The South China Sea (SCS) serves half of the world’s seaborne trade1. It has a Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) which contributes to 270 million people’s socio-economic well-being.2 In the case of the Philippines, the SCS covers most of the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) aggregating 381,000 square kilometers of maritime space.3 This is larger than the total land mass area of the country which is 300,000 square kilometers. As a quintessential coastal state, 62% of the Philippine’s population is considered coastal4 and the SCS is a big contributor of food security to the country’s 14,000 coastal community. Then again, the importance of the Philippines claim in the SCS is both critical and permissible.
In 2009, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) submitted two Notes Verbales to the United Nations Secretary General pertaining to its objections to the submission of Vietnam and
Malaysia’s joint limitation of the Continental Shelf.5 Above these objections, the PRC attached the nine dashed line map and claims that it “enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters”.6 This event was believed to be the root cause of the SCS dispute which asserts a big part of the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) of Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.
1 Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin, "South China Sea: International Status," ed. Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin, The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions (Lectures, Workshops and Proceedings of International Conferences) (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016).
2 M.R. Othman, N.A. Osnin, and H.A. Saharuddin, "An Innovative Governance Structure for the Management of the Unique South China Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (Scslme)," in Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea, ed. Zhiguo Gao, et al. (Beijing, China: China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, 2013).
3 Ibid., pp. 20
4 Aileen S.P. Baviera, "The Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute: Security and Interests," ed. Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin, The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016).
5 "Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China," ed. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) (2009).
6 Ibid., pp. 2
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Above from the nine-dashed line map, the filing of the Philippines case against China on 2013 in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is considered to be connected to a deeper and larger grounds. In 1988, China occupied and built a radar structure and military facilities on Subi Reef.7 This is located in the Philippine’s ECS and within the 12 Nautical Mile (NM) territorial sea of the Philippine occupied Thitu Island. Following this, in 1995, China again occupied another part known as the Mischief Reef.8 This is now located at the country’s EEZ within 125 NM of Palawan. Such further occupation of reefs and building of structures continued up to this date.
Continuously, China unlawfully interfered with the rights of the Philippines through several critical impasses. In 2011, two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels (CCGV) prevented a Philippine commission ship tasked for undertaking oil and gas survey in the Reed bank.9 This is entirely located within the Philippines EEZ. The following year, a maritime standoff occurred between the Philippine Navy’s largest ship BRP Gregorio del Pilar and China’s Marine Surveillance vessels wherein it blocked the attempt of the Philippines to arrest Chinese fishermen alleged for taking protected marine species such as ‘live baby sharks, giant clams, turtles and rare corals’.10 Such undertakings and standoffs are believed to be the basis of the case.
As such, the problem rises for the Philippine’s foreign policy which eventually creates an effect on its domestic politics and people. However, such are not discussed in most information
available in inquiring the SCS issues. Most analysis are based in the elements of politics, dispute, sovereignty and territories. It focuses on nation’s political arena of international relations, factors and interest. Then again, it presents the traditional analysis in international relations in which scholars today should look beyond.
7 "Before and after Satellite Images: What Has Been Buit on the Reefs That China Occupies in the Spratlys," The Strait Times 2016.
8 "Timeline: The China-Philippines South China Sea Dispute," Philippine Daily Inquirer 2016; Daniel J.
Dzurek, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin China Occupies Mischief Reef In Latest Spratly Gambit.
9 "Arbitration under Annex Vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Republic of the Philippines V. People’s Republic of China, Memorial of the Philippines," ed. Permanent Court of Arbitration (2014).
10 Alistair D.B. Cook, "Unpacking the Scarborough Shoal Dispute," East Asian Policy 04, no. 03 (2012).
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By emphasizing the importance of civic needs and perspective, this research presents a more inclusive analysis on international politics which regards all factors in a different perspective. In the case of South China Sea, the discovery of the role and significance of civic perspective and communities looks beyond the box which considers the real individuals that is caught in the fray which livelihood, income, and resources are greatly jeopardize especially in the context of the Filipino fishermen.
