Heidegger's "OntologicalDifference" andMahayana's "Twi-satyas"Theory

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Heidegger's "Ontological Difference" and Mahayana's "Twi-satyas"

Theory

Wu Xue guo Associate Professor of Religion and Comparative Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,

Nankai University

Qin Yan

Lecturer on Religion and Literature, School of Arts,

Shanxi University

The article is a comparative study on the Heideggerian and Buddhist Mahayanan philosophies. We attempt to bring them into dialogue and promote their mutual understanding through discussion of their two fun- damental ideas, i.e. "Ontological Differ- ence" and "Twi-satyas". On the one hand, Heidegger's differentiation between the Being Itself and beings, namely the differentiation between "Nothingness" and

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"beingness", is similar to the Mahayana Buddhist distinction between "Sunya" and

"bhava" in that both of them aim for recog- nition of "Nothingness" by the overcoming of obstinacy in "beingness", so we may say H e i d e g g e r ' s t h i n k i n g h a s B u d d h i s t significance. On the other hand we regard the "Twi-satyas" theory of Mahayana Bud- dhism also as a kind of "Ontological D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " : F i r s t l y , j u s t l i k e Heidegger's "Nothing", Sunya is the truth and essence of being; secondly, just like the Heideggerian "Differentiation", the "Twi- satyas" theory also contains as its significance the deconstruction of Metaphysics;

lastly, "Sunya" in Chinese Buddhism is non- fixedness (Wu Zhu or aniketa), which means freedom in the same ontological significance with Heidegger's "Nothing". The principal divergence between the Heideggerian and Mahayana theories consists in their different understanding of "Nothingness". Sunya, the Nothingness in Buddhism, is a being absolutely non-linguistic; so the difference between the two "satyas" is in fact the difference between the linguistic and the non- linguistic; To Heidegger, however, the Noth- ingness as Being itself is just the language itself or its essence, so the Ontological Dif- ference is just distinction between the language essence and the beings coming into this language. Moreover Heidegger's Noth- ing (Nichts) is time itself, whereas the

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Sunyata of Mahayana Buddhism is totally non-temporal.

The Buddhist significance in Heidegger's Ontological Dif-

ferentiation

Heidegger's "ontological difference"

(Ontologische Untersheidung) is a distinction between Being itself and the beings , which makes clear that Being is not the beings (das Seiende), but is the totally other (schlechthin Andere) of everything in the world and is separated from the latter by unfathomable abyss . This "Being-itself"

is totally without relation, unintelligible, unspeakable; in contrast with the "being" of ordinary things, it is rather "Nothing". Ne- vertheless this Nothing is the source of everything, so Nothing is "Nothingness" as essence (Wesen). Therefore the ontological difference is differentiation between being and nothing.

Chinese philosophers also discussed the problem about "being" and "nothing". So said Lao-tsu in Tao-Te-King, "Everything in the world originated from being(You), and being from nothing (Wu)", but it seems that this kind of thought have not reached the horizon of Ontological Difference . The Upanishads in ancient India have referred

Ontologische Untersheidung

das Seiende

schlechthin Andere

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to the distinction between two satyas too, but it has not gained an ontological meaning until Mahayana Buddhism. The Mahayana

"Two satyas" are "paramartha-satya" and

"sajvrti-satya", the latter of which is ordinary experiential existence (corresponding to Heidegger's "Seiende"), i.e. "being"

(bhava, or "You" in Chinese); the former is being's essential truth (corresponding to Heidegger's "essence of being"), i.e.

"sunya" (emptiness, or "kong" in Chinese).

So the Mahayana distinction between the sajvrti and the paramartha is actually a d i ff e r e n t ia t i o n b e t w e e n " b ei n g " an d

"sunya", which is similar to Heidegger's ontological difference between "being" and

"nothing".

Both the Heideggerian and the Mahayana Buddhist "differentiations" have overcome the obstinacy in beings (seiende), and realized an intuition in "Nothingness" (truth of the essence of being). We know that the

"Sunya" in Mahayana contains mainly three senses as follows: firstly sunya as the ultimate truth of essence of being, secondly sunya as an attitude to things (namely as negation of hetu-pratyaya or experiential existence), lastly sunya as the goal of negation . We think Heidegger's concept of Nothing contains similarly three aspects too.

p a r am a r t h a - s a t y a

s a j rt i - s a t y a

Seiende

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s v a l a k s a n a

die Seiendheit des Seiendes

E r e i g n i s Firstly, his explanation of Nothing as

b e i n g ' s e s s e n c e c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h Mahayana's elaboration of the "essence"

(sva-laksana) meaning of sunya (here "sva- l a k s a n a " m e an s t r u t h an d e s s e n c e ) . Mahayana Buddhists regard Nothingness i.e. sunya as the ultimate truth of being, and Heidegger's Nothing is also the truth of being in similar sense. Heidegger thought that Metaphysics saw only being, but not Nothing which is more authentic than being. So that in Metaphysics Being was never understood as Being-Itself, but in- stead as the "beingness of beings" (die Seiendheit des Seiendes) ; and Nothing, accordingly, was understood as "non- being". But in truth Nothing is never "non- being", but "the movement of the essence of Being-itself, so it is more truly being than all the other beings" . So one can say that pure Nothing is pure Being, i.e. the truth of Being .

