PART III: CORE STUDY
3. Core Books: Moral Excellence as Middle Target
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Nicomachean Ethics will draw more clearly on the analogy between moral excellence and skill as accuracy becomes a focal feature of archery.
3. Core Books: Moral Excellence as Middle Target
After discussing different ends and showing how virtues constitute the highest grade of good, Aristotle proceeds to tackling the nature and instances of moral virtue. The core books of the Nicomachean Ethics make substantial use of the metaphor we are interested in by adopting archery framework in the explication of ethical excellence, or excellence of character (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή). I shall examine three related sections where virtue is illustrated using elements of archery. As we shall see, figurative speech in the core books is extensive and varied, with archery metaphor mingling with other image sources.
In the first of these sections, Aristotle re-employs archery metaphor for a different purpose: the source domain remains while the target domain shifts from
“inquisitors of ethics” to what moral excellence is. It reads,
If therefore the way in which every art or science performs its work well is by looking to the mean and applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it—meaning that excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work, and if, like nature, virtue is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue, for this is concerned with emotions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean (…) to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue (…) In feelings and actions excess and deficiency are errors, while the mean amount is praised, and constitutes success; and to be praised and to be successful are both marks of virtue. Virtue, therefore is a mean state in the sense that it is able to hit the mean. Again, error is multiform (…), whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it); so this is another reason why excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean a mark of virtue (…)
Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us. (NE 2.6 1106b; emphasis added)116
116 οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ᾽
αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ
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There are a good number of issues to consider about metaphor use in the passage above, and I wish to begin with the obvious fact that archery is not the only source of figurative speech in the explication of moral excellence.117 The “middle” or mean (μέσον/μέσος) that lies between extremes is a central notion in the passage and various metaphors are employed to describe it. In concrete, it is compared to the aesthetic balance or proportion of a good piece of art – so perfect that nothing more need be added or taken away – and to the standard which craftsmen observe when manufacturing goods. Along with these, the target in archery is used to explain the mean. Archery metaphor is thus employed in conjunction with other metaphors. However, it is use of archery metaphor that is extended and dominates figurative speech in the excerpt from 2.6.
A range of archery features fall into focus in the passage: eyeing a target, a target with a center118, accuracy in hitting the target, the challenge or difficulty of hitting the target, and possibilities of missing the target. These features highlight aspects of moral excellence which I attempt to decipher in continuation. I shall do this by underscoring terms in the passage which harmonize with the archery-based notion of moral excellence. physician – put him in tune with Platonic conception of virtue: “Aristotle tends to think of ethics as analogous to medicine. Plato taught that virtue was a kind of health of the soul; Aristotle (…) takes this analogy very seriously”, Pakaluk 2005, 17. For J.A. Stewart, it is Aristotle’s occupation with biology that is key to his conception of virtue, which is based on an “organic” model. Stewart’s approach gives way to a matter-form solution to the problem of dual happiness: theoretical life (“internal state of reposing in truth”) is the soul of political life, Stewart 1973 443-446. His suggestion is attractive. At any case, what matters is to bear in mind that there are other image sources for excellence in the Nicomachean Ethics apart from archery, although I take this to be the dominant metaphor for ethical excellence.
118 Unfortunately, I was unable to find specific details about targets used for archery training in ancient gymnasia. Otherwise, it would be nice to examine how much the details of the metaphor derive from actual practice.
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are used, both of which are translated as “looking”. The Greek verbs, however, are more animated. When Aristotle states that art and sciences “look” (ζητεῖ/ζητέω) to a mean, the word he uses is that of active searching, that is, in the manner of huntsmen.119 Meanwhile, craftsmen “look” (βλέπουσα/βλέπω) on a standard as they work, the ocular verb being that of watching with eagerness or expectation, if not with longing. By presenting the mean as the object of such manners of looking, Aristotle in effect sets up moral excellence not only as a standard in feeling and acting but also as an end to be sought after.
The general similarity between virtue and skill mentioned earlier is now in 2.6 specified in terms of accuracy. Aristotle holds that virtue, like shooting skill, is accurate (ἀκριβεστέρα/ ἀκριβής), meaning by this that it has the quality of hitting the mean (τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική).120 The comparison of moral excellence with archery couldn’t be more poignant. In the manner of explanation of 2.6, the notion of accuracy is contingent upon two opposing terms of exceeding (ὑπερβολή) and falling short (ἔλλειψις). These are technical mistakes (ἁμαρτάνειν/ἁμαρτάνω) commonly said of projectiles that are flung too far or too near, too high or too low so that they miss the target (ἀποτυχεῖν/ ἀποτυγχάνω). These errors are mirrored in the moral sphere to vices or “kakia” (κακιῶν/κακία), literally ugly or base things, the exact opposite of what is fine or beautiful, i.e., “kalos”. In contrast, one who is
“skillful in aiming” (στοχαστική/στοχαστικός) shoots with just the right angle and force and thus “hits the mark” (ἐπιτυχεῖν/ἐπιτυγχάνω). In truth, some of these terms are not exclusive to archery, but the combination of archery jargon with generic projectile terminology results in a succession of images consistent with archery.121 Besides, accuracy, a key feature in Aristotle’s conception of ethical excellence, seems to have been fundamental in archery more than in any other missile sport practiced by the Greeks in classic times. As such, it was the activity that best exemplified the perspective of moral excellence intended by the author of the metaphor.122
119 Thus is the word employed in Xenophon’s Cynegeticus mentioned earlier in chapter 3.
120 The Stoics conceived virtue as “stochastic skill”. Intricacies of Stoic ethics based on analogy with archery discussed by Julia Annas in Annas 1993, 398-403. Interesting to discover influence of Aristotle’s metaphor use on Hellenic thought.
