plato’s work at a turning point. Its ambiguity prompts researches in finding a coherent interpretation to settle its position once and for all. For my thesis, I try to avoid following such a coherent impulse to fit the dialogue into a systematic picture, though at the same time, taking into consideration the observations provided by the previous discussions. I am more interested in the questions raised in Theaetetus per se, and would like to limit the scope to what we can get from the dialogue itself.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. There is this current tendency to give the dialogue a systematic understanding, which brings various new aspects. After Schleiermacher3, the system and unity of Plato’s work guided the readers in reconstructing the meaning transmitted from each dialogue. His romantic but scholarly reading4, provides us with a good example to retrieve and imagine the past. However, besides these internal relations that this branch of works provides, it seems that only if we believe all dialogues provide a one-aimed system for Plato’s philosophy, this approach would be valid without doubt. On the other hand, another way to discuss Plato is focused on whether the contents 1. Taken for example Klein, J. Plato’s Trilogy. Erler, M. Die Philosophie der Antike, pp.22-26. 3 See also the discussion of the chronology by D. Bostock, Plato’s Theaetetus, the first chapter. 4 See Mariña, J. ed. The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Chapter 5: The art of interpreting Plato by Lamm, Julia A. 2. 1.

(8) reflect the thoughts of Plato or Socrates.5 This approach shows the difficulties to fully reconstruct Plato’s system, but attempt to explore what insight Plato’s works may offer us. My approach sits somewhere in the middle. I would not deny the importance of Plato’s philosophical world as a whole, but I do think that Theaetetus, as the sole dialogue which touches directly upon the question of knowledge, renders something different. Its overt claim may be the search of knowledge, but what it really achieves is to present a suitable path to knowledge. In Plato’s presentation, all the psychological paths connect and redirect the people within and transform their relations with knowledge. As an experimental work6, dated generally in his later stages of life, almost all interpreters try to fit Theaetetus into the framework of Plato’s philosophy, or, to be more precise, his texts. Instead of focusing on the characteristics and the uncertainty of this short piece, most interpretations just try to make it more coherent compared with others and thus receive a more fixed status. But what if this work, because of its own nature, cannot be so? It has the form of the early dialogues, with the tendency falling back into an aporetic style. Does it suggest anything? If the base or the essence of knowledge itself is under scrutiny or reflection, why should we suppose any certain historical understanding of Plato to evaluate this content? Or historicity may be important in understanding the components within this dialogue, but not the very trend of thought itself? To be more precise, it may be the very thing that this reflection tries to escape of. Being a knowledge seeker, to search for an answer concerning an open-ended pursuit, what can Plato do to make his understanding of knowledge more endurable and still valuable for the future readers? Furthermore, do all these interpreters conceptualize the process of defining knowledge as acquiring a certain answer, rather than discovering and challenging the mind with an ongoing process? The point is, if the orientation of the interpreter himself is not to think of gaining some tangible, certain knowledge, such as the three major arguments revealed in the dialogue, the understanding may be totally altered. If we try to grasp the whole effort of Plato from a more structural point of view, then, the contrast, the shade, and the gradation of the whole dialogue will appear differently.7. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. But let us first examine the previous studies. Among all the major books, researches, and articles directly or indirectly referring to this dialogue, Ι suggest that 5. Cf. Corlett, J. A. Interpreting Plato’s dialogue, introduction, pp. 1-18. Here I mean the subtitle, πειραστικο’ς, which causes the uncertainty of the basis of this dialogue. I will not go into the discussion of this word, rather, I will just treat this beginning as a psychological preparation for any reader, who wishes to have a fresh start on such a subject. 7 Just as in the end of Theaetetus, 208e, Socrates’ example of σκιαγραφημα. 6. 2.

(9) there are basically three branches of perspectives. The first, which I will classify as a historical view, tries to locate and grasp the meaning of this discussion by its relative coordinate concerning other close-related dialogues. Jacob Klein’s Plato’s Trilogy is one such example. In his approach, he tries to find the definition of the sameness and the difference（the other）talked about in the dialogue, and he concludes that its main theme is not knowledge, but the possibility of error. 8 I found it hardly acceptable and yet, illuminating in a way. First, it cuts the tie between the knowledge seeker and knowledge itself. If the stress is upon the negativity of this activity, then it is bizarre for any person to desire to participate in such an activity. Even Theaetetus, the protagonist in the dialogue, needs the encouragement from Socrates from to time to time. This can hardly be Plato’s project in mind. If the road to knowledge highlights such a psychological perspective to the impossibility of such a pursuit, this is definitely a one-sided interpretation. Perhaps for Klein, it is the whole compendium of Plato’s work which brings the positive psychological impulse, but I think the text of Theaetetus itself already provides us with this clue and motivation. Klein does make it right when he tries to read out of the arguments themselves, not confining the lessons we can learn from this dialogue only within the realm of arguments; but he still wants to combine this discovery to other dialogues but not solely from the text of Theaetetus itself. This historical approach is quite important in offering us the coordinate of the dialogue, such as dating, the vicissitude of a writer’s mental struggle, etc. However, concerning the content of Theaetetus, it seems not so proper to push too far in that direction, since what Socrates suggests in the dialogue, is to probe into the very essence, the very beginning of the activity to make sense of what knowledge might be. It is also possible that the absence of the theory of idea or form as a testimony that Plato just wants a fresh start without theoretical burden in reader’s mind. As we can clearly see, when Theaetetus named his own learning of mathematical knowledge, and some other professions of life as the possible candidates of knowledge, he was immediately stopped by Socrates. This event shows not only what Socrates inquires after is not any branch of specific knowledge, but also that he demands a whole new start without any presumption. Even perception is worth of a new examination. The first approach has the tendency to interpret the lack of discussion of Plato’s form theory as a sign or revelation for their own interpretation, it can be meaningful but without certainty. It also leads to unbalanced interpretation of each paragraph. The proportion of the discussion of perception deserves our attention. As Mojsisch9 has observed, the variety of perception is set side by side with the question of being. Socrates’ refutation shows the weakness of. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 8 9. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. See Klein, op. cit., pp.144-145. See Kobusch, T. Und Mojsisch, B. ed. Platon Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer Forschung, p.172. 3.

