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suspend the oil and gas projects of Vietnam’s southeast coast44. In early 2009, China also made enthusiastic attempt to dissuade Philippine from enacting its revised baseline law but in vain after all45. China’s attitudes kept turning firm. In a talk with the U.S. senior officials in Beijing in March 2010, the Chinese leaders mentioned for the first time that “the South China Sea is Chin’s core interest”.
From January 2012 to May 2013, Beijing continuously dispatched fish boats, surveillance ships and fleets to the South China Sea. It moved actively around Scarborough Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal within the Philippine’s EEZ, which caused military confrontations and standoff in the region and got the nerves of the littoral states again.
5.2 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute
Historical Background
In the vast expanse of East China Sea, eight tiny islands are located on it46. These islands are located in its extended continental shelf edge,
44 Schofield and Storey, Supra note 1, p. 22.
45 Philippine passed a baseline law in February 2009, which made a revision and claimed the Kalayaan Archipelago as well as the Scarborough Shoal into its territory.
The revision made the law more consistent with the LOSC. Schofield and Storey, Supra note 1, p. 29.
46 Their names in turns are Diaoyu/Uotsuri, Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima, Nanxiaodao/Minami-kojima, Beixiaodao/Kita-kijima, Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima or
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where is between 25 degrees 40 minutes to 26 degrees north latitude, and from 123 degrees to 124 degrees 34 minutes east longitude. Total area of the eight islands is merely about 6.5 square kilometers, and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is the biggest one of them, which is measured about 3.91 square kilometers. Yet in the eight islands, only two out of them are over 1 square kilometers47. These islands are 102 nautical miles north from Taiwan, 90 nautical miles east from mainland China and 230 nautical miles south from Naha, Okinawa. Although these islands are remote and uninhabitable, for centuries, they have been a rest place and an indicator for fishermen and people who travel between China and Japan.
In the 15th century, China named these islands “Diaoyu Yu” or
“Diaoyutai” and recorded them into history, furthermore, the Chinese designated the islands to be under Taiwan’s administration at that time.
However, Japan also drew these islands into their territory and named them “Senkaku” islands in 1895 before the First Sino-Japanese war broke out. After World War II, according to the San Francisco Treaty, Japan handed over the islands. The Japanese government made Nansei Islands including Ryukyu Islands as well as Daito Islands under trusteeship of the United States48. Yet in June 1971, the U.S. government returned the Taisho-jima, Chongbeiyen/Okini Kitaiwa, Chongnanye/Kino Minamiiwa, Feilai/Tobise.
47 The other one is the Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima Island.
48 As the Treaty refers, “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole
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trusted region to Japan according to the “Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (also known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty)”, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was included. The Reversion Treaty was implemented in May 1972, then Japan incorporated the islands into jurisdiction of Ishigaki , Okinawa49.
There was no dispute over this maritime area until the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) declared their discovery that there might be oil deposits around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 196850.
After the ECAFE’s announcement, China issued its first formal claim to the islands in December 197151. Japan and Taiwan also made their claims after China. The U.S. as one of the contributors of this administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)…Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters. ” See Chapter II, Article 3, San Francisco Treaty (Treaty of Peace with Japan).
49 National Policy Foundation (July 6, 2005): “Diao Yu Tai Zhu Quan Zheng Yi Yu Hu Yu Wen Ti,” via: http://old.npf.org.tw/Symposium/s94/940714-NS.htm, latest retrieved on 2013/7/3.
50 Ibid.
51 “Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Wai Jiao Bu Sheng Ming”, Renmin Ribao, front-page, December 31, 1971.
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situation clarified they would keep neutral on the sovereignty issue in November 1971. William P. Rogers, Secretary of the State of that time, stated in the Senate Committee saying that “This treaty does not affect the legal status of those islands of all. Whatever the legal situation prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect52.” After that, Washington keeps neutral on issues of the sovereignty of the islands officially. Nonetheless, it also confirms that The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan which was signed by the two countries in January 1960 would apply to the Senkaku Islands.
In Article 5 of the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, it stipulated that53:
Each party (i.e. the United State and Japan) recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.
52 Han-yi Shaw, (1999), “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 3, p. 123.
53 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Article V (January 19, 1960), See the online document here:
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/mutual_cooperation_treaty.pdf latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
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In March 2004, Deputy Spokesman of the State Department, Adam Ereli, reaffirmed this position. He mentioned that “Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty states that it applies to the territories under the administration of Japan (i.e. Senkaku Islands)54.” Until recently, the U.S. provides the similar language in public when it comes to this issue55.
The U.S. standpoint makes the situation complicated. Since both of China and Japan see Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands the important real estate for their economic values. Moreover, after ECAFE’s 1968 discovery, some also put attention on strategic status of the islands. In addition to the lucrative and large deposits of oil lying around, the islands could play a role allowing its owners to claim their maritime rights under the UNCLOS thus have a greater predominance of the East China Sea.
