As the above discussion highlights, the content and orientation of Chinese nationalism has consistently evolved according to the position vis-à-vis the state of Chinese nationalists (those describing the contents of, or ascribing contents to the “Chinese nation”), as well as changing ideological factors, social and political events, and the shifting policy directions of state actors. While Chinese nationalist discourse has generally drawn upon ethnic, cultural, civic, and territorial elements to justify China’s national cohesion (民族凝聚力) and “deep, horizontal comradeship,” as well as to interpret events in relation to “the nation” and mobilize a “national”
response, the relative salience – and sometimes meaning – of each given element has varied. At the same time, the above analysis gives evidence of both based (nationalizing) and polity-seeking nationalisms from the late Qing to the Hu Jintao era. To what extent have the first five years of Xi Jinping’s administration represented a new direction in the discourse of Chinese nationalism?
This question touches on two crucial issues. First, under Xi Jinping, who is espousing polity-seeking nationalism, and who is articulating polity-based (nationalizing) nationalisms? In a sense, this is the nationalism-studies equivalent of the question posed by Hays Gries et al in a 2011 study: “Is China a status quo power seeking to integrate itself peacefully into the extant international system? Or is it a revisionist power seeking to overturn the global order?”306 We can maintain the overall structure of that question to begin analysis here: Is Chinese nationalism a status quo (polity based, nationalizing) nationalizing seeking to integrate the Chinese nation peacefully into the present political boundaries of Greater China? Or is it a revisionist (polity-seeking) nationalism which seeks to overturn the status quo political boundaries of Greater China?
This chapter focuses on addressing these questions through a detailed examination of Chinese-language sources.
5.1: Official Nationalism under Xi Jinping
We can begin by examining how the party under Xi narrates itself; how Xi and those who interpret his policies place his governance in the broader historical context. In a recent article in
306 Peter Hays Gries et al., “Patriotism, Nationalism and China’s US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity,” The China Quarterly 205 (March 2011): 1.
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the Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. (中共中央党校, hereafter referred to as the CPSJ, for Central Party School Journal), Professor Song Fu Fan (宋福范) declares that “examining the new line of thinking within Xi Jinping’s governance from a macroscopic logic perspective” one finds “achieving the Chinese Dream of the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation as the foundational purpose.”307 If rhetoric is a guide, one can hardly disagree; Under Xi Jinping the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中华民族 伟大复兴) is mentioned as the ultimate justification for basic tenets such as socialism with Chinese characteristics308 and envelopes fundamental goals such as national prosperity and strength (國家富強) and peoples’ well-being (人民幸福).309
Song additionally emphasizes that the ideology undergirding Xi’s governance centers on the understanding that China has entered a new historical starting point (新的历史起点).310 This is to say that Xi intends to provide transformational leadership, shifting key aspects of the state-society relationship within the PRC. Most fundamentally, this has to do with troubling trends that have plagued China’s politics since the beginning of the reform era. Song notes the
“increasingly clear trend of diversification of stakeholders, political demands and values in China” following the implementation of market-oriented reforms since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee (in December 1978).311 Indeed, China’s reform and opening introduced a flood of economic globalization, fiscal decentralization, wealth accumulation and interest diversification underneath a relatively static political structure. The explosion of corruption at the provincial and local levels of the Chinese government that Nathan observed in the 1980s and 90s apparently coincided with “an increasing sense of normlessness.”312
It would be difficult to overstate the damage that this corruption did to the party’s image and reputation for “serving the people.” Sharing a similar interpretation, Song notes that the
307「从宏观逻辑上审视习近平治国理政的新思路...以实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦为根本目的」宋福范,
〈论习近平治国理政的宏观理路〉,《中共中央党校学报》第 21 卷，第一期 (2017 年 2 月): 5.
308 「中国特色社会主义…实现中华民族伟大复兴的必由之路.」Ibid., 6.
309 Ibid., 7-8.
310 Ibid., 5-6.
311 Ibid., 8.
312 Andrew Nathan, China’s Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990), 103. Quoted in Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and HK (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 95.
