Model and Propositions

Appendix 1.B Model and Propositions

Consider a stylized world, containing 2 countries (Home and Foreign), where (upstream) production requires capital (^K at home and

K

^*in the foreign country) and skilled labor (L_S at home and L^*_Sin the foreign country).

Capital and skilled labor are assumed to be homogeneous and mobile within but immobile across borders. The product space is dense with a continuum of varieties which are indexed byz[0,1]. The market for a given variety

z

is characterized by Cournot competition between

n

firms from home and n^* firms from the foreign country. For any given

z

, producers in a given location face identical Cobb-Douglas unit cost of production: c A(z)w¹_s^(z)r^(z) at home and foreign respectively. Downstream producers can purchase a variety

z

at a price p(z)from the upstream market and employ unskilled labor (homogeneous and mobile within but immobile across borders), denoted by LU at home and L^*_U in the foreign country, to produce a homogeneous output that is freely traded across the borders. We assume that each unit of output requires one unit of a given variety

z

and each country’s access to production technology is reflected by unit requirements of their unskilled labor denoted by



and



^* with wages

w

u and w^*_u at home and foreign respectively. The world inverse demand curve for a given variety

z

_is

)

respectively.



is the world marginal utility of income which we choose as the numeraire. We will, hereinafter, normalize the factor prices to W_s 



w_s,

For the same

z

, each firm in the foreign country will

 

^* _{1 1} ^{* * *}

‧

In equilibrium, each firm yields

(A.3)

_

not exceed a weighted average of the demand intercept and the unit cost of a foreign firm, where the weight attached to the former is decreasing in the number of foreign producers:

(A.5) c₀a'



1₀



c^*

Analogously, it will be profitable for a foreign firm to produce

z

_{iff its} unit cost does not exceed a weighted average of the demand intercept and the unit cost of a home firm, where the weight attached to the former is decreasing in the number of home firms:

(A.6) ^{c a}



^*0



^c

The aggregate output and price are

(A.7)

_

The profit each firm earns is

(A.9)



i

^{( n , n}

^*

⁾  ^{b '}  ^y

i

^{( n , n}

^*

⁾ 

²

 i 

1,2,...,

n

(A.10)



^*i

^{( n , n}

^*

⁾  ^{b '}  ^y

i^*

^{( n , n}

^*

⁾ 

²  i1,2,...,n^* Skilled labor markets clear if

(A.11)

^ 

‧

foreign country respectively, and

)

Capital markets clear if (A.13)

^ 

country respectively, and

)

essentially a General Equilibrium analogue of the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman index ( HHI ), for an industry with multi-product firms operating in an open economy, operating in each of the regions

‧

Figure A.1 Concentration and Trade

Figure A.1 above captures the distribution of production and trade.

When the cost of every producer exceeds '

a

, in region O, then the variety is not produced at all. In region H only the home firms can compete and in

Figure A.2 Increase in the number of Foreign Firms, Concentration, and Trade



0

‧

foreign firms on the distribution of production and trade. When the number of foreign producers rises, the extensive margins of trade expand with region

F (where exclusively foreign firms can compete) expanding and the cone of

diversification HF (where both foreign and home firms can co-exist) shrinking.

In effect, the HHI falls in F, rises in HF, but remains unchanged in H.

Figure A.3 below captures the effect of a merger between a foreign firm and a firm on the distribution of production and trade. In the post-merger equilibrium, the extensive margins of trade expand with regions F (where exclusively foreign firms can compete) and H (where exclusively home firms can compete) expanding and the cone of diversification HF (where both foreign and home firms can co-exist) shrinking. In effect, the HHI rises in F and H but falls in HF.

Figure A.3 Merger, Concentration, and Trade

Starting from the equilibrium industrial structure in autarky, with

n

firms at home and ^n* firms in the foreign country, let us (for ease of exposition, without loss of any generality) assume hereinafter that foreign firms are relatively cost-efficient i.e. cc^*.

The net gain from a takeover of a home firm by a foreign firm is

(A.18)

    

1 1 ^*



‧

The same logic can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to a takeover of a foreign firm by a home firm which will be profitable iff

c

When an upstream firm is integrated with a downstream firm at home, the net gain from a takeover of the integrated home firm by a foreign firm is (19)

G

^*

^ N

₀

^ _ ^ 2 ( c ^ c )

^*

y

₁

( n , n

^*

) ^ b  y

₁

( n , n

^*

) 

²

 N

₀

^ ( n ^ n

^*

^ 2 )  ^ _ ^

When an upstream firm is integrated with a downstream firm at home, the net gain from a takeover of a disintegrated home firm by a foreign firm is

(20)

  _

_*

_

‧

Our main propositions follow from (A.18) through (A.21).

