Pacifism, Nationalism, and Security Alliance in Japan
By
Reinhot S. Shi, Ph.D student
Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University Kaohsiung 80424, Taiwan
Manuscript to [Asian Security Facing Hegemony] Symposium
Contents Abstract………..2 1. Changing partnership………...…………..3 2. Pacifism………..4 3. Nationalism………....5 4. Instabilities in alliance……...………6 5. Japan in Asia………..…..7 6. Some disputes……….……..10 7. Conclusions………...13 References……….14
Abstract
Pacifism and nationalism in Japan cause actual challenges and instabilities to security alliance in different ways. The Japanese are seriously concerned about security alliance with a hegemonic U.S. On a number of international issues, Japan has already felt it necessary to part ways with its ally. The reason may be pacifism or nationalism, or both. All nationalist wants is totally autonomy, pacifist is free of military duty, and U.S could never to accept any of it. Thus trend lines in both Japan and the United States do not guarantee the retention of the alliance in the same form as today.
1. Changing partnership
Serious debate about the future direction of Japan security alliance is divided from two camps: pacifism and nationalism. Both are traditional, strong and popular in Japanese society and influencing the security alliance in its own way. The performance of this fundamental and increasingly public confrontation grows daily between hawks and doves, nationalists and pacifist, young and old. On the grand scale, this three competing interests tend to cloud the desired path for Japan into the 21st century and decide the real context of security alliance.
The older and more pacifist segments of Japanese society desire to avoid entrapment in a war that may come about if they drift too far toward an active military role in the alliance with the United States or take on too much international leadership. The younger and more realistic politicians, academics, and the public want to prevent abandonment by the United States, especially with respect to North Korea, if they are seen as not supportive enough of US security alliance. (Rapp, 2004, 106) Besides, those in the growing nationalist movement are increasingly interested in the pursuit of self-interestand advancing Japan’sown specific goals,although,asasociety,such national interests continue to elude broad- based articulation and acceptance.
The common perception that Japan will either remain pacifist or veer to the extreme of its 1930s militarism is simply wrong—a middle ground may be difficult to achieve but is nonetheless available to the Japanese. “Trying to determine a future
strategy in security policy amid these often competing imperatives continues to pose difficulties for Tokyo and results in Janus1-like responses to security issues. (Rapp, 2004, 107)”
2. Pacifism
The tradition of pacifism after world war Ⅱ has great influence to acknowledge of security alliance. Such pacifism is based on individualism. Long periods of peace in Japan have resulted in an expanded conception of security that makes the safety of the individual citizen more important than overall national security. Alliance with hegemony is very possible bringing individual to the situation of warfare.
In Japan itistheconception of“Anzen Hosho（security assurance）”evolved overthelastfourdecades,with theresultbeing an “irrational”prioritization of the individual over the state, even if national security would be at stake, and alliance must obey such conception, or it will be meaningless (Rapp, 2004, 112).
But debate on this topic is not a mainstream concern, because very few commentators and even fewer politicians are willing to take the side of the state over the individual. However, this imagination of security does exist, and because of it, Japan has not yet come to any semblance of consensus on what national interests are worth the life of any of its citizens. Oil from South-west Asia, although it is without question the lifeline of Japan, is clearly not one of these state interests.
The need to take a hard line with North Korea over potential nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (clearly pointed at Japan) is a case. The public desire to fully account for the handful of abducted Japanese citizens and their families in North Korea. (Rapp, 2004, 113)Until present day, such fear of damages to the individual puts the reliability of the alliance between the United States and Japan in serious question.
Japan’s strategy of fighting the good fight without sending a single soldier,
however,ran itscourse.In the1970sand 1980s,Japan’spacifism becameaflimsy shield, behind which the country’sopposition lawmakersproclaimed thatthey were “proud ofthefactthatnotasingleperson in the world hasbeen wounded by a shot fired by a Japanese soldier since 1945 (Okamoto, 2002, 61).”Consequently, when concerned policy makers realized that the pacifist creed had gone too far, they found that decades of refusing to send government personnel into conflict zones had bred a strong domestic resistance to casualties.
