CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review of this chapter is based on three theoretical frameworks.
The first one discusses issues in pragmatics, in which Speech Act Theory, Politeness Model, and the speech act of complaining will be introduced. The second one addresses issues in interlanguage pragmatics (ILP), which deals with pragmatic competence and related ILP studies. The last one concerns pragmatics in language teaching, which discusses the pedagogical interventions and instructional effects on learners’ interlanguage pragmatics development.
2.1 Issues in Pragmatics
According to Leech (1983), general pragmatics includes two major parts. The first part is sociopragmatics, which focuses on the sociological part of pragmatics.
The sociopragmatic studies are generally culture-specific in that the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle operate variably in different cultures of language communities. The other part of pragmatics is pragmalinguistics, which deals with the more linguistic part of pragmatics (Leech, 1983).The pragmalinguistic studies are generally language-specific in that they consider the particular resources of a given language for conveying particular illocutions (Leech, 1983). Of all the issues concerning language usage, speech act theory has aroused widespread interests because the acquisition of speech acts is considered a prerequisite for the acquisition of language in general (Levinson, 1983).
Therefore, in this section, three important issues relevant to this study will be
discussed: the speech act theory, the politeness principles, and the speech act of
complaining. The first two issues are the major concerns in pragmatics, and the last
one particularly addresses the speech act under investigation in this study.
2.1.1 Speech Act Theory
The speech act theory began with the work by J. Austin (1962), who argues that language is used to perform actions instead of determining truth values. What is important for an utterance is to distinguish between sense, which refers to the meaning of the speaker's words, and force, which refers to the speaker's communicative intention. He further distinguished three types of forces: locutionary force, which refers to the actual sounds and words uttered; illocutionary force, which refers to the intention underlying the words; and perlocutionary force, which refers to the effect of the utterance on the hearer.
Searle (1969) drew on Austin's work and had two major contributions to the speech act theory. The first contribution has to do with formalization of speech acts, in which classification and felicity conditions of speech acts were proposed.
1The second contribution relates to indirectness, which will be addressed in detail in this section because it is highly relevant to the present study.
Indirect speech acts occur when there is a mismatch problem between the expressed and the implied meaning (Thomas, 1995). Searle (1975: 60) stated that in indirect speech acts
...the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.
Searle further distinguished two kinds of indirectness in speech acts:
1 Searle (1975a) identified five major categories of communicative acts: representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. Representatives refer to the acts used to describe states of affairs (e.g. stating, asserting). Directives refer to the acts used to ask the hearer to do something (e.g.
requesting, ordering). Commissives refer to the acts used to commit the speaker to do something (e.g.
promising, guaranteeing). Expressives refer to the acts used to express the emotional feelings of the speaker (e.g. apologizing, thanking). Declarations refer to the acts used to change the status of state of affairs (e.g. appointing, naming).
nonconventional and conventional. Nonconventional indirectness is open ended in propositional content, linguistic form and pragmatic force (Blum-Kulka, 1989). Searle described ten processing steps for a hearer to arrive at the primary illocutionary force from the literal illocution. In Step 1, the hearer draws facts about the conversation. In Step 2, the hearer assumes that the speaker observes principles of conversational cooperation and that his/her remarks are therefore relevant to the conversation. In Step 3, the hearer assumes that the speaker produces a relevant response. In Step 4, the hearer recognizes that the speaker’s literal meaning of the utterance is not a relevant response inferred from Steps 1 and 3. In Step5, the hearer assumes that the speaker means more than he/she says. In Step 6, the hearer further judges the speaker’s utterances from factual background information, or, knowledge of the world. In Step 7, the hearer makes inferences from Step 6. In Step 8, the hearer draws on the preparatory condition to determine the propositional content the speaker conveys. In Step 9, the hearer infers from Step 1 (facts about conversation), Step 7 and Step 8 (theory of speech acts). In Step 10, the hearer arrives at the speaker’s primary illocutionary point. In general, the more indirect an utterance is, the more cognitive processing efforts are needed (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).