Proposition I. Vertical integration at home increases the gains from

In other words, the incentives for cross-border mergers rise with vertical integration when the pre-merger HHI at home is sufficiently low relative to the HHI in the foreign country. Intuitively, this follows from an interaction between efficiency and concentration as a merger between a high-cost and a low-cost firm increases efficiency by eliminating the high-cost firm. The larger the cost differential, the greater is the gain from a low cost firm taking over a high cost firm. Vertical integration affects relative costs through its effects on competition in the input market. The profits of the downstream unit of the integrated firm rise with a rise in its rivals’ costs and the integrated firm is better off withdrawing from the input market. The withdrawal of a vertically integrated firm from the input market weakens upstream competition. This raises the input price which, in turn, leads to a higher cost for the non-integrated downstream firms.

Proposition II. When an upstream firm is integrated with a downstream firm

at home, a relatively efficient foreign firm will have an incentive to acquire a) a disintegrated home firm iff



3 3 ^*



significantly to justify its taking over a high-cost home firm. When this cost differential is sufficiently large, the foreign firm has a greater incentive to merge with the integrated home firm than to merge with a disintegrated home firm. Vertical integration at home makes foreign downstream firms more competitive and the disintegrated domestic downstream firms less competitive. As such, a vertical integration at home changes the strategic advantages for foreign firms. With the vertically integrated home-firm operating at a lower cost relative to the disintegrated home firms, the increase in the profits of a foreign firm from a merger with an integrated home firm exceeds the increase in its profits from a merger with a disintegrated home firm when there are fewer disintegrated firms at home in the pre-merger equilibrium. In other words, the incentives for a merger between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm will be higher (lower) than that for a merger between a foreign firm and a disintegrated home firm, when the pre-merger HHI at home is high (low) relative to the pre-merger HHI in the foreign country.

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銀行的商譽與參貸銀行的選擇：商譽互補效果

1. 前言

聯合貸款市場(Syndicated loan market)儼然已成為公司融資的主要管道。

聯合貸款一詞主要係由一間或一間以上之銀行團貸放給借款公司。在銀行團裡的 成員中，係由主貸銀行(Lead arranger)負責簽屬契約條件，透過與借款人協商來 完成契約。當借款金額較為龐大時，主貸銀行釋放部份貸款額度，尋找潛在有意 參與的銀行加入，以提供足夠的資金完成聯合貸款契約。而後期加入的潛在銀行 我們稱之為參貸銀行(Participant bank)。本篇文章主要在探討，主貸銀行是如何 選擇參貸銀行？而選擇參貸銀行主要決定性因素為何？當主貸銀行面對市場眾 多的潛在的參與銀行時，會以何種條件視別、及區分他們？主貸銀行本身的條件 是否會偏好某特定性之參貸銀行。

為了分析上述之研究議題，我們利用銀行本身的商譽(Reputation)條件作為 參貸銀行的分類準則，接著再進一步分析主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的誘因及決定性 因素。在聯貸的過程中，代理問題以及資訊不對稱是影響契約條件的主要關鍵，

這也同時影響了聯貸銀行團的組成條件。過去文獻Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2005)曾指出，在資訊不對稱的情況下，外界投資人無法知道公司本身的努力程 度以及未來績效時，通常會以公司的商譽視為選擇合作夥伴的主要選項之一。因 此，主貸銀行是否會選擇商譽較佳的銀行成為參貸成員，以解決在參貸選擇時的 資訊不對稱問題。

參貸銀行的選擇是很重要的，因為這不僅影響契約條件的執行以及市場參與 者的評價(Sufi, 2007)。在具有重覆性往來對手的市場裡，其往來關係者，可利用 這重覆性往來關係來建立彼此的互信，且在長久合作的情況下，降低與往來關係 者的資訊不對稱是很重要的。在聯貸市場中，由於銀行團之間的重覆性合作，銀 行之間也可藉由合作學習來培養互信，並建立市場的商譽(Barro, 1986; Boot and Thakor, 1993; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Shane and Cable, 2002; Fang, 2005; Lewellen, 2006; Ross, 2010; Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli, 2011;

Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012)。在這層的關係考量之下，主貸銀行 會有誘因選擇具有較高商譽的銀行成為合作夥伴，以建立商譽。這樣的關係，我 們稱之為“建立商譽下的互補 (Complementarity in reputation building)”動 機。