Although Japanese citizens in the mid-1980s agreed that the SDF (Self-Defense Forces) might have a role to play in maintaining international peace and security, no consensus developed on the possibility that SDF personnel might have to kill or die for international security (Okamoto, 2002, 62). When suspected Khmer Rouge assailants shotand killed justoneJapanesecivilian policeofficerserving in Japan’s first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, Japanese voices called for an immediate end to Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping.
3. Nationalism
In Japan, nationalism had been economic context after1945 for a long time, which sought economic rehabilitation. Rapid and sustained economic success produced widespread confidence among politicians, bureaucrats and big business in Japan’sabilities,and led to arenewed senseofpridein traditional, cultural values (Rose, 2000, 174).
This in turn created a political nationalist mood, which gained momentum as more Japanese felt that Japan should begin to play a more active political role in international affairs commensurate with the country’seconomicpower.（Rose, 2000, 171） Confidence and pride in Japan’s economic success led to a resurgence of political nationalism that had been suppressed since the end of the Second World War. Academics, economists, journalists and politicians began to discuss the sensitive topic of constitutional revision, or argued that Japan should play an independent political roleand begin to build Japan’smilitary poweras betted her economic power.
Thus, as many Asian state argued today, Japanese are rediscovering their sense of nationalism and desire for independence of policy. Conversations with younger Japanese politicians about the alliance with America reveal a marked and relatively uniform desire for greater strategic self- determination (Rapp, 2004, 111). Asian states often fell uncomfortable about a remilitarized Japan, though it is still hard to say that Japan faces a clear and present choice between continued one-country pacifism and the nationalistic militarism of the 1930s. The tendency of academic writings and political statements from Japan indicate a reasoned and determined shift toward national and military autonomy is the truth.
In practice, for years Japanese nationalism has made significant strides to build a more independent military capable of defending the home islands against 21st century threats and projecting Japanese power abroad. It will be at least 10 to 15 years before Japan will have a basic missile defense system; full-package, precision-strike capability; integrated and responsive command, control, and intelligence structures; and power-projection platforms（Rapp, 2004, 106）, however, such capabilities are currently under construction in present days. As Japan develops those capabilities, and loosens its domestic controls on the use of military force, its strategic options for achieving basic national security goals will increase, and it is not necessary to go behind U.S. (Weston, 2004, 40)
4. Instabilities in alliance
The Japanese are seriously concerned about security alliance with a hegemonic U.S. On a number of international issues, Japan has already felt it necessary to part ways with its ally. The reason may be pacifism or nationalism, or both.
For instance, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi was a good friend to the United States, but he strongly believed that Japan should become an original signatory to the International Land Mine Treaty and acted accordingly, despite the opposition from U.S. The Japanese do not understand the reason for the U.S. failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other multilateral conventions dealing with
weapons of mass destruction. Japan also does not understand why the United States abandoned the Kyoto Protocol without offering an alternative (Okamoto, 2002, 60).
And, many Japanese were unable to comprehend the U.S. administration’s announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Many believed that the United States failed to make its case to the international community that pursuing a national missile defense system was more desirable than other cooperative means of increasing U.S. and global security (Okamoto, 2002, 62). Such opinion is very similar in both pacifist and nationalist, the former cares about U.S. militarism attitude, the latter feels very uncomfortable about U.S. unilateralism tendency.
