Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Puzzle
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Puzzle
There are many existing definitions of corruption in general and political corruption in
particular. This studies focuses on the political corruption in particular. Amundsen (1999, 36) defines political corruption as misuses of public authority where political decision-makers are involved. The 1889 edition of The Oxford English Dictionary defined political corruption as:
“perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor;
the use or existence of corrupt practices, especially in a state, public corporations etc.” Joseph Nye defines corruption as s behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains;
or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967, 419). This study will focus on political corruption as a misuse of power by public officials for the sake of private gain. Moreover, the political corruption selected for this paper is related to the variable retrieved from the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) Institute, that measures corruption in the executive, judicial and legislative levels (Coppedge et al. 2019).
Countries who consider the application for becoming a member of the European Union should comply with the criteria for membership application based on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Article 49 and the obligations under Article 2 of Treaty on European Union states that any European State that respects values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights, and is committed to promote such values, has the right to apply for the EU membership. When a state applies, the Council of the EU should notify both the European Parliament and the applicant’s respective national parliament, and the application must be agreed by European Council and the European Commission. Furthermore, the agreement between Member States and applicant state should be submitted for ratification by all contracting states according to their respective constitutional requirements.
The process of EU accession consists three major stages. First, the country becomes a candidate for the EU membership. Second, the country starts accession negotiations. Third, after successful negotiation, the country becomes a member of the EU. In more detailed description, a country has to go through several specific steps and procedures of accession.
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First, given country submits the application to the Council of the EU. Second, EC gives its opinion on the application submitted. Third, all the member countries have to decided unanimously in order for a applicant country to become a candidate country. And fourth, if all conditions are met, accession negotiations open in agreement with all member states. The European Commission proposes the negotiation framework as the basis of the talks, and during the negotiations the country prepares to implement EU laws and standards. The acquis communautaire has 35 chapters in different policy areas, once the negotiations in all areas are finalized, the European Commission gives its opinion whether the country is ready to become a member state or not. Based on the opinion of the Commission, the EU member states will deicide unanimously to close the negotiation process and the European Parliament must give its consent. And the final step is when all the member states and the candidate country sign and ratify the accession treaty, the applicant country will become a member of the European Union.
In June 1993, the European Council held a meeting in Copenhagen, in regards of the future membership to the EU of the Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. European Council suggested that accession will take place soon as the CEE countries show their ability to attain specific economic and political conditions set by the EU. Since then, those conditions, which are known as the Copenhagen criteria, include the stability of institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respecting human rights, and protecting minorities. Moreover, the Copenhagen criteria also demands countries to have well functioning market economy and to hold ability to cope with the competitive nature of the market of EU. And lastly, the
Copenhagen criteria requires countries to fulfill the obligations of membership, including the willingness to achieve common political and economic goals and join the European Union (Hillion 2004, 2). Previous research on enlargement process paid attention to the political and legal transformation in the candidate countries set by EU conditionality. In this process, the candidate countries had to adopt not only the EU acquis communautaire, but also principles and rules related to democracy and rule of law that are foreseen in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union, for which the union did not have competences over old member states (Sedelmeier 2011).
In 2004 and 2007, seven Central Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania), three Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and two Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus), became members of the
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European Union. This period of enlargement is known as the fifth wave of EU enlargements.
In 2013 Croatia became the 28th member of the EU, thus becoming the only Western Balkan country to gain accession as of 2020, whereas, six other Western Balkan countries remain non-members (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia). Nevertheless, the European Commission’s Western Balkan Strategy in 2018 provided a major boost for the region’s aspirations to become EU members. The strategy reconfirmed the future of the Western Balkans as an integral part of the European Union (European Commission 2018a). Moreover, in February 2018, European Commission announced the six flagship initiatives that sees EU taking specific actions in the next two years to support the changes in areas of mutual interest in Western Balkans. Among others, the initiatives aimed to strengthen rule of law (which also includes fight against corruption and organized crime), reinforce cooperation on security and migration, to expand EU Energy Union to Western Balkans. The strategy also included the need for the EU to prepare to welcome new members to the union once they have met the criteria (European Commission 2018c).
After each enlargement, the EU applies a constructive accession policy approach, which lays its attention to different aspects depending on the nature of the region and countries, and also takes into account lessons from previous memberships (European Commission 2012a). For the future enlargement of EU strategy that includes Western Balkan countries, European Commission suggested that countries of the region should meet all necessary conditions, and the emphasis was given in strengthening of democracies, reforming the rule of law which includes the fight against organized crime and corruption. Moreover, the Commission further requests for countries to employ economic reforms to ensure competitiveness in the European market. And the last requirement is the regional cooperation and reconciliation for addressing the legacies left by the Yugoslavian wars that devastated the region in the 1990s (European Commission 2018a).
Corruption for EU is a phenomenon that hinders economic growth, channeled away from the productive outcomes of the economy and undermines the coherence of public spending. It is estimated that corruption brings a cost of 120 billion EURO per year for the EU economy (European Commission 2017, 1-2). The Convention against corruption involving public officials derived by The Council of the European Union in 26 May 1997, aimed to ensure that every EU country takes necessary measures to criminalize corruption that involves public
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officials. The convention was designated to fight corruption against European or national officials of EU countries by strengthening the judicial cooperation between EU countries. In September 2005, the European Commission signed the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), and in November 2008 ratified it, making the European Commission a party of the convention.
The primary interest of this study lies on the future enlargement policy to include Western Balkan countries as part of larger, integrated EU. In addition to the formal requirements, what makes a non-member state more likely to be granted a candidacy for becoming an EU
member or a formal EU membership? Previous studies have shown that the probability for a non-member state to join the EU is dependent on various factors. For instance, Mattli and Plümper (2002) and Schimmelfennig (2002) find that the level of democracy is positively associated with accession to the EU. In addition, Katchanovski (2011) and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2006) demonstrate that a non-member state with a higher level of economic development is more likely to become an EU member.
Given that the level of democracy and the level of economic development matter for applicant countries to obtain EU membership, some studies suggest that an applicant country’s level of corruption might be related with its prospect of EU accession (Grubiša 2010; Kartal 2014; Vachudova 2014). If so, does the level of corruption always matter for explaining to what extent an applicant country is likely to join the EU? Or, is the corruption issue becoming increasingly important for future applicants? Without systematic analyses for addressing these questions, the relationship between corruption and probability of EU
accession remains a puzzle.
To fill the empirical gap in the literature, I focus on how corruption shapes the prospect of EU accession after the fifth EU enlargement in 2007. Specifically, I argue that after the fifth enlargement, the corruption situations in Bulgaria and Romania made the EU reconsider the criteria for applying EU membership. In other words, the EU started to pay more attention to non-member states’ situation of corruption for evaluating the qualification for EU
membership since 2007 (Grubiša 2010; Vachudova 2014). Therefore, a non-member country is less likely to join the EU after 2007 if it suffers a high level of political corruption. In this thesis, I adopt a mixed method approach to present quantitative and qualitative evidence to support my argument.
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