The other type of indirectness is conventional indirectness. According to
Blum-Kulka (1989), conventions of usage are represented in conventions of means
and conventions of forms. Conventions of means refer to the kinds of sentences that
are typically used. On the other hand, conventions of forms refer to the wording used
in the utterances. For example, Searle (1975: 65-7) identified six means to perform
conventionally indirect directives, which include the address to the H's ability to
perform A (e.g. “Can you reach the salt”), S's wish that H will do A (e.g. “I would like
you to go now”), H's doing A (e.g. “Will you quit making that awful racket”), H's
desire or willingness to do A (e.g. “Would you be willing to write a letter”), reasons
for doing A (e.g. “You should leave immediately”) and embedding of the previous elements into one another (e.g. “Might I ask you to take off your hat”).
Blum-Kulka (1989) further argues that the two types of indirectness differ in the inherent pragmatic ambiguities in each, which can be realized in terms of sentence meaning, utterance meaning and speaker meaning. Sentence meaning is similar to the interpretation assigned to linguistic structures only. Utterance meaning refers to the pairing of linguistic expressions with specific contexts. Speaker meaning refers to what the speaker intends to convey to make the hearer recognize his/her intentions.
She claims that the pragmatic ambiguity of non-conventional indirectness lies at the level of speaker meaning, while the pragmatic ambiguity of conventional indirectness exists at the level of utterance meaning.
To conclude, Austin’s pioneering works proposed the notion of speech acts.
Based on Austin’s work, Searle was devoted to the formalization of speech acts. His other contribution, indirectness, is closely related to politeness, which will be discussed in the next section.
2.1.2 Politeness Model
Fraser (1990) identified four current perspectives on politeness: the social-norm view, the conversational-maxim view, the face-saving view and the conversational-contract view. Of the four perspectives to a construct of politeness, the face-saving model advocated by Brown & Levinson (1987) has been best known.
Brown & Levinson started with the assumption that all competent interactants have
two kinds of properties: face and rationality. Drawing on Goffman's (1967) notion of
face, they claim that people cooperate in communication to maintain each other's face
(Brown & Levinson, 1987). In this model, there are two types of face wants. The first
type is negative face wants, which refer to "the basic claim to territories, personal
preserves, rights to non-distraction" (Brrown & Levinson, 1987: 61). The second type
is positive face wants, which refer to "the positive consistent self-image or personality claimed by interactants" (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 61). According to Brown &
Levinson, certain speech acts are face-threatening in that they may threaten the speaker's or hearer's negative or positive face. The other property of interactants prescribed in the model is rational capacities. Combining these two properties together, a competent adult, when considering a face-threatening act (FTA), must be able to assess the payoffs, which are usually influenced by three sociological variables:
the social distance between speaker and hearer, the relative power between the speaker and hearer, and the absolute ranking of impositions in a particular culture.
He/she may choose from the five superstrategies—Do the FTA without any redress, Do the FTA with positive politeness redress, Do the FTA with negative politeness redress, Do the FTA off record and Do not do the FTA.
The first three are on-record strategies. The first strategy is bald-on-record, which corresponds roughly to the maxims described in Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle.
2The second and third ones are on-record strategies with redressive actions, in which the speaker attempts to give face to the hearer. Positive politeness redress is approach-based in that the speaker intends to minimize the face threat by saying what the hearer wants. Negative politeness redress, on the other hand, is avoidance-based in that the speaker intends to maintain the hearer's basic wants of self determination.
The fourth strategy relates to hints, with which the hearer may not commit himself to particular intentions. The four strategies can be measured on a directness scale, with bald-on-record strategy the most direct, off-record strategy the most indirect, and
2 In Logic and Conversation, Grice (1975) proposed four conversational maxims, which include Maxim of Quantity, Maxim of Quality, Maxim of Relation and Maxim of Manner. Maxim of Quality refers to the amount of information a speaker should provide. The information should not be more or less than required. Maxim of Quality claims that a speaker should tell the truth, and do not say what he/she believes to be false. Maxim of Relation refers to the relevance of information a speaker should provide to the course of conversation. Maxim of Manner states that a speaker should be concise and orderly when speaking and avoid obscurity and ambiguity of expressions.