In details, pacifist took pride in the absence of a military dimension to their foreign policy. In international circles, Japan’s strict pacifism had its admirers. Certainly, U. S. administrations and members of Congress hated it, despite the fact that the U.S. Occupation authorities had drafted the Peace Constitution. Japan’s pacifism helped China,theDemocratic People’sRepublicofKorea (DPRK),and the ROK keep Japan perpetually on edge about the mythological threat of a return of Japanese militarism. (Okamoto, 2002, 62)
“In the eyesoftheUnited States,Japan hasmadeonly economiccontributionsto the security of the world beyond its immediate neighborhood. Through trade, soft loans,and OfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)”(Okamoto,2002, 62), Japan has made sizeable contributions toward improving a lotoftheworld’s poverty. Japan is theworld‘sgreatestdonorofnonmilitary aid and oneofthemostgenerouspercapita providersofeconomicassistance.Japan’sgenerosity on theeconomicaspectofworld affairs has contrasted with a near total absence of contributions on the military side. UnderJapan’s“PeaceConstitution,”successiveJapanesegovernmentssteered clear of international cooperation or interaction that the world might construe as having a military component. (Sato, 2000, 101)
Nationalists go even further; they wereincensed ataU.S.military commander’s remark that the Japan-U.S. alliance was the “cork in the bottle” restraining latent Japanese militarism. Some in Japan and Asia now argue that the opposite is true and
that the alliance is the “cork in the bottle” of a U.S. drift toward unilateralism (Okamoto, 2002, 61). Some of the actions that recent U.S. administrations have taken in the conduct of foreign policy have been interpreted in the region as giving little consideration to world opinion, much less the opinions of close U.S. allies. Some perceive the United States as acting in a manner that maximizes its own power and profits while undermining the legitimacy of international institutions. (Weston, 2004, 40)
The same, such nationalism tendencies will reduce how the United States views the future reliability of Japan as its primary ally and partner in achieving balance and stability in East Asia. The United States did noticed Japanese domestic quarrel in the maintenance of American peace, stability, democracy, and free markets in Asia.
Thus, at the stake of pacifism and nationalism, vectors of security alliance over thenextdecadearenotclear.“Although alliance managerson both sides are highly optimistic about the closeness of the vectors at the present time, they may very likely be simply crossing on different trajectories leading to very disparate positions in the future (Rapp, 2004, 107).” The nationalism and pacifism factors may reduce alliance reliability between the United States and Japan. Japan will increasingly seek to chart its own course in the future and will be less likely to respond favorably and quickly to selected American requests for military and diplomatic support.
5. Japan in Asia
The role played by Japan and security alliance in Asian is another battle between pacifism and nationalism.
Both pacifism and nationalism are forced to recognize that the U.S.-Japan alliance faces opposition from other powers in the Asia-Pacific region. And despite its unpopularity in certain quarters, they still think that the U.S.- Japan alliance should has influence to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. But the focus and approach is totally different between pacifism and nationalism.
The pacifist’s view regarded the legacy of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century colonialism and imperialism, a prickly sensitivity remains against basing non-Asian forcesin thearea.ResentmentoverJapan’swartimebehaviorin the region and the perception — legitimate or not — that Japan has been insufficiently apologetic about the events and incidents of the period are also still evident. The security will be possible only if Japanese could face its past in Asia. For example, as the Chinese and ROK governments’ strong negative reactions to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’svisitto theYasukuniShinsha(nationalshrine)on August 13, 2001,Beijing’sand Seoul’suneaseremainsin tense,Japanesedomesticpacifistthink this visit is very inappropriate and having invisible damages in the real purpose of security alliance.
Besides, Japanese pacifist basically perceived economic and technical leadership of a well-integrated Asia as an important advantage in global economic competition. In many Japanese quarters, the belief still holds that closer political relations, increased trade, and popular contact can harmonize relations and exercise security. (Sutter, 2002, 42)
They hold “Asiafirst”approach, it emphasizes closer economic, political, and other interactions with both Southeast Asia and China in a variety of forums. One can see it most notably in the ASEAN plus Three dialogues, which is designed to address regional problems and promote cooperation among members in the face of the perceived negative side effects of globalization (Sutter, 2002, 42). Japanese economic and foreign policy bureaucracies and industrial leaders and associations, along with politicians sympathetic to them, should support greater Asian cooperation. And the strengthen of military alliance is not efficient resolution in Asia.
