PART IV: COMPARISON
1. East and West: Metaphoric Encounter
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example of a shared metaphor that is able to fulfill such function. I now press forward with demonstrating the truth of the thesis by recapitulating earlier discussions and indicating viable areas of comparison brought about by focus on the metaphor.
1. East and West: Metaphoric Encounter
I began the research project delighted with the discovery of a common metaphor but at the same time apprehensive about the limited number of passages with archery metaphor. In the Analects, there were three such passages, two of which could be read as simple literal statements. The Nicomachean Ethics, where “hitting the mark”
is a recurring phrase, offered a few more sample verses. Still, the phrase and passages threatened to be insignificant in view of the length and eloquence of the entire treatise. Fortunately, in the process of writing the core chapters of the dissertation, apprehension over the matter diminished as the profound implications of archery metaphor came to light. Questions we had set in the beginning were
‘what moral significance did the two sides give to archery?’ And, ‘how does archery metaphor function in their ethical discourses?’ Now is the moment to take stock of parallel investigations in the previous chapters.
In Analects 3.7, the theme of the figurative passage is the competition of gentlemen. The expression 「君子無所爭必也射乎」sets forth ritual archery competition as framework for the behavior of gentlemen. Two standard gestures in the ritual practice are specified, bowing and offering wine, which help spell out semblances between archers in a ritual and moral gentlemen. I suggested that the passage does more than describe the polite manners of a gentleman, e.g., being courteous and cordial. Taking cue from the general discourse of the Analects where ren and fulfilment of duty are primary moral issues, the passage could very well be taken to assert the ideal conduct expected of a person occupying office or holding authority. Saluting would then represent his regard for others’ rank, and offering drink his solicitude towards subordinates. The metaphoric proposition makes for a two-fold moral recipe for success in wielding power, that is, to promote peace and harmony and to concentrate on duties corresponding to rank. Such proposition echoes counsels of wise ministers to monarchs and princes in archaic literature, likewise numerous passages in the Analects itself which speak about benevolent rule and fulfillment of roles. I think that concern over escalating military conflicts and political power struggles in late Spring and Autumn period rings strongly in the idea of “not contending over anything” (無所爭).
The same passage ends with thought of how gentlemen compete (其爭也君子), so from a different angle it is also plausible to take the theme of the passage to be
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about the moral striving of a student of the Way. Elements of archery competition shed light on moral struggle in that it is chiefly about cultivating ren, symbolized by the non-conflictive and altruistic gestures of ritual archery. Moreover, it too is an intense and challenging fight that does not entail direct opposition nor causing injury to other participants in battle.
Passage 3.16 like 3.7 is inspired by ritual archery and can be taken as a literal statement approving the ritual’s non-emphasis on the outcome that is determined by physical strength and registers on the hide: 「射不主皮為力不同科」. Read figuratively, ritual archery’s non-emphasis on the target is laid down as paradigm for the way that the ancients ruled – by de as opposed to force –, or, possibly too, for the way that the ancients learned, that is, keeping focus on self-cultivation and personal moral progress rather than external results such as professional success, social recognition, or material remuneration. Discussion of this passage brought us to consider moral psychology in the Analects. It is not analysis of the powers of soul based on a theory of human action – which archery metaphor in the Nicomachean Ethics gives partial view of – but an incisive perception and poignant account of what transpires in a moral agent, in concrete, how words and conduct ensue from private endorsement of ends or motives, plans or desires, interests or enjoyments. The picture that we get of moral striving is that of being upright and consistent about these things, hence the preoccupation with being mindful of what one is actually after, and of observing others’ conduct to discover what lies underneath.