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development of China’s market economy witnessed a soaring incidence of corruption that
“seriously polluted China’s political ecology.”313 He goes on to note:
In terms of ideology, the psychological conflicts caused by unequal [economic]
distribution caused a degradation of [our] values, the long-term accumulation [of which]
brought about a moral decline and deficiency of integrity [which] corrupted [China’s]
social atmosphere since [the advent of] reform and opening.314
This reality – combined, of course, with a recognition of the Party’s accomplishments – constitutes Xi’s “new historical starting point.”315 “The new reasoning/logic of Xi Jinping’s governance is based upon this reality. [This logic] is advanced from [Xi] fixing [his] gaze on resolving these contradictions and problems.”316
According to Song, Xi intends to address the accumulated issues plaguing China’s politics, “social atmosphere,” and party-people relations by reviving ideology. “Especially in regards to an organic whole composed out of diffuse individuals, [an] explicit purpose and goal can condense a group consensus and form united willpower; settle an ideological foundation [upon which] willpower converges.”317 Before assuming China’s highest political offices in 2012 and 2013, 318 Xi served as president of the Central Party School (CPS). His words at the opening ceremony of the fall term of the CPS in September 2010 are particularly instructive:
A state, a nation, a party, at any time and in any circumstances must establish and stick to explicit ideals and convictions. If [we are] without, or lose [our] ideals and convictions, [we] will lose sight of the goal of [our] struggle and the direction [of our] advance. Like a sheet of loose sand, unable to muster cohesiveness, [we] will lose [our] spiritual backbone
313 宋福范 ，〈论习近平治国理政的宏观理路〉, 7.
314「在思想文化上，分配不公造成的人们心理失衡，引发价值观陷入混乱，长期积累下来导致了严重的道
德滑坡和诚信缺失，恶化了改革开放以来的社会风气，等等. 以上矛盾和问题与我们所取得的巨大成就一起，
构成了『在新的历史起点上』的基本内涵. 习近平治国理政的新思路，就是立足于这一现实，着眼于解决这 些矛盾和问题而提出来的. 解决这些矛盾和问题的逻辑构想，就形成了习近平治国理政的基本理路。」Ibid.
315 Ibid.
316「习近平治国理政的新思路，就是立足于这一现实，着眼于解决这些矛盾和问题而提出来的.」Ibid.
317「特别是对于一个由分散的个体所构成的有机整体来讲，明确的目的目标，能够凝聚群体共识，形成统
一意志，为汇集力量奠定思想基础.」Ibid.
318 Xi Jinping assumed the office of General Secretary of the CCP’s Central Committee and head of the Central Military Commission after appointment by the Politburo Standing Committee in late 2012. He assumed the largely ceremonial position of President of the PRC in March 2013, after receiving 2,952 out of 2,956 possible votes in the National People’s Congress.
84 and self-disintegrate.319
Xi’s message fits into the historical context of Chinese nationalist rhetoric in no uncertain terms.
In referencing Sun’s “sheet of loose sand,” he calls back to a time of Chinese weakness, when
“national” disintegration appeared to be a more pressing and possible threat. In implying that the state, the nation, and the party struggle together, advance together, and share a common spiritual backbone, he advances the “logical conformism” of the cultural nation, as well as the party’s place within that homogenous being: the party-nation-state.