Thenationalist’sview on security alliance began atmilitary issue.Asa regional leader,Japan’sduty isto increasemilitary powerto maintain peaceand stability in Asia, especially on China and Korean Peninsula issues. And Japan should not only depend on alliance with U.S, but to build her own military power, including the nuclearweapon,ofcourse.Japanesecan say “no”to U.S.ifnecessary.
came from China. Alliance’s first target undoubtedly is China. The ASEAN “first regional forum (ARF)”met in Bangkok in July, 1994. It gathered seventeen countries from the Asia-Pacific region, including the P.R.C., the U.S.A., Japan and Russia. On this occasion also, the Japanese press positively reported that the 22 per cent increase in China's defense budget this year was a serious concern in East Asian countries (Niquet, 1995, 135). No doubt, for these countries the "essential question" today is that of how to respond to the economic and military pressure from China.
The past disparity of the economic relationship between the two powers adds to ongoing differences over territorial, strategic, historical, and economic issues and has strengthened mutual wariness and antipathy. Japanese nationalist have targeted China’sincreasing powerasJapan’skey long-term security concern (Sutter, 2002, 37). Many nationalist views China’ssizeand remarkableeconomicgrowth asundercutting their country’s leading economic role in Asia. Rising Japanese nationalism, generationalchangein Japaneseleadership and Beijing’slossofmoralstanding in the eyesoftheJapanese havealso contributed to thissentimentand diminished Japan’s willingness to accommodate Chinese demands on historical and other issues.
On the other side, long-standing Chinese concerns about Japan’s impressive military capabilities have increased since 1996 as a result of U.S. - Japanese agreements broadening Japan’sstrategicrolein Asiato includerecentJapanesenaval deployments in the Indian Ocean. Recent plans for a Japanese-U.S.-Australian strategic dialogue have elicited repeated expressions of concern from China (Sutter, 2002, 38). Chinese leaders have appealed to nationalism and the sensibility that foreign aggressors have victimized China in the past. These feelings have largely focused on Japan, by far the most despised foreign aggress or in modern Chinese history, and have exacerbated Chinese antipathy toward Japan. (Weston, 2004, 40)
Negative trend in the Sino- Japanese relationship has prompted warning of intensified rivalry forleadership in Asia.Therise ofChina’spowerand influencein Asian affairsin the 1990sand China’smilitary assertiveness over Taiwan and the South China Sea coincided with a protracted period of lackluster Japanese economic performance and weak political leadership (Sutter, 2002, 37).
Nationalist had argued the aid to China for years under the reason of security, this opinion has accepted by official and public gradually. The first significant cutbacks in Japanese aid to China since the normalization of bilateral relations and the stepped-up Japanese efforts to improve security, aid, and other cooperation with India and other nations on China’s southern and western flanks. These efforts involve significant Japanese aid efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Sutter, 2002, 37). In the faceofChina’ssteadily increasing economictieswith and politicalinfluencein South Korea, Japan also has made recent efforts to improve relations with Seoul.
A closerlook atthetwo powers’recentapproachesto AsiaunderscoresChina’s growing influenceand greateractivism and Japan’srelativedecline.Consultations with dozens of Japanese national media, academic, government, business, and other opinion leaders in four Japanese cities in May 2002 reflected a deepening anxiety overJapan’suncertain futurein the face ofChina’scontinued remarkableeconomic growth and expanding military power and influence (Sutter, 2002, 37). Those interviewed believed that the expected continued stagnation in Japan’s economic growth and apperceived “hollowing out”ofJapanesemanufacturing due to relocation to China means that the United States and other world powers will inevitably devote less attention to Japan and more attention to China in the future. They say they are at a loss to define an appropriate policy for Japan to deal with these adverse developments. That is the serious question the nationalist hold in mind.
