This study began with the observation that there remains little consensus as to the role that Chinese nationalism plays in structuring China’s domestic politics, foreign relations, and geopolitical future. This lack of consensus remains troubling given the variety of evidence indicating a highly salient sense of nationhood in Chinese society as well as the crucial role that nationalism allegedly plays in securing the PRC’s regime legitimacy. Agreeing with Carlson’s description of Chinese nationalism as a “contested object,” this study has aimed to carefully consider the sources of such contestation along two dimensions: contents and orientations. In developing and testing a practical methodology through which to interpret Chinese nationalist rhetoric, this study has demonstrated a new approach within nationalism studies: the
disaggregation of nationalist discourse according to the civic/political, territorial, ethnic, and cultural elements that constitute putative national identity, and the based and
polity-seeking orientations of nationalism as a form of politics. This broad and inherently generalizable approach strikes an attractive balance between pure theory and theory-blind China studies or regional studies. Specifically, it centers our attention on the actual words and deeds of those who claim to speak for their putative nation, but leverages the insights of theory to aid in the
interpretation and contextualization of those words and deeds. This approach holds potential to generate more consensus regarding the nature and consequences of Chinese nationalism, and additionally to introduce greater uniformity into nationalism studies as a subfield of comparative politics.
6.1: Value of the Methodology
When a Chinese speaker attributes particular contents to the “Chinese nation,” he or she is rhetorically appealing to a certain conception of Chinese national identity. This approach holds that national identity is constructed out of any combination of civic, territorial, ethnic, or cultural elements. Understanding the combination of inherently “nationalize-able” elements of identity that come to define the Chinese nation is important precisely because a particular conception of the nation “provides a conceptual map which enables people to relate their
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particular material and moral interests to a broader terrain of action.”367 Indeed, as Wang notes,
“national interests are constructed by national identity, and national interests in turn determine foreign policy and state action.”368 Thus by carefully considering the elements of identity which nationalist rhetoric claims are or should be constitutive of the putative nation, we have potential to further understand not only the rhetoric related to nationalization of a community, but in fact the very core of nation-ness as it pertains to the construction of national interest.
This study has also maintained that we must critically examine the orientations of any nationalism, since rhetoric and policy that is correctly understood as nationalist, can, in fact, be directed at either society or the state. As a form of politics, nationalism seeks to redress some issue considered to plague the putative nation: either a lack of an adequate polity for the existing nation, a lack of adequate social cohesion necessary for the engendering of the nation, or, as we have seen in much of Chinese nationalist rhetoric, both. In the first case, polity-seeking
nationalism promotes state-level reform, revolution, separation or unification; it is thus said to be revisionist at the state or intestate level. In the second case, polity-based nationalism promotes nationalization of society within the status-quo state; it is thus revisionist at the societal level.
Finally, as we have seen, nationalism may seek to accomplish both, but typically by appealing to two or more separate imaginings of the nation. In Hu Jintao’s rhetoric towards Taiwan, for example, an ethnic nation was imagined as the basis for a polity-seeking nationalism aimed at unifying Taiwan with the PRC, while a polity-based nationalism aimed to solidify cross-strait national cohesion on cultural grounds. Without carefully considering both content and orientation of nationalist rhetoric, the analyst misses these nuances.
This study focused disproportionately on nationalist rhetoric coming from Chinese political leaders, and spent relatively little space considering the competing views of dissidents, intellectuals, and grassroots movements. This choice was made in part due to the conception of Chinese nationalism as a component of the party-state-sponsored push for Gramscian hegemony within China’s state-society relationship, but also because political leaders tend to offer rhetoric that is relatively clear-cut in its orientation and is very frequently recorded. But a more complete picture of the contending discourses within Chinese nationalism would have to carefully dissect
367 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 13.
368 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, xiii.
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the content and orientation of the rhetoric of other speakers as well. Hopefully the methodology embodied in this study can serve as a model for such further research.