5.1.1: National Rejuvenation under Xi Jinping
The “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” as articulated by Xi, must be understood in light of the “new historical starting point” concept and Xi’s previous emphasis on national cohesiveness. Xi has presented this concept in connection with several
overarching ideas: the concept national struggle to overcome China’s humiliation since the Opium Wars, a blurring of the line between ethnicity, nation, and state, and the goal of
“building a prosperous and strong (富強), democratic, civilized and harmonious modern socialist state.”320 In every case, the themes of Xi’s national rejuvenation are intimately connected with the promoting a historiography of modern China that endows the CCP with the status of “national savior.”321 Xi connected these three themes with national rejuvenation on Nov. 29, 2012, in a brief speech entitled “Realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the Chinese nation’s greatest dream in modern times.”322 In the speech, Xi
emphasizes that “In modern times, the Chinese nation has endured hardships and sacrifices of a scale seldom seen in world history.”323 “Having finally found the correct path to achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation… socialism with Chinese characteristics,”324
319「一个国家、一个民族、一个政党，任何时候任何情况下都必须树立和坚持明确的理想信念。如果没有
或丧失理想信念，就会迷失奋斗目标和前进方向，就会像一盘散沙而形不成凝聚力，就会失去精神支柱而 自我瓦解。」 Quoted in 宋福范, 〈论习近平治国理政的宏观理路〉, 8.
320「建成富強民主文明和諧的社會主義現代化國家」. 習近平, 〈實現中華民族偉大復興是中華民族近代
以來最偉大的夢想〉,《談治國理政》, 36.
321 This term is used similarly in Timothy Cheek, Living with Reform: China since 1989 (London: Zed Books, 2006), 45.
322 習近平,〈實現中華民族偉大復興〉, 35.
323「近代以來, 中華民族遭受的苦難之重, 付出的犧牲之大, 在世界史上都是罕見的.」 Ibid.
324「終於找到了實現中華民族偉大復興的正確道路…這條道路就是中國特色社會主義.」Ibid.
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however, the Chinese nation now has “bright prospects”325 for national rejuvenation.
Xi goes on to blend the Chinese nation with both political and ethnic descriptors:
“Achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation… this dream binds together the aspirations of generations of Chinese, embodies the Chinese nation’s and the Chinese people’s overall interests, and is the shared hope of every son and daughter of China [中華兒女 – son and daughter of zhonghua, in this case an “ethno-cultural China” capable of producing primordially Chinese offspring].”326 Xi structures this sentence around four different expressions of who composes “China:” the Chinese, the Chinese nation, the Chinese people, and the sons and daughters of ethno-cultural China. Following this statement, Xi raises what has become one of the most clear themes of “national rejuvenation” under his leadership: “the future and destiny of every individual is closely linked with the future and destiny of the state and the nation. Only if the state is well and the nation is well, may we all be well.”327
In addition to ethno-cultural dimensions, Xi has likewise expounded on civic dimensions of Chinese-ness, imparting a renewed emphasis on Chinese Communist ideology as a factor defining the Chinese nation. In the opinion of this reader, Xi’s April 2013 speech, “Hard Work Makes Dreams Come True” (實幹才能夢想成真) could instead have been named “Eulogy to the Worker.” 328 Here Xi extolled China’s working class as “China’s leading class,” (我國的領導階 級), reminding the Party of its responsibility to “consolidate the position of the working class” as such (鞏固工人階級的領導階級地位).329 In a turn of phrase reminiscent of Marx, Xi declares,
“labor… is the source of happiness” (勞動．．．是幸福的源泉).330 Yet he goes further:
“Labor created the Chinese nation and formed the Chinese nation’s glorious history, and it shall produce the Chinese nation’s radiant future.”331 To some extent, Xi hearkens back to Mao’s declared intent to create a proletarian China when he attributes the nation’s creation, history, and
325「中華民族偉大復興展現出光明的前景」. 習近平,〈實現中華民族偉大復興〉, 35.
326「實現中華民族偉大復興…這個夢想，凝聚了幾代中國人的夙願，體現了中華民族和中國人民的整體利
益，是每一個中華兒女的共同期盼.」 (Emphasis added). Ibid., 36.
327「每個人的前途命運都與國家和民族的前途命運緊密相連. 國家好, 民族好, 大家才會好.」Ibid.
328 習近平,〈實幹才能夢想成真〉,《談治國理政》, 45.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid., 46.
331「勞動創造了中華民族, 造就了中華民族的輝煌歷史, 也必將創造出中華民族的光明未來」. Ibid.