Thus, regional military pressures, stemming from such developments as the rise ofChina’smilitary powerorNorth Korea’smilitary posture,may lead nationalistto strengthen state military power. These pressures also may lead Japan to consider a more competitive stance toward China (Sutter, 2002, 37). Yet, economic and political pressures associated with globalization position Japan to accelerate efforts toward regionaleconomicintegration.Tokyo’smultidimensionalapproach to Asiarequires some degree of finesse and compromise, especially when military security interests run up against those of economic security.
Historical problems
In this issue, nationalists are more popular, but pacifism still holds by lots of citizens and never disappeared in every time. History is very sensitive in Japan’s Asian relation; some bias to security alliance came from it because of distrust.
As we all know, many political leaders had declared many kinds of comment about historical problem, though nationalism is majority, the statement of pacifism also can appear at official and informal occasions, even just diplomatic phrase.
For this, Chinese, Korean, and other area papers analyze very minutely Japanese declarations about the history in Second World War. Especially China, she takes Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945) and the Nanjing massacre very serious. After all, this is a topic of unique significance for Beijing: China's war of resistance against Japanese occupation has underpinned verses and chapters of a nationalistic mysticism which remains the only source of legitimacy for the regime (Niquet, 1995, 131). Despite Prime Minister Hata's apologies ("profound regrets"), in June 1994 a flurry of articles in the Chinese press denounced the declarations of the Japanese Minister for Justice reported by the Mainichi Shimbun（Mainichi Daily）. These articles accused "some Japanese circles" of refusing to acknowledge the facts, of denying the sufferings of the Chinese people and compromising the progress of Sino-Japanese friendship. The wrongdoing of imperial Japan constitutes a precious weapon for Beijing's foreign policy, and the press does not miss an occasion to recall it. 1994, Chairman Jiang Zemin attended the solemn ceremony commemorating the one-hundredth anniversary of the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese war.
In 1994 on the occasion of the forty-ninth anniversary of Japan's defeat, the Emperor renewed the expression of "profound regrets". Then, in September, the socialist Prime Minister Murayama declared that Japan had an "obligation" to "regret" its own history. Nevertheless, the Chinese press continues to express Beijing's doubts as to the sincerity and the actual "profoundness" of Japan's regrets.
Engagements of Taiwan
to reduce Chinese regional influence, the range of alliance issue also including Taiwan; pacifist is more identified with one-China principle, ambitious new guideline must bring China and Japan to another military conflict. It ‘s hard to say which is powerful because of the strength of China is growing rapidly, nationalism and pacifism statements got reasonable only in some times and at some occasion. No permanent majority in this issue today.
The commemoration of the 1894-1895 war took place also at a time of mounting tensions regarding Taiwan. The Chinese press took the opportunity to recall Japan's colonial policies in Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 and, again, its culpability towards "the Chinese people." The message was clear: this historical record should preclude any Japanese faux pas in matters related to the unity of China.
In 1994 when discussing the coming visiting of Taiwan’s president, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono met his Chinese counterpart and told him that China retained a privileged place in Japan's foreign policy. He added that Prime Minister Murayama was convinced of the necessity of pursuing the development of bilateral relations by buttressing China's reforms, opening and modernization. In contrast, the Chinese Foreign Minister emphasized their disagreements: if Prime Minister Murayama has several times expressed his interest in Sino-Japanese relations, China would trust actions rather than words, particularly on any issue which could undermine the One-China principle. (Niquet, 1995, 131)
In the past Beijing could count on a more obedient attitude on the part of Tokyo, which used to yield as a rule to Chinese demands regarding the relations between Taiwan and Japan. But, today, the Japanese government seems to have decided to adopt a stronger stance toward the political regime in Beijing and its bullying postures (Niquet, 1995, 131). If Tokyo cancelled the invitation to President Lee Teng-hui, it nonetheless ignored the strong protests from Beijing and maintained the invitation to Vice-premier Hsu Li-teh in his role as chairman of the Taiwan 2002 Asian Games Preparatory Committee. He was the highest Taiwanese official to come to Japan since 1972.
