The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Business Performance for Tourism Industry in Taiwan
李約翰、張椿柏
E-mail: 365783@mail.dyu.edu.tw
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of Taiwan public trading tourism industry ownership structure, board
characteristics and business performance from the perspective of corporate governance. In addition, we investigate the monitoring effect of institutional investors shareholding ratio, and the number of outside directors. The empirical results indicate as follows: first, managerial ownership has nonlinear relationship with business performance. While managerial ownership ratio is lower than 5%, managerial ownership is positively related to business performance and supported convergence-of-interest hypothesis. On the other hand, when the managerial ownership ratio is above 5%, managerial ownership is negatively related to business performance and supported entrenchment hypothesis Second, family ownership is positively related to business performance. Third, as core agency problem gets worse, business controlling right deviates from cash flow right, business performances would get poorer. Forth, when institutional investor’s shareholding ratio is positive related to business performance, it supports efficient monitoring hypothesis.
Next, as the number of outside directors is more than half proportion, the ratio of outside directors has nonlinear relationship with business performance. The number of outside director is less than half; the ratio of outside directors is positively related to business performance. Reversely, the number of outside director is more than half; the ratio of outside directors is natively related to business performance. Last, the general manager of company is hold concurrently by the president will save operating cost and the business performance will arise.
Keywords : Core Agency Problem、Controlling Right、Cash Flow Right、Nonlinear Relationship Table of Contents
封面內頁 簽名頁 中文摘要─Ⅰ 英文摘要─Ⅱ 誌謝─Ⅲ 目錄─Ⅳ 圖目錄─Ⅵ 表目錄─Ⅶ 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究背景 與動機─1 第二節 研究目的─5 第三節 研究範圍─5 第四節 研究架構與流程─6 第二章 文獻探討 第一節 公司治理之相關 研究─8 第二節 股權結構與企業績效關係之相關研究─13 第三節 董事會特性與企業績效關係之相關研究─22 第三章 研 究設計 第一節 樣本選取與資料來源─26 第二節 變數定義與衡量─26 第三節 模型設計─33 第四章 實證結果分析 第一節 敘述統計─35 第二節 變數相關性檢定─36 第三節 迴歸分析─39 第五章 結論─47 參考文獻─49
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