Mahayana Buddhism, especially that in China, mostly understands sunya, i.e. Noth- ingness as being's substratum or origin (dharmabhuta or bhuta-tathata), and regards everything to be produced from it. In Heidegger's philosophy "Nothingness",

"Occurrence of Being" (Ereignis) is also

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the source of all the beings. So Nothing's

"baselessness" (Abgrund) becomes conversely the "base" (Grund) of being and world. Nothing is the original openness of Being as Being, in this sense Nothing is conversely the source of "things" (beings):

"from the nothing all beings as beings come to be" . There has been a shift of stress from "Dasein" to "Sein" in the development of Heidegger's thought. Relevantly the

"Nothing" in his early thinking means Dasein's authentic "Seinkonnen", namely the original openness in which beings are revealed; whereas in his later thinking it m e an s t h e " O c c u r r e n c e o f b e i n g "

(Ereignis), i.e. the secret source of being and world.

Heidegger's Nothing, as a openness in which beings are revealed is identical with freedom. Freedom is truth of Being's essence The essence of Being is the movement of interpreting revelation and projection, while the beings are the revealed and projected. As something projected the beings are somewhat inert and non-free, but the Being Itself as the action of revealing and projecting is characterized as the "non- determined", in this sense it is freedom. The essence of Heidegger's "Nothing" (Nichts) is "nihilation" (Nichten) . Nihilation is

A b g r u n d G r u n d

Dasein Sein

Seinkonnen

Ereignis

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not elimination of beings, but the negation of obstruction and concealment of being, so nihilation is transcendence and freedom . Freedom in this sense is not without simi- larity with Mahayana Buddhist sunya.

Firstly sunya is freedom because it's free from the fetters of beings. Secondly, Chi- nese Buddhism emphasizes "Sunya" as "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" (keeping the mind moving freely without obstacle), so it is more similar with the concept of Heidegger's Nichten and freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" does not interpret sunya as an immutable being, but as a "free moving" (Yuan Yong) essence.

As freedom and movement, "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" is totally identical with the Heide- ggerian "Nothing". "Wu Zhu" (aniketa, getting rid of obstruction, fixedness and inertia) overcomes our obsession (abhinivewa) with finite things, and brings understanding of being into the state of "Wu Ai Wu Zhi" (no fetter, no blockage), "Zi Zai Yuan Yong"

(absolutely free and perfect); We think Heidegger's "Nichten" is a freedom in the same sense, it overcomes the one-sidedness of Dasein's understanding of being and brings Dasein for the first time in front of the unity of being as being .

Nichts Nichten

a n i k e t a

N i c h t e n

Dasein

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Secondly, Heidegger's discussion on Nothing aims at deconstruction of Meta- physics too, which is also "breaking with abhinivewa (obstinacy, one-sidedness, sink- ing in world, indulging in practical life)" just like Mahayana's Sunya as negation of hetu- pratyaya (i.e. as prayojana). The wisdom of "breaking with abhinivewa" is not the patent of Buddhism or oriental spirit. For example Plato's distinction between the sensible world and the supersensible is also a breaking with the "abhinivewa" in sensible world. But Metaphysics always takes up a n e w " a b h i n i v e w a " ( w i t h P l a t o , t h e

"abhinivewa" in supersensible world) after doing away with the old one. Husserl's phe- nomenological reduction also aimed at breaking with "abhinivewa", for reduction is

"just the cancellation of the presumption of the being of the objective world" , which is in fact implied in the significance of the Mahayana Sunya. As the result of reduction only the transcendental consciousness that has direct evidence survives . In the Bud- d h i s t v i e w , t h e r e d u c t i o n " s u n y a t e s "

(nihilates) the "Jing" (artha, or world) by means of "Xin (cit, or Subject), but still s a v e s " X i n " , i . e . t r an s c e n d e n t a l consciousness, so it, as "sunya", is not ultimate. The saved "Xin" as a self-adequate reality is dissolved by Heidegger into Dasein's temporal movement . There- fore in hermeneutic ontology there is no

prayojana

r e d u c t i o n

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more Metaphysical Ego (Xin), but only the t e m p o r a l L an g u a g e m o v e m e n t o f interpretation; in words of Buddhism, it even

"sunyates" the world-sunyating consciousness (cit) , so it is "sunya-sunyating" (in Chinese, "kong kong"). The cit or self ex- ists only in the temporal process of the transformation of language into the "non- self"(things), so Gadamer said language is

" t h e m o s t s e l f l es s " ( i . e . n i r- a t m an i n Mahayana) . The temporal language consciousness is essentially identical to Mahayana Yogacara's concept of alaya vijbanana .

