2.2 Weber’s Framework
2.2.3 Religious Virtuoso, Prophecy and Breakthrough
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2.2.3 Religious Virtuoso, Prophecy and Breakthrough
Weber’s methodology focuses on the process of dominance, change and breakthrough.
Put simply, the religious virtuoso is an office that represents the establishment and the prophet is a figure of change for Weber. The established order of a society inevitably involves some form of dominance of the general population under that order. The reason for this being tied to the ‘religious virtuoso’ is because it is theological constructions, produced by the ‘religious virtuoso,’ that give a society shape, people consent to their domination because of the sense-making work of the ‘religious virtuoso’. Prophecy refers to strands of thought that rise up to challenge that order, and breakthrough refers to reform or revolution that comes as a result of more successful prophetic movements. This subsection will focus on outlining the relationship between them and therefore the basis of institutional dynamics that are present in every human society.
Domination and the Religious Virtuoso
For Weber, it seems that social formation begins with the search for questions.1 In an imagined pre-history, Weber talks about those people who are able to answer questions and offer solutions to the wider society. An implicit assumption here is that such a role is necessary;
that no society could do without answers to these fundamental questions. The one who provides answers, in Weber's imagined pre-historical society, is the one who is seen as able to channel 'extraordinary powers that have been designated by such special terms as "mana," "orenda,"
and the Iranian "maga" (the term from which our word "magic" is derived). We shall henceforth employ the term "charisma" for such extraordinary powers.' (Weber 1965, 2) We will return in more detail to the concept of 'charisma' later, for now, it is sufficient to say that these powers are the equivalent of being able to interpret and even shape the very fabric of reality; to channel divinity. This person is the 'Religious Virtuoso'.
This figure takes on a role of leadership over the process of interpretation of reality.
They are theological leaders as they offer the primary means through which the wider society is able to interpret its existence and purpose in relation to reality. This is the nature of ‘charisma’
the ability to interpret and in some cases influence the nature of reality and draw information and lessons that are useful for the wider society. In this context, consent to the structure of reality as it is presented by a ‘religious virtuoso’ is the best way of interpreting what Weber
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calls ‘legitimate domination.’ Within this Weber differentiated three separate types of legitimate domination: ‘legal domination [submission to the legal system and procedures] ...;
traditional domination [submission to a custom or precedent] ...; and finally charismatic domination [submission to an individual leader.]’ (Mommsen 1989, 21) These types will be the subject of greater focus in the section that discusses the antinomies charisma and bureaucracy.
It should be pointed out that in building up patterns of thought, action, and imagination within these systems, the 'religious virtuoso' is building up the society itself. The idea that Weber is playing with here is not the modern assumption that the 'religious virtuoso' is a self-serving parasite telling (at best noble) lies to ensure their own survival and position of power, dominance, within the society. Instead, the imaginative, theological, constructive work that the 'religious virtuoso' does; trying to bring meaning to the lives of those around them is seen to be a prerequisite for the society itself. Theology is not an aspect of the life of a society that has already been formed, it is the foundation that makes the existence of the society possible in the first place.
As Mommsen writes: ‘There is… the insight that all social relations are ultimately relations of domination and that even the different types of democracy do not basically overcome domination, that is, the external determination of individuals by other individuals.’
(Mommsen 1989, 32) This point might be easier to make if Weber had not framed it in terms of domination; the point is that every society is hierarchical and entails the acceptance either implicit or explicit, of a certain view of reality. As Parsons writes:
The ideas in question imply, not only social and behavioral patterns, but kinds and levels of motivational commitment required for the implementation of these implied patterns. The motivational commitments include both “belief,” in the sense of seriousness of commitment to the cognitive validity of the ideas, and practical commitment, in the sense of readiness to put one’s own interests at stake in the service of the ideas. (Parsons 1965, xxxiii)
This is what Weber means when he talks of democratic domination, (Mommsen 1989, 41) that is ‘legitimate domination primarily in terms of acceptance of effective leadership’ (Mommsen 1989, viii)
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The specific insight that seems to cause the most problems here is the necessity of such domination. It is necessary to have some rudimentary ‘systematisation of a pattern or program for life as a whole, which is given meaning by an existential conception of the universe, and within it the human condition in which this action can be carried out.’ (Parsons 1965, xxxiii) Implied here is that without such theological systematisation, we would be unable to function, not because we would fall into some form of existentialist crisis, but because the raw information that we collect by our senses would be overwhelming and we would not be able to cope. In other words, theologising in this way is built into humans, it is part of our existence.
In this, we see the basis of drawing people into acts of devotion and dedication that we would call worship. The 'Religious Virtuoso' provides the foundation for the society; including all the actions that are done in its name. This finds its parallel in Durkheim’s idea that ‘worship of a god is the symbolic means by which people worship their own society, their mutual dependency.’ (Kertzer 1991, 86)
As is probably clear this presents a fundamental challenge to the liberal enlightenment vision of freedom. On the fundamental question of identity, there is no neutral frictionless ground where we are sovereign and able to choose our allegiances, there is no Archimedean point. The question is not if we choose to devote ourselves to something, but what we choose to devote ourselves to. It is a mistake to think that we are capable of believing in nothing, of worshipping nothing. The only capacity we retain is deciding what to believe in, what to worship.