In the context of the fishing situation in the Philippines, aside from the country being the main exporter of fishing in the world, 39% of its fish production is contributed by the municipal group or the small-scale fisheries.11 Looking at more data, the country roughly produces 1,000,000 metric tons per year which roughly values to 500,000 USD. In 2012, the foreign trade surplus of fishing is 5 billion USD. 12 Clearly, the claims of the Philippines in the SCS does not only justify its territory but also the need and livelihood of its people.
Furthermore, it is important to take note that the main philosophical background of this research lies on humanitarian needs in which it emphasizes the importance and recognition of people’s needs and situation. As it looks on the Filipino fishermen in the midst of the SCS dispute, it brings a linked analysis of foreign policy and international relations to everyday politics and situation of the people.
Then again, a research that looks beyond international politics which emphasizes the civic perspective in the issues of south China sea will provide a new lens of looking the conflict which will benefit not only the people but the future scholars studying the international politics effect on regular citizens. In another, discovering the fishermen’s perspective in the midst of this international dispute is shifting away from the conventional forms of analyzing international politics and delving beyond the unheard voices of the SCS controversy.
11 "The Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines 2012-2016," ed. Fisheries Statistic Division (Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Statistics Authority, 2017).
12 "Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: The Republic of the Philippines," ed. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2014).
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PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION
The gap of looking beyond international politics and exploring the civic perspective is the core of this study. It aims to look at the SCS politics and maritime diplomacy in a profound
perspective where it focuses on the greater issues and realities of SCS phenomenon in a Philippine civic setting. Primarily, this study concentrates on Filipino fishermen as these individuals are believed to be the greater victims of such dispute. This notwithstanding the fact that the distressed fishermen are all present in the countries affected by the SCS dispute.
However, for better inquiry in such phenomenon, it will cover an ethnographic research in the case of Filipino fishermen wherein it discovers respective details and perspectives through rapport building. To clearly define the research and its puzzle, below are the following question this study aims to answer:
1. How does the South China Sea dispute affect the life stories of Filipino fishermen?
a. What are the life-fishing experiences before the Philippines filed a case against China?
b. How does the SCS dispute changed the Filipino fishermen’s case in terms of fishing experiences after the case filing?
c. How does the following factors affect the fishing life-stories in SCS?
i. Nationality or Identity
ii. Business or fishing experiences
iii. Perspective on Philippine government actions iv. Environment
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the exploration of related literature discussing the research topic, the literature review is divided into four different themes focusing on the following: (a) Asymmetric and bilateral relationships to establish a general and theoretical lens of the Philippines-China relations; (b) Filipino foreign policy towards China to emphasize their relations and how it developed; (c) Philippine’s position in the South China Sea to look at the country’s position; (d) Conclusion and importance of these related literature to the study.
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The Theory of Asymmetric Relationships
The theory of asymmetric relationships presents the interaction of power and vulnerability. It covers a larger framework of state’s interaction and provides a new paradigm which looks at the international relationship of countries.13 Basically, it is recognized as an elemental unit of analyzing bilateral relationships which emphasizes the mentality of bigger states and smaller states including the roots of its interactions and on this account, it may serve as a good analytical framework in looking at the Sino-Philippine relations including its effect to the SCS / WPS dispute.
As discussed by Womack (2016) the definition of asymmetric relationship is unequal but far from domination.14 Such is evident through the disparities of countries’ capabilities. Capabilities in this context are “resources for sustaining, furthering, and protecting its interests, and vary a great deal from country to country”.15 Hence, the framework of significant difference of states’
capabilities is considered as an asymmetrical relationship.
This asymmetric relationship structure is further propounded by the fundamentals of locatedness of interest wherein state’s in common territories creates and shapes each other’s outlooks, strategies and interests. Such is primarily because of shared territories’ certain resources and common opportunities for the greater population.16 Then again, this again may serve as a complementary framework for the Philippines-China case in the SCS/WPS dispute as both territories and resources are involved.