The problem of Metaphysics consists essentially in its seeing only being but not nothing , which means almost the same thing as the so-called "abhinivewa" in ontological sense by Buddhism. So the Heide- ggerian nothing and Buddhist sunya have the similar object to nihilate. Apart from the relation with nothing, Metaphysics understands Being as beingness (seiendheit) of beings, while the absolute idea, substance, absolute spirit and will to power, etc. all fall into its scope. So the so-called "Meta- physik" is actually still "physik" , in that it sees only Anwesen but not Anwesen- lassen, only Lichte(light) but not Lichtung

D a s e i n

°

nir-a tman

s e i e n d h e i t

Meta-physik

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(lighten) , only "being" in light but not the secret nothing which leads the beings into light. It is in essence "flight from" the

"nothing". Being afraid of Nothing, man always attempted to hold on to being, thence he projected a being "best qualified as being" (das seiendste Seiende), i.e. the absolute idea, the highest reality, the highest good to protect himself from the attack of Nothing and assure himself safety. Likewise the "Onto-theo-logie" of Christianity understands God as "the most absolute being", and regards the authentic nothing, i.e. the freedom, as sin; so its essence is also "flight from nothing", whereas Heidegger's funda- mental ontology ought to be regarded as an attempt to cut off the way of Dasein's flight . In words of Mahayana Buddhist, "flight from Nothing" is abhinivewa in beings, while forcing man to face nothing is similar to Buddhist giving up "being" and realizing

"sunya".

Lastly, Heidegger's analysis on nothing aimed at the revelation of the truth of Being,

physik Anwesen Anwesenlassen

Lichte Lichtung

das seiendste Seiende

Dasein

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hence it is similar to the Buddhistic "Sunya"

as goal of negation (namely the "artha" as- pect of "Sunya"). Twi-satyas theory lies in negating "being" and revealing "Sunya", likewise Heidegger's distinction between being and nothing consists in "highlighting Being from beings" . Heidegger thought that old Metaphysics always determined Being from the viewpoint of beings, which led to the forgetting of the essence of Being, and finally even this forgetting is forgotten . B u t t h e " N i c h t e n " ( n i h i l a t i o n ) o f

"Nichts" makes the world as unity of beings indifferent, and deprives Dasein of his relation with being's unity, therefore makes him come directly in front of Being itself, i.

e. Nothing, Abyss or the secret source of beings occurrence (Ereignis). Here we think Heidegger's intention agrees with that of Mahayana to negate vyavaharika "being"

(bhava) and reveal paramarthika "nothing"

(sunya).

The sentiment (Stimmung) in which the Nothing is revealed is anxiety. But anxiety is not an ordinary feeling. It is like the Bud- dhist Dhyana. Here, as Heidegger says, "All t h i n g s an d w e o u r s e l v e s s i n k i n t o indifference, .... The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety op- presses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this `no

Nichts Nichten

Dasein

Ereig- n i s

b h a v a

Stimmung

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hold on things' comes over us and remains.

Anxiety reveals the nothing" . Dhyana also requires the student to be "away with difference, away with concept of human, away with Egoism" and perceive the authentic sunyata (Nothingness). Moreover the so- called "indifference" is neither ordinary existence of beings, nor an emptiness with all things annihilated, but is characterized as "non-being, non-emptiness"; similarly the Buddhist "sunya intuition" is not an absolute elimination of being either, but aims at the "non-being, non-emptiness" too. More- over Heidegger's nothing is formless, unthinkable, so it cannot be held on like beings; that is in accordance with the negating spirit of Buddhist too. Lastly just as it is with Mahayana's "intuition in sunya", so Heidegger's realization of nothing is also

"speechless", because in Nothing being's unity disappears, both the objects of speech and the being's relation which makes speech possible come into silence. The situation finds its analogous expression in a phrase of Chinese Taoism "Great speech is without voice, great being is without form".

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The Twi-satyas theory as an

"Ontological Differenciation"

What are the twi-satyas? Nagarjuna said in Mulamadhyamaka-karika

"The Buddhas teach the people dharma according to Twi-Satyas, t h e o n e i s t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l (sajvrti-satya);The other is the ultimate (paramartha-satyas). If one does not know the distinction between the two satyas, he would not understand the true meanings of Buddha's deep dharma" .