(10) perception but the impression caused by the dialogue also leads us to wonder more about whether the perception has a critical role in our knowledge-forming process or not. The second approach, I would call it the argument-oriented interpretation, which centers on the inner development and internal consistency of the arguments in question. This branch consists of scholars such as Bostock, Heidegger, and Cornford, etc. Heidegger for example, in his own framework, he contrasts Politelia with Theaetetus, treating these two dialogues as two poles of the history of the concept of truth and untruth; he thinks that these two together will offer the reader the presencing of truth. Heidegger’s reading is more phenomenological in that he tries to bring out the development of consciousness in the dialogue. I am also sided with this observation, i.e. to read closely the impact aroused by the details in the dialogue. But does Theaetetus really just offer us this polarity and lie inevitably on the negative side of the spectrum of truth? Concerning Socrates’ stress of his maieutic skill, this position seems to be fragile. The midwife first identifies the hopeful candidates then to provoke them to give birth to their own offsprings. In the end, although Theaetetus realized that the efforts brought up wind-eggs, but he also admitted that he has said far more than before. Although Heidegger’s approach is rich in the phenomenological, ontological awareness, it seems still inevitable to try digging substantial claim of knowledge (though from the negative side) from the dialogue. Stern’s new work10 is also a one-sided try. He highlights the political aspect of this dialogue, but seems not to be concerned with the knowledge-seeking itself. The political atmosphere in that epoch is prevalent, and that is probably why Socrates (or Plato) inclined to refer to this aspect of life as an example to illustrate his point of view. While highlighting this, it definitely ignores what Socrates try to say in the so-called second digression, that the philosopher promotes another kind of lifestyle, which contrasts prominently with the men in politics. Curiously enough, Sedley’s work, The Midwife of Platonism, which in a way continued Cornford’s observation, also tries to depict the effort of this dialogue as a witness of the “art of midwifery”. In other words, Stern and Sedley do not really think that this dialogue contains anything meant for itself, but for others (other dialogues). In Sedley’s own words, the dialogue portrays a kind of rebirth of historical Socrates.11 The objection to the second type of interpretation is that, it often reads too much into the arguments and images (or metaphors) posed by Socrates. They often try to create a solid theory of knowledge based on the content in Theaetetus. Under this. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 10 11. Ch. engchi. Stern, P. Knowledge and Politics in Plato’s Theaetetus. Sedley, D. The Midwife of Platonism, Chapter 1. 4. i n U. v.

(11) understanding, it is doomed to treat Plato’s answer to what knowledge is as a failure, only illuminating in defeating some of the most intricate arguments at that time. In terms of arguments, the epistemological facet of this dialogue is not complete, if the interpreter tries to reconstruct the theory through arguments. But if we also take other clues provided in the dialogue into account and shift our focus to the whole process, things might turn out differently. And this concern brings about the next approach. The third approach, the human existence approach, can be represented by Paul Friedländer. In his view, he treats all the arguments and the so-called digressions within as a presentation of the boundary situation of life. All epistemological, ethical or metaphysical connotations enriched this dialogue, making it not simply a search for a theory of knowledge.12 I am basically in line with this interpretation, and think it is always hard to discuss or contemplate knowledge as a solitary, independent facet of life. But to my disappointment, it seems that even this branch of discussion often has its presupposition of what knowledge should be like. He thinks that this dialogue has the intention to move people to higher knowledge. From the introduction of his three-volume study of Plato, we can also see the reason why he takes this as basis, i.e. Plato takes a turn in his later years to focus on the question of being, and makes it as the ultimate goal. But does it naturally endorse Theaetetus as the case under this basic structure? This dialogue seems to suggest that, in fact, you cannot and should not suppose what knowledge is like, but you need to reflect upon possible solutions or paths repeatedly to reach a possible account or judgment. And the more preparation and well-tuned propensity you have, the better it may be. We may have the intention to value the knowledge at hand, but when we come back to rethink the basis of knowledge, the hierarchy of knowledge may be another matter which is not central to be discussed under the framework of this dialogue.13. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. I found the last approach most appealing. However, it is not complete, and thus, I believe it is worthwhile to reconsider the whole dialogue. I will focus my discussion on the first part of this dialogue, namely the paragraph from 143d to 187a. The reason for this choice is that it contains the most vibrant part of this dialogue, and the paragraph actually lays the reason and the cause of the ensuing two arguments. My approach will be psychological; while having in mind also the aspects of self-knowledge and politics of knowledge14, I will try to show the dynamics and the 12. See Friedländer, P. Plato 3, pp.188-189. And maybe it is why the mentioning of Parmenides theory is cut immediately after Theaetetus expressed his desire to hear more about it following the former discussion. 14 Tschemplick, A. Knowledge and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus and Stern, op. cit. 13. 5.

(12) facts I observe from the dialogue. My basic problem towards this passage is: what does Socrates want to achieve through his midwifery? What does the conflict between the views of Socrates and Protagoras really reflect? Does this dialogue really aim to produce a kind of “knowledge”? Or, rather, it shows the transformation related in this very process? In the work of Divan written by Jalat al-Din Rumi, a Persian philosopher and poet, he uses his rhetoric devices to express his understanding of the paradoxical nature of life.15For him, as what Fatemeh (1998) has mentioned, there may be a kind of knowledge or wisdom, which we may call “intelligent ignorance”. Human beings are forced to play different games to approach the unfathomable depth of knowledge the world presented. The contrast, oxymoron, impossibility, and silence are all rhetoric devices to show a certain facet of knowledge. For example, we can observe the contrast in the sorts and the essence of knowledge; the persuasiveness of perception and the contradiction brought by it when trying to judge competing experience of perception; and the aporetic ending. Back to Theaetetus, we see striking familiarity of all these experiences. If in regard to Theaetetus, the dating and the style are only valid in guiding us having a tentative picture of Plato but never a completely final word, then, once we strip of this theoretical presupposition, the dialogue opens more room for contemplation. In Theaetetus, we can observe a still uncertain mentality towards knowledge, and under such background, what may be a better solution to discuss such a fundamental question? I will try to explore this mental facet all along, and the ambiguity among wisdom and knowledge, in order to offer a new way to look at this monumental work by Plato.. 政治大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. But what constitutes the psychological, mental dimension which offers the dialogue the perpetual dynamics? In Sedley’s work, he treats the dialogue as a pivot of Plato’s middle to later works, which renders the continuity of Plato’s thought. I, too, find the dialogue earns its special status among other dialogues in showing the difficulty of defining knowledge through the framework of midwifery. The midwifery in my eye is less than an assertion of a claim of knowledge; rather, it captures the motivation behind this work, manifesting so bluntly as possible. Thus, I think that it will be proper to give an analysis of the midwifery, in that it will show how midwifery works in changing and enlarging the interlocutor’s thought and concern. Furthermore, the Protagorean theme is a crucial part in connecting the epistemological issue further to an ethical, political perspective of knowledge. Without this, the digression part may seem hard to be understood, when the issue 15. Keshavarz, F. Reading Mystical Lyric. 6.