Focusing on the nationalist discourse of the CCP between its founding in 1921 and the establishment of the PRC in 1949 – Chinese nationalism’s “moment of arrival,” discussed in chapter four – would also greatly contribute to this study’s comprehensiveness. As noted, in the transition from inciting revolution against government, to being government, the nationalism of any group can be expected to change. Such was the case in the nationalism of the KMT before and after the Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命); the Han-centric, polity-seeking nationalism of Sun Yat-sen, for example, was replaced by a polity-based multi-minzu imagining of the nation. We may presume that an equally stark transition existed in the CCP’s nationalism before and after 1949, but because this study does not investigate the former, this aspect of Chinese nationalism in history is left unstudied.
Possibilities to improve upon this study’s methodology exist as well. For example, this study does not engage with the social science literature of speech acts or the broader literature of political linguistics. It was determined that moving the methodology away from a strict focus on theories of nationalism would add unwanted complexity to the study. However, it remains possible that a more capable analyst could effectively integrate such literature into this or a similar study. An even more promising possibility for improvement is the incorporation of large-n quantitative data that could describe the relative frequencies with which particular contents are attributed to the Chinese nation over time and across politically diverse groups.
Such a study could investigate one of several intriguing research questions. For example, the rhetoric of Chinese nationalists in the PRC and Chinese nationalists in Taiwan could be compared quantitatively to determine whether the common rhetorical object of “the Chinese nation” is in fact imagined consistently in these two very different parts of Greater China.
6.2: Implications for Theory
Any application of a particular methodology should yield feedback for the underlying theory. Although “civic-territorial” and “ethno-cultural” represent an enduringly fascinating theoretical dichotomy, the actual rhetoric of official Chinese nationalism freely draws on civic/political, territorial, ethnic, and cultural elements, resulting in conceptualizations of the
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Chinese nation that cannot be described by Kohn’s dichotomy. The analysis in chapters four and five, in fact, gave credence to the argument that Chinese nationalism has, at times, imagined the Chinese nation as a “civic-cultural” or “ethno-territorial” community.
As this study demonstrates, the contents of Chinese nationalism cannot be understood without a serious consideration of civic/political nation-ness in an authoritarian state. There is mounting evidence that many PRC citizens identify with their political system and with China’s rise in international reputation, and this study has shown that much of the rhetoric of Chinese nationalism deals with framing the nation in terms that are at times civic, often related to public morality, and frequently based on some conception of a uniquely Chinese political culture. In the methodology of this study, these various contents have been subsumed under the category of
“the civic nation,” principally because they all seem related to the promotion of rational
patriotism and allegiance to a specific form of politics – whether that be a Maoist “dictatorship of the proletariat” and “mass line” populism, or “socialism with Chinese characteristics” since Deng’s time. Thus it is clear that theoretically restricting the civic nation to democratic polities impedes our ability to describe and understand Chinese nationalism.
There is a deeper epistemic issue within the question of Chinese civic nationalism. As Dickson’s research reveals, “most Chinese see their political system as already at a relatively high level of democracy and becoming increasingly democratic, and they are optimistic about higher levels in the future and satisfied with the level as it currently exists.” Dickson goes on to explain why: “The key is in recognizing how democracy is defined in China… most Chinese define democracy in terms of outcomes: providing for the needs of society and raising standards of living,” thus, “most Chinese see [democracy] already happening.”369 If there exists a
consensus view among Chinese that their political system is democratic, then can we deny the existence of a civic nation within China? If the nation, after all, is an imagined political community, are its characteristics not imagined by its putative members? This author sees no problem in declaring that these Chinese respondents are incorrect as to the nature of their political system; it is not, in fact, democratic. Yet the fact that they see it as democratic means that their imagined community can absolutely be described as such. The state can perhaps be described in objective, universal terms, but putative nations are more subjective phenomena.
369 Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, 317-318.
