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worried about Beijing would take further aggression into India’s inner territory. However, China unilaterally declared the cease-fire and retreated from the eastern sector on the next day.
4.2 Sino-Soviet Conflict
Historical Background
Many researchers think the series of conflicts on the Sino-Soviet borders in 1969 were not only ignited by disputes of territorial sovereignty but also should be seen as a result of the deterioration of China-Soviet relationship33. The Soviet Union and China as the two pivots of the socialist camp since the Cold War began, and with other socialist states, they confronted against the imperial incarnations—especially Japan and the United State at that time. There was a prosperous period between China and the Soviet Union since they supported each other not only on ideology but politics and other
33 Xin Qi, (1969), Zhen Bao Dao Shi Jian Zhen Xiang. Hong Kong: Steps Publications Ltd; Thomas W. Robinson, (1972), “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute:
Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 1175-1202; Xiao-yan, Zhang, (1978), Zhen Bao Dao Shi Jian Ji Fei E Guan Xi. Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise; Lyle J.
Goldstein, (2001), “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why it Matters,” The China Quarterly, pp. 985-997; Kui-song Yang, (2000), “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol.1, No.1, pp.21-52.
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dimensions.
As regards brotherhood between the Chinese and the Soviets, Mao Zedong had mentioned in many occasions that:
Thank for Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, they give us weapons, which are not machine guns, but Marxism Leninism…We should unite with the countries abroad who treat us fairly, and struggle (against the imperialism) with them. That is to say, we unite with the Soviet Union, unite with other people’s republic countries, unite with the masses and proletariats in the world, as an international united front34.
While Anastas Mikoyan as an envoy of the Soviet Union made his secret visit to China in 1949, Mao highly appreciated and praised the guidance, advises and helps which the Soviet Union has provided to CCP in the meeting. He said to Mikoyan:
The Chinese Communist Party born in 1921 is one of the direct results of the October Revolution, and the Soviet Union led by Lenin gave us help. After Lenin, Stalin also gives us help. …it’s crucial that the Soviet Union gives us a quarter of its total foreign aid. We would probably have not succeeded without your help35.
34 Zedong Mao, “Lun Ren Min Min Zhu Zhuan Zheng,” Renmin Ribao, July 1, 1949.
35 Chi-hua, Shen, (2009), “From Xibaipo to Moscow: Mao Zedong’s Announcement of Leaning to One Side Re-discussions on the Background and Basis of Sino-Soviet
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acknowledged the first place of the Soviet Union among all socialist states and spoke of the “deep and strong relationship” between China and the Soviet Union, in which, Mao described both of them were great powers36. Until 1957, at the fortieth annual convention of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Mao reaffirmed the fraternal relationship and interdependence between China and the USSR, Mao highly praised the Soviet Union’s leading role among the socialist camp while admitting China as a follower37. The similar tone acknowledging the Soviet Union as a forerunner and a leader of socialist revolution can be heard among the leaderships of the Chinese Communist Party at that time. For example, Kang Sheng (Zhang Zong Ke) also mentioned the revolution happened in China was the sequel of the October Revolution38.It was not only rhetoric for the Chinese leaderships to highly praise the contributions of the Soviet Union. Connections on military, foreign Alliance,” Zhong Gong Dangshi Yanjiu, Vol. 4, pp. 14-33.
36 Dieter Heinzig, (2004), The Soviet Union and the Communist China, 1945-1950:
The Arduous Road to the Alliance. New York: M. E. Sharpe. p. 269.
37 Zedong Mao, “Zai Su Lian Zui Gao Su Wei Ai Qin Zhu Shi Yue Ge Ming Si Shi Zhou Nian Hui Shang De Jiang Hua (The Speech at the Fortieth Convention of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union),” Mao Ze Dong Wen Ji Di Qi Juan (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, VII). Also see Renmin Ribao, the Front Page, November 7, 1957.
38 Sheng Kang, “Zhong Guo Ge Ming Shi Wei Da De Shi Yue Ge Ming De Ji Xu Wei Su Lian Gong Chan Dang Ren Er Zuo (The Revolution of China is the Continuance of the Great Revolution of Octorber—for the Communists of the Soviet Union),”
Renmin Ribao, the seventh folio, November 7, 1957.
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policies and economy affairs between China and the USSR were further confirmed and improved after the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed by the two governments in 195039. The treaty officially unfolded an era of interdependence and mutual benefit between the two countries.
