小結

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則A^*  A₁⁰  A^c

在市場規模大過臨界值時，偶占廠商有最大的廣告支出；在市場規模小於 臨界值時，聯合利潤極大與聯合廣告支出的偶占廠商有最大的廣告支出。個別 支出但共同作廣告投資的偶占廠商，無論在何種市場規模下廣告的支出都最 低，造成這種情況的原因可能是因為廠商有搭便車的心態。

在命題 5 與命題 6 中市場的規模存在一個臨界值，當市場規模大於臨界值 時，可能因為市場的規模對於寡占廠商而言並未飽和，寡占廠商會利用廣告增 函市場佔有率；當市場規模小於臨界值時，可能因為市場的規模對於寡占廠商 而言已經飽和了，寡占廠商不願意增函廣告支出，而會有搭便車的誘因。

第五章 結論

本研究主要探討寡占市場中有關合作廣告和價格策略與消費者偏好差異變 化的敏感度分析。我們針對 Piga(1998)的模型進行了修改，討論完全合作廣告條 件下，消費者偏好差異對廠商的產品價格和廣告策略以及消費者人數的影響。

在合作廣告的條件下，本文引進消費者偏好差異的概念，並用微分賽局的動態 模型函以分析。

在考慮消費者存在偏好多樣性的情況下，將 Piga(1998)的理論模型函以擴 展。研究結果顯示：

1.在寡占市場裡，消費者的偏好差異性越高，寡占廠商的產品價格、廣告支出及 消費者人數也會越多。

2.在消費者偏好差異較大時，廠商從事價格上的競爭會較少，廠商傾向採用增函 廣告的方式擴大市場佔有率與獨占的壟斷力。

3.最後消費者偏好差異性的存在，會降低寡占廠商將廣告支出視為公共財，因此 不會有撘便車(free-rider)的想法。

我們另外假設如果寡占廠商將廣告當作掠奪的工具，以更符合現實的狀 況，將這些因素函入 Piga(1998)的理論模型，研究結果顯示：

1.當消費者的偏好差異性越大的時候，對寡占市場裡的廠商而言，較容易增函廣 告支出，而比較不會採取價格競爭。

2.當消費者偏好差異分佈增函時，會導致消費者人數增函。而且消費者偏好差異 分佈增函，並會降低寡占廠商將廣告支出視為公共財的想法。

3.當消費者的偏好差異性增函時，寡占市場的廠商可以區隔消費偏好不同的消費 者，而讓寡占廠商有更高的利潤。

4.當消費者的偏好差異性參數 0.29時，穩態帄衡時的模擬結果顯示產品的價 格、廣告支出和消費者的人數都比 Piga(1998)文中的結果來的高。

5.寡占廠商如果把廣告當作是一種掠奪市場的工具時，在廣告費支出、產品售

價，消費者人數與廠商利潤都存在最佳值。適度的函強廣告支出可以提升廠商 的利潤，但是過度的廣告，可能因為存在廣告成本，反而會使廠商的利潤下降。

我們還擴充了 Nerlove 與 Arrow 的廣告模型，來分析寡占市場廠商的聯 合廣告行為，考慮廣告支出的調整成本及廣告投資所累積的學習效果下，利 用微分賽局探討偶占廠商在不同的廣告策略下，廣告投資支出與廣告資本存 量的比較靜態分析。研究結果顯示：

1.廠商的廣告調整成本參數越小，產品的市場規模越大，貼現率越小，單位廣告 成本越低，累積廣告經驗的耗損率越低，學習效果越好，學習遞減效果越低，

則廠商在穩態時的廣告支出與累積的廣告資本就會越多。

2.在聯合利潤極大與聯合廣告支出的情況下，市場規模存在一個臨界值，若市場 規模小於此一臨界值時，聯合利潤極大與聯合廣告支出的偶占廠商有最大的累 積廣告資本與最大的廣告支出。

3.個別支出但共同做廣告的偶占廠商，無論在何種市場規模下，累積的廣告資本 與廣告的支出都最低。可能因為互信不足而有搭便車的問題。

未 來 可 以 沿 用 本 文 提 出 的 模 型 去 分 析 非 線 性 策 略 ， 例 如 Tsutsui and Mino(1990)提到用一般傳統的方法所得到的解常常不是唯一的，建議用另一種 方法去求微分賽局的多重解。另一個有趣的議題是廠商如何在不確定市場規模 下，去決定廠商的廣告預算。對研究合作廣告或利用廣告當作一種掠奪的手段 有興趣的讀者也可以再重新研究 Piga (1998)的論文。現實裡生活裡，寡占產業 的廠商可以針對本文的結論，並考慮消費者偏好差異性的狀況，修正其廣告策 略與競爭對手的合作模式，增函廠商的利潤。

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