Towards the end of a lifetime of observing China, Lucian Pye wrote in 1996, “The content of contemporary Chinese nationalism… appears to be exceedingly thin… without a substantive core which can be readily articulated.”1 Now, over 20 years since Pye’s observation, the contents and orientations of Chinese nationalism merit reconsideration. This thesis seeks to do so, methodically, over several sections. First, this introduction presents several key
disagreements in the English-language literature on Chinese nationalism, brief theoretical considerations relating to nationalism studies and comparative politics, key definitions, and a general conceptualization of the theoretical relationship between national identity, the nation as an imagined community, and nationalism as a form of politics.
1.1: Why Study Chinese Nationalism?
Many questions are considered over the following pages. One question that must be addressed at the outset, however, is the why of this study: why study Chinese nationalism? Why choose to view Chinese politics through a notoriously difficult lens, one with decades of
theoretical disagreements and seemingly unresolvable disputes? And why study a Chinese political phenomenon through a theoretical lens that has been highly influenced by the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of its mostly non-Chinese theorists? I raise these points up front, not to elicit the reader’s sympathy for the difficulties inherent in this study, but rather to offer some thoughts on the vital importance of the subject matter at hand.
A significant body of evidence suggests that nationhood is unusually salient in Chinese society. Surveys conducted in the PRC in 2010 and 2014 showed that over 80 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, “When other people criticize China, it is as though they are criticizing me.”2 As Dickson writes, “This is a clear indicator that the self-identity of many Chinese is intimately tied to their country.”3 A 2008 survey showed that 84.3 percent of Chinese respondents agreed, “Your country should pursue its national interest even if it could harm the
1 Lucian W. Pye, “How China’s Nationalism Was Shanghaied,” in Chinese Nationalism, ed. Jonathan Unger (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 106.
2 Bruce J. Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 235.
3 Ibid., 235.
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interests of another.”4 This is not typical; as Linley notes, only about 40 percent of Japanese affirm such an “unconditional support” for their national interest.5 Surveys conducted from 2005 to 2010 by Asian Barometer showed that the Chinese public had the most positive feelings about their nation among the publics of thirteen Asian countries.6 Each of these findings, of course, portrays no more than a particular facet of the sentiments that connect individual Chinese to the Chinese nation. Nonetheless, a variety of metrics support the argument that “The Chinese today possess a strong sense of nationhood.”7
It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that nationalist sentiments at the social level are deterministic of policy choices at the state level. At the same time, however, we dare not pretend that phenomena at the social level are irrelevant to policy formulated at the state level, or that state actors are fully in control of changes in the salience of nationalism within society.
How then can nationalism be situated in the state-society relationship? Although seldom mentioned in studies of nationalism, political regime theory offers a way to conceptualize the state-society relationship that is particularly instructive here. As Macridis and Burg write, political regime theory emphasizes the state’s imperative to “Generate commonly shared goals…
commonly shared ideas or… a prevailing ideology.”8 Often accomplished by socialization, this is said to be the first “major function” of all political systems.9 Is state-led nationalism the
“prevailing ideology” that China’s political system seeks to generate?
A number of scholars present essentially this argument. Some, stressing Antonio
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, argue that official nationalism seeks a position of ‘Gramscian’
hegemony within Chinese society. Gramsci theorized that power must be understood as a combination of consent and coercion, and used the concept of hegemony to discuss the interplay of consent and coercion within the state-society relationship.10 Jones notes that Gramsci’s notion
4 Findings quoted in Matthew Linley, “Nationalist Attitudes among mass publics in East Asia,” in Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered, ed. Jeff Kingston (London: Routledge, 2016), 126.
5 Linley, “Nationalist Attitudes,” 126.
6 Ibid., 118
7 Henry S. Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3, July 2007.
8 Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics, 2nd ed. (Moosic, PA: HarperCollins, 1991), 3.