On one hand, according to some estimates, sovereignty over the islands could affects approximately 40,000 square kilometers of continental shelf or EEZ56. On the other hand, owners could grant their
54 U.S. Department of State: “Daily Press Briefing (Corrected), March 24, 2004,” via:
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/30743.htm latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
55 U.S. Department of State: “Daily Press Briefing, August 16, 2010,” via:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/08/146001.htm latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
56 Zhong-qi Pan, (2007), “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands:
The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 72.
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military and security advantage by controlling the west side of the first island chain of the Western Pacific. Combination of these various values makes Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands the ground of contesting eventually.
The Claimants
There are three claimants vying for sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Based on the special historical background, Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) has its reasons for claiming the Diaoyu Islands similar with that of China57, which mainly focus on geographical proximity, historical records and usages. And same with China, Taiwan asserts that according to the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, the Diaoyu Islands should have been restored to the Republic of China, not to mention that this conclusion was reconfirmed in the later 1951 San Francisco Treaty and the 1952 Peace Treaty between the Republic of China and Japan58.
Japan’s claim to the islands is mainly based on their seizure and
57 After the second part of the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) retreated to Taiwan, and after that the ROC government in Taiwan has been vying for the representative status and the legitimism of “China” with the PRC government in the international society.
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan): Statement, “The Diaoyutai Islands An Inherent Part of the Territory of the Republic of China
(Taiwan)” via:
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/fd8c3459-b3ec-4ca6-9231-403f2920090a latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
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usage of these islands. In late 1890s the Japanese Koga Tatsushiro established business on the islands, operating bonito-flake factories and processing albatross feathers to sell59. Japan alleges that the islands were terra nullius (as empty land) when it occupied these islands in 1895, so they were not included into the Treaty of Shimonoseki and thus not in the obligation to be returned to China after the World War II according to either the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Proclamation. Japan asserts that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands belong to the description of Article 3 in the San Francisco Treaty as the Nansei Islands which were put under the U.S. administration after the treaty was signed in 1951, but not the islands it renounced in the Article 260. While the U.S. deliberately maintains its neutrality on the sovereignty issues, Japan asserts that its use and control over the islands was normal and undisputed until the possibility of oil resources was released in 1968.
China’s assertion is mainly against that of Japan’s. First of all, Beijing refutes that the islands were terra nullius in 1895 strongly argued by Tokyo. Based on this point of view, Beijing asserts that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are affiliated with Taiwan and included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed after the First Sino-Japanese War, As a
59 The Japan Times (May 18, 2012): “Owner OK with metro bid to buy disputed
Senkaku Islands,” via:
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/18/news/owner-ok-with-metro-bid-to-buy-disputed-senkaku-islands/#.UdZ5gDttPik latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: “Basic View on the Senkaku Islands,”
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/ latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
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corollary, these islands should be returned to the Chinese after the end of World War II in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the San Francisco Peace Treaty61. In addition to its legitimacy status, China also put emphasis on historical evidences claiming that the islands were named and recorded in its history since the Ming Dynasty in 15th century. Furthermore, according to Beijing, the Diaoyu Islands were used intermittently by the Chinese and have been put under administration of Taiwan since Qing Dynasty, so it is the Japanese who usurped the islands in 1895.
Contest Simmering
Though the quarrel has happened since 1970s, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were actually controlled by Japan after the Okinawa Reversion Treaty which came into effect in 1972. From then on, flashpoints werwe mainly kept under the civilian level between the Chinese communities (including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China) and the Japanese society62.
61 Xinhua News (June 13, 2013): “Lu Xing Kai Luo Xuan Yan Ling Tu Tiao Kuan
Gui Huain Zhong Guo Diao Yu Dao,” via:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-06/13/c_124851115.htm latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
62 To be detailed, the sentiment is between the Chinese communities and specific right-wing groups of Japan. From 1970 to 2000, several incidents burst out between the Chinese communities and certain Japanese right-wing political groups, which usually have beginnings of the Japanese try to set flag or lighthouse on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to confirm their sovereignty, and such behaviours provoke
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aside the sovereignty problem in his visit to Japan, he said63:Our two sides agreed not to touch upon this question when diplomatic relations were normalized between China and Japan…It doesn’t matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years.
Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will surely find a solution acceptable to all.
In May 1979, when he was at a meeting with the Japanese congressman Suzuki Zenko, Deng further suggested that China and Japan should jointly exploit the resources around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and shelve the sovereignty problem temporarily. The idea was formally made as a guideline included to China’s maritime dispute policy later in June of the same year64. Since then, the two parties have only achieved a the Chinese side. The most two prominent groups are the Nihon Seinensha (Japan Youth Federation) and the Chinese Baodiao movement (Protect Diaoyu Islands). The sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is more generally concerned in the Chinese society than in Japan, since many Chinese are still suffering from sense of humiliation according to the historical rivalry with Japan. Shaw, Supra note 52, pp.
11-18.
63 “Vice-Premier Teng at Tokyo Press Conference: New Upsurge in Friendly Relations between China and Japan”, Peking Review, Vol. 21, No. 44, p. 16.
