Drawing Lines

國

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

107

CHAPTER SIX 6. Conclusions

6.1 Drawing Lines

This work has provided a rather unique study comparing the immigration policy formation of Italy and Taiwan since the late 1980s to the present. The uniqueness of this study resides in the fact that this is a comparative analysis carried out between two nations belonging to regional and cultural areas as far apart as you can get, though surprisingly they do retain common features. First, the two countries have reached the highest economic development at the same time in the late 1980s; second, they have experienced a rapid economic restructuring as an effect of the globalisation and the penetration of world economic systems; third, they have both fallen victim of their own success by experiencing a rising domestic labour shortage in the low-skilled job sectors, along the pattern explained by the dual labour market theories; fourth, a low birth rate and a rapid aging population have exacerbated and perpetuated the divide between highly-skilled and well-paid jobs – to which a more educated population is attracted – and the low-skilled and low-paid 3D (dirty, demeaning and dangerous) occupations that domestic workers in both countries have taken to spurn consistently; fifth, Italy and Taiwan saw the first mass immigration inflows in the late 1980s and came up with the first comprehensive immigration policies only in the early 1990s, when the immigration phenomenon had already taken roots and the foreign workforce had become a stable component of their respective economies. So far the most important similarities that made such a comparative research an interesting endeavour.

As for the differences, the two nations could not be more distant. Geographically, one is a relatively large peninsula, whose shape has always constituted a sort of natural bridge between continental Europe and Africa and the Middle East, which can partially explain still today its vocation as a transit country for millions of migrants travelling from the South to the North of the world. Conversely, Taiwan is a small over-crowded island lying off the south-eastern coast of China, in an isolated though strategic position half-way between the Chinese, Japanese and

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

108

Southeast Asian regional systems, which had its own advantages in an ideologically divided world but has become a real burden in a less ideologically opposed and more economically united global arena. This could account for Taiwan’s struggle to find a meaning in its geographical role without giving up its identity. Historically, Italy has been an emigration country for over a century – since it became an independent and unified nation in 1861 – during which time millions of nationals left the poorest regions in the south and northeast of the peninsula to reach destinations in Europe and overseas. This biblical exodus reached the peaks around the times of the two World Wars, when most migrants crossed the Atlantic to North and South America. By contrast, Taiwan had always been a natural frontier for new immigration from mainland China but historical events changed it to a secluded island where in- and out-migration were barred for almost a century, with the brief exception of the post-war period. There first came the Japanese in 1895, who transformed the island into an imperial colony, precluding all access from China though encouraging migrant inflows from Japan;

then followed the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1945, who after completing the withdrawal into Taiwan shut its doors for the following four decades.

Politically, Italy has been a multi-party democracy since the end of the war and its population enjoyed human rights and freedom of expression; while Taiwan was an autocracy ruled by Kuomintang under the martial law until the 1987.

In spite of differences, this research has found agreement with the extant literature on three main points. First, the main sources of labour in the world can be identified in the colonial and ex-colonial formations present in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, but also in the Mediterranean basin; these sources happen to be located at the crossroads of important regional and continental formations where labour migration flows were first created and channelled by colonial powers to plantations or other production sites; today they serve the market forces of single states or multinational corporations. Second, in the long run the migration process between origin and destination countries has shown a natural tendency to transit from a mass labour migration phase to a permanent settlement, regardless of obstacles set by the single receiving and sending nations. Third, the state has played an important role in determining migration flows through complex processes of exclusion, inclusion and allocation of foreign manpower in

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

109

its domestic economic system. Such state power has been exercised with the enforcement of specific immigration policies created to meet the immediate needs of the national economy and legitimized by ideological views. In general, the views informing state policies on immigration aim at preserving a construct national image of uniformity and homogeneity through the exclusion of alien workers from the host nation-community in many forms: from the physical segregation to the denial of basic human rights, from the impediment of family reunion to the prohibition of permanent settlement.

Overall, this comparative study has made it emerge that both nations have undergone the same passage from ignorance to inclusion with regards to immigration through three main stages: initial negation, then partial admission (provided it was temporary), and finally full inclusion in the legislative system.

