第五章 結論與建議
第二節 研究限制
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第二節 研究限制
本研究的限制與對後續研究者的建議如下所示：
一、本研究所採用的其中一個租稅規避指標－財稅所得差異的計算，需要課稅所得之資料，
但基於所得稅申報書的隱密性，本文無法取得台灣公司真實的課稅所得，僅能以財務 報導的資料進行估計，因此可能存有潛在的衡量誤差。
二、因台灣公司對外國營運所得無一般性的強制揭露規定，因此該資料之取得亦有難度，
本文僅能以外銷比率衡量公司的境外營運活動規模，但外銷活動僅能衡量營運活動的 收益面活動，無法捕捉費損面相關的資訊，故可能無法完整的衡量公司的境外營運活 動規模。另外，台灣經濟新報資料庫中雖然有提供經理人認股權發放數量的資料，但 有揭露認股權公允價值的樣本過少，故無法依照 Desai and Dhamapala (2009)的原始設 計，以認股權公允價值佔經理人薪酬的比例作為控制變數，改以經理人持股作為股份 基礎給付的衡量指標，控制股份基礎給付對公司價值的影響，此舉可能造成模型設計 上的偏誤，故仍建議後續研究在認股權資料可取得的情形下，仍使用認股權公允價值 佔經理人薪酬的比例作為控制變數。
三、根據 Hanlon and Heizman (2010)的看法，目前現存文獻所使用的租稅規避指標皆無法 捕捉具備財稅一致性(book-tax conformity)的租稅規避行為4，本文所採用的指標也是如 此。因此，本文所做的任何實證結果的詮釋皆侷限於不具財稅一致性的租稅規避行為，
而無法更具一般性地對整體租稅規避行為進行推論。如何建構可同時衡量各種租稅規 避行為的指標為當前租稅規避理論研究的瓶頸。故本文建議後續研究可以朝此方向發 展。
四、本文在選取樣本時，就性質特殊的樣本予以刪除或截斷（truncate），雖然國內外不乏 文獻能支持本文的做法，但此舉能可能因為選樣的偏誤造成實證結果有誤。
4 具財稅一致性的租稅規避方式如：列報某項扣除額的同時也在財務報表上認列費用。
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