Such a conception has led to fierce debates over Weber himself; from looking at his life and works it seems variously accurate to describe him as a nationalist and as a liberal. There is a lot of debate around which one is a better description. (Mommsen 1989, 24-25) Following this strand of through, however, it seems correct to follow Mommsen and say that Weber was both a Liberal and a Nationalist. (Mommsen 1989, 25) Unlike Mommsen, we do not need to see this as a contradiction.
That there is no neutral place to stand, and no way of objectively determining a 'correct' place to stand, does not absolve us of the necessity of standing somewhere. In other words, nothing could tell us or compel us to stand in a specific place, to believe in a specific god. On this point, Weber could be described as a liberal.2 In fact, the increased knowledge of other
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societies and theological systems gave us greater leverage when forming our choices. 'Weber ultimately appealed to what he called the “polytheism” of modern life - the notion that the highest values capable of guiding human action were locked in a conflict so fundamental that no scholarship was capable of mediating among them.’ (Derman 2012, 10) However this increased level of choice did not permit us to avoid choosing an altar, or multiple altars, to worship at. Weber is quoted as saying the following:
We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. (Gane 2004, 28)
If you have to choose your god, then Weber chose Germany. He was a nationalist in that he wanted Germany to be strong, to defeat its enemies in wars if it came to that. He was also a liberal in that he saw the importance of maintaining free competition between different groups in order to make that society stronger. In this way, he thought that competition between different theological systems, societies and sub-societies maintained the health of a society.
This will be explored in more detail as part of the discussion on bureaucracy and charisma.
In all this, we can see that this role of 'religious virtuoso' is used by Weber to personify the sense-making activity of any theological system. And how such paradigms for operating within reality come to dominate people's minds, either through unquestioned obedience or a wilful submission. In this way, the figure is related to the established or orthodox position of a society.
It is within this framework that the place of Weber’s key concept of prophecy is to be understood. The prophet is above all the agent of the process of breakthrough to a higher, in the sense of more rationalised and systematised, cultural order, an order at the level of religious ethics, which in turn has implications for the nature of the society in which it has become institutionalised. (Parsons 1965, xxxiii)
It is to this process that we now turn our attention.
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Prophecy and Breakthrough
Weber asks the question 'What is a prophet, from the perspective of sociology?' (Weber 1965, 46) In the context of an established socio-theological system a prophet, for Weber, is an agent that seeks to bring change to that system. This could either be a figure that wants to engender a radical break with the orthodox establishment or one who wants to return to a purer, older interpretation of it. As opposed to the 'religious virtuoso' 'the enterprise of the prophet is closer to that of the popular orator (demagogue) or political publicist than to that of a teacher.' (Weber 1965, 53)
Weber outlines different types of prophet, (Weber 1965, 54-55) what unites them all is leadership. This is one way Weber distinguishes them from the 'religious virtuoso' who are normally 'organized into guilds or official hierarchies.' (Weber 1965, 60) If successful then the followers of the prophet form a permanent community 'helpers, who are active co-workers with the prophet in his mission and who generally also possess some special charismatic qualifications.' (Weber 1965, 60) Weber dedicates a lot of time to analyse the reasons that such prophetic breakthroughs might take place, what circumstances might result in them being successful, and what might the possible responses be from the establishment. These questions will all be engaged with when we encounter the more practical examples in China's history in chapter four.
For now, a basic point can be made. As has been explored above, Weber was 'firmly convinced that individuals are consciously guided by ultimate values of whatever sort.’
(Mommsen 1989, 58) These ultimate values are systematised into a theology that seeks to make sense of reality that surround the person. With this background it seems clear that ‘the more these values stand in opposition to everyday reality, the more far-reaching their effects.’
(Mommsen 1989, 58) In other words the greater the disconnection between the theology that underpins the society and the material reality that people experience, then the greater the call for prophecy. This fits perfectly with the idea that society is shaped not by either ideas or materiality alone, but an interplay of the two based on a theological grounding that helps people to make sense of their reality.
Prophets and their followers present a challenge to those ‘religious virtuoso’ by presenting or representing an experience that does not fit with the narrative that is offered to make sense of everything. The ‘religious virtuoso’ in response must ‘assume the obligation of
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codifying either the victorious new doctrine or the old doctrine which had maintained itself despite the attack of the prophets.’ (Weber 1965, 67)
What is important to note here is that ‘at each primary decision point… the alternative is between a direction which makes for a source of evolutionary change in the “established”
order, and another direction which tends either to reinforce the established order or at least not to change it drastically.’ (Parsons 1965, xxix) The theology at the heart of the society is constantly systematised based upon ‘the power of prophetic charisma and the enduring habits of the masses.’ (Weber 1965, 79) We can see that the evolutionary nature of this method is not intended to be read progressively. Weber does believe in the inevitable progress of history and leaves the option open for regressive as well as progressive change. This leads us to an oppositional that runs throughout Weber’s work.