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第五章、結論
隨著國際間貿易日益頻繁以及科技的發達,智慧財產權的保護逐漸需要被貿 易雙方國家共同保護,光靠單一方面的努力並不完備,因此仿冒查緝成了現今各 國間經濟、政治與法律必須共同面對的問題。又由於查緝仿冒的實際執行率,會 影響到正版商、仿冒商與消費者三者間的利益分配,故仿冒查緝率是維持交易市 場秩序的重要課題。本文將模型假設簡化為無形資產為外國正版商所持有,而有 數家仿冒商存在於本國市場之中,除此之外我們並假設沒有查緝成本,使查緝率 不致於受到成本的限制。在以上種種假設之下,本研究的結果顯示本國政府對仿 冒查緝率的制定會受到外國市場規模大小的程度所影響,而其運作方法是藉由關 稅連結近一步影響關稅,以達到影響本國政府最適仿冒查緝率的決策,若外國市 場愈小,則本國政府對於仿冒查緝率的制定將會愈低;相反的當外國市場愈大,
則仿冒查緝率的制定將會愈高。
最後,本文為了分析的簡便,我們並未假設外國廠商可藉由政治獻金影響外 國政府之行為,然而現實情況中,廠商往往為維護自身利益,會藉由一些方法達 成其目標。若外國正版廠商可藉由政治獻金影響國外政府之決策,則本國政府仿 冒查緝率,將有可能因來自國外壓力的更加提升而進一步提高。此外,若仿冒被 查緝時,模型中是否應加入課處罰金之機制也是一值得探討之議題。最後,除了 藉由關稅此一貿易策略影響他國政府之決策外,尚有許多方法可影響決策,如經 由外交手段或國防威脅,都可能影響他國的貿易決策。然而本文目前只專注於探 討外國政府經由關稅影響本國政府仿冒查緝之結果,其餘部分可留待未來各方的 學者加以探討之。
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