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guide actor’s decisions and provide meanings for the actions15. However, rules and norms do not determine human behaviors absolutely and directly, it also depends on the process of deliberation and interpretation16.
3.3 Identity, Interest, and Behavior
As Maja Zehfuss mentions, it is difficult to determine what is the core concept of constructivism, because every constructivist emphasizes different concepts in their theories.17 This makes the constructivism more discrete and obscure than we expect. To make theoretical applications, we must make a blend of these concepts.
Nonetheless, there is still consensus among constructivists. By viewing the state and the international structure as human being in a society, constructivists apply social theories to IR study. To this extant, the constructivists stand on the same ground.
On the other hand, the constructivists also deny the exogenous between actor and structure. They argue that the international political environment should not be seen as an unchangeable and given fact, instead, the structure interacts with the actor.
15 Ibid. p. 34.
16 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
17 Zhefuss, Supra note 8, p. 2.
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Furthermore, by refusing the fundamental assumptions of the rationalism, constructivists have the same questions in IR research. Since the material power is not the only factor states take into account when they are considering what actions would they adopt, “what is the critical factor make states act in different ways in the international society?”
Constructivists are aiming at providing explanations for states behaviors. Yet differing from the realists, their starting point is the idea, rather than a given and unchangeable structural based on material power such as economy and military. In the constructivist view, it is not necessary for the great power politics to go to a gloomy result, since Hobbesian anarchy is not the only logic in the international society and there are other cultures of interaction among actors. It is not necessary to jump into skepticism while facing China’s rise. Once we consider China’s rise in a constructive perspective. In other words, when we take state’s identity into account and realize that there are other kind of cultures among international relations, then we can probably find another rising path different from “the tragedy of great power politics”.
Alexander Wendt provides four kinds of identity in his book Social Theory of International Politics, which are personal/corporate, type, role, and collective18. Based on these identities, a state as an actor in international society can recognize its interests and know how to interact
18 Alexander Wendt, (1999), Social Theory of International Politics. New York:
Cambridge University Press. p. 224.
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with others. Following we are introducing these four kinds of identities.
The personal/corporate identity is based on material or physical characters. When a state has its territory and people, then it forms itself an individual entity in the society. Personal/corporate identities is the basis and element of other identities.
The type identity—as other two kinds of identities which will be mentioned below—derives from a state’s personal/corporate identity.
Wendt borrows the concept from Jim Fearon, who provides the concept of “social category”. Which indicates someone’s objective characters, such as his appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, opinions, experiences, historical commonalities and so forth, can make the actor recognized and labeled in a group19. Social rules or norms play a role in this recognizing process. That is to say, members in a group identify or discriminate each other by objective characters, which also reflect the rules or norms behind the society. On the other hand, rules in the society guide other members to take actions or have expectations on a member in certain category. In the international society, the type identity could be referred to “regime types” or “forms of state,” such as capital states, communist states, fascist states or democrat state, and so forth20. A member in a society can have not only one type identity at the
19 Jim D. Fearon, (1999), “What is Type Identity (As We Now Use The Word),” p. 19, Stanford University.
20 Wendt, Supra note 18, pp. 226.
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same time.21 In short, pre-existing and self-organizing characters under social rules make type identities constructivist.
The role identity relies on Others and depends on culture largely.
Role identity is not based on intrinsic or inner characteristics of an actor, but only exists in relations with Others22. That is to say, an actor cannot obtain role identities only by itself, role identities must be rooted in interactions happened between Self and Other. Within such interactions, the counter-parts share some common knowledge embedded in a society, and the Self can see itself from the eyes of Others23.
Collective identity is also known as “social” identities in the social identity theory24, which “takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification25.” The collective identity is the combination of type identities and role identities to some extent, yet go beyond them at the same time. Holding such identity, distinctions between Self and Others become blurred, and the Self integrates itself into Others (and vise versa) eventually. It is a progress of making “Me” as
“Others” and, “Others” as “Me.” With the collective identity, the Self
21 Ibid. pp.226-7.
22 Ibid. p. 227.
23 Ibid. p. 227.
24 Ji Lin, (2012), “Rethinking the Identity Theory Under the Framework of Systematic Constructivism: Concepts and Logic”, World Economics and Politics, Vol.