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6.3: Chinese Nationalism as a Political Phenomenon
Should we continue to agree with Lucian Pye’s 1996 assessment that “the content of contemporary Chinese nationalism… appears to be exceedingly thin… without a substantive core which can be readily articulated”? On the matter of “thin” content, this study begs to differ.
At least within the rhetoric offered by leaders of the party-state, civic, territorial, ethnic, and cultural contents of Chinese national identity are consistently appealed to in the rhetoric of Chinese nationalism. These contents, if anything, are quite “thick” in the overall political discourse produced by the party-state. Moreover, under Xi Jinping, the theme of national rejuvenation has emerged as a clear “substantive core” within the broader discourse on Chinese-ness and nationhood. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on national rejuvenation embodies both reclaiming the lost glory of ethno-cultural and civilizational China, and on infusing political ideology back into the heart of Chinese national identity. While the latter is often presented as a means to the former, these two sides of official Chinse nationalism are inseparable in the overall discourse and are embodied within Xi’s “China Dream.” It appears, therefore, that Pye’s assessment is no longer helpful in the 21st century PRC.
There remains the question of whether Chinese nationalism contributes to a revisionist or status quo orientation within China’s foreign relations. This study has demonstrated that, at least at the rhetorical level, both orientations are clear. The discourse of Chinese nationalism has both revisionist and status quo orientations with respect to China’s domestic society and the interstate relations of Greater China. There are clearly revisionist trends, some of which have been
internalized within Chinese society. A majority of respondents polled in 10 Chinese cities in 2017 expressed that the faster Taiwan is unified with the mainland, the better.370 This indicates an acceptance by the Chinese public of the official polity-seeking nationalism of the party-state.
At the same time, citizens also express a serious need for sources of unity and moral guidance within the current borders of the PRC. A 2014 study found that 88 percent of Chinese
respondents agreed that “China was beset by ‘a social disease of moral decay and lack of
370 H.H. Pan, W. C. Wang, and Y.T. Chang, “How Chinese Citizens Perceive Cross-Strait Relations: Survey Results from Ten Major Cities in China,” Journal of Contemporary China (January 2017). Cited in 王宏恩, 〈中國 民眾怎麼看待統獨與兩岸關係?〉,《菜市場政治學》, 2017 年 5 月 16 日, http://whogovernstw.org/2017/05/16/
austinwang25/.
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trust.’”371 Thus there appears to be a recognition within Chinese society of the need for unifying civic and moral ideals. As Ian Johnson argues, China “needs a moral compass. This longing for moral certitude is especially strong in China due to its history and tradition. For millennia, Chinese society was held together by the idea that laws alone cannot keep people together.”372 Whether nationalism can provide such moral certitude remains an unanswered question, but it is clear that under Xi Jinping the party-state has paternalistically included the moral domain within its version of nationalism, intensifying the party-state’s quest for a Gramscian expansive
hegemony.
It is unclear whether the state’s paternalism with respect to morality and nationhood will produce, on balance, greater loyalty or greater backlash, as it is inseparable from and
complicated by a paternalism with respect to history and culture. As Duara notes, a specific mobilization toward a particular source of [national] identification” inherently comes “at the expense of others.”373 Thus the party-state’s sponsorship of a core Han-nation conception of ethno-cultural Chinese-ness will remain problematic. There is tremendous evidence that particular ethnic minorities take serious issue with mobilization towards any source of identity that reduces their autonomy vis-à-vis Beijing. A sizable community of scholars views the PRC as a “‘powder-keg’ of ethnic contradictions,” a situation exasperated by mobilization towards a Han-centric national identity. 374 “Hanification” of China’s ethnic minority regions may breed resentment rather than harmonious blending. 375
Ethnic identity can both arise, in the first place, and take on national character among people with limited objective sociological commonalities upon which to imagine shared community. Wang Ming Ke’s (王明珂) research on the Qiang people (羌族) demonstrates as much.376 Liberal scholars such as Ma Rong (馬戎) have criticized the “institutionalization of ethnic groups,” arguing that this process “systematically creates institutional barriers for the
371 Johnson, Souls of China, Kindle Loc. 1620.
372 Ibid., Kindle Loc. 380.
373 Duara, “De-Constructing the Chinese Nation,” 55.
374 Leibold, “Ethnic Policy in China,” 12.
375 “The Great Leap West: The ‘Hanification’ of Xinjiang province,” The Economist, August 26, 2004, http://www.economist.com/node/3140706.
