在金融海嘯後，董事會效能與薪酬議題又重新受到矚目，產、學界紛紛開始檢視 過去薪酬制度是否能有效降低代理問題，促使管理者極大化股東權益。董事會為公司 內部監督的最高機制，負責擬訂公司營運計畫、決定高階經理人薪酬，當董事會效能 能夠發揮時，能夠設計出較佳的薪酬方案，促使股東與經理人利益一致性。然而當董 事與經理人存在親信關係時，管理者可能會互相勾結，因而產生無效率的薪酬方案。
本研究探討超額報酬對於公司績效的影響，結果發現在控制其他股權結構以及公 司特性等公司治理因子後，董監事與經理人薪酬存在正相關，並根據 Brick et al. (2006) 假設，董監事與高階經理人薪酬正相關源於任用親信，將導致董事會無法發揮有效的 監督機制，並導致公司績效的下降。
我們檢視台灣上市櫃公司 2005~2008 年樣本後發現，董監事超額報酬確實存在任 用親信情形，經理人受董事影響的增額報酬對會計績效以及市場績效皆呈現負相關。
此外，本研究將樣本按公司特性分群探討，其結果皆支持我們先前任用親信的假說，
並發現當公司為集團企業、資訊透明度較高企業以及電子產業時，超額績效有較高的 負向影響。
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