From 1951, the USSR gave aids to China in several ways, including offering low-interests loans, providing science and technology archives, constructing or reconstructing key projects for development (especially on heavy industries), starting up bilateral trades, setting up joint stock companies, dispatching the Soviet experts to China as well as training the Chinese experts, helping to draw up economic plan and so forth. Among which also contained the well-known “156 key projects” compatible with the first five-year plan of China, and the project was viewed to contribute significantly to China’s industry development40. Li Fuchun, who was in
39 According to the treaty, there were 6 clauses in it, including mutual military cooperation, to fight together against imperialist states and invasions, joint consultation on the common stakes, spirit of friendly cooperation reflected on territory integrity and respect toward sovereignty of internal affairs, to cultivate and consolidate on the cultural and economic relationships of the two countries. The original text of the treaty was also published on the Renmin Ribao on February 15, 1950.
40 After the Chinese civil war and the CCP established the “new China”, infrastructures in China had been severely destroyed. The Soviet aids at the time were mainly focused on economic rebuilding and setting up foundations for industry. The
“156 key projects” were progressively implemented and mainly concentrated on coal, electricity, steel, non-ferrous metals, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, and military industry sectors. Zhi-hua Shen, (2001), “Jian Guo Chu Qi Su Lian Dui
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the Government Administration Council and also a member of the first five-year plan group then, once commented in his report that China would not have gained its achievements in the first five-year plan without the USSR’s help41.
In the Stalin era, he did not amplify China’s status in the socialist camp. Until the early years of Khrushchev’s term, he started to pay more attention on the relationship with China and to increase more aids to Beijing.
The turning point of the fraternal relationship between the two countries appeared around the middle of the 1950s, especially after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union42. At the Congress of the CPSU on February 24, 1956, Khrushchev delivered a
“secrete speech”, which especially lashed out at Stalin’s crimes and tried Hua Jing Ji Yuan Zhu De Ji Ben Qing Kuang (Xu Qian),” Dang Shi Yan Jiu Zi Liao, no.3, pp.1-16.
41 Li Fuchun reconfirmed this opinion at a meeting of the first session of the National People’s Congress in 1955, the transcript of the speech was also printed on the Renmin Ribao, see “Gaun Yu Fa Zhan Guo Min Jing Ji De Di Yi Ge Wu Nian Ji Hua De Bao Gao Zhi Si”, Renmin Ribao, July 8, 1955; The China Review News (March 9, 2013): “Li Shi Hui Gu: Su Lian Zhuan Jia Yuan Hua Yu Che Li Shi Mo,” via:
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/mag/docDetail.jsp?coluid=101&docid
=102463439&page=1 latest retrieved on April 22, 2013.
42 The particular time when the split between China and the USSR has happened is not clear, however, we can still be sure it was triggered by the changes of ideological and foreign policy orientation which were made by Khrushchev. See Thomas Robinson, Supra note 33, pp.1175-1177; Zhang, Supra note 33, Chapter 2.
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to overthrow the cult of personality toward Stalin43. After the Congress, Khrushchev further threw out the idea of “peaceful coexistence” arguing that by peaceful competition with the western countries, a war between the communist camp and the capitalist camp could be avoidable44. In 1959, Khrushchev as the head of Soviet Union made his first visit to the United State which convinced the western countries there might be a start of the thaw between the two superpowers under the cold war structure45.
Nonetheless, the series of u-turns Khrushchev made on ideology and foreign policies brought about discrepancies between Beijing and Moscow increasingly. In fact, the discords appeared before 1960, and some even think one of the causes of the Great Leap Forward in China was to surpass the Soviet Union and so that to help China to claim its central role in the socialist camp46.
43 Robinson, Supra note 33, p. 1776; also see the full text of this speech—“On The Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” via:
http://archive.org/details/TheCrimesOfTheStalinEraSpecialReportToThe20thCongress OfThe latest retrieved on Aprial 28, 2013.
44 Nikita S. Khrushchev, (1959), “On peaceful coexistence,” Foreign Affairs, No. 1, Vol. 38. New York: Council of Foreign Affairs, pp.1-18.
45 Though this optimism and harmonious atmosphere turned out to be a flash in the pan after the U-2 incident which happened in May 1960.