(13) shifts from the perception to the life style taken by the knowledge seeker. What is to be taken as a vehicle to speak out the real content and intention of Plato is the real crucial frontline among all contesting interpretations. And I hope by discussing these mental-forming sides of the pursuit, we may perceive how the main concern of the dialogue may be understood properly; moreover, I wish to present the relation between my position and the third approach which I categorized above.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 7. i n U. v.

(14) Chapter II Invitation to the inquiry of knowledge I.Midwifery In the beginning of the dialogue, the scene between Eucleides and Terpison lays out the background of the following memory, a dialogue between a promising youth and the famous philosopher Socrates. We cannot help noticing the nature of Theaetetus in this framework: a youth who is willing to fight for his honor pertaining to the city-state where he lives and fulfills his duty. It is intriguing to read the lines between 142b-c, Eucleides: Only just now I was listening to some people singing his praises for the way he behaved in the battle. Terpison: Well, there’s nothing extraordinary about that. Much more to be wondered at if he hadn’t distinguished himself.16. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. The twist manifests the reliability of this “historical” account. It seems that Plato, as a writer, suggests that he too noticed the credibility in question and intended to use this dramatic setting to settle the tone of the dialogue. Going further into the content of the dialogue itself, I do not intend to follow its timeline. Rather, I think the theme of the art of midwifery can guide us in noticing the important traces in the dialogue. After being guided by Socrates in admitting the importance of discovering what knowledge is, Theaetetus shows his worry that he has never truly taken any possible measure to question this very question. Socrates expresses his sympathy towards this troubled state and further dives into an enumeration of his method. In 149 b- c,. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Socrates: You know, I suppose, that women never practice as midwives while they are still conceiving and bearing children themselves. It is only those who are past child-bearing who take this up. … She didn’t, it’s true, entrust the duties of midwifery to barren women, because human nature is too weak to acquire skill where it has no experience. But she assigned the task to those who have become incapable of child-bearing through age---honouring their likeness to herself.. 16. Translation from Levett, M.J., revised by Burnyeat, M. The Theaetetus of Plato. The following quotes will be taken from this book, except for some certain parts, where other version provides better precision. 8.

(15) Socrates speaks of the initial condition of a midwife with two characteristics. First, midwifes are themselves barren since they are past child-bearing; second, their function works where human nature is weak and fragile. Why does he say this? Does it change the mind-set of his interlocutor? Saying that his position possesses nothing, but in the meantime, he has an art to help; these are both encouraging and baffling. How can you ever trust such a person to lead you on the search for knowledge, if he does not possess any fixed knowledge? This knowledge-less claim crumbles the normal relation between a teacher and a student, where the possession of fixed knowledge determines the structural hierarchy. To complicate the situation even more, we do know from the context that Theaetetus acknowledges Socrates as a more experienced, wise old man. We can imagine that, in modern day, within a critical seminar, the structure of the teaching system seems to determine this unbalanced relationship even further and prior to the teaching scene. But what Socrates tries to offer at the same time is the possibility of the inter-subjective situation, where both the mentor and the student return to an equal point. This definitely is worth of our attention.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. From 149d to 150a, Socrates speaks of the difference between a match-maker and a midwife. In this part, he stresses the selectivity of a midwife. Unlike the professed all-knowing match-maker who would take as many cases as possible, either lawful or unlawful; a midwife, on the contrary, is not proud to assert her ability and also cautious in accepting the offer. We can see that in the first place, that the role of a midwife is relatively passive, it results from the cautiousness concerning the important event of delivering.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The situation become even stranger when Socrates continues to say that it is the midwife who can tell better whether a woman is pregnant or not; furthermore, it is the midwife who is the brightest matchmaker and gives the lawful matchmaking instead of ways such as procuring. At 150b1, Socrates says that the patients are sometimes delivered of phantoms (εἴδωλα) and sometimes of realities (ἀληθινά). It seems to suggest that as the owner of this art, he knows how to distinguish what is true or wrong, which reminds us of the discussion of judgment and logos in the second and third argument of the whole dialogue. However, Socrates actually failed to give such an account in the end, only refuting all possibilities he himself suggested. Reading through Theaetetus, we may find that Socrates reaches his judgment of midwifery by getting his interlocutor’s answer. But even the consent of the interlocutor may not be a true, real baby of knowledge. In reality, Theaetetus like most of so-called early dialogues, has the peculiarity in not giving any positive results, 9.

(16) which would offer only “wind-eggs” according to this dialogue. But obviously, all scholars gain the profit of knowing more about Plato through all these wind-eggs. If it is not the result of the discussion being true or false which determines whether the learning is meaningful or not, then it will be absurd to stress upon the final negative result of a dialogue. Writing a dialogue specific on knowledge, Plato must have thought of this tricky situation; nonetheless, he still tries to assert and make explicit the methodology of midwifery. The following may be seen as an explanation of this ambiguous method. Socrates suggests his three distinct differences against the traditional midwifery. (1) That he treats man instead of woman. (2) He watches over the process of souls instead of bodies. (3) He can apply all possible tests to the offspring to reveal true or false.. 立. 政治大. And the similarities are:. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. (1) He is himself as barren as all midwives. (2) The pain he brings out in the process is an important sign.. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Also in the long monologue from 150b to 151d, we can see some very interesting indicators of his technique. He always gets answers from others instead of his own since he has no knowledge. It is God’s work perpetrating through his hand. But this is also two-edged: some students gain progress through having contact with Socrates, and the fact that they get to know better results in the turning away of the students. Students left early as Socrates expected either because of self-satisfying with the results or the influence of others. Here, we see that it poses a puzzling state. Perhaps it is only from the end of a person’s life can we possibly (not necessary) judge his pursuit in life, and how can anyone know to what extent should they find another route? It explains very little by saying that others provide false or harmful guidance or teaching while the contesting view may seem equally persuasive. Socrates has named Aristeides as one such bad example, but this only partially reflects what Socrates really meant. The issue that I am posing here is that if we have the intention to pin down the final lesson Socrates offered, it will be close to impossible. But the certain thing is that he may remind the students about how to choose their directions.. Ch. engchi. 10. i n U. v.

