建議

本研究分析了 2002 ~ 2004 年間曾經分紅入股企業（534 家）的誘因強度、

相對比例與影響變數。由於資料公開的限制，使得在上市樣本掛牌的企業不論在 公開資訊觀測站或是台灣經濟新報中都只能取從2003 年開始的企業分紅入股的 數量，相較之下上櫃樣本可以追尋的資料超過六年以上（1999 年），為了使的 整個研究實證的完整性，本研究閱讀了上市樣本六百多家的2002 年年度財務報 告書，從中找尋、收集各公司分紅入股的數量，遂使得整個研究期間為三年。

本研究的主要評估指標，誘因強度，是用來評估分紅入股數量的變化量；由 於分紅入股會增加企業流通在外的股數，因此本研究也考慮到稀釋效果（dilution effect）的影響。但是此效果難以精準估出，所以評估指標的衡量並未加入此效 果的影響修正。

另外，由於本國相關金融機構（行政院金融監督管理委員會證券期貨局；證 期局）目前未像美國證管會強制要求各掛牌企業公布CEO 及經營團隊的詳盡工 作報償契約內容，使得本研究無法分析本國企業經營團隊（CEO）的誘因強度與 相對比例。

在代理成本決定因素方面，原本CEO 的年紀（決策時間長短）也是一個研 究因素，也是因為目前本國掛牌企業並無公開其經營團隊的個人資料，使得這個 變數成為遺珠之憾。而本研究中的績效評估的非預期效果因為許多企業上市、櫃 期間過短，造成變數的係數太大，間接降低實證的研究效力。

此外，投資機會的評估僅採用研發費用佔企業市場價值的比例估之，但是已 研發完成的技術只需要資本投入資產即可；因此，如果未來的投資機會評估加入

「固定資產的變動」，可能可以得到更精準的結論。

另外，經營團隊的持股比例本研究做出來的結果是沒有顯著關係，雖然與部 分文獻的結果一致；但是，也有部分文獻結果是負相關；因此，如果未來的研究 方法改採取非線性迴歸去分析，可能可以得到負相關的結論。

所以未來的研究在資料取得的前提下，可以試著去完成CEO 與企業之間的 誘因強度與相對比例；另外，如果也可以取得CEO 的真實年齡，未來也可以將 之考慮做為相關變數之一；至於績效評估的非預期效果，未來的研究可以在時間 較長的前提下，再去計算真正誤差較小的額外效果；投資機會則可考慮固定資產 的變動性；經營團隊的持股比例則可採用非線性迴歸評之。最後，未來也可針對 電子類股的某特定產品或服務去瞭解這些公司的誘因強度與相對比例為何？

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