46 See the related interviews with Chinese historians including Li Dan-hui, Shen Zhi-hua, and other officials on video programs, “Dong Feng Po-- Zhong Su Guan Xi Bian Qian Jie Bi”, you can find the resources at the website below:
http://so.v.ifeng.com/video?q=%E4%B8%9C%E9%A3%8E%E7%A0%B4-%E4%B8
%AD%E8%8B%8F%E5%85%B3%E7%B3%BB%E5%8F%98%E8%BF%81%E6%
8F%AD%E7%A7%98%EF%BC%88%E4%B8%80%EF%BC%89&c=5 latest
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Mao showed skepticism toward Soviet Union’s conversion on ideology and he thought Khrushchev’s advocacy for “peaceful coexistence” would eventually turn out to be wrong. In contrary to Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence theory, Mao alleged that it is definite and necessary to open a war with the capitalist countries one day and the violent revolutionary liberation movement will defeat the capitalists in the end. In Mao’s view, the socialist camp and the capitalist camp could only be enemies against each other, accordingly, there’s no room for the
“peaceful coexistence”.
When it comes to 1960, the disputes over ideology began to emerge in public. At the Warsaw summit in February, 1960, Khrushchev mentioned that “We (the USSR) are now going to go our own way”, which means, a way different from that of China’s47. Two days after, Renmin Ribao published an article written by a representative of China for the Warsaw Summit, which denounced the “revisionism” severely48.
retrieved on April 20, 2013.
47 Ming-fu Yan, (2007), “Sui Kang Sheng Can Jia Hua Jue Shou Nao Hui Yi,”
Hundred Year Tide, pp. 10-13.
48 This article was written by Kang Sheng, one of the members of the core leadership at the time, he was also the representative of China for Warsaw summit. The article did not scold the Soviet Union directly, instead, Yugoslavia took up the blame as the revisionist. Nonetheless, what China blamed for—including the peaceful projection toward the Western bloc, was all contrary to Khrushchev’s inclination of foreign policy at the time. See “Zai Hua Sha Tiao Yue Di Yue Kuo Zheng Zhi Xie Shang Wei Yuan Hui Hui Yi Shang Kang Sheng Tong Zhi Tan Mu Qian Kuo Ji Xing Shi”, Renmin Ribao, front page, February 6, 1950.
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At that time, the CCP put its weight on mauling revisionists49. In the same year, the two fraternal communist countries had quarrels fiercely with each other in public. China blamed the USSR as a revisionist, and the latter criticized China as “infantilism” and “doctrinism” in retaliation50.
Discords on ideology were lasting, and it jeopardized relationship between the two countries. In July 1960, Moscow tore up the contract of scientific cooperation signed with Beijing previously; furthermore, all experts dispatched to China were recalled to the USSR. This recall put Beijing in an embarrassing position, for they could not rely on the Moscow’s scientific and technical supports anymore. The undergoing nuclear cooperation project was also cut, as a result, the Chinese had to do the nuclear weapon developing by their own from scratch51.
In July 1963, the Soviet Union admitted on the Pravda that there were fundamental and theoretical discrepancies between the leaderships of China and the USSR. Meanwhile, China revealed its controversies
49 China government published articles in series criticizing the revisionism on domestic presses after the Warsaw summit in February 1960, though all of them did not blame the USSR or Khrushchev’s foreign policies directly. See “Lie Ning Zhu Yi Wan Sui”, Hongqi, 1960 (8), pp. 1-29; “Yan Zhe Wei Da Lie Ning De Dao Lu Qian Jin”, Renmin Ribao, editorial, April 22, 1960; “Zai Lie Ning De Ge Ming Qi Zhi Xia Tuan Jie Qi Lai”, Renmin Ribao, the front page, April 23, 1960.
50 Danhui Li, (2006), “Zui Hou De Nu Li Zhong Su Zai 1960 Nian Dai Chu De Dou Zheng Yu Diao He (Last Effort: Struggle and Conciliation of China and Soviet Union in Early 1960s),” Journal of Social Science, pp. 146-154.
51 Robinson, Supra note 33, p. 1176.
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with the USSR in September, and it also published the noted “Nine Commentaries on the CPSU” in succession on its official media52.
While the two parties criticized each other as traitor of the communism, the contests also transferred to military and boundary disputes. Since China and the USSR shared a lengthy common border line from the western to the eastern China, Mao worried a lot that the Chinese territory joint with the USSR were under risk. He once complained “the Soviet Union occupies too much territory (of others)”.