(17) At the end of this long monologue, we can see that Socrates has tried to set those people whose temperament or preparation are not what he demanded to those who are more proper to guide them; Socrates says that with all good will, he, because of suspicious of the pregnancy of Theaetetus, wants Theaetetus to go on this journey of exploring the definition of knowledge. Where does the midwifery lead to? It seems to push the search of knowledge to an uncertain point. But is it really so? When reflecting further on this, all this information practically serves as psychological preparations for Theaetetus. Socrates’ words have the effect in asking Theaetetus to decide for himself once again if he is willing to go on with Socrates; Theaetetus here underwent a choice, whether to go on this painful passage of pregnancy of the self-exploration. Disregard of Socrates’ belief from that historical moment that women are not so much in the center of knowledge seeking, so he puts women outside of his midwifery; the stress he puts on is that because of his emptiness in knowledge, therefore he is in the best position to examine his target. And all the psychological struggles imposed through midwifery may very well be experienced by all knowledge seekers. From here, namely 151e, Theaetetus finally suggests his first thought, that knowledge is perception.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Sedley17and Stern18 provided different ways to look at the contribution of the whole paragraph about midwifery. It will be illuminating to compare them and bring about some of my suggestions. For Sedley, this part presents an image with two-facets. He suggests that the claim of ignorance and the absence (or silence) of manifest theory is a dramatic maneuver. It is like a pretense of the attitude in order for the discussion of such a basic, simple concept to be able to go on. The other facet which Sedley tries to draw out is through the connection of this dialogue with Meno. These two dialogues share structural similarity. The aviary model in the later part of the dialogue insinuates the theory of recollection in Plato’s work.19 Furthermore, Sedley treats the following explanation as showing the tools and the effects of midwifery. In this light, the technique seems to be perfect and flawless, a powerful weapon to find a certain knowledge. Another topic raised by Sedley is the relation between Socrates’ assertion of having no knowledge and the assertion that he knows the art of midwifery. The fact that he knows nothing but midwifery is further confirmed at 161b, where Socrates converses with Theodorus. As the ability endowed by God, Socrates seems to avoid further questioning of this expertise.. 17 18 19. Ch. engchi. i n U. See Sedley, op. cit., pp. 30-37. See Stern, op. cit., pp. 66-81. This observation is also backed up by Cornford, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 11. v.

(18) When we go back to the reluctance of a midwife (150a), where it shows the difference between a midwife and a normal match-maker, Sedley might just follow the tendency to draw knowledge from the classical passage, i.e. that the midwifery presents a fixed, functional state. However, the difficult conditions encountered by a midwife just show how uncertain this process may be, and not how powerful or how correct midwife can reach. What will happen if the one who possesses this art is not as good as Socrates? (Even Socrates may not be perfect.) The correlation between Meno and Theaetetus is also uncertain. I have two doubts. First, is it certain that Plato has Meno in mind and not trying something new? This argument requires the internal evidence to back up for it, Sedley takes the similar occurring point in these two dialogues (which Cornford already observed) and the words appearing in the aviary model as evidence. But I think Sedley’s justification of this connection is weak. Sedley separates two layers of Socrates, one dramatically innocent of the theoretical burden, the other starts an embryonic state of the practices of extracting inner resources from the interlocutor.20I consider this scheme to be too artificial. It is hard to determine if Plato and Socrates are totally identified in this dialogue, any conjecture is hard to be confirmed by Plato himself. The hypothesis Sedley takes requires the accidental matchup of two historically uncertain minds. Second, the context of the aviary part does not suggest so strong the importance of recollection, the validity of this passage to be an evidence is not secured. This aviary model still basically deals with the problem of retrieving the knowledge being processed by experience, not obviously recollection in a Platonic sense. All in all, I think that Sedley’s approach hopes for a fruitful result, and he finds it. This epistemological tendency to read into all minute details inevitably leads to show the certain side of the whole process, while ignoring the uncertain factors in play.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Stern’s approach provides a very interesting counterpoint. From the very beginning, he reads out the political atmosphere of the dialogue, corresponding with the tragic shade of the ending that Socrates was going to face the trial.21In his eye, this passage of midwife shows a political defiance and shakes the ground of the political community at that time. Socrates’ “selflessness” and “the insistence of sterility of himself” pose a strong contrast with the ample knowledge of the sophists.22 His self-portrait is a testimony of his observation on the impossibility of direct teaching; even if direct teaching exists, it will be valid only in a limited manner. He also points out that “the pain of Socratic midwifery occurs in the critical rather 20. See Sedley, op. cit., pp.29-30. See also Friedländer for his analysis, which I will pick up later in Chapter 4. 22 See also the discussion of sophists at that time by Broadie, S. The Sophists and Socrates, in The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, Sedley, D. ed. 21. 12.

(19) than in the elicitive phase,”23 when compared with usual circumstances of midwifery. He thinks that the Socratic way is to help us to be less attached to ourselves, to overcome the given order of the common sense of the world. What Stern reads out is not some substantial knowledge, but unsettling effects of midwifery upon the claim of knowledge. But I also find this interpretation to be overly politicized, since Socrates in his later digression mentions his aloofness from the political matter. It seems that it is not the substantial matters in the political world which he tries to aim at. Stern’s observation of the psychic dynamic is acute,24 and I keep this part as further fuel for discussion. But to his so-called political facet, I think it is more in the metaphorical sense that Socrates tries to arouse. Like the analogy of his mental assistance to midwifery, this perspective also functions in an analogical manner. Stern’s claim of the stress on the critical stage is also dubious. In the very beginning of the discussion of midwifery, Theaetetus is already at a perplexed state. I do not think such a separation of stage is necessary.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. To make a third choice after this examination, I would say that this passage does show the perilous and uncertain facet of the art of midwifery, but it is all the way aiming at the dynamic of identifying possible knowledge, successful or not. But only if we believe the godly order which guides Socrates through his praxis is justified, can we give full validity to this method. While having the approval of the conversation with no other third party in the process to examine the validity, we can hardly say that the result of each midwifery is irrefutable. However, regarding the weakness of Plato’s method, his stress upon the ignorance of the midwife is just the best response towards the situation he perceived. By this initial condition he sets for every discussion, he turns this fatal flaw into something acceptable, even necessary in every discussion if it is in a midwifery-like situation. This also provides new energy and hope for every future debate, since they have to always come to an equal, unbiased starting line. It is the politics of the inner conflict which Plato tries to present here. We see also that in the end, Socrates, when facing the wind-egg they produced, is not urgent in fulfilling his “midwifery”; instead, he reminds Theaetetus to take the position of midwifery in the future debate with anyone.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. To paraphrase my thoughts, the real effect of the midwifery image given in Theaetetus seems to stress less on the fruit, i.e. the conclusion reached so far; rather, 23. Stern, op. cit., p.79. See Stern, op. cit., footnote 90, he also mentions that one of his obvious differences from the perpective of Sedley, is the recognition of “psychic complexity.” 24. 13.