As this theory discusses smaller and larger state’s actions and involvement, it emphasizes the concept of asymmetric attention17 rooted in asymmetric power. As shown in Figure 1, Brantly Womack presented the salience of asymmetry through explaining the larger state (A) greater presence to the smaller state (B) in different factors. These factors may vary in the sphere of
13 Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, Kindle Edition ed. (New York, USA:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
14 Ibid., pp 3.
15 Ibid., pp 44.
16 Ibid., pp 40.
17 Brantly Womack, "Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China, Vietnam and Cambodia During the 1970s," Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 2 (2003)., pp.95
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economic power, military power, diplomatic power and so on. Because of this significant disparities in capabilities, it creates the asymmetry in giving attention.
Given that a larger state (A) has greater capabilities, its main concerns, plans and strategies focuses on its domestic development or the larger international community. It does not give greater importance and emphasis to its relationship to a smaller state (B). Then again it produces under attention18.
Figure 1: Figure of Asymmetric Attention by Brantly Womack19
On the other hand, due to the larger state’s role and presence on the smaller state (B) arena, the smaller state (B) focuses more on larger states’ (A) interest and policies as this would determine a significant increase both in vulnerabilities and opportunities. and given that asymmetry is presence between the countries, smaller state is evidently more exposed to larger risks especially with its vulnerabilities to stronger states greater power in economy and security. This is
perceived through smaller states’ economic dependency and its inability to reciprocate the
18 Ibid., pp. 97
19 Asymmetry and International Relationships., pp. 43.
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possible threat of bigger states to national security.20 Because of such, smaller state focuses much on the larger state and produces over attention.21
Both over attention and under attention are the roots of asymmetry in which may create the possibility of systemic misperception22 in which Womack explains as the larger side’s highly likely to commit errors that will affect the smaller side from under-attention and the smaller side’s false interpretation of the larger sides action all because of over-attention.
Further discussing the context of smaller states under attention, Womack explains that it it produces a less coordinated, intermittent and crisis-oriented policies in which both is not beneficial for the smaller country’s international relations and domestic development as it looks at the situation as always targeted by the larger country and it disables the smaller to produced proper strategies that does not only in response to the larger tactics.
Meanwhile, in the context of sovereignty, the asymmetric power structure recognizes David Lake’s Hierarchy in International Relations which argues that the set of hierarchies in international arena creates series of asymmetric relationships and a sovereign relational authority. This cause greater powers to create a flexible notion of sovereignty in which it can negotiate or disregard.23 On this account, it is very essential as the only factor that lessens the milieu of asymmetrical relationship is distance and in the case of Philippines and China, it shares the asymmetrical relationship and territories.
Above all these, the theory of asymmetric relations is chosen as the main frame to explain the connection of this study as it does not limits on the bigger country’s power and interest but rather it recognizes the smaller country’s power on bilateral associations and negotiations which
exactly the situation of the Philippines with United States and Japan against China.
20 Ibid., pp. 44.
21 "Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China, Vietnam and Cambodia During the 1970s.", pp.96.
22 "Asymmetry Theory and China’s Concept of Multipolarity," Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 39 (2004)., pp. 360.
23 David Lake, Heirarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009).
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The Philippine’s China Policy
In the past years, the Philippines and China foreign relations has its own peaks and valleys. Such relations can be traced back in 1967 when the Philippine government opened their diplomatic relations with China.
The peaks of the Sino-Philippine relations
According to Lim (1999) before the Marcos period, the Philippines largely based its economic trade relations to the United States Laurel Langley Trade Agreement (USLLTA).24 This made the US as the strongest trade partner of the Philippines and created the basis of its relations. He argued that the Philippines-US relations were slightly detangled because of the agreement near expiration and the Philippine oil crisis in 1973.25 This crucial event was perceived to be the beginning of a new and strong Philippines-China relations.
As discussed, De Castro (2010) claims that it is also the 1960’s political economic needs of the Philippines. It crucially required the country to accelerate trade with other countries. Because of this, he confers that the Philippines presented its new foreign policy opening its door to socialist countries and promoting the new Filipinism and a wiser development diplomacy.26 This was the government’s basis in preparing and establishing its new diplomatic ties to China and the Soviet Union.