本研究延伸Diamond (1991)建立商譽理論(Reputation building theory)，考 量“建立商譽下的互補”的觀點，探討主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的誘因與動機。我 們認為銀行商譽不僅可降低銀行團內的資訊不對稱，也可藉由彼此的特性上的互 補來達成團隊合作的經營模式(Fu et al, 2008)。因此我們認為當主貸銀行本身的 特性能與參貸銀行之間形成互補的狀態的情況下，此參貸銀行極為可能為主貸銀 行的主要選擇(Wilson, 1985; Gould, 2002; Jensen and Roy, 2008)。利用銀行商譽 將參貸銀行區分成兩類的選擇狀態下，主貸銀行的特性是否會影響其選擇誘因？

以及具備何種特性的銀行需要較佳商譽參貸銀行的加入？本研究針對主貸銀行 自身相關特性尋找決定性因子， 主要取決於主貸銀行，自身相關特徵因子 (Self-related)，以及工作經驗(Task-related)之技術性因子。前者，自身相關特徵 因子，主要考量主貸銀行本身的商譽條件、公司經營狀態，以及治理機制相關之

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因素。後者，與銀行工作經驗有關的特性考量，認為主貸銀行的市場的活絡程度，

是否為特定領域之專家、往來關係，和其他同產業競爭對手的影響。在兩種因素 的分類下，分析這兩類因素在主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行商譽特性上的關係。

許多文獻都曾探討有關於如何選擇合作夥伴之議題³。本文是第一篇針對主

貸銀行本身特性下的選擇誘因，來觀察何種特性之銀行會偏好選擇商譽較佳的參 貸銀行。本文利用概率選擇模型(probit choice model)來分析以下問題：

(1) 銀行商譽在主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的過程中，扮演的角色何為？在

參貸者的商譽為主貸銀行選擇偏好上是極為重要的決定性分類的情 況下，何種特性的主貸銀行會選擇商譽程度較佳的參貸銀行？

(2) 建立商譽的互補誘因是否存在於主貸銀行選擇參貸銀行的決策過程

中？此結果應會反應在選擇模型的觀察係數上，我們預期當主貸銀 行的情勢劣於參貸銀行時，主貸銀行會有誘因選擇商譽程度較高之 參貸銀行進行合作。選擇較佳商譽的參貸銀行，不僅可降低與借款 人之間的資訊不對稱，更可藉由程度上的互補建立市場商譽。

(3) 商譽程度是否會影響主貸銀行的選擇？我們商譽的衡量除了全球性

的排名為主要選擇依據外，在考量商譽程度的分析上，本文加入地 域上的排名，即國家級的銀行排名。認為全球級排名的商譽程度優 於地域性之排名，當主貸銀行在極具弱勢的情況下，會選擇程度較 佳的商譽參貸銀行。然而，當主貸銀行本身存在跨國資訊不對稱、

以及本土偏好(home bias)時，則可能會選擇地域性排名較佳的參貸 銀行。

為了分析上述的研究問題與假設，我們利用全球聯貸案例為主要研究樣本，

其資料來源取自於LPC Dealscan，樣本期間於 2001 年至 2014 年。為了全面性 考量主貸銀行的相關特性，我們除了考量銀行本身之商譽外，也考慮公司的審計 者(auditor)的商譽，銀行本身的經營狀態，以及銀行的所有權結構，試圖了解主

貸銀行的本身特性因子，這類分析資訊取自於 BankScope 資料庫。在公司市場

的經驗分析上，我們以觀察主貸銀行過去在聯貸市場的活動往來情況為依據，並 考量同市場的其他銀行競爭者的選擇，以瞭解除了公司自身特性外，競爭者的相 關選擇活動是否也會影響主貸銀行對高商譽參貸者的需求。

本研究結果主要發現有三。參貸銀行的商譽在主貸銀行選擇參貸者的過程中 扮演極為重要的角色。選擇高商譽與非高商譽的參貸者，其主貸銀行特性上有明 顯的差異，證明參貸銀行商譽的不同確實會影響主貸銀行的選擇。其中銀行商譽

的衡量，我們依據 Ross (2010)的方式，利用聯貸市場每間銀行每年的出資份額

來進行排名，將每年前三名之銀行分類成高商譽之參貸銀行。這當中我們也會進

3 在借款人選擇的文獻中 Yasuda (2005)利用兩階段模型(two-stage regression)先觀察發行商選 擇承銷銀行之特性，接著研究選擇後的承銷所索取的承銷費用。Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)也是使用兩階段模型(two-stage regression)來探討分析的選擇在債券市場的 重要性。Cantillo and Wright (2000)利用簡單的概率模型(Probit regression)來說明選擇銀行的 重要是否取決資訊優勢的考量。

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行銀行購併歷史⁴的處理。

行銀行購併歷史⁴的處理。

在文檔中 公司財務決策論文兩篇:跨國購併目標公司之選擇以及聯貸市場參貸銀行的選擇 - 政大學術集成 (頁 35-80)