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: “Ge Zhi Zheng Yi,
Gong Tong Kai Fa,” via:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/wjs_611318/2159_611322/t8958.sht ml latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
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fisheries pact treaty in November 199765, and after that, both of them try to keep a low-key attitude on the sovereignty issues.
However, things have been changed in recent decade. In fact, since 1999, Beijing apparently has raised its level of presence in the disputed maritime area by shifting its verbal claims to dispatching physical researches and naval vessels to water area nearby the islands66. At the same time, Japan also drafted a plan in November 2004 indicating that it would “defend the southern remote islands of Kyushu and Okinawa from possible invasion67” aiming at reconfirming and strengthening its power over the disputed maritime area.
In February 2005, Japan announced a lighthouse erected on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island by the Nihon Seinensha—a Japan right-wing activists was placed under state protection and control, which resulted in a strong protest from Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Ministry called the move by Tokyo as “a serious provocation and violation of Chinese
65 China and Japan had made their first official fishery pact treaty in 1975, and after 1982 the two side signed and ratified the LOSC, they established a new treaty in 1997 which came into effect in 2000. Chien-liang Lu, (2011), “Sino-Japan Fisheries Agreement and the Solution to Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Disputes,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 43-50. Pan, p. 75.
66 Pan, Supra note 56, p. 75.
67 Taylor Fravel, (2010), “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands
Dispute,” p. 150. On line resource
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/fravel/2010_senkaku.pdf, latest retrieved on 2013/07/01.
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territorial sovereignty68.” In December 2008, two Chinese survey ships were reportedly found entering into Japan’s territorial waters around the disputed islands, which marked for the first time that Chinese non-civilian but the official vessels traveled so close to the disputed islands69.
Tensions did not stop here, from around 2012, Beijing put fairly regular incursions by dispatching the government aircrafts and vessels to the nearby disputed areas, which were thought to give Japan a pressure and hint it that China owns the sovereignty over these islands70. In addition to actual moves around the islands, in March 2012, China also officially announced the names of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and other feature affiliated nearby to confirm its legitimacy around the maritime area71.
The disputes reached its peak in July 2012, after Japanese government formally provided a project to buy and nationalize the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. On July 7, 2012, the Japanese Premier Noda
68 Pan, Supra note 56, p. 76.
69 Fravel, Supra note 67, p. 156.
70 Michael Swaine, (2013), “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” China Leader Monitor, No. 41, pp. 1-10.
71 State Oceanic Administration of People’s Republic of China (March 2, 2012):
“Guo Jia Hai Yang Ju Min Zheng Bu Shou Quan Gong Bu Wo Guo Diao Yu Dao Ji Bu Fen Fu Shu Dao Yu Biao Zhun Ming Cheng,” via:
http://www.soa.gov.cn/xw/hyyw_90/201211/t20121109_561.html latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
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Yoshihiko reiterated in an interview that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands belongs to Japan undoubtedly, and there was no territorial dispute on the islands between China and Japan72. Japan’s announcement aroused the Chinese ire. After that, Beijing sent their vessels entering into the territorial waters of the islands more frequently, and even had a military exercise in the East China Sea73.
The Japanese government officially signed a contract buying the islands from its owner on September 11, 2012. However, China did not stop sending it vessels patrolling the disputed water areas after that. In fact, from September 11 to the end of 2012, China was allegedly found it made 18 incursions into the territorial waters74.
The arena also shifts to diplomatic channels. However, from September 2012, to May 2013, consultations and meetings between the two parties did not ease the situation. On April 26, 2013, Beijing expressed that the Diaoyu Islands is China’s “core interest”, which is a term usually associates with Tibet and Taiwan issues and means that the room for compromise is little75. This position is reaffirmed again when Xi
72 Swaine, Supra note 70, p. 13.
73 Ibid.; China Times (July 10, 2012): “Da Lu Hai Jun Jin Qi Dong Hai Shi Tan Yan Xi,” via: http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050501/112012071000187.html latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
74 Swaine, Supra note 70, p. 16.
75 Nikkei (April 27, 2013): “Zhong Guo Shou Ci Biao Shi Diao Yu Tai Shi He Xin Li
Yi,” via:
http://zh.cn.nikkei.com/politicsaeconomy/politicsasociety/5419-20130427.html latest
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Jinping when he met with Barack Obama in a China-U.S. summit in June 201376.
It seems that a solution between China and Japan will not easily come up in a near future.
retrieved on July 1, 2013.
76 Global Post (June 11, 2013): “Senkaku Islands are "core interest" of China, Xi
tells Obama,” via:
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130611/senkaku -islands-are-core-interest-china-xi-tells-obama latest retrieved on July 1, 2013.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
Realists assert that the international system is dynamic since states are never satisfied with their status quo in the society. To survive and make sure their security in the system, a state will struggle to maximize its power and be hegemony in the region. Thus, there are always revisionist states, once they obtain potential power, these states will challenge the status quo in the system, which brings about wars and conflicts.
Based on realistic thoughts, the China Threat advocates predict that
Based on realistic thoughts, the China Threat advocates predict that