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INTRODUCTION
(With) the discovery of the fact of pluralism, that the truth admits of more than one valid formulation, (…) the very thing that was formerly a scandal and a disgrace to philosophy, namely that philosophers do not agree, turns out to be its great virtue, for through it are revealed essential features of all thought, present indeed everywhere, but nowhere so clearly as in philosophy.
- Walter Watson1
1. Statement of Topic, Aims of Study
In our global and technological world, traditions intermingle constantly. As a matter of fact, contact between different cultures is nothing new. It has been there since the dawn of recorded human history, often evidencing itself as a catalyst in the formation of civilizations, or in the rise and fall of empires. What is new in our age is that cross-cultural encounter is no longer limited to specific fields of human activity, such as navigation, military exploits and mercantile trade. Nor is it limited any longer to certain places, say, imperial courts and urban markets. In varying degrees, the experience of multi-culturality has come to involve everyone and meets us at every turn.
In ethics too, the experience of multi-culturality is keenly felt and impels us on occasion to come to terms with varying moral views and standards. Comparative ethics comes across as a platform for reflecting on how different moral traditions square against each other and for bringing their wisdom to bear on perennial questions as well as contemporary issues.
This doctoral dissertation is a comparative study of Confucian and Aristotelian ethics based on archery-inspired metaphoric expressions that emerge in their primary literature. Archery appears to be an important source of images for figurative speech in the Analects and the Nicomachean Ethics. The aims of the research are: (1) to acquire new perspectives for understanding Confucian and Aristotelian ethics by focusing on what I take to be a significative metaphor in the moral discourse of each of the two schools, (2) to work out a well-grounded and on par comparison of the two traditions based on separate inquiries into archery metaphors, finally, (3) to articulate ideas that can contribute to comparative methodology and more fruitful
1 From the Preface of his book The Architectonics of Meaning: Foundations of the New Pluralism (SUNY, 1985).
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cross-cultural dialogue. In the process of developing this research, I hope to show too the relevance of these classic schools to our era by allowing their thoughts to enlighten us on perennial subjects. There will also be opportunities to comment on metaphor theory. The research is of great interest: in adapting metaphor as tool for comparison, I develop an intercultural and interdisciplinary study that offers a fresh approach to the usual ways of doing comparative philosophy. Moreover, the research is in line with current trends in the academe of taking metaphors seriously, in our case, of literary metaphors occurring in early texts.
The need for such study is evident. To date, studies and joint academic exercises on comparative Eastern and Western philosophies abound. From resulting publications and discussions, however, it is apparent that scholars in the field are struggling to find suitable methods for simultaneously handling starkly different traditions, struggling too to find “neutral grounds” when weighing differing stances.
The challenges that beset comparative philosophy are many. There are frequent blunders to be mindful of, such as out-of-context and anachronic readings, oversimplifications and illicit assimilations (Wong 2009), as well as “word fetishism”, that is, the face value and often forced matching of equivalent terms between two traditions (Slingerland 2000, 322-323). Apart from these more or less technical flaws is the use of approaches that seem to work better for one side than the other.
Shun Kwongloi has coined the term “asymmetric tendency” for the rampant phenomenon in comparative philosophy of adapting Western concepts or frameworks (Shun 2009). In the same vein, Philip Huang complains of the prevalence of a “rational choice approach” which sets Western investigative practice as universal standard in research and indiscriminately applies the rigor proper to empirical sciences onto studies in social sciences and humanities. Such approach, he complains, pays “little respect for qualitative knowledge about the cultural specificities of different societies” (Huang 2000, 25-26).
If blunders and one-sided approaches are not enough, more fundamental issues are at stake which challenge either the possibility or the worthwhileness of comparative philosophy. There is Alasdair MacIntyre’s famed notion of incommensurability between independent traditions (MacIntyre 1988), as well as parochialist or relativist mindsets which dampen the potentials of cross-cultural exchange for mutual enrichment.
I take all these hurdles to be indicative of the need to refine tools and approaches in comparative work. Several decades of experience in comparative investigations has led to some consensus among leading scholars about basic requirements for balanced comparisons. There is, for example, the recognition of language as door to understanding a tradition with its key aspects and subtleties
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(e.g., MacIntyre 1991, 111; Huang 2000, 23-24; Shen 2013, 5).2 In this respect, familiarity with the original language of primary texts becomes indispensable for perceiving the weight and breadth of thoughts expressed therein. Apart from language, attention to the historical and cultural context – to which we may also add psychological context, such as the overpowering concern that motivates the speaker or writer – is crucial to understanding ideas.3 Perhaps more exigent still is the challenge of opening up to less familiar modes and expressions of rationality (Northrop 1946; Hall and Ames 1987; Yu 2007: 13-14; Sun 2009: 404-405, Zong 2010;
Shen 2013, 3,6).