(20) it is the idea of becoming a midwife himself, after realizing all the difficulties in the process of grasping the true essence of knowledge, which may be the real aim. Concerning the perception and future, the complex of being good and being true, the no-knowledge position may be the only way for a man to understand himself in the flux. Two pre-conceived concepts make various researchers to overlook this aspect. First, this dialogue has to be about the knowledge itself. Second, this dialogue does not represent the genuine thoughts about knowledge, but is just a passage towards the conclusion of other Plato’s works. What if we just set aside this connection as not necessary, and go back to the spiritual arousal from this dialogue? The issue being touched upon can serve as a paradigm even for people in modern age. It reminds us of what cannot be left out in a discussion of knowledge, even without any theoretical frameworks to work with: i.e. the motivation, attitude, and the orientation of the knowledge seeker. Plato may not be trying to settle any adequate theory in this dialogue; however, he presents a vacuous position, i.e. Socrates, as the one who triggers the knowledge seeker’s mind to build his own relation and understanding with knowledge. This may not be the knowledge itself, but it is definitely the most knowledge-generating settings we can ever think of.25The one who questions is empty and ignorant, but is sensitive in connecting the resources to vibrate again and again the psychological need to question the base of knowledge. He invents the “midwifery” as a psychological-pedagogy, to train and to guide the knowledge seeker.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. Theaetetus may very well continue questioning Socrates’ basis as possessing the key of midwifery, and that may also lead to another criterion check, which is also epistemologically relevant. However, Theaetetus is familiar with the form of a straight forward answer which made him start giving the following straight answer, i.e that knowledge is perception. Before delving into that part of discussion, let us see how Socrates conducts the matter in the way he wishes to be discussed. He deliberately brings into Protagoras’ “perspective” and presents us with other facets of knowledge in this dialogue.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. II. Protagoras Socrates accepts Theaetetus suggestion, that knowledge is perception and tries to make him reflect that, upon which tradition this type of discussion he refers to. But Socrates’ guidance is also in a sense misleading. He immediately suggests this definition to be directly connected with the Protagorean way of examining 25. This thought is partly due to the reflection of Lacan on Psychoanalysis; but a detailed comparison would need another work to solve. 14.

(21) perception. It is quite clear that we do not really see the historical Protagoras here.26It is a Platonic Protagoras. But this intentional shift of direction is no doubt an important turning point of the discussion. From here, although we first observe that Socrates tries to define the crucial elements in the process of perceiving, such as what a percipient is, in reality we can see there are three major compositions in this first discussion of Theaetetus’ proposal, i.e. two of Protagoras’ points of view which attribute to Protagoras by Socrates, and one very long so-called digression. Instead of directly treating all kinds of ways of perception, he focuses basically on two facets of the possible outcomes if knowledge is perception in a “Protagorean” way. Thanks to the observation by Ugo Zilioli, in his book27, he points out that Socrates’ Protagoras basically has the ontological and ethical concern in Theaetetus. Together with the digression, and the numerous assertions by Socrates himself, that he himself is barren of knowledge, it is thus meaningful to ask what Plato means exactly by bringing out all these arguments. I will now examine both of these two arguments.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. The first approach is to redefine the definition “Knowledge is perception” by referring to Protagoras’ so-called “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.” He makes Theaetetus think if anything has its own property regardless of the observer, or rather things show differently when it is perceived by different observer. The example Socrates mentions is temperature. It is not a detailed discussion, since some very controversial cases are left out, such as colors, smells. Socrates further suggests this world as reflected by the famous literary writers, such as Homer: that the world is full of flux and motion itself. According to the observation of the nature, it seems that the processing of becoming is a renewal power of all creatures, and thus our learning process is similarly refreshed by motion.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Here we should make a stop. Why Socrates questions the absoluteness of perception but also praises the goodness the motions brought along at the same time? It may be a way to show his impartiality towards this position, that he sees both side of this phenomenon. However, in the following sections, he mentions several times the ambiguity of all these contesting states. In 157e, Socrates mentions the borderline cases, e.g. the dream, the insanity, the disease, the misperception. He says that it will be hard to distinguish the reality between a normally-functioned state and so-called deviation. In 158c9 to d6, he says that we make our assertions 26 27. See Schiappa, E. Protagoras and Logos, esp. pp. 117-130. See Zilioli, U. Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism, esp. chap. 1&3. 15.

(22) with equal conviction in both cases, i.e. real life and the dream. Here, we may further infer the case of psycho-diseases. Modern psychoanalysis treats the patient seriously and never simply defines the patients’ perception as false, instead, they accept their psycho-reality first, and that leads to a further totally different aspect of the troubling soul. Interestingly, in the following passage, he tries to persuade Theaetetus that if for the case of disease or madness, the criterion here which differs between the sleep and real life might be a matter of time, but not the very state itself. These chaotic shifting perspectives warn us the linear understanding of all these discussions. The ontological status of perception is still possible, before we can eliminate all these ambiguous settings. In the second enumeration and reply of Protagoras, imagined by Socrates, Protagoras says that he doesn’t agree with Socrates that there is only one type homogeneous memory, and also the matter of true and false should be changed to the question of good and bad. However, in 170a2-3, Socrates immediately points out that Protagoras’ promising proposal is self-defeating. He thinks that it is obvious that in human society, we do believe in the distinction between wisdom and ignorance; that makes it hard to admit that everyone has his own truth.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Previously, I mentioned that some critics have pointed out the two facets of Protagoras’ arguments: ontological and ethical. Here, we can observe during this transition, from “the man is the measure of all things” to “there are better judgment; one kind are better than the others, but in no way truer” (167b), what it meant. In a social situation, it does lead to comparison. But Protagoras always respects the legitimacy of everyone’s direct perception, no matter from which aspect or circumstances it arises from. This “democratic” way of inviting all to the process of searching for knowledge is itself not about relativistic measurements, but of an ethical character. It shows the inevitable arena of contesting measurements. Socrates must have sensed this perspective, since he tries to falsify by claiming it to be self-defeating, but very soon in the “digression”, he picks up this daunting enemy in his mind again, thus elaborating his own version of a good psychic state, that is not affected by the political world. He tries to express his ideal state to deal away this ethical quandary.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. From here, I would like to first discuss the inappropriateness in some of the former discussions. When referring to the political character of Theaetetus, it is often targeted on the historical background of Plato and Protagoras. Cynthia Farrar’s. 16.