And Pivgalanetra's commentary on it is :"The sajvrti-satya is that all things are empty but ordinary people owing to wrong understanding produce untrue dharmas and look upon them as true. The saints know their wrongness and look upon all dharmas as empty and without origin, so it is paramartha-satya, namely the truth."

"Satya" means teaching, theory or truth. In Mahayana Buddhism the Twi-satyas are not only two methods of teaching, but also two s e n s e - d i m e n s i o n s o f b e i n g . T h e paramartha-satya is the original truth of b e i n g , i . e . t a t h a ta o r d h a r m a ta , a l s o

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called"sunya"or "sunyata"; while the sajvrti-satya means experiential beings, it is the being projected by human convention and custom, also called "being" or "vyavaharika being". We think the distinction between "sunya" and "being" is similar in spirit to Heidegger's differentiation between

"Nothing" and "being".

The Buddhist Twi-satyas theory converted the differentiation of Upanishads be- t w e e n t h e p a r a - B r ah m an ( t h e h i g h e r Brahman) and the apara-Brahamn (the lower Brahman) into distinction between sunya and being, hence raised it onto the ontological level. Sunya is the truth and essence of being, but is different from ordinary beings (the vyavaharika), it is the "totally other" of all beings. Rather than ranked as "being"

(bhava), it would better be called "Nothing- ness" (while the "being" as asanta-bhava, i.e. wrong existence is conversely produced from "sunya" by vitatha,i.e. wrong understanding).

Just as it is with Heidegger's differentiation, so the twi-satyas theory is brought forth in order to reveal the realm of Noth- ingness as opposite to being (bhava). The Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is a speech-less, formless dark principle. Sunya as Nothing- ness is neither a real "being" as Vorhan-

denheit (the present existence), nor "non- Vorhandenheit

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being" as negation of Vorhandenheit, but

"non-being, non-emptiness" as in the case with Heidegger. In sectarian Buddhism the Sarvastivadins held on to "being" theory, i.

e. realism, regarding all dharmas as ultimate "bhava" (being); on the other hand the Vaipulyists held on to"empty"theory, i.e.

nihilism, regarding all dharmas as absolute

"abhava" (emptiness). The Mahayana Bud- dhists view both as wrong. They think that true sunya falls neither on the side of

"being", nor on the side of "non-being". That is called the "Middle Way". The true sages

"love neither sunya nor non-sunya" . Af- terwards the San-lun school in China devel- oped out of Nagarjuna's twi-satyas the

"Four-fold Twi-satyas", in the fourth (the highest) fold of which it is understood that everything can be spoken of is sajvrti-satya, only the "speechless, unintelligible" essence is the absolute truth (paramartha-satya) . T h e Tw i - s a t y as t h e o r y, j u s t l i k e Heidegger's "Differentiation", also aims at deconstruction of Metaphysics. There is Metaphysics in the East as well as in the West. Like their counterpart in the West, the eastern Metaphysicians also hold on to

"being"(bhava) and don't see "Nothingness"

(Sunya). So the Twi-satyas theory aims to deconstruct the "being" of things and reveal the "Nothingness"( i.e. sunya which is the essence of the truth of being), which is similar with Heidegger's deconstruction of

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Western Metaphysics.

Metaphysics is just "abhinivewa". Ac- cording to Buddhism the "abhinivewas" in- clude abhinivewa in being (dharma) and abhinivew a in self ( a tman). In Indian thoughts, Hinaiyana Buddhism and the Brah- man Vaiwesika school etc. are experiential realism, while the philosophy in later Upanishads and Bhagavadgita etc. is transcendent metaphysics, both of them are

"dharma abhinivewa". Very similarly to the case with Heidegger, the Buddhists also take the understanding of the temporality of being as their starting point in deconstruction o f d h a r m a a b h i n i v e w a . T h e d h a r m a abhinivewa of Hinayana and Tirthaka (the non-Buddhists) is mostly holding on "dharma as real, dharma's being as eternal", i.e. they think dharmas are eternal substances without time. But Buddha has said that "all phenomena are transitory"(anityah sarva- sajskarah), so revealed phenomena as mo- mentarily appearing and disappearing and h a v i n g n o e t e r n a l e x i s t e n c e ; a g a i n Mahayana's "occurrence theory" (pratitya- samutpada vada), e.g. the alaya pratitya- samutpada of vijbapti matrata, also emphasizes that all beings appear in the temporal continuous running (samta-prortti) of being.