The force and the determination of the respective governments have been quite different though. Italy’s migration policies have been intermittent and inconsistent throughout the period started with the first mass migration of the late 1980s until the present day. Market forces and social changes within the country – coupled with inaction and ignorance at the level of central government – seem to be the most important determinants of the migrant population formation in Italy. Attempts to regulate and control foreign labour inflows through the creation of general policies had been made repeatedly, but the few good results obtained were soon undid by next political coalition ruling the country, which was too anxious to show its anti-immigration stance by promoting repressive border policies and by raising admission requirements to unrealistic levels. Nonetheless, since the economic and social motives that attracted foreign labour remained unchanged in Italy – if they did not increase at all – the frequent change of rules and regulations by Italian authorities were simply met with quick adjustment of strategies and new schemes by prospective migrants. Therefore it is little wonder that the largest part of the foreign migrant community legally settled in Italy is more the result of five successive massive amnesties – implemented over the years from the late 1980s to the early 2000s – than the outcome of planned migration policies from central governments. Today, the still unresolved economic crisis that envelops Italy makes the topic of immigration policy not a particular attractive one with ruling and opposition parties, both of which fear the

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

110

reaction of a disgruntled and disillusioned public opinion. All future planning and policy formation are now being shunned (immigration quotas have been drastically reduced or zeroed since the crisis started) and redirected to European authorities, which in turn refuse to take any responsibility for lack of a common agreement on non-EU migration issues among the member states. Now a new informal practice has emerged among the Italian authorities. Since most irregular migrants and refugees admittedly treat Italy as a transit area to reach other destinations in Europe – where they can rely on relatives, friends and other connections – these people are assisted when they arrive, but not checked or registered with police, nor are they arrested. They are simply set free to go wherever they want, with the result that they quickly head for the borders with neighbouring countries where other authorities will have to deal with them. This final image is consistent with a country where immigration policy has been more the result of a bottom-up action, due to the presence of a soft-centred power which always chose to delegate away responsibilities, first to local authorities and today to supranational formations.

Planning and overconfidence were the most important features of Taiwan’s early immigration policies, as emerged from this research. Planning was the result of a strong-centred power dominated by the military and always concerned with national security. This attitude also emerged in the case of immigration, with the adoption of the Guestworker scheme, which had the advantage of allowing the access of temporary workers from abroad, with the option of sending them back as soon as economic conditions made them redundant and no longer needed. This policy clearly served two goals: supplementing the shortage of manpower in the low- and semi-skilled levels of Taiwan’s labour market and preserving the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of its population. In practical terms this scheme would make it extremely difficult for guest workers to overstay their contracts or to settle down in the host country. In ideological terms, the notion of seeing the imported foreign labour as “desirable workers but unwanted citizens” was underscored by the distinction made by policy-makers between “foreign workers”, as the ideal type, and “immigrant workers”, whose final motivation was to settle in the new country with their families (Tseng and Komiya 2004: 104). The overconfidence aspect of Taiwan’s top-down policy on immigration lied in the

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

111

belief that this scheme would work out smoothly in the long term, mostly on the assumption that the economic instances were isolated from the social context.

Evidence showed that this was not the case, and some corrections to the immigration policy were later introduced towards a more welcoming attitude that in some cases also allowed settlement, family reunion, integration programs, and generally longer stay periods for the immigrant worker. (Nonetheless, the

‘sedentary bias’ still persists in the Taiwanese policy towards immigrant manpower, as evidenced by the main way of settlement used by foreigners, namely, through marriage with Taiwanese nationals.) Whether this perceived shift of policy is due more to humanitarian considerations from the authorities of a still democratic country or rather a practical response to the perpetuation of labour shortage in the domestic manufacturing and care sectors is hard to tell;

however, economic and social factors signal that the need of foreign labour will grow in the future for the island. The only problem for Taiwan will be how to appeal to potential migrants. Low economic growth and lower wages in comparison to other Asian immigrant countries will make Taiwan a less attractive destination for migration flows, with the result that policy-makers will have to explore new avenues to find the necessary labour supply. One of these is to go towards a multicultural society by allowing even low-skilled and semi-skilled foreign workers to settle down in Taiwan and enjoy its high living standards and social benefits. The other is to agree with more formal ties with PRC and make use of its still huge labour surplus by relaxing regulations for the access of Mainlanders to the island. A good guess would be that Taiwan will follow a middle path whose width nobody knows yet, not even its policy-makers.