The focus of Analects 15.6 varies significantly from the images of the previous two passages. Here, the image called to mind is not something culture-specific to archery in ancient China but a universal feature of archery: the ammunition and mechanism of an arrow that is discharged with amazing force towards a pre-determined, lineal course: 「直哉史魚…如矢」. The utterance pegs the similarity between arrow and minister at the quality of straightness. The simple profile of an arrow, consisting in a perfectly erect shaft, exemplifies the quality. Placed beside its partner, the bow, the arrow’s straightness would have stood out even more, what with the bow’s curved constitution, disfigurement when drawn, and tendency to lose alignment when stored.2 Not only the body of an arrow but its movement too when released strongly exemplifies straightness. Delving deeper into the explicit point of semblance results in a unified conception of what it means to be a moral exemplar which, I think, is a good substitute for a definition of a “gentleman” in that it gives a fairly concise idea of what it is to be one. Literally speaking, a straight, flying arrow (1) is well-positioned towards a set target, (2) follows a direct course, and (3) advances
2 Hence the various methods and accessories used by ancient Chinese to align the bow. In English, the etymology of archery denotes the instrument’s being typically bent, i.e., arch-shaped.
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unstoppably in that direction unto its culmination. Translating the qualities of an arrow into the moral sphere, being morally straight accordingly consists in psychological orientation towards the right objects, steady progress in the Way, and accomplishment of duties corresponding to one’s role in the family, society, and feudal hierarchy. Shiyu’s story and reputation – as far as we can gather from posterior works and glosses – manifest these arrow-like entailments in that he persisted in ministerial duty regardless of the moral state of the environment and the ruler’s obstinacy (邦有道、無道如矢). Chen Lai writes that the sage and the gentleman are characterized by non-deviation (不偏) from the moral path (Chen 2010, 281). The unswerving trajectory of an arrow is in this sense a visual summary of the travails of a gentleman, how we might map out his life, if we had to.
Having reviewed all three sample passages, we can now try to assess the significance of archery metaphor in the Analects. How fundamental is it in the light of the entire text? In truth, I cannot ascertain whether archery is a dominant metaphor in the ethical discourse of the Analects. Certainly, it gives important insights into its saliencies and proclivities of thought. Very strongly, ritual emerges as an underlying framework of moral thinking and weighty theme of moral discourse. The source images of two out of three passages draw from ritual archery. In one, the ritual archer is offered as prototype of gentleman conduct; in the other, ritual archery norm of valuing other factors besides actual target-shooting is raised as a principle of the ancients that is worth emulation. Thinking on archery thus distinctively gravitates towards rituals surrounding its practice. Archery is only one of numerous sources of figurative utterances in the Analects, and, interestingly, belongs to a larger group of metaphors inspired by things related to ritual, for example, gestures of propriety, music, and prestige objects of vessels and jade. The attraction to ritual details of archery is, I find, very telling of the text’s ethic and sets it in striking variance from the way that archery is perceived in the Nicomachean Ethics. Obviously, what captivates Aristotle about archery are the target and hitting it accurately.3 Although not providing a definition of ritual, archeric passages partially set forth what ritual is and its moral significance. As far as official archery events show us, ritual is instrumental occasion for dispositional habituation established and inherited from past moral authority. One thing to consider too is that the three passages we
3 Not to say that Aristotle did not have regard for rituals. Sim thinks Aristotle had laws in place of ritual, Sim 2007, 181. Actually, even the most external or trivial elements that come to mind when we think of li were part of gymnasium-based education, i.e., gesticulation and social manners. Further, note how Aristotle describes a great-souled person: “dignified in his behavior towards people of distinction or the well-off, but unassuming towards people at the middle level (…) His movements are thought slow, his voice deep, he is not likely to be rushed (…) he is not vehement when he speaks; it is rushing and vehemence that make for hastiness and a high-pitched voice. Such a person, then, is the great souled”, NE 4.3 1124b-1125a.
