Transcendentalism and Immanentism

國

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

necessarily restricts the range of positions that it could be placed on this spectrum; although not by much.

3.3.2 Transcendentalism and Immanentism

The second spectrum, which helps to complete our framework of analysis, runs between transcendentalism and immanentism. Again this takes inspiration from the priest-magician or bureaucratic-charismatic oppositional. Weber talks about the process of rationalist disenchantment in a near deterministic manner. The benefits contained in this development are progress towards the modernist rational and especially material systems of thought that define and dominate what we call ‘modern’ societies. In describing the development of more materialistic patterns of thought Weber inadvertently gives us the basis for our second spectrum.

Through greater bureaucratic (priestly) rationalisation, Weber sees new bases for ethical systems developing. Alongside coercing and convincing divine powers, greater systematisation and rationalisation allows for ‘obedience to the religious law as the distinctive way to win the god’s favor.’ (Weber 1965, 37) This requires greater levels of abstraction as the significance of our actions can be measured as either good or bad depending on how they relate to the foundational theological principles that govern reality. The reverse of this is taboo (Weber 1965, 37-38). Weber ties Taboo with magical thinking and Religious ethics with rationalist thinking, systematisation. (Weber 1965, 42)

The key difference between the systems is that taboo relies on things being restricted or prohibited. Evil in this system takes on the form of a plague, it is external and physical and must be avoided. All who encounter it must be ritually cleansed. A legal system, on the other hand, sees all action as being potentially good or bad, different actions can be codified into an entire system; this is the theological basis of legal systems. Evil in this sense is much more internal and much less physical, perhaps best understood in terms of possession by an immaterial force. The difference between a taboo system and a religious ethic system is the characterisation of evil. In a taboo system, it is like an infection. In the religious ethic system, it is a force, more fluid. (Weber 1965, 45)

This distinction in Weber is reworked into a spectrum between transcendentalism, characterised by a system of ethics and law, on the one hand, and immanentism, characterised by a system of taboo, on the other. To develop and clarify the differences it is useful to first focus on the conception of evil and its connection to how the society is constructed.

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

A transcendentalist places the threat of evil internally, evil is often portrayed as a temptation that threatens the body only indirectly through the mind. To avoid evil, great emphasis is placed on self-control, discipline, and indeed self-denial. Immaterial forces are seen to be at work twisting and corrupting the materially weak and the materially strong alike.

In fact, often it is thought that to be materially strong or wealthy is to invite evil. Material power is seen to invite corruption. Control over other people is seen in the same way. In the extreme, a transcendentalist becomes an ascetic. This translates to a priesthood that separates itself from society in an attempt to remove itself from the temptations associated with material power. The society that forms around such a priesthood is expected to follow the example laid down by this priesthood. However, due to the aversion on the part of the priesthood away from having control over others, any legal code that is produced is not strongly enforced outside of the priesthood itself. Anybody can join the priesthood, therefore these societies often enjoy a high degree of social mobility. Monastic communities represent an extreme version of this theological position. As their '[c]oncentration upon the actual pursuit of salvation may entail a formal withdrawal from the "world"' (Weber 1965, 166)

The other end of the spectrum belongs to immanentism. The construction of evil in such a system is much more physically grounded, evil is avoided or removed from a community through action and ritual. Evil is placed externally, and it is material strength and power, renounced by the transcendentalist, which is the means the immanentist recognises as necessary for their defence and preservation. An immanentist priesthood would actively seek power and, rather than remove themselves from wider society, would work together to control and guide the society in the direction that they think best ensures its peace and prosperity. The ethical code of such a society would be much more strictly enforced, reflecting the immanentist priesthood's desire for control. It would also be less socially mobile. An extreme version of such a society exists in the caste system built around India's traditional priesthood of Brahmins.

Weber describes such a system whereby focus on the physical labour that the wider society requires of you is imagined as the path to your salvation:

Caste ethics glorifies the spirit of craftsmanship and enjoins pride, not in economic earnings measured by money, nor in the miracle of rational technology as exemplified in the rational use of labor, but rather in the personal virtuosity of the producer as manifested in the beauty and worth of the product appropriate to his particular caste. (Weber 1965, 42)

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

Both of these extremes can be equally undesirable, depending on your perspective. The extreme transcendentalists could easily be portrayed as quietist abdicators of their responsibility to the wider society. Extreme immanentists alternatively can be seen exerting totalitarian control over their followers, justifying systems of exploitation through instilling fear of outsiders. An analysis of this spectrum offers a way to understand a fundamental point about the complexities of human's social lives. As societies can be placed at different points along this spectrum, and have different non-overlapping aims; it is entirely possible, in fact, it is the norm, for societies to overlap and for people to belong to multiple societies simultaneously.

In fact, this author would argue that by looking at this spectrum, it is possible to see the origins of the confusion over secularisation, a frequent issue in the works discussed in Chapter 2. The question is the relationship between the societies that do overlap. They can only overlap if they are different in terms of occupying different spaces on the transcendent-immanent theological spectrum. If they are too close, then they come into conflict. Secularisation, based on this observation, is the argument that when societies do overlap in this way, they should be made separate and the space between them should be policed.

Such a position usually has its origin in handovers and conquests of territory that leave the priesthood of the conquered territory painting itself in a more transcendentalist light in order to survive the new power of the territory by relinquishing their grasp on power. Alongside this, it could also be the conquering power that maintains them as a way of pacifying the local populace who still recognise them as authoritative. Weber writes about exactly this process:

...the transition from a priesthood serving a political association into a religious congregation was associated primarily with the rise of the great world empires of the Near East, especially Persia. Political associations were annihilated and the population disarmed, their priesthoods, however, were assigned certain political powers and were rendered secure in their positions. This was done because the religious congregation was regarded as a valuable instrument for pacifying the conquered, just as the coercive community resulting from a neighbourhood association was found useful for the protection of financial interests… In Egypt, after the decline of political independence, the national priesthood built a sort of

“church” organisation, apparently the first of its kind, with synods. On the other hand, religious congregations in India arose in the more limited sense as exemplary

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

congregations. There, the integral status of the Brahmin estate, as well as the regulations of asceticism, survived the multiplicity of ephemeral political structures.

(Weber 1965, 63-64)

If we introduce the nation as a category into this debate we see that its demand on both territorial control and the lethal loyalties of its citizens immediately paint it as an immanentist theological system. However, we should be careful not to fall into simplistic divisions of political (immanentist) vs ‘religious’ (transcendentalist); as with monotheism and polytheism, these ideas flow into one another, with each society being some blend of the two positions. We will see in our discussion of China that this question comes up again and again when discussing the ‘religious’ policies of the contemporary Chinese nation.

However, before we enter into an exploration of the findings that this method brings, due to the amount of ground covered it would no doubt be helpful to offer up a short summary of the methodology that has been the focus of this chapter.