9 Ibid.
10 Originally formulated as an explanation of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in European polities, Gramsci’s theory has been applied to a diverse set of questions far removed from his original Marxist framework. Its
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of hegemony allows us to analyze the relationship of a ruling group to power in terms of
“expansive hegemony” and “limited hegemony.”11 Expansive hegemony is achieved when (in theory) coercion and repression are no longer necessary; the social and political status quo is fully consensual and the cultural production of power at the state level and social level are mutually compatible. Then, the “multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world.”12 (In later sections, this study considers rhetoric of Chinese leaders and intellectuals since Sun Yat-sen that bears a remarkable similarity to the above quote.) Limited hegemony, on the other hand, characterizes the much more common situation in which a ruling group has not genuinely adopted “the interest of the popular classes,” but has rather “neutralized or
‘decapitated’ them through depriving them of their leadership.”13
It is in the interest of political elites to seek expansive hegemony. After all, coercion tends to be comparatively messy and expensive, and is sometimes self-defeating; consent is harmonious and “civilized.” Certainly the CCP, like other ruling groups, prefers the later to the former, and the CCP’s monopoly over the mechanisms of the state provides it with the means necessary to pursue expansive hegemony. Analyzing contemporary state media in the PRC, Yong concludes, “Party-led nationalism in China should be understood as a hegemonic
ideology.”14 We can understand that to mean the following: the CCP instrumentalizes Chinese nationalism at the state level in order to construct and shape national identity at the social level such that social interests become more compatible with the goals of the party-state.
Indeed, state-led nationalism appears to play a particularly clear role in the (attempted) generation of a “prevailing ideology” since the implementation of the 1990’s Patriotic Education Campaign, a development explored briefly in Chapter five. Although the larger picture of
applicability to the Chinese state-society relationship is proposed in Yong Cao, “From Communism to Nationalism:
China’s Press in the Transition of Dominant Ideology,” Global Media Journal 4, no. 6 (June 2005),
http://www.globalmediajournal.com/ open-access/from-communism-to-nationalism-chinas-press-in-the-transition-of-dominant-ideology.php?aid=35104. Also discussed in Xueli Zhang, “Redefining Chinese Nationalism: State-Society Relations and China’s Modernization in the Era of Globalization” (PhD diss., Northern Arizona University, 2007).
11 Steve Jones, Antonio Gramsci (Routledge: New York, 2006), 52.
12 C. Mercer, “Generating Consent,” Ten, 1984, 9. Quoted in Jones, Antonio Gramsci, 53.
13 Jones, Antonio Gramsci, 52.
14 Yong Cao, “From Communism to Nationalism,” n.p.
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Chinese nationalism as a contested political discourse – and “China” as a putative nation – is far too complex to be reduced to the state-led perspective alone, neither can that perspective be overlooked. As explored below, nationalism certainly functions bi-directionally; it occurs in both top-down (state-led) and bottom up (society-driven) forms. It will be seen, moreover, that these two forms of nationalism are mutually influencing. But if Hobsbawm, Wang, and others are correct, then it is the state, first and foremost, that creates the nation – and it does so via nationalism.15
An abundance of secondary literature contends that the CCP has a powerful incentive to encourage the nationalization of Chinese society. English-language discussions of the PRC’s political regime politics published in the last two decades present a near-consensus that
nationalism constitutes one of two primary pillars legitimating the PRC’s political regime. (The other pillar is typically called “economic growth,” although Dickson has convincingly argued that rising individual income is far more important than aggregate growth for CCP legitimacy.16) Christensen writes, “Since jettisoning Maoist Communist ideology in the reform period, the nominally Communist CCP has legitimized itself through fast-paced economic growth and by nationalism. It portrays itself as an increasingly capable protector of Chinese interests and national honor.”17 Shambaugh concurs, “Chinese nationalism continues to be a key anchor of the regime’s legitimacy.”18
Nor are Western academics alone in adhering to the “two pillar” interpretation of CCP legitimacy in post-Maoist China. An unnamed leader of the 1989 pro-Democracy movement is said to have reflected, after his release from prison in 1996, “People are more nationalistic
15 Hobsbawm writes, “it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to… [the]
modern territorial state… Nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way round.” Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-10. Gellner additionally discusses the nation as a product of nationalism, writing, “it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round.” Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 55.
16 Dickson’s survey data demonstrates that “neither levels of per capita GD nor rates of growth increase trust and support in China’s main political institutions – the Party, the government, and the people’s congress (China’s legislature) – at either the central or local level. However, individuals who have seen their incomes rise in recent years and believe they will continue to grow in the years ahead are more likely to support the regime.” This finding is key because it suggests that “Slower economic growth is not a threat to [the Party’s] popular support so long as incomes continue to rise.” Bruce J. Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, 9.