In response to cultural differences that lead to conflicts or segregation, Huang suggests cultivating a bi-cultural attitude. In the same way that a person can learn more languages beyond her native tongue, one can also come to discover different cultural viewpoints, to acquire, that is, a “comparative and critical perspective from thoroughgoing acquaintance with at least one other culture.” Bi-culturality means being able to enjoy the “co-presence of two cultures (in a) continued interaction with undetermined outcomes and creative possibilities” (Huang 2000, 27-28). Such an attitude is conducive to intercultural understanding and transnational visions and alternatives as it goes beyond parochialism, cultural imperialism, and even radical relativism. Huang’s words are grand, yet he gives concrete examples of persons and places in which bi-culturality is a reality.
A basic premise of this research is that comparative philosophy, though arduous, is worthwhile. The sheer amount of literature that has been produced in the field and the insights these yield sufficiently attest its value. Moreover, when it comes to ethics, learning from Aristotle and Confucius seems particularly meaningful.
We may expect to be brought to ponder about themes which conjure up to living well (εὐ ζῆν, NE 1.4 1095a20) or dying content (夕死可矣 An 4.8).
These said, I wish to press forward with the vision of comparative philosophy that guides this research. The stakes for doing comparative philosophy vary. There are authors who treat comparison as a tool for better understanding traditions compared (e.g., Yu Jiyuan’s “friend as mirror” method in Yu 2007). Many authors use comparison as a way to seek solutions to current moral issues from alternatives
2 What Gadamer wrote about the hermeneutic role of language in cultural understanding is helpful, see Gadamer 2003, 434-474.
3 To give a couple of examples of how comparative authors turn to background knowledge to explain discrepancies, Vincent Shen suggests that Chinese thinkers were originally motivated by concern, leading to practical wisdom, while Greek philosophies started with wonder that blossomed into theoretical disciplines, cf. Shen 2013, 6. In similar vein, Ni Peimin defends Confucianism from May Sim’s charge of lacking a rational foundation by explaining that it was originally intended as a “Gong Fu”
(功夫) system, so that its justification lies in the effectiveness of its practice rather than theoretical argumentation, Ni 2009, 313.
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posed by time-honored traditions.4 As a matter of fact, my intention to compare two ancient schools is partly driven by my high regard for classical traditions which, because they touch upon enduring human questions, can continue to enlighten us on present issues (Neville 2001, 1; Yu 2007, 10).5 In continuation, other authors engage in comparative philosophy with a view to developing a hybrid, even “global”, philosophy. The latter case would entail extracting what seems best in different traditions, for example, the robust metaphysics grounding Aristotelian ethics (Sim 2007), or the “rigor of structural organization and logical formulation of Western thought” (Shen 2013, 9).
For my part, I agree that comparison – a form of contact with an other – could be a springboard for appreciating unique cultural identities. To achieve this result, however, I deem examination of a tradition’s context and primary literature fundamental to the understanding of that tradition. Our focus on metaphor is beneficial in this regard. Metaphors are highly context-dependent linguistic phenomena, and comprehending archery metaphor in the Analects and Nicomachean Ethics will require of us serious inquest into the background of the utterances and their image source. Exploration of archery in ancient Chinese and Greek societies will thus be necessary work for metaphor exegesis and comparison.
In engaging in comparative philosophy, I am not interested in seeing a hybrid or global philosophy even if it were to successfully fuse the best of different traditions.
Instead, the idea of comparative philosophy that inspires me consists, first, in acquiring the bi-cultural perspective described by Philip Huang (Huang 2000); second, in being a learning ground for the kind of multi-cultural dialogue that intermittently takes place in and around us6; and, third, in the ability in the end to appreciate the unique ways that different traditions tackle human moral condition. In this light, I do not think it necessary in the process of comparison to take sides on every point of difference. Most of the time, I suppose it will suffice to acknowledge that there are alternative positions that are simultaneously valid. However, I would not hesitate “to take sides” where appropriate for critical analysis.
4 In the inaugural issue of Dao Journal of Comparative Philosophy, Robert Neville’s opening article classifies studies with such motivation as “the normative approach to comparison” which “centers on addressing contemporary problems and looks to the historical positions as resources for contemporary thinking”, see Neville 2001, 2.
5 I am obviously influenced by Gadamer’s notion of the “classical”, as described in his landmark work Truth & Method, see Gadamer 2003, 285-290.
6 In Neville’s words, comparative philosophy is a “paideia for participation in a global philosophic public”, and that “the need for a global public creates the ideal and that ideal drives comparative philosophy”, Neville 2001, 1, 11.
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