(23) book28 brings out this nuance in detail, also quite unorthodoxly defends Protagoras’ position as a relativist compared to the idealistic Plato. This historical concern is very enticing. However in this tentative work of Plato, I think his portrayal is less of a conflict of the outside world, the political atmosphere of the city state. Rather, he always focuses on the inner conflict of a knowledge-seeker. The evidence lies in the whole dialogue that discusses knowledge in an abstract, general way; even in the digression, Socrates remains firm in this attitude. On the other hand, the approach which suggests the negation of the thesis that “knowledge is perception” also misses the point. It only shows the incapability or the inexperienced state of Theaetetus, who is thoroughly quite passive all along this discussion. What it really brings out, is the worry of Plato itself, his uncertain assertion concerning his own position. Actually, on Socrates’ own formulation of Protagoras’ refutation and his own doubts, it already brings out latently the following two dimensions which Theaetetus suggested, that of being a right judgment and a clear account. To have a no answer result would be no surprise if we take a closer look into the first part, since Plato never really solves the puzzle which Protagoras engendered. Most of the interpretations suggest that from this ending which all arguments are refuted, it testifies the negative character of the dialogue, and only serves as a preliminary work of the trilogy, i.e Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. However, I do not take this negative approach.29The dialogue offers us every time something new, both the psychological dynamics and other aspects of knowledge which cannot be ignored. And if there is room for the possibility that Plato is not trying to present firm knowledge claim in this dialogue, the guidance of orientation and motivation is still pedagogically meaningful.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i n U. v. The Protagorean content taken as a whole in this dialogue shows the inner-political dimension of the knowledge-seeking process. What I mean by “inner-political” refers to the psychic struggle to resettle the preponderance of each knowledge claim in mind. Stern’s interpretation tempts to elevate the political dimension and the death of Socratic as a framework to a degree that it represents something as a paradigm for the people at that time. But I think what Plato tries to achieve is more modest though no less important: he tries to pin down some inevitable conflicts we will have to face in everyday life. Person such as Theaetetus, a young, promising man, equipped with the preparation training of mathematics, is still vulnerable under such preliminary examination. For Theaetetus, the boundary of mundane and sacred, perception and being, may be conceptually understandable,. engchi. 28. Farrar, C. The origins of democratic thinking. This is partly inspired by Tuozzo, T. M. Plato’s Charmides, especially the first chapter. There he also notices the psychic pedagogue of the early dialogue. In Theaetetus, this later dialogue, in a similar writing style, may offer such a lesson. 29. 17.

(24) but in practice, in the very activity of giving definition and grasping the essence of knowledge, he is confronted by Socrates’ way to interconnect all these different things in his mind. The phenomenon of nature is being correlated with the phenomenon of human world, and from now on, the conflict can no longer be purely theoretical, but it has to consider the social side of it. If anything really political here, I would say it is an inner-political fight, a fight to resettle the possible arena of definition of knowledge in a person’s experience. After examining the Protagorean content in the dialogue, I also realize the danger of taking this dialogue as a manifestation of some traces of skepticism. While Plato is trying hard from Theaetetus on, to put perception into his framework of knowledge, it seems difficult to reconcile that aspect easily with his own conception of knowledge. Not resorting to other works of Plato, I will try to discuss this problem within the range of this dialogue, to see if it has something meaningful to offer.. 立. III. Skepticism?. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Lisa Raphals 30 in her essay, Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus31, tried to formulate the similarities between these two pieces of work. Apart from the differences of the argument style in two cultural zones, they shared strikingly similar skeptical methods. In her analysis of the narrative techniques, she noticed that the main dialogue is centered on the first definition of knowledge; however, most of the proofs and some digressions are indirect. She also points out that there are a variety of detailed similes to represent theories of knowledge, especially in Socrates two vivid models on how we get and retrieve knowledge. But, all these suggestions of definition are refuted, and in most of the Plato researches, it will just be deemed as the attempt showing the failure of this definition; or for some, it shows the transition stage of Plato’s later theory. Raphal’s observation shows that the questions raised in these two texts manifest the intention that there are hierarchies concerning the matter of knowledge, but they all avoid defining it in the end.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 30. i n U. v. Her understanding of Zhuangzi may not be correct, since the difference of the epistemology behind these two authors may be both fundamental and cultural. But I do think that her comparison brings out some unstressed part of Theaetetus. 31 See Kjellberg, P. & Ivanhoe, P. J. ed. Essays on skepticism, relativism, and ethics in Zhuangzi, chap. 2, pp. 26-49. 18.

(25) In the interpretations of Cornford32, the theory of form always becomes the refuge for the deadlock of the arguments within the dialogue. This dialogue thus presents no real bafflement, but just has its fixed positions among other Plato’s dialogues. He writes: The Theaetetus will formulate and examine the claim of the senses to yield knowledge. The discussion moves in the world of appearance and proves that, if we try to leave out the world of true being, we cannot extract knowledge from sensible experience.33 Cornford’s position is firm in accepting the negative result of this dialogue. Bostock, however, has expressed a not so ordered reading experience in his book34. In chapter seven of his book, his understanding is that the first half of the book is about knowing that, and its second part about knowing things.35 Bostock senses the subject-shift by observing the verbs used by Plato; he also thinks that this reflects that Plato himself also offering something which seems to be a problem rather than a solution. The muddling state of the pursuit of knowledge seems to show the uncertain state of Plato, shifting his focus between truth and things, trying hard to explain something which Plato himself also finds it difficult to give a lucid account.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Returning to the dialogue with the aforementioned discussions in mind, the introductory setting is not promising in the first place. Socrates invites a young man to discuss something he does not really know, and the midwifery serves as a way to bring out and check the result. In this process, the very mediating medium, i.e. the midwifery, does not go through the self-reflexive examining, such as the perception, the judgment and a description of the logos behind it. If it cannot guarantee its truth, what does it really help in an epistemological journey? It will be hard to say that the tone of this dialogue is skeptical, since its overt aim is to find a definition of knowledge. But, clearly, we face the situation of no answer.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Then, what we may gain from this discussion, is the psychological turn which anyone who is interested in the pursuit of knowledge, should bear in mind. The result that Socrates arduously refutes in the validity of perception as knowledge and stopped the discussion at an aporetic point seems to reveal the bafflement of Plato. If perception is far from his real objective, why does he donate such a proportion to it 32 33 34 35. Cornford, F.M. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. Cornford, F.M. op. cit., p.7. Bostock, op. cit. Bostock, op. cit., pp.268-279. 19.

