Chapter 1. Introduction
1.2 Debates on European Integration
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1.2 Debates on European Integration
European integration has two aspects: “deepening” (supranational centralization), and
“widening” (expansion of membership). EU started as supranational regulation on coal and steel with its six original members and further expended to EU with currently 28 members states and with ambition to further expand (Schimmelfennig 2010). European integration are defined in three dimensions. The first dimension is sectoral integration, also known as broadening, which is a process where policy areas previously governed at national level get transferred partially or fully regulated by EU. The second dimension is vertical integration, also known as deepening, which is related to the sharing of competencies between
institutions of EU. considering the extension of sectoral and vertical integration of given state (Schimmelfennig 2010, 37). As Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2015, 37) argue, horizontal integration includes enlargement of EU as its most important process.
How can we understand the nature of the EU integration? There are two theoretical debates.
The first debate is between supranationalist and intergovernmentalist theories, revolving around whether regional integration is a self-reinforcing and transformative process or not.
For intergovernmentalists, integration remains under the control of the member states, and these states ultimately and collectively decide the speed of the integration. On the other hand, supranationalists argue that integration is a process in which its institutions of member states set off a self-reinforcing process which leads to further integration and is no longer controlled by member states, and it thus transforms the EU and the societies within the union
(Rosamond 2007, 19). Grabbe and Sedelmeier (2010, 376) argue that internal integration has become more complex, reaching beyond member states; it does not offer only opt-outs for its members but also opt-ins for non- members such as Schengen area for Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and more recently all of Western Balkan states except Kosovo. The EU further has extended its functional reach effectively through the process of EU enlargement; prior to accession it demands fulfillment of such rules but without declared end-goal of membership (Grabbe and Sedelmeier 2010, 377).
Intergovermentalists explain the supranational institution-building as a bargaining that comes from states that had specific geopolitical interests in specific historical circumstances.
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Whereas, Moravcsik (1993) argues that liberalism focuses on the preference of state
formation rather than geopolitical interests of nation states in contrast with realists who focus on state-centrism on international level. Neofunctionalists argue that Europe moved from the anarchic state system to supranational institutionalism by following the societal and market patterns and pushing political elites to advocate for such arrangements. Neofunctionalists recognized that policy initiatives derived from the supranational institutions could have spill-over effects that lead to further integration; however, these phenomenon is not automatic. It requires for nations who redefined their identities and loyalties to actively seek further integration (Diez and Wiener 2009, 9-10).
The second theoretical debate revolves around the concept of enlargement, which has been caught up in the different perspectives of contemporary rationalist and constructivist debate.
Rationalists argue that candidate states and members states calculate the costs and benefits of a potential enlargement of the EU (Pollack 2001). Member states will accept new member if that membership will increase the utility of the current members. However, rationalist further argue that members who are not benefiting from the enlargement of the union should be compensated in some form. Rationalist theorists assume that all member states’ preferences in regards of enlargement are set by the expected cost of single states. EU states or
institutions are keen for enlargement if they expect to benefit from the enlargement. Whereas, non-members seek to join EU, relying on the expectation that they would benefit more from membership than any other form relation with the European Union (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006, 103).
What is known as external incentive model that derives from rational choice is a bargaining model that focuses on the actors and assumes that conditionality is a bargaining mechanism between rational actors, decisions of whom are calculated by material and political interests and cost-benefit (Zhelyazkova et al. 2018, 18). According to this model, EU bargaining comes from conditioning candidate countries to adopt and implement the rules that target their government in order to acquire rewards. In case of compliance of these conditions EU will reward given country, and in case of failing to comply it will withhold the reward. Such rewards range from financial assistance to full membership to the union. These tactic can be seen in the Kosovo case where visa liberalization was promised in case of fulfilling certain requirements by EU. However, despite Kosovo fulfilling those requirements, it was not rewarded by EU (Zhelyazkova et al. 2018, 18-19).