Forum in Yokohama at the end of October. On this point, Tokyo did not waver even though the Foreign Ministry in Beijing objected that the invitation would affect "the healthy development" of Sino-Japanese relations.
Regardless of whetherChina’sdevelopmenttakesthebrightpath orthefearful one, however, reason for concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. To Chinese, the U.S.- Japan alliance represents a significant difficulty for a resolution of the Taiwan problem, and indeed, Japanese nationalists are doing so (Okamoto, 2002, 68). Both Japan and the United States have clearly stated that the oppose reunification by force, it meanings the reunification still the triple business of the three players. When China conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carriergroupsinto nearby watersasasign ofitsdisapprovalofChina’s belligerent act. (Oka, 2001, 18)
Japan encoded the U.S. action, hinting at the possibility of its offering logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities. Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliancebacksup Japan’sbasic stance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution. (Okamoto, 2002, 68)
In addition,Japan’snationalist in government increased support for Taiwan and its cooperation with the Bush administration for stronger U.S. backing of Taiwan, including active dialogue by senior Japanese defense and foreign policy officials with their U.S. counterparts who were concerning Taiwan, have raised Chinese apprehension. Chinese officials are worried that the planned Japanese -U.S.-Australian strategic dialogue may focus on Taiwan contingencies.
No doubt, for the Chinese government, the Japanese nationalist stance toward Taiwan constitutes the most important and maybe the one decisive criterion when it comes to evaluating Sino-Japanese relations. The Guangming Daily accuses "some members" of the political circles in Japan of endangering the development of
Sino-Japanese relations by trying to bet on the "American" theories of "Two China's" or "One China, One Taiwan" (Niquet, 1995, 136).
Territory issues
Maybe the simplest way to identify pacifists or nationalists is to specify the position of territory issue they are. Clearly nationalists assert no flexible space about this issue because of direct connection with security; and pacifists regard mutual rights of natural resources as a best way to deal with it. However, like many other states,territory issue alwaysoccupied by hawks.Pacifist’svoice is weak and hard to be heard.
Territory had been a complex affair for a long time; Japan has disputed islands with China, Taiwan, Russia and Korea. Until today, no sufficient resolution had found in those states.
For instance, nationalist argued loudly that Chinese Navy extends its bullying tactics from the South China Sea to the East China Sea, in the proximity of the Senkaku Archipelago, which is claimed by Tokyo, Beijing and Taipei. The Chinese Navy conducted important exercises in that region in May 1992, and, in 1993, many incidents have involved Japanese fishing-boats and "unidentified vessels", most certainly Chinese. (Mochizuki, 2003, 83)Despite Japanese protests, Beijing apparently uses bullying tactics against Japan in the East China Sea. Nationalist think such operation is a real invasion to Japan and is a serious security problem, the SDF must response clear and present to manifest the legal right.
Beijing argues that the continental plateau in the East China Sea constitutes a "natural extension" of the Chinese continental plateau. This argument could be a Pandora's Box: will Beijing identify many other "natural extensions" of its territory? Lastly, China needs oil, and the reserves in the disputed zone of the East China Sea could be crucial to the development of Shanghai (Niquet, 1995, 136).
Security alliance has been more than fifty years. However, the trend lines in both Japan and the United States do not guarantee the retention of the alliance in the same form as today. The acknowledgement of security in alliance obviously is more and more losing common base. At Japan side, all nationalist wants is totally autonomy, pacifist is free of military duty, and U.S could never to accept any of it. Today though the alliance seems still consolidated, we can find problems in several issues whether domestic or international.
Within the next decade, possibly significant changes due to nationalism and pacifism will have to occur for the alliance to reduce viable and effective for both countries. At the current trajectory, domestic nationalism and pacifism confuse the state’s choice under alliance, the perceived lack of reliability of Japan as an alliance partner will likely cause the United States in the region to seek alternative means of achieving her purpose. Breaking of alliance may be one of future options.
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