6, p. 77; Alexander Wendt, (1994), “Collective Identity Formation and the International Sate,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2, p. 385.
25 Wendt, Supra note 18, p.229.
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could define the welfare of Others’ as part of its own welfare, which Wendt calls it “altruistic.26” Though an altruistic actor can still be seen as rational in constructivism.
Wendt does not have too much emphasis on the actual contents of the rules and norms in his book, yet Finnemore could give a complement in her work27. And we know that neither real political interaction nor foreign policy states make in international society is the core of Wendt’s work. Nonetheless, we are still trying to make these scattered concepts and theories more integrated so that can further apply it to the real world.
The constructivists argue that only if the actors in a society recognize their identities, can they decide how to act with others and achieve their interests28. Thus, we have to provide a clearer illustration on interest as well.
Realists directly define interest of a state through a material view, such as economy growth rate or military capability. It would be expedient to have interest based on material things when we assess interests of a state and further to predict what actions it may take. However, social theories distinguish two kinds of interests—they are objective and
26 Ibid. p.229.
27Martha Finnemore provides three cases in her book, National Interests in International Society, elaborating how the states are affected and react to the rules and norms under the international society.
28 Finnemore , Supra note 11,Chapter 1; Wendt, Supra note 18, p. 231.
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subjective interests29. Under the culture context, a state recognizes its identities which can guide it to know its own specific interests as well as to take actions. It seems that there is kind of causality between identities and interests, since constructivists allege that interests derive from identities, but the former also makes incentives (either positive or negative) of the latter. As Wendt mentions in his book, “without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction.30”
From another ontological view, constructivists argue that there are two kinds of interest existing for states. Objective interests are needs or functional imperatives which must be fulfilled if an identity has to be reproduced. For example, these objective interests of a state can be monopoly of organized violence, sovereignty, a certain regime type or form of state, alliance and even vassal states and so forth. From a socialist view, a state has to pursue these objective interests to make sure its existence in the society.
However, a state does not always recognize its objective needs and interests. A state does not really know what it needs or what solutions should it adopt into under certain circumstances. Indeed, a state usually takes actions based on its beliefs rather than its objective needs. And these beliefs usually derive from cultures, histories of the structure. Such
29 Wendt, Supra note 18, p. 231.
30 Ibid.
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beliefs provide proximate motivations for a state to take actions31, which Wendt terms them subjective interests.
As mentioned above, we can obtain a model depicting how these elements are considered by constructivists in IR studies. Figure 2.1 is an epitome shows the constructing process between actor and structure. In this interaction, an actor recognizes its identities as well as interests (including objective and subjective interests). Different considerations of interests lead to different behaviors, and finally these behaviors may give feedback to the structure reversely.
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework: connections of culture, identity, interest
31 Ibid. p. 232.
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and behavior
We can take this model into account while trying to figure out China’s behaviors in the international society and to understand its rise path. How could we view the China threat debate? Will it be like Germany and Japan in World War II and follow their steps? Will there be inevasible wars and conflicts as the realists concern between a rising power and a ruling power? Or should we have more confidence on the Chinese leaderships who claim that they will adopt a peaceful rise path and be a responsible great power?
By looking into cases in the following chapters, we can expect to see after 1949 China as a member in the international society: how does it identify itself, how these identities affect China to consider its national interests, and how dose China response these interest recognitions?
We will exam and make a check if there is a consistency between the realist concern and what China has done in the past. We would like to make sure whether China has a more aggressive attitude in territorial disputes with other states, or by contrast, it chooses to get more closer to the international norms and rules—which is to say, it adopts a more moderate and peaceful way.
Here I use some international law principles as indicators while examing China’s attitude in disputes. Mainly of them I am referring to are non-use of force principle, cooperative principle,…etc., which had been
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written and embodied in the United Nations Charter and other specific laws. We will see if China chooses to be close to these international law principles or to stay away from them. And we will decide whether China’s attitude lead to more opportunities for conflicts and make them a threat to other states in the end.