At a meeting with a Japanese Socialist Party Delegation in 1964, Mao mentioned:
Whenever they (the Soviets) can put something into their pockets, they will. It is said that they even want to occupy Xinjiang and Heilongjiang53.
Mao’s concern seemed not unwarranted, for Moscow also viewed Beijing as a threat at the time. The USSR signed a mutual defense treaty with Mongolia in 1966 so that it can deploy troops to the Sino-Soviet border. Especially after the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August
52 The Nine Commentaries were published on Renmin Ribao and Hong Qui (Red Flag periodical) from September 1963 to July 1964 in series, aiming at elaborating the discrepancies between China and the USSR, as well as criticizing Khrushchev and the USSR under his governing was revisionist and the secession of the international communist movement.
53 Yang, Supra note 33, p.23.
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1968, which made the Chinese were more concerned that under the
“Brezhnev doctrine” one day the Soviets would invade China as well.
The tension escalated. In October 1964, there were over 1,000 incidents took place along the border, and in 1969, the number of incident spiked to 4,18954.
There was a chance for reconciliation of Beijing and Moscow after Khrushchev’s downfall and when Leonid Brezhnev took over his position in October 1964. However, it finally turned out to be a futility. As the Chinese official press commented, since Brezhnev’s government still adhered to the peaceful coexistence theory, it looked like his government was a “Khrushchev doctrine without Khrushchev55”.
The Disputed Points
54 There was a trend in Czechoslovakia that the domestic people requested for democracy, yet this relatively limited democracy requesting movement was seen as challenging to the Soviet’s dominant status then; the movement made its end after the Soviets and other socialist states invaded Czechoslovakia with armed weapons in August 1968. In China, the invasion was seen as “Brezhnev doctrine”, which asserted that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene other socialist countries to correct the political deviations. Ibid. p. 24, also see the Note. 7 and 10 at p. 50; Goldstein. Supra note 33, p. 990.
55 See “San Yue Fen Lie Hui Yi Hou Su Gong Xin Ling Dao Ji Qi Zhui Sui Zhe De Fan Hua Yan Lun” Renmin Riboa, November 10, 1965.
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The disputed points of Sino-Soviet territory conflict burst out in March 1969, mainly concentrated on the way of boundary delimitating and the treaties which were signed by the Ching dynasty and the tsarist Russia.
The battle locale, Zhenbao Island—which was called Damansky (Damanskii) Island in Russian—was one of the numerous islands on the Ussuri, where a common boundary river between China and Russia at the Far East. There were at least hundreds of islands scattered on the Ussuri and Heilongjiang River, many of them were not sizable, even two of the largest islands of them—the Chilichin Island and Zhenbao Island, were measured by 3.6 and 0.74 square kilometers. Some of these islands belonged to China, others belonged to the USSR; nonetheless, there were many islands on the rivers belonging to neither one of them. Though Zhenbao Island was uninhabited, the China government made it incorporated into Heilongjian province; yet the west bank of the river inhabited the Tungustic ethnic of China. The USSR also set posts just around the islands at the east bank56.
Before the clash happened in 1969, there had been territorial disputes between the CCP government and the USSR, the sovereignty of the islands on the Ussuri River was only part of them. It has long been a bane in the Chinese mind that the tsarist Russia had robbed China of massive lands since the late years of the Ching dynasty through the
56 Zhang, Supra note 33, pp. 73-75.
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“unequal treaties” and even forcibly occupies without treaties. At the time, China was encountered with great powers from around the world, the tsarist Russia was just one of them. According to some accounts, there were at least 4.2 millions square kilometers that China had yielded to Russia from 1689 to 194557.
China and Russia had signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, Treaty of Aigun in 1858, Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 and Convention of Peking in 1860. These treaties signed at the Ching dynasty confirmed part of the outlines between China and Russia58. And according to them, the Argun River at the northern China marked the two countries; Heilongjiang was made as a boundary river, at its southeast, Ussuri also marked the border later. Then the boundary contour at the northeast China was roughly settled down.
The Ussuri as a boundary river, which distinguished China and Russia, yet debates were emerging when it comes to sovereignty of the islands on river. Both of the two countries alleged they owned these islands.
57 Most of the “lost lands” from east to west of China were bounded with Russia,
57 Most of the “lost lands” from east to west of China were bounded with Russia,