研究限制與建議

第五章結論與建議

第二節研究限制與建議

本研究的實證過程受到若干研究限制，後續研究可考慮針對下列幾個方向加以重新驗證。第一、本研究的財務資訊與公司治理資訊來自台灣經濟新報資料庫，由於資料庫的資料並不完整，遺漏值甚多，若有更詳細的資料來源，可以提高實證結果的可靠性。第二、本研究使用分析師預測誤差做為資訊不對稱代理變數，由於分析師預測誤差的資料相對較少，可能會影響檢測結果，後續研究可使用其他替代變數，例如買賣價差。第三、本研究使用員工股票分紅做為經理人超額薪酬的代理變數，由於樣本數較少，可能會影響檢測結果，後續研就可使用其他變數做為替代變數。第四、使用員工股票分紅與董監事薪酬做為超額薪酬代理變數，員工分紅與董監事薪酬對公司的影響，可能為激勵動機或是盈餘管理，效果可能較為複雜，非最適的超額薪酬之代理變數。第五、本研究使用的發生財務危機機率，為使用財務變數與市場變數計算出的財務危機機率，後續研究可納入其他變數，重新計算發生財務危機機率，或是使用配對樣本方式檢測發生財務危機的公司與正常公司盈餘穩健性的差異，因本研究發現財務危機對盈餘穩健性的解是能力非常高，進而可能影響其他變數與盈餘穩健性的關聯性。

另外，針對本文提供以下新的研究方向，第一、本研究以整體期間研究盈餘穩健性，後續研究將樣本期間依景氣波動區分，檢驗不同的經濟環境盈餘穩健性是否不同，不同的經濟環境，公司對於損失的認列程度可能不同，在景氣蕭條時，

公司對於損失的認列可能相對較高。第二、台灣的家族企業比重很高，應可考慮將樣本區分為家族與非家族企業，檢測是否會因家族企也與否而改變結果。第二、將研究納入國際資料，檢驗不同國家代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健之關聯性。

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在文檔中代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 (頁 92-103)

第五章 結論與建議

第二節 研究限制與建議