Moreover the manner of Mahayana's negation of self-abhinivewa is analogous to that o f H e i d e g g e r ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f subjectivism. We have pointed out that the

s a m t a - prortti

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alaya vijbana concept of Vijbaptimatrata school dissolved the non-temporal Ego of Sa j k h y a an d Ve d an t a i n t o t h e s e l f - transforming, eternal running movement of time. So the Buddhist Karma theory is an expression of their understanding about the temporality of existence: it makes clear that the essence of man is not an immutable consciousness but is formed by his past life, which reminds us of the explanation of the historicity of human being by hermeneutic philosophy. The dissolution of Ego in the horizon of time or its disappearance in karma's movement is the same.

Moreover, Sunya-vada deconstructed the o l d B r a h m an t h e o l o g y, j u s t as t h e Heideggerian "Nothing" theory did to the Christian scholastic theology. Heidegger's

"Ontological Difference" negates the God concept of Christian "Onto-theo-logie" as the highest being, the eternal transcendent absolute far beyond the world, thence forces man to face Nothing squarely. In Indian thoughts it is in later Upanishads that a Meta- physics about Brahman's supersensible world is at first established, thereafter the Bhagavadgita, identifying Brahman with God, introduced the upanishadic Metaphys- ics into theology, therefore the then Indian theism also was an Onto-theo-logie. The twi- satyas theory contains deconstruction of this theism. Mahayana regards "non-difference, non-duality (advaita), middle way" as the

K a r m a

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true understanding of dharma required by t w i - s a t y a s t h e o r y , s o i t " s u n y a t e d "

( d e c o n s t r u c t e d ) t h e t r an s c e n d e n t intelligence. Moreover Mahayana Buddhism is also against Hinayana's opposition of Nirvana and world and its flight from world to nirvana, but insists on "neither sticking to world, nor to nirvana" , because all dharmas are one, indifferent; consequently the division between noumenon and phenomenon is broken. The decon-struction of the transcendent world requires man to re- turn from the ideal "heaven" to the world of real life. In words of Mahayana, it is "realizing sunyata just in the rupa"(ru paj wunyata, wunyata iva rupaj); in words of Nietzsche and Heidegger, it is "returning to the earth again" .

The negation of "being" aims to mani- fest sunya. Some scholars pointed out that

"karma" in Buddhism, just as "essence of technology" in Heidegger, is the cause of concealment of being . Both Western Metaphysics and Eastern "bhava"(being) theories concealed the original truth of Being, so they must be negated. But obvi- o u s l y t h e B u d d h i s t n e g a t i o n i s m o r e thoroughgoing. Mahayana looks upon all beings as non-substantial and thence their existence (sva-bhava) as empty, so we must nihilate them and realize "all dharms are nothing, all hetu-pratyayas are empty" ,

a

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and finally come to the state of "having nothing". This "having nothing", however, does not mean nihilism, but aims at the realization of sunyata, i.e. the truth of dharma.

All are sunya(empty), while only the clear, taintless substratum as sunyata is real. Nev- ertheless the reality of the substratum is not the Metaphysical reality, substance, i.e.

atman, but the true Being manifested after the nihilation of atman.

The "Vajracchedika-prajba-paramita- sutra" explains sunya as "keeping the mind moving freely without obstacle" (In Chinese,

"Wu Zhu Sheng Xin") . Chinese Bud- dhism always understands "non-abhinvewa"

an d " s u n y a " f r o m t h e p o i n t o f " n o n - obstruction, non-blockage", so it realized throughout the spirit of "Wu Zhu"(aniketa, non-fixedness). "Wu Zhu" is ontologically s i m i l a r t o H e i d e g g e r ' s " N i c h t e n " a s freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" in Chinese Buddhism means keeping the mind free from abhinivewa and keeping it moving naturally, running smoothly without fetter.

In words of Chan, it is "no blockage in mind,"

"sticking to neither the exterior nor the interior, going and coming freely, getting rid of abhinivewa thoughts and realizing non- obstruction" . Not only those ideas stick to the mistaken, but also those stick to "the correct" must be gotten rid of, hence even- tually the complete freedom of spirit is

Nichten

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realized. This freedom is neither autocracy of reason over the senses (as in Kant), nor reckless fool action, but removing the concealment (avidya, abhinivewa) and keeping an openness for the truth of being (bhuta- tathata); the so understood freedom is in ontological sense totally similar with Heidegger's understanding of Nothing.

Maybe that is the reason why Heidegger was so interested in Chan Buddhism!