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examined all allude in one way or another to behavior of persons occupying some rank in society. Perspectives cast by images inspired by archery specifically attend to social political behavior. I hesitate to derive from this the conclusion that all Confucian ethics is social, as James Behuniak does.4 As noted a few times, there are other metaphors apart from what we are focusing on, and examination of these other metaphors may very well uncover other areas of Confucian ethics. Archery metaphor in the Analects consistently touches on ethics of social and political behavior, and this is something expected given the bow’s early association with power and authority. The theme of passage 3.7 is how persons in feudal authority should conduct themselves with other gentlemen and those of lower status. The cryptic expression of 3.16 about not giving too much import on what can be achieved by strength or force bespeaks of the art of governance. Meanwhile, the tribute to Shiyu – along with Qu Boyu – offers a model for unwavering uprightness and dedication to ministerial duty. I think these passages together can spell out a
“morality of public office” in the Analects consisting in guidelines on how to act (like archers in ritual), who to learn from (the ancient rulers), and which traits to foster (e.g., diplomacy, solicitude, integrity). These are plausible propositions about wielding authority set forth by figurative expressions such as 「無所爭」,「不主皮」,
「如矢」.
Going back to the minor thesis about the fundamentality of archery metaphor in the light of the entire text, as stated earlier I am unable to commit entirely to the extent of its representative value, my reasons being that pertinent passages are few in comparison to numerous types of metaphors employed. Moreover, interpretation of two of the passages required more guesswork and extra-textual support: 3.16 is cryptic, while 15.16, though about a specific person, is unspecific about details of Shiyu’s life for which he was said to be straight as an arrow. There are, nonetheless, good grounds for claiming archery metaphor in the Analects to be highly expressive of early Confucian ethics. With regard to the socio-political dimension of Confucian ethics the three passages are certainly telling. But with regard to the Analects’ ethics as a whole, I think archery metaphor might also be said to express matters fundamental to the school. Discussion in chapter 4 showed the propositions of each of the three passages could be linked to central passages of the text. Moreover, if we can agree that ren, junzi and dao – subjects touched upon by sample passages – are central ideas in the entire discourse of the Analects, then we can confidently affirm that figurative passages from archery though insignificant in number, are significant in meaning. Ritual archery gestures exemplify ren. The competition’s protocol of not
4 “In the Confucian tradition, as for Dewey, ‘all morality is social,’ not because it ought to be, but just because it is”, Behuniak 2010, 600
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glorifying powerful or skillful shots presages the dao of the ancients, while the expression 「如矢」could be a pictographic, two-word summary of the life and conduct of a gentleman.
At this point that we have archery metaphor in the Analects fresh in mind and are about to do a similar rundown of the Nicomachean Ethics, it is timely to pause and consider a claim about what the metaphor stands for in a comparative work on Confucian and Aristotelian ethics. The source, Yu Jiyuan, writes the following:
Why do Aristotle and Confucius, independently from each other, each develop a doctrine of the mean? Is it purely coincidental, or is there a deep philosophical and historical reason for this striking similarity? (…) For both ethics, the mean is not a notion of quantity or proportionality, but is identified with what is right. Calling what is right the “mean” happens because both sides follow the model of archery in their effort to explicate the nature of virtue (…) For both, the doctrine of the mean is meant to show that virtue should be conceived as an archery-like quality and that a virtuous agent who is disposed to act or live rightly is likened to an excellent archer who has the skill to hit the target. A virtuous agent forms and exercises his virtue, just as an archer develops and exercises his archery.
(Yu 2007, 79-80; italics mine)
We could give Yu credit for paying attention to archery metaphor: very few scholars have done so. However, having closely examined contexts and meanings of archery metaphor in Confucius and Aristotle, we cannot but notice whopping slips, first, in his interpretation of the metaphor, second, in his method of comparison. The cognitive role which he implicitly assigns to metaphor is also problematic, and I shall return to it in the section about implications of our study on metaphor theory.
Regarding the first problem, it is obvious that Yu passes over actual passages in the Analects. In terms of doing comparison, the immediately diagnosable blunders are even more poignant: (1) precipitated casting of a blanket of similarity, (2) projection of Aristotelian metaphor use onto the other tradition, (3) application of a framework (whether the doctrine of the mean or virtue ethics) that has not been duly substantiated or contextualized, hence the futility of the framework in capturing profound similarities and differences. We will have more to say about comparative method later in this chapter.
