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be set in stone. That Mao and now Xi believe that they have the right to rewrite the rules to better reflect their vision, this belies greater polytheism, as only the weak are expected to follow the rules that have been laid down. The strong are the ones who write them.
The point to make against Weber is that he seemed to see institutional charisma flowing one way. The case of the Communist Priesthood of China is a prime example of it moving in whichever way the leadership demands.
4.3 Communist Party Theology
Weber was working on 'The Religions of China' up until his death in 1920. Interpreting what has happened in China since his death is something that offers many fascinating avenues for discussion. The primary interest in adapting his methodology has been using it to analyse the continuity and change between the Literati priesthood that was his focus and the Communist priesthood that has since emerged.
If the Literati priesthood had their foundational myth in the control of floodwaters, then the Communist priesthood has theirs in the narrative of The Long March. This was a strategic military retreat after Chiang-kai Shek turned on and sought to wipe out the Communists as a rival. The Long March is an Exodus of sorts, and it saw Mao emerge the undisputed leader of the movement and we saw his followers, the permanent community of the followers of the prophet, (Weber 1965, 60) gain a near-mythic status as the Iron Generation of Communist leadership. The fact that all the major leaders of China have been directly linked to this generation is no coincidence.
The influence any religion exerts on the conduct of life, and especially on the conditions of rebirth, varies in accordance with the particular path to salvation which is desired and striven for, and in accordance with the psychological quality of the salvation in question. (Weber 1965, 151)
The influence that the Communist party has on Chinese society is directly related to how far they justify that control and think it necessary to ensure the salvation of China, which is understood as China taking its rightful place as a great nation of the world.
A key point of continuity throughout Chinese theology is the flexibility of the priesthood on specific policies, so long as the uncompromising vision of China is maintained,
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under the Communists this vision of China changed from a monotheist one to a polytheist one.
This flexibility is why the Mao’s vision of communism was dropped when it proved disastrous.
And why the official line from the Communist Party on Mao’s legacy is that he was 70% right and 30% wrong. As with the literati, who were willing to compromise on their control of society in order to slowly bring about their monotheistic vision, the Communist priesthood has proven itself willing to compromise on everything apart from their core vision of themselves leading China to the position of global power. This is because a core component of their theology is the so-called Mass Line. It is to this that we now turn.
The shift towards a nationalist theological system meant that the justification of the priesthood had to be reimagined. What was their legitimacy, their connection to the divine;
how were they able to interpret the will of their god, the Chinese people. Most national systems do so on the basis of elections. The Communist party came up with a unique answer to this specific question. The Mass Line has its basis in democratic centralism, it envisioned a direct link between the masses and the leadership of the Communist party. Not unlike the ontological link between the Christian God and the Papacy in Roman Catholicism. The Communist leadership interprets the will of the people directly and bases its decisions for policy direction upon this.
This material salvation has been achieved for the most part by the economic advancement that has happened in China under the watch of the Communist party, the scale and success of this economic transformation has seen it dubbed by many to be a ‘miracle’. The nature of this thesis allows us to take this name seriously, as the priesthood, the communist party, has finally enabled the god, the Chinese people, to make itself known as a power with global reach. Offering salvation to the country and its people from weakness and poverty. The Communist Priesthood, therefore have tied their legitimacy to their ability to bring about this salvation for China. Though they do not accept the legitimacy of any rival priesthood, they have proven themselves to be surprisingly flexible and pragmatic towards this end. It is the polytheistic system that enabled such pragmatism, exemplified by Deng, to be enacted in China.
