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第五章 結論
在二十一世紀的現今，資訊科技以飛快的速度持續地進步，雖然帶來方便、
快捷的生活，但也因更能輕易從事仿冒行為，以致吸引各種仿冒商趁機進入市 場。有鑑於此，世界各國紛紛著手進行保護智慧財產權的行動，而仿冒查緝更是 政府首要面對的課題之一。本文中商品的設定類似 CD、DVD 等數位商品，因 為技術純熟，此類商品的仿冒品幾乎以假亂真，內容、品質皆與正版品相去不遠。
故消費者在選購此類正版商品時，憑藉的不是商品的品質及購買此商品可以得到 的效用，而是憑藉著其對於「正版品」的偏好。
本文引用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 的政治獻金模型，研究利益團體如 何經由提供政治獻金進行遊說來影響政府仿冒查緝率之決策。本文假設版權為本 國正版廠商擁有，仿冒者則為國外廠商，而由於消費者購買仿冒品為違法行為，
因此本文假設僅國內正版商參與遊說。此外，由於現實中，政府取締盜版有其成 本存在，故本文亦加入查緝成本進行探討，觀察其對政府制定仿冒查緝率的影響。
透過模型推導進行分析，政府的最適仿冒查緝率將會分別視極大化社會福利 函數或政府的目標函數來制定，而其所訂定的仿冒查緝率將依市場規模大小訂為
「零」或「查緝率上限」。17我們可以發現惟有在市場規模為中段時，本國正版 商的遊說可以改變政府仿冒查緝率的制定決策，故此時本國正版商才願意向政府 提供政治獻金。而加入仿冒查緝成本之後，增加了政府取締仿冒品的限制，故最 適查緝率為零的範圍將擴增，當查緝成本愈高，查緝率為零的可能性愈大。並且，
加入查緝成本後，本國正版商願意提供政治獻金的可能性亦將增加；隨著查緝成 本愈高，本國廠商願意提供政治獻金的可能性也會愈高。
與文獻進行比較，相較於本文中設本國有一家正版商，而仿冒商則為外國廠 商，Banerjee (2006) 中假設國內存有正版及盜版兩家廠商。正版商為原來即存在 的廠商，可透過設定一個阻擋進入的價格 (entry-deterring limit price) 或依靠政府 查緝來防止盜版商進入；而仿冒商則可根據正版商及政府的行為，選擇是否進入 市場。在正版商尚未進行遊說時，政府的唯一最適政策為放任盜版 (即不查緝)；
然而，當正版商對政府遊說後，政府最適政策則會對仿冒商進行查緝。並且其文 中得到當遊說效率愈高，就愈容易制止仿冒行為。其結果與本文不同的是，在本 文中若市場規模很大，則即使正版商不進行遊說，本國政府亦會進行查緝工作。
本文中假設商品由本國正版商生產且由外國仿冒商進行仿冒，遊說的參與者
17此部分結果和王智賢與楊敦雅 (2008)、王智賢與陳盈竹 (2009) 假設外國正版商進行遊說的查 緝均衡角解情況相同。
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則僅有國內的正版商。但事實上，外國仿冒商亦可能透過遊說外國政府，進而對 本國政府施加壓力。而依據實際狀況，本國國內其實亦存在著仿冒商，故若考慮 到國內仿冒商，將會改變社會福利函數及政府目標函數，如上述 Banerjee (2006) 文中之設定。再者，消費者亦會經由管道進行遊說，因此若將消費者加入遊說的 行列，亦會加深模型的複雜程度。此皆可留待未來作進一步的探討。
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