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future, to labor. As Zhu has pointed out, “It is not clear whether Xi actually agrees with the [Neo-Maoist] Left or if he is being pragmatic to gain their support,” as his rhetoric is “consistent with both possibilities.”332 In any event, as Xi has become the PRC’s “core leader,” he enjoys particular power to establish the contours of politically correct speech; his rhetoric has a force of its own.
Further extolling civic sources of national identity, Xi reminds workers to
“self-consciously practice the core socialist values” (自覺踐行社會主義核心價值觀), “use advanced thinking” (用先進思想), and thus “be a model in promoting the Chinese spirit” (做弘揚中國精 神的楷模).333 In a phrase that is uniquely Chinese-Communist, he declares that “the model worker ethos… enriches the national ethos and the spirit of our times.”334 Xi has unambiguously reasserted the Party’s position on who – besides the CCP – most represents the Chinese nation:
workers, especially dedicated socialist workers. In doing so, he re-elevated elements of the civic or political culture dominant under Mao into the content of official Chinese nationalism. Within this dimension, Xi’s nationalism is clearly polity-based and nationalizing. His rhetoric here is unconcerned with reshaping the borders of Greater China; in fact, in continuously stressing the PRC’s socialist national identity, he actually reinforces the differences in national identity within Greater China.
Polity-based (nationalizing) nationalism based on civic and ideological identity features prominently in a speech Xi gave to commemorate the 2013 anniversary of the May Fourh Movement. As suggested by the speech’s title, it was directed primarily at China’s youth: “Let Youthful Dreams Soar In the Lively Practice of Realizing the China Dream.”335 In familiar wording, Xi encouraged young people to be “firm in ideals and convictions,” for “without ideals
332 Shaoming Zhu, “Comments on ‘China’s Coming Ideological Wars’,” Foundation for Law and International Affairs, http://flia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Shaoming-Zhu-Comments-on-Chinas-Coming-Ideological-War.pdf.
333 習近平,〈實幹才能夢想成真〉, 45-46.
334 The choice of “ethos” over “spirit” comes from Xi Jinping, Governance of China, 46. The original is as follows:「勞模精神，豐富了民族精神和時代精神的內涵」. Ibid., 46.
335 The Official English Translation, “Realize Youthful Dreams,” simply does not communicate the fullness of
「在實現中國夢的生動實踐中放飛青春夢想」. 習近平,〈在實現中國夢的生動實踐中放飛青春夢想〉,《談 治國理政》, 49.
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and convictions, one’s spirit becomes weak.”336 Xi is explicit concerning the ideals and convictions …. “The China Dream is the shared ideal of people of every ethnic group in China and the lofty ideal that every generation of youth should firmly establish.”337 Xi repeats the same admonition regarding “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”338 More specifically, Xi advocates that China’s youth:
firmly adhere to Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents, foster minds equipped with a ‘Scientific Outlook on Development;’ establish their ideals and convictions on a rational recognition of scientific theory, a correct understanding of history, and a correct comprehension of China’s ‘national conditions’; unceasingly strengthen their confidence in China’s path, its [ideological] theory, and its [political] institutions; strengthen their conviction to support the Party, and forever closely follow the Party as it holds high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics.339
Later in the speech, Xi goes into even greater detail concerning the role of China’s youth in creating a nation of morality and character. Beginning with the declaration that “Socialism with Chinese characteristics is a form of socialism in which material and cultural (or spiritual) progresses go hand in hand. It is difficult for a nation without inner strength to be self- reliant, and a cause that lacks a cultural buttress cannot be sustained for long.”340 With political
ideology as the nation’s “inner strength,” and official state ideology as a doctrine that combines material and spiritual development, Xi’s rhetoric is clearly designed to encourage the creation of a civic nation within the PRC’s borders. He goes on to stress this nationalization as a moral imperative, stating:
Young people must integrate correct moral cognition, conscious moral development and active moral practice, conscientiously establish and practice the core socialist values,
Young people must integrate correct moral cognition, conscious moral development and active moral practice, conscientiously establish and practice the core socialist values,