17 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 2015), 109.
18 David Shambaugh, China’s Future (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 170.
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[now], and because of economic growth they have more personal space and freedom and money, so it makes it easier to accept the government’s line.”19 The argument that nationalism and economic growth constitute the two primary sources of CCP legitimacy, in fact, has become commonplace in university and graduate-level coursework in Chinese politics.20
Despite this near-consensus on national identity’s salience in Chinese society and nationalism’s importance for the CCP, there is considerable disagreement about the effects that nationalism has or could have on the PRC’s future political development and foreign relations.
The most common treatment views Chinese nationalism as “a double edged sword”: a
phenomenon that ordinarily generates unity, shared identity, and support for the party-state, yet also increases the potential for public rage should the government prove insufficiently
“nationalist” on issues of concern to the Chinese people.21 Chen apparently views Chinese nationalism as equally likely to threaten as to strengthen regime security, thus “explaining the state’s ambivalence toward the phenomenon… While state-nurtured patriotism provides a much-needed sense of collective identity and solidarity,” she postulates, “the CCP faces the dilemma of containing expressions of popular anger targeting foreign countries without sacrificing the
nationalist credentials on which its legitimacy is based.”22 Zhao writes plainly, “nationalism… is a value that both the regime and its critics share [but also] a two-edged sword: It mobilizes people behind the state, but it also gives them a ground on which to judge the state’s
performance.”23 The double-edged sword concept is frequently raised in Western media as well.
In but one example, Kristof writes that nationalism is “a particularly interesting force in China, given its potential not just for conferring legitimacy on the government but also for taking it away.”24
Shambaugh presents a somewhat more controversial – although not unreasonable – view,
19 Emphasis Added. Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs; China’s Nationalist Tide,” The New York Times, March 13, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/13/opinion/foreign-affairs-china-s-nationalist-tide.html.
20 This observation comes from the author’s coursework in the United States and Taiwan between 2013 and 2016.
21 This view of Chinese nationalism is summarized in Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, 232-233.
22 Chen Chunhua, “Nationalism and its political implications in contemporary China,” in Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered, ed. Jeff Kingston (London: Routledge, 2016), 148.
23 Suisheng Zhao, “Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016): 83.
24 Nicholas D. Kristof, “The World: Fruits of Democracy; Guess who’s a Chinese Nationalist Now?” The New York Times, April 22, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/22/weekinreview/the-world-fruits-of-democracy-guess-who-s-a-chinese-nationalist-now.html.
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writing that Chinese nationalism drives the PRC “in a more assertive direction” vis-à-vis its neighboring states,25 and could trigger “aggressive moves against Japan and other neighbors.”26 Apparently viewing Chinese nationalism primarily as a latent public sentiment to which CCP leaders are beholden, Shambaugh suggests that in a context of “already hyper Chinese
nationalism,” the CCP could turn to a “diversionary war” if faced with a legitimacy crisis.27 The implication to this claim is that China’s leaders are somewhat at the mercy of a highly
nationalistic population. Johnston notes that a similar interpretation is held within the U.S.
defense establishment. “Senior U.S. military officers,” to whom he spoke in 2015 and 2016, expressed a “worry that the Chinese leadership will engage in diversionary conflict when China’s economic growth slows.28 Shirk similarly sees China’s leaders somewhat at the mercy of a nationalistic population, writing, “The worst nightmare of China’s leaders is a national protest movement of discontented groups… united against the regime by the shared fervor of nationalism” 29
Thus these scholars share a presumption that latently powerful Chinese nationalism is intimately connected with potential violence that could either manifest as an eruption of public discontent towards the party-state, or in a war pursued by the party-state in order to mitigate that risk. These concerns cannot be lightly dismissed. According to anonymous sources who
attended the November 2016 meeting between Xi Jinping and Hong Hsiu-chu, chairwoman and leader of the KMT at the time, Xi offered a frank summary the relationship between nationalism and regime security in a cross-strait relations context: “From the position of Chinese people’s nationalism, 1.3 billion people on the mainland would not agree to Taiwan’s formal
independence… The Communist Party would be overthrown by the people if the pro-independence issue was not dealt with.”30 In this context, any war initiated by the PRC in
25 Shambaugh, China’s Future, 170.
26 Ibid., 52.
27 Ibid., 171.
28 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing,” International Security 41, no.