121 Other commentators think so too. For John Burnet, the combination of ἀποτυχεῖν-σκοποῦ-ἐπιτυχεῖν (miss-target-hit) makes the image of the metaphor unmistakably that of archery. He continues, “Goodness is στοχαστική τοῦ μέσου <hitting the mean> and we may think of the μεσότης <mean> as the bull’s eye in the target”, Burnet 1973, 94. Sarah Broadie uses more abstract words to describe the archeric structure of virtue, referring to is as a “triadic scheme” of excess, intermediacy and deficiency, cf. Broadie & Rowe 2002, 303, 305.
122 The closest sport to archery was javelin throwing which was also part of ephebic skills instruction.
However, as Henri Marrou explains, it was force more than precision that counted in javelin use: “in athletics, the one idea was to throw it as far as possible in a certain direction; whereas for its more utilitarian purposes, the thrower practiced by aiming at a horizontal target drawn on the ground”,
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Involving as it does a range of features, the perspective which archery casts on moral excellence results in an elaborate pairing of entailments between source and target domains. Accordingly, the metaphoric argument of 2.6 construes virtue as the targeted mean, the virtuous person as a skilled archer who consistently fires accurate hits, and virtuous behavior as what is praiseworthy and successful (ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται) in the way that winning athletes are celebrated. The scheme may roughly be outlined as in Figure 9. Turns of phrases in the central books will repeatedly pick up or even elaborate the archery metaphor in 2.6.123 Hence, we shall save further discussion for when we examine a couple of these other supporting passages.
One issue about the extract from 2.6 which is interesting for metaphor theory is the hybrid employment of speech. In explaining the mean in ethical excellence, Aristotle does not only utilize a combination of metaphors with different source domains but also uses these alongside direct, formulaic language. Consequently, figurative expressions co-exist with analytic, formal definitions of moral excellence in 2.6. I think this flexibility of speech mode in philosophical discourse is worth attending to, aware as we are of the tendency to contrapose them. Its advantage is also plain to see: graphic metaphoric expressions lend life to prosaic phraseology which, in turn, helps to articulate or pin down the latent proposition of the former.
Combined use of figurative and literal speech modes proves mutually beneficial.
The central books of the treatise discuss moral excellences such as courage, temperance, justice, and liberality. In all these, the working framework of virtue is the one expounded in terms of archeric elements. As mentioned, later segments in the core chapters follow up the metaphoric cum analytic explanation of moral excellence in 2.6, in concrete, the following extract from section 2.9:
Enough has now been said to show that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between two vices, one of
Marrou, 1981, 121. In relation, Wallace McLeod in explaining what counts as “an effective arrow” says that shooting force and distance was what mattered in the battlefield compared to accuracy when stationed at a fortress, see McLeod 1965, 8. This gives us hint about how accuracy must have been particularly nurtured in the military training of epheboi and older citizens for garrison duty. These historical details support exemplification of accuracy by archery. That archery is the image source of the metaphor in 2.6 will become more apparent when we examine a passage from 6.1 where bowstrings come into the picture.
123 For example, in 2.1, legislators are said to “miss their target” (ἁμαρτάνω) when they fail to habituate citizens to becoming good; in 3.12, the appetitive element and reason of a temperate person “both aim at what is noble” (σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν); in 6.12, virtue is said to make the aim right, and practical wisdom the things towards it (ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον); in 8.10, tyrannical rule of Persians is described as “off-mark” (ἡμαρτημένη); and in 9.1, the idea that “not getting what one aims at is like not getting anything at all” (οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ), much as in hunting where missing the aim means losing the game.
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excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions. This is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find the middle point in anything: for instance, not everybody can find the center of a circle, but only someone who knows geometry. So also anybody can become angry—that is easy, and so it is to give and spend money; but to be angry with or give money to the right person, and to the right amount, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not within everybody's power and is not easy; so that to do these things properly is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.
Hence the first rule in aiming at the mean is to avoid that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean, as Calypso advises — “Steer the ship clear of yonder spray and surge.” For of the two extremes one is a more serious error than the other. Hence, inasmuch as to hit the mean is difficult, the second best way to sail, as the saying goes, is to take the least of the evils.