Nothingness or Sunya never belongs to beings, so it cannot be exposed by means of language. The Chinese Xuan Xue (theory about Tao) often says: "When the fish are gotten, the net can be given up; when the meaning is gotten, the speech can be given up"; the Indian Upanishads also said that words are only "weariness of speech" and the ultimate truth is unspeakable ; and the European mystics sighed over the limita- tions of language too. We must also admit t h e N o t h i n g n e s s o f H e i d e g g e r an d Mahayana Buddhism as unspeakable because it does not belong to the sphere of being and has no relation of being with world . Mahayana believes everything speak- a b l e i s v y a v a h a r i k a " b e i n g " b u t n o t paramarthika "sunya". Being is conversely produced from "sunya" by virtue of abhuta- parikalpa(wrong understanding), while abhuta-parikalpa is senseless speech of ordinary man. Therefore being is only a prod-

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uct of language, while Sunya is the absolute truth outside of Language. So Buddhism is c a l l e d a r e l i g i o n " w i t h o u t s p e e c h " , Wakyamuni "the King of Silence". The Bodhi-sattvas of great intelligence ought to nihilate all the senseless speech and realize with prajba wisdom the languageless truth (tathata), this is what is called "tasting it like a dumb" by "Mahayana-sajuparigraha- wastra".

Conclusion

We believe that, the similarities between the Heideggerian and Buddhist thoughts are mainly due to (besides their common logic of thinking) the direct or indirect influences of oriental tradition on Heidegger. Firstly, Heidegger's Ontological difference was inspired by Christian mysticism, and today's scholars have found that there have been a number of ties between medieval mysticism and Indian Upanishadic mysticism ; secondly Heidegger could get in touch with and take use of the achievements in Oriental study in the 19^th century and the first two or t h r e e d e c ad e s o f t h e 2 0^{t h} c e n t u r y . Heidegger's differentiation between Being and beings has benefited from Rudolf Otto, a theologian in Marburg, Heidegger's say- ing that Being is "the absolutely other "

(schlechthin Andere )of beings was bor- rowed from Otto, and Otto's expression was

inspired by Buddhist and Indian thought . schlechthin Andere

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On the other hand we think a comparative research should not only see the common aspects of both sides, but also their differences. Although both the Ontological Differentiation and Twi-satyas theory aim t o n i h i l a t e " b e i n g " a n d r e a l i z e

"Nothingness", but their understanding of Nothingness is not wholly the same one.

The Buddhist Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is an absolutely non-linguistic being (in Indian Buddhism, it is mostly still an absolutely non-spiritual being), a dark indifferent essence which is "speechless, unthinkable"

(totally opposed to language and thought), so the distinction of the Two Satyas is in fact that between the linguistic and the non- linguistic (Sunya is unspeakable, because it is just the opposition of language). But in Heidegger's thought Nothingness, i.e. the Being Itself is in essence language, "Lan- guage is the house of being" ; that Being is "unspeakable" is just because it is language itself or its essence, Language can say anything, except itself . Relevantly, the Nothingness or Ereignis of Heidegger is time; whereas the sunya of Buddhism, re- maining the same one from no beginning, is absolutely non-temporal. Moreover though the Buddhist negation of substance by vir-

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tue of momentariness of beings shares a common Logic with Heidegger's deconstruction of the metaphysical concept of reality by means of being's temporality, yet the Buddhist attitude is "negation without affirmation":"momentariness"(anityah) is vyavahara-satya, i.e. the existent state of ordinary beings, while the essence of Be- ing (paramartha-satya) is the absolutely timeless sunyata or bhuta-tathata; that is quite contrary to Headeggers viewpoint.

Heidegger used the concept of temporality to negate the Metaphysical being, mean- while "affirmed" temporality as Being's essence, so his attitude is "affirmation with negation".

Moreover although Heidegger's interpre- t a t i o n o f N o t h i n g i s fo r m a l l y a l s o a deconstruction of Metaphysic abhinivewa, this deconstruction means only overcoming of the one-sidedness of Metaphysics, but not the absolute negation of worldly life. The purpose of the Heideggerian discussion on Nothing is not to come to the Buddhist emptiness (sunya) or non-action (vyupawama), on the contrary it is to let Being develop itself more freely.

Nevertheless, Chinese Buddhism is quite

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different from that of India, in that it insists o n t h e i d e n t i t y o f " X i n " ( c i t o r consciousness) and "Xing" (tathata or truth),

"Li" (bhuta-tathata or essence) and "Shi"

(dharma or phenomenon); their "sunya" is no longer anything non-spiritual, passive, immutable, but consciousness, truth and freedom of existence (Wu Zhu, Wu Ai);

Moreover their teaching(e.g. as in Chan), insisting that "the ordinary consciousness is truth", completely negated the negation of ordinary life, which makes it more in h a r m o n y w i t h H ei d e g g e r t h an I n d ian Buddhism. Maybe here lies the reason why Heidegger, lacking of Schopenhauerian warmth for Indian thought, was so fond of the teachings of Chan Buddhism!