Yu is spot on about archery metaphor as far as Aristotle is concerned. Indeed, as we have seen, the idea of a mean in virtue figures importantly in Aristotle’s figurative use of images from archery, particularly in the core books whose principal subject is ethical excellence. Before then, however, there is different use of archery in book 1 where Aristotle makes methodological notes about the science of ethics: “Shall we
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not as toxotai who have a skopos be more likely to hit what we should?” The archer’s poise provides the framework for understanding the condition of one engaging in ethical inquiry: that there is tall knowledge to reach requiring focus and effort from the enquirer. The simple line from NE 1.2 declares the underlying approach of the Nicomachean Ethics by stating the aim (knowledge of the Good), setting the parameters or limits of the study (goods attainable in action), and indicating measures for testing conclusions (e.g., the Good must be self-sufficient, final, etc.) In the end, the practical science of ethics in which we seek the good in human action is propaedeutic to superior knowledge of the Good in higher and more inclusive sciences such as Politics and Metaphysics.5 Archery metaphor in the introduction also gives the general idea that the ethical endeavor is a bi-valued activity, the relation between the inquisitor and the end of ethics being like that between an archer and his target, a pursuer and pursued.
At the same time, the interesting alternative came up of comparing the student of ethics with a bow-armed guard, dutifully and competently fulfilling his charge of guarding people, land and heritage. Following this line of interpretation takes us more into the political ramifications of ethics. Even though the bulk of the treatise is about developing personal character traits which give good calibration to the flow of emotions and deeds, the public dimension of ethics is ever in sight. After all, the treatise is a prelude to political science. On this point, both sides’ employment of archery metaphor furnishes a worthwhile area of comparison: that of civic or political morality. We would have to bear in mind, however, that the Analects addresses persons in feudal government – rulers and administrators, or would-be administrators –, while the Nicomachean Ethics addresses citizens, or would-be citizens, of a polis. This discrepancy would have to be factored in when weighing each side’s contributions to the subject.
Archery inspired expressions in the central books of the Nicomachean Ethics
5 The matter touches on Aristotle’s conceived hierarchy of sciences. Here is how David Charles explains the inter-relatedness of knowledge in empirical, practical, and theoretical disciplines: “In Posterior Analytics B.19, Aristotle offers an account of how we come to grasp the universals required for enquiry (and) provides the resources to answer this question. (I)n Metaphysics A.1, he points to a route that proceeds from perception via memory and experience to thought of universals. In his account, we begin with a grasp of particulars (gained by perception: 99b35) and proceed (by means of memory and experiences: 100a5) to a grasp on the relevant universals (…) Experience is the key (…) Experience provides the springboard for the grasp on the kind required at stage 1 of enquiry”, Charles 2010, 144, 147. The route via memory and experience to universals hints at the suitability of metaphor use in philosophical discourse and helps us understand too the indispensability of ethical science and practice for the fulfilment of the philosophical ideal: without perception and experience of the fine in concrete human activity, the student will not be able to know or enjoy the Good in higher sciences, cf. NE 1.3 1095a. The student is grateful to Prof. Charles who was her academic host at Oxford University in May 2014. She benefitted immensely from lectures and study groups. As much as half of the material collected for the dissertation were accessed through Oxford’s libraries system.
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make up the bulk of samples from the treatise. The passages focus on target-shooting aspects of archery. The parallelism established between archery and ethics is elaborate and sustained: the virtuous agent is like a skilled archer, the rightness of his deeds like arrows that consistently hit the mark. Further, practical reason guiding his emotions and deeds is like the trained eye and hands of an archer which point and manipulate his instrument towards a pre-determined goal, while
make up the bulk of samples from the treatise. The passages focus on target-shooting aspects of archery. The parallelism established between archery and ethics is elaborate and sustained: the virtuous agent is like a skilled archer, the rightness of his deeds like arrows that consistently hit the mark. Further, practical reason guiding his emotions and deeds is like the trained eye and hands of an archer which point and manipulate his instrument towards a pre-determined goal, while