As Weber writes:
The needs of economic life make themselves manifest either through a reinterpretation of the sacred commandments or through a by-passing of the sacred commandments, either procedure being motivated by casuistry. Occasionally we also come upon a simple, practical elimination of religious injunctions, similar to
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the actual practice in the ecclesiastical dispensation of penance and grace. (Weber 1965, 208)
In his work, Weber offers a unique argument about the theological factors that must be in place for modern capitalism to take hold in a society. Something that he was unable to do is look at how Capitalism arrives due to the Communists removing many of the inhibiting factors that were the focus of his work. (Yang 1964, xli) Weber argues that you need a specific breed of immanentism, one where material wealth is not an end in itself but a sign of salvation. The strict immanentist or materialist is actually a worse businessman because their lack of morals means that no system can be built. (Weber 1965, 182-183). In the same way that complete free-market capitalism leads to monopolies and inequalities that then destroy the system in a boom-bust cycle. In this way to have economic advancement, you need a moderate to strong immanentism and moderate balance of monotheism and polytheism. This gives you a rationalist, materially grounded society, which is based upon a specific shared and enforced moral principles; and yet is still open to competition.
Weber suggests here that economic activity arises within Christianity here because there isn’t the resentment of the pariah groups. They are not segregated, nor are they economically frustrated. But also key is the indifference towards (as opposed to Buddhism’s rejection of) material goods. There isn’t resentment or hatred of the material, it is an important part of life even if it not the most important thing. (Weber 1965, 116)
This additional factor is intellectualism as such, more particularly the metaphysical needs of the human mind as it is driven to reflect on ethical and religious questions, driven not by material need but by an inner compulsion to understand the world as a meaningful cosmos and to take up a position towards it. (Weber 1965, 117)
This is systematisation, but one that is neutral on the issue of materialism. Immanentist theology that is not too immanentist thus requires control, means engaging in mainstream society, but on the terms of rules that have set for oneself that keep you safe from the temptations of the world.
Hence, as the field provided for this active certification, the order of the world in which the ascetic is situated becomes for him a vocation which he must fulfill rationally. As a consequence, and although the enjoyment of wealth is forbidden to the ascetic, it becomes his vocation to engage in economic activity which is faithful
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to rationalised ethical requirements and which conforms to strict legality. If success supervenes upon such acquisitive activity, it is regarded as the manifestation of god’s blessing upon the labor of the pious man and of god’s pleasure with his economic pattern of life. (Weber 1965, 167)
In this model, China failed in the past to develop modern capitalism because it was too immanentist. The pursuit of material wealth was not symbolic of salvation in any way. In Confucianism, it was necessary in order to pursue cultivation, but being increasingly wealthy if anything was a sign of a failure to cultivate.
Weber argues that a system is necessary whereby 'the unique concentration of human behaviour on activities leading to salvation may require the participation within the world (or more precisely: within the institutions of the world but in opposition to them).' (Weber 1965, 166) The literati priesthood of Imperial China never saw themselves as in opposition to material wealth. Puritan Christianity is for Weber the earliest example of such a theological formulation.
The interesting thing to note for our purposes is that the more reformist theology of Deng's Communist party would also fit.
This is why an economic miracle was possible under Deng whereas it wasn’t under Mao. Weber links the systematisation/rationalisation to the encroachment onto all aspects of life, laying the ground for the protestant work ethic - capitalism argument. (Weber 1965, 160-161) Looking at this in terms of disenchantment is useful. As this links to the Witch-hunts.
Mao went too far in terms of exerting control, bureaucratising everything under state control, in some ways the old literati’s dream. But terrible for economic development. Mao was too immanentist, and therefore less pragmatic, and wanted to build a true communist society rather than simply make China great by any means necessary. He was convinced that salvation would be won through making a socialist country. He wanted China great by Communist means, and when that didn’t work and he was pushed to the side-lines he started another revolution (the Cultural Revolution) just to hold onto power. He was wrong. The reforms opening up was the communist priesthood retreating from claiming to have the answers on the economy. The shift is towards collaboration with the people. A more transcendentalist shift.
It is the priesthood redefining itself. Instead of Mao, who had a clear vision of how the economy and society should work, there was a transition to a more pragmatic approach of Deng, where the priesthood was a partner and a parental figure. Under Xi, the view of the economy
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has not shifted, he seems to agree with Deng, but on the role of society he is very uncompromising about the respect and singularity of the Communist priesthood in society. It is the only priesthood. He is more stringent than Deng on this point, but maybe not as much as we might think.
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