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Constructivist theorists, on the other hand, argue that enlargement is closely related to the collective identities and norms and values of the community. According to constructivist theory, EU will accept new members if they are ready to identify themselves with EU community and also if they are ready to accept the values and norms of the union
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 513-14). The debates within the integration theories and the enlargement concept find their way into the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007.
The two enlargement developments remain a puzzle among scholars who argue that large EU members such as Germany and France should have been opposed to the Eastern enlargements and yet they were in favor (Risse 2004).
Schimmelfennig (2003) uses a sociological institutionalist perspective to argue that EU has a liberal community of states that as long as the applicant countries show commitment to democracy, human rights, market economy and strengthening the rule of law, member states are likely to agree for other members to join the Union. In terms of discourse for the Eastern enlargement, representatives of EU used the community discourse in order to legitimize the request of CEE countries to become members. This dominant discourse as “part of us” made it difficult for opponents of this enlargement to make objections (Risse 2012,12).
Constructive institutionalism focuses on the process of “norm socialization” where domestic political elites and the population incorporate EU norms. Instead of dealing with the
manipulation of cost-benefit calculations of candidate countries, constructivist argue that the rule transfer can only be effective when people in candidate countries identify themselves with union and are prone to change behavior through mechanisms set by EU that have impact on domestic level through socialization and persuasion (Checkel 2005). Social constructivists put their attention to the independence of the structure of the state and the importance of ideas, norms, institutions, and identities in the realm of international politics. Moreover, sociological institutionalism can serve as a constructivist-inspired approach to study how Europeanization affects domestic change related to the formation of collective identity and how this phenomenon affects further integration (Risse 2004, 173-74).
National identity and European collective identity is an aspect that is often discussed among scholars. Eurosceptics argue it is impossible for an European identity to be formed since there is no such thing as European people. However, empirical studies and survey data show that there are individuals that have multiple identities, and people who feel like they belong to
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Europe parallel with their national identity and other identities they hold. Anderson (1991) argues that European Community is “imagined community”, whereas other scholars argue that European identity is not necessarily exclusive and should not be conceptualize as if with the increase of one’s European identity, one’s national identity would decrease. In other words, people can be have multiple identities without having the need to choose one single identification (Risse 2005, 295), and this argument is supported by survey data that shows many citizens in Europe can be identified with both national and European identities (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 417). Moreover, Risse (2004, 154) argues that EU has created a hegemony of European identity, and one example is that the accession of the CEE countries to the EU was framed as the “return to Europe,” as if these CEE countries were not part of the continent before. This also resonates with the Western Balkan countries that have a sense of becoming part of “Europe’. Europe and EU are often used interchangeably meaning that EU has managed to occupy the meaning of being European, therefore states that are part of the continent but not EU members often feel a sense of being outsiders (Risse 2004, 154).
The debate between supranationalist and intergovernmentalist theories and the debate
between rationalists and constructivists focus on the nature of EU integration and the concept of enlargement, respectively. This thesis focuses on the “widening” or horizontal aspect of integration. My primary focus is to study what determines the prospect of Western Balkan countries to become EU members. Since the violent unrest occurred with the dissolvent of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav wars, the intention of EU to accept new members relies on the idea that it is in EU’s interest to have a stable Western Balkans. This idea goes in line with the IR theory of institutional liberalism; international organizations are crucial factors in conflict management, collective security, cooperating and maintaining peace. (Acharya 2014).
EU’s interest on expanding itself relies on maintaining stability in the continent. The
incentives also relate to commercial liberalism that stands for economic interdependence and free trade, a concept which commercial liberalists would consider as minimizing chances of war, by increasing its cost to the involved parties (Burchill et al. 2005,63-4). Furthermore, the incentives of Western Balkan countries for joining the EU is more related to the rationalist approach, which suggests that becoming the EU members could help them to pursue more economic interests by enjoying the single market, free movement of commercial and human capital, and more investments from other EU members.
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While these theoretical debates help us further understand what regional integration is about, we need to focus on specific factors that explain the probability of EU accession for
individual countries. In the next chapter, I provide discussion of existing explanations on EU enlargement, and propose my testable hypothesis about the relationship between political corruption and EU accession.
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