(NE 2.9 1109a; emphasis added)124
The passage, as we can see, merely reiterates the metaphoric description and formal definition of moral excellence in 2.6. There are, on the other hand, new touches as more metaphors are thrown in. In different ways, the additional metaphors emphasize – if not dramatize – the difficulty of achieving the mean.
A mathematical metaphor is introduced which compares finding the exact center of a circle (κύκλου/κύκλος) – a mental task, tedious to calculate125 – with observance of the ethical mean. This metaphor, besides providing a visual image for the mean, also seems to me to highlight the rational aspect of excellence. This aspect turns up explicitly in the general definition of the human good laid out in 1.7 as a
“kind of life whose activity is in accordance with reason.”
A navigational metaphor from Homer emerges in the last lines of the excerpt.
This time, observance of the mean is compared to Odysseus desperately plying a
124 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ᾽
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι: τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον: διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ “τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε” νῆα. τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ᾽ ἧττον: ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν.
125 There is a very likely Platonic – and Pythagorean – influence in the choice of metaphor. Recall too from chapter 3 what Plutarch explains about the value which Plato gave to hunting for honing “powers of reasoning and deduction”, i.e., the “logismos”. More on this later. Incidentally, the geometric term used in the metaphoric expression referring to round figures also denotes the ring or “circle which hunters draw round their game”, see word entry in Perseus Digital Library.
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middle course.126 Aristotle falsely recalls the protagonist to be acting on Calypso’s counsel. The blunder, however, does not diminish the imagistic power of this metaphor beside which the previous mathematical metaphor appears abstract.127
Figure 9: NE 2.6
126 J.E. Stewart finds in this navigational rendition of the mean a valuable practical rule to “find out the things you have a weakness for, and avoid them as much as you can”, Stewart 1973, 220.
127 John Burnet observes from this minor lapse Aristotle’s familiarity with literary tradition: “Aristotle, like Plato, quotes Homer from memory and often makes slips like this”, Burnet 1973, 106.
ARCHERY
Act of looking at
target Target with
center
Missing the target
Overshoot Fall short
Consequences of success and praise
Moral excellence
Mean in feeling and
acting
Vicious
Excess Defect Observing what is
fine in attitude/behavior
Recognized as excellent by the
prudent man Challenging
skill of hitting accurately
Difficult to achieve virtuous
disposition to feel/act rightly
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Evoking the well-known story of the hero having to steer his ship as safely as possible between Scylla and Charybdis, the metaphor highlights at least two co-relative features of moral excellence: that it is a mean, and that this mean lies between two extremes. The powerful image further construes the middle course to be what is safe though difficult, while the extremes are dangerous and easy to fall into. Illocutionary force is likewise vested in the metaphor. Persuading with images rather than words, it tells receptors that attaining to the mean in feelings and deeds has nothing to do with mediocrity or half-measures. It is, instead, a challenge similar to the ordeal of Odysseus and his crew. It indirectly yet strongly warns against vice: the consequences of falling into extremes of excess or deficiency are magnified as we imagine straying to one side and being eaten up by the many-headed sea monster Charybdis, or to the other and getting sucked into the depths of the sea by the giant whirlpool Scylla.
As representative image for the mean in moral excellence, target-aiming in archery offers visual clarity. The navigational metaphor, on the other hand, lends drama to the representation. By this point we can actually count up to five image sources with which Aristotle has established semblances with the mean. These are:
the aesthetic proportion of an artwork, the guiding standard in production, the center of a target, the median point of a circle, and the middle course of Odysseus’s ship. The employment of varied image sources is interesting for metaphor theory.
What motivates use of different metaphors around the same phenomenon of a moral mean: a linguistic need to express something difficult, or just sheer verbosity?
No matter what the answer, what is clear is that each image source invoked casts different lights and perspectives on the subject. All the same, archery is unarguably the dominant metaphor in Aristotle’s explication of moral excellence. As image source, it generates a more structured and developed perspective of the phenomenon.
Moreover, it seems clear that there is more to the phenomenon of the mean in ethics than any of the metaphors can satisfactorily convey – and this may well be the reason for the mettle of image sources.128 Thus, for example, the aesthetic metaphor shows the mean to be what is fine and beautiful in feeling or acting; the standard in craft may display the normativity of the mean, its functioning as criteria in human behavior; archery metaphor is source of various propositions about moral excellence which I have tried to articulate in the foregoing, such as its being the mean and goal to aim at. The metaphor from math illustrates the rational side of observing the mean: that under whatever circumstance, it is the course of action that displays good reasoning. Meanwhile, the navigational metaphor from the Odyssey
128 Same can be said of the Analects, where archery is not the only model for moral qualities. It would be interesting to look into the specialty perspective of each kind of metaphor used in these classics.
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hammers in the seriousness of abiding in the mean and avoiding vices that hover about it. We can thus determine that while archery metaphor is dominant among these, it does not on the other hand totally configure thinking on moral excellence.
The moral mean, as it were, eludes full doxastic grip of even a metaphor as rich and
The moral mean, as it were, eludes full doxastic grip of even a metaphor as rich and