(26) in the dialogue? The following chapter will try to bring out and examine the discussions around this, and explain why the focus of mine is different. I believe that, in this dialogue, Plato is trying to capture the tension of mind in knowledge seeking, while putting the most important issues in question.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 20. i n U. v.

(27) Chapter III Knowledge as Perception I.Theaetetus’ Choice Before giving his first suggestion, Theaetetus approaches Socrates’ mind through various ways. Not everyone will take this as necessary, but he does. Perhaps it is due to Socrates’ famous meticulous search for the precise definition. In passage 145b1-b4, Socrates suggests that when referring to the praise given to Theaetetus, he questions if there will be a kind of urgency to examine the person being praised; reciprocally, the person being praised might also have the desire to show himself off. The invitation softens the resistance of his interlocutor, and moreover, it sets up the self-examining scene. It turns out to be an examination of a person’s educational makeup. Socrates wants him to remember what he has been through during his lifetime. The geometry, astronomy, music, and arithmetic are all subjects which he learned from Theodorus. Socrates says that he has gone through the same kind of education before, showing his empathy, but he is confused about what he has learned. He asks if “to learn is to become wiser about the thing one is learning”. And next, he leads Theaetetus to respond to his question, whether “it is through wisdom, that wise men are wise men. 36 ” After the affirmation from Theaetetus, Socrates then tries to make a very quick identification, between wisdom and knowledge.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i n U. v. What Socrates tries to do here will seem to be very rough. In many cultures, it is difficult to pin down the real difference between wisdom and knowledge. Take African for example, in Kresse’s Book,37 he uses an anthropological way to examine some crucial vocabularies in the Swahili culture zone, and tries to reveal the different facets of knowledge and wisdom. It becomes one of the crucial contesting focuses in an epistemological pursuit, to enumerate the complex relation between wisdom and knowledge. But here, Socrates just uses some simple phrases to run through this grey area.. engchi. Could Socrates have possibly ignored this roughness? Actually, this is where the tension comes from, his confusion of what makes wisdom and knowledge homogeneous, if it is possible. In his monologue, Socrates notices this silence (146a), 36. Here I took the translation from the French edition by Diès, A. Platon and modified into English, instead of Burnyeat’ translation, since Diès’ translation is closer to the original ancient Greek. 37 Kresse, K. Philosophising in Mombasa. 21.

(28) and it actually confirms the ambiguity and uncertainty which Socrates himself brings in. Socrates already did this “blocking” before, when he reminds Theaetetus about his education. He mentions the subjects, but actually doesn’t want to start from all these in detail. There is a strangeness when something is being treated as unimportant or irrelevant while others value it. (cf. 145d, Theaetetus expresses his ardour in his learning). We see that this psychological stress looms out as soon as possible. When Theaetetus is being further questioned on what knowledge is, he mentions immediately the teachings of Theodorus. Also in the sequence, he asserts that crafts such as cobbling must be knowledge. But it is refuted by Socrates, saying that this is not what he actually concerns. He says that, “I am asking for one thing, but you give me many.” He elucidates his point by saying that what he questions is not what knowledge is of, or the varieties there are; instead, he wants to know what it is.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Having knowledge of Plato’s philosophy, and the passage 185-186 in Theaetetus, it is always tempting to say that he is suggesting his own philosophical point of view, that here is the trace of the fight between one and many. But following the whole sequence, it seems more to be a self-caused problem with the rough treatment between wisdom and knowledge, if we conceive that these two interlocutors both have the simple hearts to put away the existing framework of thought and restart plainly.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n. So here we see a new arena to compare the approach of both and try to find a consistent one. Theaetetus responds to this demand of Socrates by narrating a story between him and Socrates the Younger. It is a discussion upon the incommensurable numbers. The whole discussion is raised under a geometric understanding of number, which shows the still practical side of mathematics at that time. The gist from this example is not clear, but what is certain is that in his solution, he has divided his objects into two groups: one which can be provided by equal numbers and the other which cannot be. Maybe we immediately think of this example being applied to the demarcation of knowledge and wisdom, one is self generating and the other not (or vice versa), but Theaetetus eliminates this connection. He thinks this example shows the ambiguity of Socrates concern, but do not know how to apply to it.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. What can we learn from this example? What does it show? Does Theaetetus want to express his inherent doubt about Socrates approach, suggesting that he is departing on the grey zone of definition? As a prominent mathematician, it will be 22.

(29) bizarre for him to show his weakness in mathematics during such a conversation. Moreover, it can be an implicit resistance to Socrates’ urge; it shows that Theaetetus still tries to understand the problem in a mathematical way, but feels perplexed in how to apply it to the question at hand. Before the passage leading to the description of Socrates’ midwifery, Socrates wants to re-confirm that Theaetetus is following him that what they are pursuing is nothing trivial. It is a reaction directly towards Theaetetus’ response. Theaetetus shows his uncertainty, but Socrates seems to ignore it. He just wants to have Theaetetus willing to dig on the issue of what knowledge is. Theaetetus shows his fragile and incapable mentality confronting this matter, and Socrates uses his story of midwifery to justify this mental discomfort, it is pain out of fullness but not emptiness. Besides the psychological discomfort, here is a landmark of the beginning of a search for knowledge. The midwifery metaphor stresses the pain and the help from outside. Those interpretations which suggest the self-knowledge facet of this dialogue has to face this obvious contradiction. Not without the intervention of a mental midwife, knowledge never shows its meaning itself. And the position of this midwife is crucial to the pursuit of knowledge, if there is any. The pain is also not a common sense and usual practice for every procuring of knowledge. The ongoing pain forces all knowledge seekers to return again and again to the starting point. But through this metaphor, Socrates makes it as an inherent property in a relation of collaboration. This point seems to be ignored greatly in most of the philosophical discussions, as if it is only a random coincidence or not the crucial point in understanding the dialogue. However, when we reflect about the process of education and every beginning towards a certain goal of knowledge, our mental state is so important. The modern separation of philosophy and psychology often treats this as unnecessary accompaniment, but here we see again the interconnected importance of it in a pedagogical, structural setting. Before turning into the philosophical argument itself, Socrates decides to linger and spends much time in guiding Theaetetus to the preferable mode which he thinks fitter for the investigation of knowledge. Here, we may also talk about the boundary between the sophists and Socrates again. For sophists, the rhetoric is worthwhile in that it brings the persuasiveness when manipulating the psychological state of its object. In contrast, Socrates’ attitude in treating the psychological perspective lies in the arousal of the awareness of the troubling state of mind before embarking on a journey of pursuit. He relies not on the persuasiveness but the orienting effect of the psychological turn; in fact, the uncertainty accompanies all along. While the skill for the sophist lies in. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 23. i n U. v.