Note

With reference to Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache(Stuttgart:

Neske, 1997), P. 110.

Martin Heidegger, Beitraege Zur P h i l o s o p h i e ( F r an k f u r t : Vi t t o r i o Klostermann, 1989), P. 477.

Here "Nothing", as the first cause of

"being", is actually another "being"

(Seiende).

Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs z u r S p r ac h e ( S t u t t g a r t : N es k e , 1997), P. 110.

Martin Heidegger, Beitraege Zur Philosophie(Frankfurt:Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), P. 477.

Seiende

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N a m e l y S u n y a s s v a - L a k s a n a ( e s s e n c e ) , p r a y o j an a ( a c t i v i t y, function) and artha (object, value).

See Mulamadhyamaka-karika XXIV ( Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu 1944). Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti have given different interpretation to this Karika. Our explanation basically agrees with that of Candrakirti, because we think it is more objective than that of Bhavaviveka.

Beitraege Zur Philosophie, P. 266.

ibid., P. 266.

Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.

ibid., P. 110.

M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , W e g m a r k e n ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : V i t t o r i o Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.

Basic Writings, P. 105.

ibid.

E . H u s s e r l . C a r t e s i a n i s c h e Meditationen (Hamburg:Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980), P. 22. See also Cairns' translation: Cartesian Meditations

XXIV

( , 1944)

Beitraege Zur Philosophie, P.

266.

Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.

Martin Heidegger,Wegmarken ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : V i t t o r i o Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.

Basic Writings, P. 105.

E . H u s s e r l . C a r t e s i a n i s c h e M e d i t a t i o n e n ( H a m b u r g : F e l i x Meiner Verlag, 1980), P. 22.

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(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), PP. 20~21)

Husserl said:"The sense of transcendental reduction is that it can only take Ego and not the others as the beginning of being"(Cartesianische Meditationen, P. 31; see also Cairns' translation, P. 30).

The process is similar to the Bud- dhist negation of "man-abhinivesa".

Zimmermann has written a book on Heidegger, whose title is "Eclipse of the self", which means a gradual pro- c e s s t o o v e r c o m e e g o i s m , w h e r e

"inauthenticity is an intensification of everyday egoism; authenticity is a d im i n u t i o n o f i t " ( Z im m e r m an n , Eclipse of the Self(Ohio: Ohio Uni- versity Press, 1981), P.47.) The process is the dissolution of the Ego as im m u t ab l e s u b s t an c e , s e l f - u n d e r- standing or self-adequate subjectiv- ity into temporal language movement.

H e r e G a d a m e r c o m m e n t e d :

"Heideggers thesis is: being itself is time, thence all the subjectivism of modern Philosophy is exploded"(H.

G.Gadamer, Wahrheit Und Methorde (Tybingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1986), P.

243.).

C a i r n s ' C a r t e s i a n Meditations(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), PP. 20~21)

(Cartesianis- che Meditationen, P. 31;

Cairns' P. 30)

Zimmermann

Eclipse of the self

( Z i m m e r m a n n , Eclipse of the Self(Ohio: Ohio Uni- versity Press, 1981), P. 47.)

(H.

G . G a d a m e r , W a h r h e i t U n d Methorde(Tybingen: J.C.B.Mohr,

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Hans Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte We r k e B an d 2 ( Tu e b i n g e n : J . C . B . Mohr, 1986), PP. 125 126.

The alaya vijbana is not an "Ego". It is not an eternal substance, but is always converting itself into world, and is always changed by our every- d a y u n d e r s t an d i n g an d b e h a v i o r, therefore its existence is "temporal".

Moreover the "self" of Heideggers Philosophy is Language, while alaya vijbana in Yogacara school is also called "manojalpa vijbana". i.e. language consciousness; both Heidegger and Yogaca ra school attribute the occurrence of being (in Buddhism

"pratitya-samutpada") to Language movement. So Heideggers interpretation of Nothing and the work of Mahayana don't only have the same purpose, but also have reached the similar end.

Basic Writings, P. 106.

Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1959), P. 17.

See Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens(Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,1976), PP. 72-74.

1986), P. 243)

Hans Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke Band2(Tuebingen: J.C.B.

Mohr, 1986), PP. 125 126.

Martin Heidegger, An Introduc- tion to Metaphysics (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1959), P. 17.

Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache d e s D e n k e n s ( T u e b i n g e n : M a x

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Rydiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus Deutschland(Mynchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994), P. 191.

An Introduction to Metaphysics, PP.

19.