3 (Winter 2016/2017): 8.
29 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2007), 7.
30 Zhang Pinghui, “Xi Jinping warns Communist Party would be ‘overthrown’ if Taiwan’s independence push left unchecked.” South China Morning Post, November 4, 2016,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2042784/xi-jinping-warns-communist-party-would-be-overthrown-if.
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accordance with the 2005 Anti-Secession law31 would be presented as a defense of “China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” but conducted for the deeper purposes of protecting the party-state’s regime security from the threat of domestic insurrection of the kind described by Shirk.
Yet a number of scholars take a firmly opposing view regarding Chinese nationalism’s salience and likely effects. Kuo argues that “the appeal of nationalism in China appears to be dwindling.”32 A recent study by Johnston uses surveys conducted in Beijing to demonstrate declining “levels of nationalism since around 2009.” Johnston additionally finds that, “contrary to the conventional wisdom…it is China’s older generations that are more nationalistic than its youth.” Thus, “rising Chinese nationalism,” though a highly visible meme in Western media,
“may not be a critically important variable constraining Chinese foreign policy.”33 Li similarly argues that the common description of a surge in Chinese nationalism exaggerates the
nationalistic sentiments of Chinese youth. He sees, on the contrary, a Chinese youth relatively disengaged from the ideas of nation and nationalism.34
Indeed, reviewing the scholarly literature on Chinese nationalism reveals major
disagreements on the impact of nationalism on Chinese politics and foreign relations. In light of these conflicting arguments, neither the popular “double-edged sword” interpretation, nor the aggressive nationalism or dwindling nationalism hypotheses are overly persuasive. Indeed, as Carlson observes, “neither those who have argued that nationalism is pushing China towards confrontational positions in the international arena, nor those who have disputed that position have supported their respective arguments in a compelling fashion.” Perhaps, he reasons, “we still have little agreement over what Chinese nationalism is,” and “a contested object” cannot
31 Article 8 of the law states, “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing
Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “Problems of Stateness: Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,” in China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 219.
32 Kaiser Kuo, “Do we really need to worry so much about Chinese nationalism?” SupChina, February 2017, http://supchina.com/2017/02/24/really-need-worry-much-chinese-nationalism/.
33 Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising,” 9.
34 Liqing Li, “China’s Rising Nationalism and Its Forefront: Politically Apathetic Youth,” China Report 51, no. 4 (November 2015), 311-326.
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readily explain or predict other phenomena.35 Enthusiastically agreeing with Carlson’s prognosis, this study aims to add clarity to the discussion of Chinese nationalism by interpreting its related discourses through an important but underutilized theoretical lens. To do so, we must first consider the conceptual distinction between “categories of practice” and “categories of analysis”
in relation to Chinese nationalism.
1.2: Chinese Nationalism in Theory and in Practice
There are important constraints and implications generated by any given theoretical approach to nationalism. Carlson has noted that “in framing the study of identity in China primarily within the paradigm of nationalism, scholars have tended to reify the categories of nation, state, and identity that they are ostensibly examining.”36 Callahan likewise expresses concern that many treatments of “Chinese-ness” frame the object of their study as a kind of identity implicitly “limited to nation and state.” These studies therefore “[risk] further naturalizing the link between nation, security and identity in the service of the nation.”37 By
“tethering the study of identity in China to the intellectual research tradition of nationalism,” in other words, scholars inadvertently demonstrate the existence of a “Chinese nation” by virtue of their theoretical approach.38 “Such definitional exercises become self-fulfilling prophecies, overlooking the degree to which the practice of individual agents/actors shapes the structure of social constructs” such as national identity.39
Is there no dispositive approach to studying the nation? In other words, how can we study Chinese nationalism without merely reproducing the Chinese nationalist claim that there is a particular kind of Chinese nation? We may begin by taking seriously Brubaker’s admonition to “decouple categories of analysis from categories of practice, retaining as analytically
indispensable the notions of nation as practical category, nationhood as institutionalized form,
indispensable the notions of nation as practical category, nationhood as institutionalized form,