(30) the expertise of persuasion, Socrates keeps the interlocutor aware of their deficiency throughout the process. This preparation stage of entering into the argument concerning perception often is treated as not so necessarily expressing any obvious aspect about knowledge; at most, it can be taken as a framework of showing the usual attitude expressed also in other early dialogues. However, if we take the alternating of perspective into the crucial component of reflecting knowledge, this preparation may appear to be as important as the issue in question. One must decide how to situate his endowment and previous “knowledge” first; and what we see here, is exactly its process. Socrates is trying to make Theaetetus realize that no matter how erudite he was before, he has to give away all the preconceptions in order to gain new insight of knowledge.. 政治大. Now, let us dive into the passage of knowledge as perception.. 立. II.Knowledge as perception. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Interestingly, after Theaetetus’ proposal, Socrates immediately connects this proposal with the tradition from Protagoras. He says even that such a “wise man” will not talk in nonsense. Reading carefully this seeming jokingly praise to the ancestor, we see again the dubious identity between wisdom and knowledge. Socrates selectively took the figures he is interested in as the start point of discussion, and the tone he uses and the way he presents certainly will influence our perception of the objects or people in the discussion.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Further on, Socrates starts to narrate what Protagoras might do to analyze the perception. First, it is the relativity of feeling: how it appears to each of us or how we perceive it may be different one from another. In 152d-e, we see that Socrates leads it to an observation, that nothing has its intrinsic status if we grasp things through perception; they are constantly under the influence of move and change, in other words, the process of coming to be. To further his thought, he brings forth even more traditions in their cultural zone, namely other philosophers and writers at that time. Among the writers, he mentions both comedy and tragedy. He believes that they portrayed everything as connected with flux and motion. What he meant here is really quite obscure, since we do not really know what stance he took exactly towards these dramas at this moment. The image and content from the literature may either brings us to the physical world or let us wander in the mental realm. What we can be certain of is that, he thinks all this branch of philosophizing or 24.

(31) literary works reflect the moving side of the world. He even mentions his understanding of fire and heat to backup his point. The next step he makes is an analogy, between the outside world and the soul. He compares the state of rest with not to study and to forget, the state of motion as to learn and to study by the soul. This again shows the ambivalent state when calling forth the tradition of literature. Concerning his former description of his “mental midwifery”, it seems quite legitimate to have this analogical move. But if we question further, we may say here it is a leap which has to be solved. More interestingly, Socrates, from this standpoint, immediately gives his valuation of these two kinds of activity, i.e. one that is beneficial and the other not. We are familiar with these logics of oppositions in Plato’s thought, but this really does not guarantee this argument. We may further point out the faults of his argument by his subsequent analysis. In 153c-d, he uses Homer’s understanding of the natural world to backup his conceived argument. This connection is also weak in that we do not really see how the motion inside a soul and that in the outside world coincide as an epistemological approach. To understand the correlation here, it has to be a psychological effect, which makes the interlocutor rethink his own connection with the world, and thus opens the possibility for this very analogy. As a reader, we have to question if we think it is so easy to sympathize with Theaetetus at this moment, and as the epistemological reasoning is not so strong, it still has the experience with the world and the psychological affinity with the phenomenon to make us be willing to go along.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i n U. v. In 154a-d, Socrates offers a suggestion on the alteration of the self. If self is also changeable, it does not have to be during the encountering that the relativity comes into. This gives the relativity a more essentialistic nature. Adding an illustrating example of dices, Socrates gives till now the most brain-teasing narration of the discussion. He brings out three principles not to be violated while making judgments. They are:. engchi. (1) Things are equal to themselves, in bulk and in number. (2) If there is no disturbance of increasing or decreasing, things will remain equal. (3) Without becoming, nothing will become what it is not. After these, actually, Socrates mentions another factor which seems to bypass the aforementioned criterion, namely aging.. 25.

(32) With all these bewilderments, Theaetetus expresses his wonder, or to be more precise, his bafflement. Here, Socrates opens up a totally new dimension, the alteration causes by time. We see that how elated Socrates is, when he feels Theaetetus’ bafflement, which shows his interlocutor’s sensibility of all these underlying factors. Socrates’ metaphor of the myth of Iris and his statement in 155d testifies this very moment. The broad use of such kind of metaphor from the literature shows a quite different attitude of Plato towards literature. This expresses Socrates’ need to grasp the feelings of Theaetetus through such a literary device. Then, Socrates points out directly that there are people who just refuse to admit the existence of unseen factors. This leads to the following, more subtle argument for the advocate of the moving principle. From 156a to 157c on, Socrates talks about two forms of motion, one being active, the other being passive, and each has an infinite multitude. These two factors are correlated, and will not come into reality until one meets the other. He has numerated examples such as sight, the relation between eyes and something which comes into its vicinity. Through the coordination of motions in the intervening space, the eye, which is slower in motion, is filled with sight; and something which in its vicinity which is faster is filled with whiteness. Consequently, we get a seeing eye and the perception of a white object. Socrates uses this explanation of the physical mechanism to illustrate the relation of the passiveness and activeness in play. It will always come in a pair in a process of perception; more generally, it is observed in any motion. And, what is passive in a situation may turn active in another, or vice versa. Socrates concludes his words by saying that the verb “to be” must be abolished under such a theory, since it does not describe the facts properly. After all this, Theaetetus clearly expresses his confusion in mind, because he does not think this discussion lead to any places. He questions if Socrates is stating his own opinion or trying him out. And here, Socrates restates his position again as not-knowing, but just pieces together some useful information. What is noticeable here has been pointed out by Böhme38. In the pair given by Socrates, there are also pleasures and pains, desires and fears. (Lust und Unlust, Begierde und Abscheu) Under the framework of the dialogue, it seems not coincidental or surprising. Because the mental dimension is something which Socrates repeatedly brings out and wishes Theaetetus to take notice of. It is in the later passage that Socrates uses the faculty of mind to close this part of discussion; Theaetetus is guided to say that it is through the self-function of soul that we perceive common features. But where can we categorize these affective factors? They seem to be neither process by general organs of human nor counting. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 38. Ch. engchi. i n U. See Böhme, G. Platons theoretische Philosophie, pp. 203-209. 26. v.