In order to describe the experience of Nothing, Heidegger cited a passag from Knut Hamsun's poem "The Road Leads On" : "Here he sits between his ears and all he hears is emptiness. An amusing conception, indeed. On the s e a t h e r e w e r e b o t h m o t i o n an d sound, something for the ear to feed upon, a chorus of waters. Here nothingness meets nothingness and the result is zero, not even a hole. Enough to make one shake one's head, utterly a t a l o s s " ( A n I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Metaphysics, P. 27.)

Mulamadhyamaka-karika with the Commentary by Pivgalanetra.X X IV (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1944.)

Ibid.

Asajga, Shun Zhong Lun. Nan Jing:

Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932.

Niemeyer Verlag,1976), PP. 72-74.

Rydiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus D e u t s c h l a n d ( M y n c h e n : C a r l Hanser Verlag, 1994), P. 191.

An Introduction to Metaphysics, PP. 19.

K n u t H a m s u n

(An Intro- duction to Metaphysics, P. 27.)

XXIV 1944

1932

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. 1944

Grund

XVI

( N e w Y o r k : T h e M a c m i l i a n Company, 1916), P. 88.

Ji Zang, Da Chen Xuan Lun I. Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu 1944.

Mahayana Buddhism has throughout kept the inquiry on the essence of being in its originality. In western thought, however, the inquiry has been transformed into the inquiry on the reason (Grund) of the being of beings at the beginning, and modern science understands reason simply as causality of natural forces, consequently the reason interpretation was changed into a rationality explanation w h i c h i s d e t e r m i n e d b y p r ac t i c a l need of technological production.

W h e r e as ac c o r d i n g t o Mah a y an a , both the reason interpretation and rationality explanation are limited in vyavaharika (concerning only the b e i n g s ) , o n l y t h e p a r am a r t h i k a (authentic thinking and being) reveals the truth of essence of being; The paramarthika and the vyavaharika, the wunya and the being are sharply different. Therefore it avoided the c o n f u s i o n o f t h e e s s e n c e i n q u i r y with reason explanation, and assured the ontological inquiry its purity.

Mulamadhyamaka-karika X VI Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (New York: The Macmilian Company, 1916), P. 88.

,

普門學報社出版　地址：84049台灣高雄縣大樹鄉佛光山普門學報社電話：07-6561921轉1291、1292 傳真：07-6565774 E-mail：ugbj@fgs.org.tw

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Akihiro Takeichi, "On the Ori- gin of Nihilism", Heidegger and Asian Thought(Ed by G.Parkes) (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987), PP. 183-185.

1932

( 1942)

Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad IV 4 21(from: The Thirteen Princi- pal Upanishads, Oxford University Press, 1995.)

R.C.Majumdar, Ancient See Akihiro Takeichi,"On the Origin

of Nihilism", Heidegger and Asian Thought(Ed by G.Parkes) (Honolulu:

University of Hawaii,1987), PP. 183- 185.

Jian Yi, Ru Da Cheng Lun.

Vaj r ac c h e d i k a - p r aj b a - p a r am i t a - su tra(Trans by Kuma raji va) (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932).

Hui Neng,"on prajba,"Tan Jing (Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1942).

Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad

( f r o m : T h e T h i r t e e n P r i n c i p a l Upanishads, Oxford University Press, 1995.)

Nevertheless the meaning of the two

" N o t h i n g n e s s " s i s s o m e w h a t different, thence the reasons for their

"unspeakablity" are different too.

It is because the repeated foreign in- vasions and the active propaganda of native religions led to cultural mix- ing-together. As a result the Greek king Menandros and the Kusana king Kaniska became famous patrons of Buddhism, and a number of foreign rulers had been converted to other

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Indian religions (With reference to:

R.C.Majumdar, Ancient India(Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass,1982), P. 166;

Benimadhab Barua, A History of Pre- B u d d h i s t i c I n d i an P h i l o s o p h y (Calcutt: University of Calcutt Press, 1921), P. 420. etc.)

See J. L. Mehta, "Heidegger and Ve d a n t a " , H e i d e g g e r an d A s ian Thought, P. 24.

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (Oxford University Press, 1936), P.

30.

Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 117-118.

Although Heidegger has said in an occasion that the "sunya" of Bud- dhism is "the same with" his "Noth- ing" (Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP.

1 0 8 - 1 0 9 ) , w e w o u l d r a t h e r t h i n k s u c h an e x p r es s i o n as o r i g i n a t e d f r o m h i s m i s u n d e r s t an d i n g o f Buddhism.

India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), P. 166; Benimadhab Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhistic In- dian Philosophy (Calcutt: Univer- sity of Calcutt Press, 1921), P. 420.

etc.

J. L. Mehta, Heidegger and Vedanta, Heidegger and Asian Thought, P. 24.

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy Oxford University Press, 1936 , P. 30.

Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 117- 118.

(Unter- wegs zur Sprache, PP. 108-109)