第五章 研究結論與建議
第二節 研究限制與建議
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第二節 研究限制與建議
本研究有以下限制與建議：
一、由於本研究係以上市、上櫃企業之已揭露資訊為主，一旦企業有意隱瞞 其關係人交易資訊，則本研究將無法掌握該等交易之對象、類型與金額，
而造成研究中關係人交易之金額可能有被低估的情況。
二、因本研究在對關係人交易是否由相同會計師查核進行判斷時，因所依賴 的資訊為公開資訊，並無法取得非公開發行公司之查核會計師資訊，而 此一狀況可能使得實際之相同會計師查核金額被低估，也使其影響被低 估。
三、本研究所使用的負債資金成本代理變數，係以企業之利息費用除以平均 帶息負債以計算，然此計算方法可能受企業實際借款情況而產生偏誤，
例如某些企業借款期間並未涵蓋期初期末，這將使得本研究以期初期末 帶息負債計算的平均負債金額與利率產生誤差。
四、過去對於負債資金成本之研究除了利率之外，尚有將信用評等做為負債 資金成本代理變數之研究，因此後續研究應可以類似之方法探討相同會 計師查核關係人交易雙方對信用評等之影響。
五、資訊揭露程度受法規影響，本研究僅能從現行揭露規定下所揭露之企業 資訊，來探討相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方影響企業負債資金成本之 議題，因此未來法規若有變更，可能更得以深入探討此一議題。
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