376 王明珂, 《羌在漢藏之間：一個華夏邊緣的歷史人類學研究》, (臺北：聯經，2003 年).
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interaction and integration between the members of different ethnic groups.”377 These scholars are united around a concern that policy often intensifies ethnicization, or the “alienating process between peoples – stemming from intercultural contact – that results in the salience of ethnicity in social action.”378 Chirkova describes the process as follows:
A more or less universal pattern in present-day China is that the official state ethnic distinctions tend to gradually shape and partly solidify people’s ethnic consciousness so that they become strongly invested in the categories originally imposed upon them from outside. Eventually, this turns ethnic identity into a recognized identity.379
According to Ma and his followers, China must “‘de-politicize’ (去政治化) ethnic issues” if it hopes to “consolidate its own national identity.”380 In this context, Hu Angang (胡鞍鋼) controversially called for a “Second Generation of Ethnic Policies” in 2011, and liberal scholar Liu Junning (劉軍寧) has openly argued “we should abolish the concept of minzu both
politically and legally.”381 Liu believes that China must embrace territorial federalism, under which the state would deal with territories directly, rather than the current policy of “ethnic segregation” disguised as “regional ethnic autonomy.”382
Indeed the state’s paternalism over identity collides with more primordial ethic-cultural identities within the PRC’s extremely diverse population. Familiar to any China watcher are the images of self-immolation in Tibet, where according to the exiled Tibetan government, 142 Tibetans attempted to commit politically-motivated suicide in public between 2009 and 2015.383 Also in recent memory are the September 2015 coalmine knife attacks in which ethnic Uighurs killed 50 mostly Han miners in Xinjiang.384 As if to prove that cultural conflict exists in China,
377 James Leibold, “Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?” East-West Center (Honolulu, 2013), 16.
378 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Thinking about ethnicity in early modern China,” Late Imperial China 11, no. 1 (June 1990): 26. Discussed in Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China, 10.
379 Ekaterina Chirkova, “Between Tibetan and Chinese: Identity and Language in Chinese South-West,” Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 3 (December 2007): 407.
380 Leibold, “Ethnic Policy in China,” 17.
381 Ibid., xii, 30.
382 Ibid., 30.
383 “Fact Sheet on Tibetan Self-Immolation Protests in Tibet Since February 2009,” Central Tibetan Administration, updated August 31 2015, http://tibet.net/situation-in-tibet/factsheet-immolation-2011-2012/.
384 “At least 50 reported to have died in attack on coalmine in Xinjiang in September,” The Guardian, October 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/01/at-least-50-reported-dead-in-september-attack-as-china-celebrates-xinjiang.
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the exiled Dalai Lama attributes the immolations to a policy of “cultural genocide” from Beijing, while the CCP reacts to violence in Xinjiang by cracking down on the public practice of Islam.385 Indeed, while this study has focused primarily on the rhetoric of Chinese political leaders, the continuing process of ascribing contents to the Chinese nation, identifying “deficient
conditions,” and thus mobilizing and manipulating national identity occurs within a complex web of ethno-cultural identities, mythologized pasts, and imagined destinies. As a moral as well as cultural concept, the nation inspires some of humanities strongest passions, and nationalism has the potential to effect great change or realize long-term stability both within the PRC and throughout Greater China. It will continue to be vital that we correctly identify the nature and orientation of Chinese nationalism.
385 Andrew Jacobs, “Xinjiang Seethes under Chinese Crackdown,” The New York Times, January 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/world/asia/xinjiang-seethes-under-chinese-crackdown.html?_r=0.
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