Aside from this, as contended by both authors, the main objective of the Marcos administration is largely based on trade and economy. It served as the grounds of the Sino-Philippines relations wherein it presents a sustainable economic cooperation that will contribute to the Philippines economic progress.
24 Benito Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines," The Philippine APEC Study Center Network Discussion Paper Series 99, no. 16 (1999)., pp. 9.
25 Ibid., pp. 11.
26 Ferdinand E. Marcos, "New Filipinism: The Turing Point," in Message of His Excellency Ferdinand E.
Marcos President of the Philippines to the Congress on the State of the Nation (Legislative Building, Manla1969).
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Furthermore, Baker (2004) emphasizes that the country’s economic difficulties on the rising need for petroleum products made China a demonstrated nation willing to help the Philippines through offering ‘friendship prices’.27
The result of this good economic and trade cooperation was the Marcos administration’s creation of formal diplomatic trade relations through the signing of the one China policy in 1975. Since this administration period is quite long, the good relationship of Philippines and China stayed from 1975 – 1986. Clearly, this validates scholarly arguments which claims that the failure of the US economy during this period and the rising need of the Philippines started the diplomatic occurrence.
Such good relations were only followed after the Cory Aquino administration. It was by 1992, when the new government immediately recognized the importance of China in the region. As discussed by Cruz (1996), President Fidel Ramos term begun by instantaneously visiting China to reduce the damages of the previous administration. He argues that during the Ramos
administration, the Sino-Philippine relations were shaped by healthy exchange of state visit between Philippines and China officials and major agreements in tourism cooperation (1990), investments protection (1992), economic and technical cooperation (1993), the annual trade protocol, the biennial cultural, tourism and science and technology protocols.28
Although it was slightly mangled because of the discovery of the increasing Chinese presence on and around Mischief Reef in 1995.29 Lim’s (1999) article argues that the conflict in the SCS has no significant effect on the economic relations of the two countries. This is evident through the significant increase of the trade volume between Philippines and China despite of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.30 Then again, the conflict of Scarborough shoal and Mischief Reef did not lead to bad business relations.
27 Carl Baker, "China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Publications (2004)., pp. 3.
28 Luis T. Cruz, "Philippine-China Bilateral Relations in the 1990s," Asian Studies Journal 31 (1996).
29 Renato C. De Castro, "Weakness and Gambits of Philippine Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century," Public Affairs, University of British Columbia 83, no. 4 (2010)., pp. 705.
30 Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines.", pp. 21.
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Following this good economic associations, the administration succeeding Ramos was ascribed to be employing double asymmetric relations. As reiterated by De Castro, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s foreign policy focuses on balancing economic development and military power. He asserts that the administration’s Eight Realities of Philippine Foreign Policy
concentrates on enhancing the country’s economic competitiveness, covering the rising threat of domestic terrorism, balancing the major power relations (US, China and Japan) for the benefit of the Philippines and bolstering the security agenda through strengthening the US-Philippine alliance.31 This became the basis of a stronger bilateral cooperation between the Philippines and China. It even created a significant economic expansion according to Tuazon (2014) wherein the bilateral trade between the two countries rose to forty one percent32 which was evidently seen by 2010 when the Sino-Philippine trade was considered as the fastest growing bilateral trade in Southeast Asia. Creating a total of 83 bilateral agreements. Making China as the Philippine’s third largest trading partner and ninth top foreign investor.33
As claimed by most academics, the Macapagal administration was considered as the Philippines and China’s golden age of partnership. Its relations were based on China’s high economic and political impact in the Philippines. Then again, from the mid 1960’s to 2010, literature shows
As claimed by most academics, the Macapagal administration was considered as the Philippines and China’s golden age of partnership. Its relations were based on China’s high economic and political impact in the Philippines. Then again, from the mid 1960’s to 2010, literature shows