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CHAPTER III: THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVENRMENT POLICES AND EXTERNAL STRUCTURE
All governments with its domestic and international policies creates a connection between its departments, regional bodies, local authorities, community and civil society bodies, universities, business and individual citizens.88 Principally, it creates an impacts on a country’s economics, education, health care, tax and reforms and many others. With such, it creates a linear link and attachment with the regular people’s daily life experiences.
This is the discovered circumstance of the selected Filipino fishermen of Scarborough shoal in which all policies in the South China Sea both from the Philippines governance and China’s international relations affects their daily fishing life experiences.
Primarily discussing the interrelations of the domestic and international policies of the Philippine government and other external structures in the lives of the Filipino fishermen in the SCS, this Chapter is divided into three parts mainly: (a) Before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1990’s – 2010); (b) During the Permanent Court of Arbitration (2010 – 2016); and (c) After the release of the Court’s decision (2016 – present) to comprehensively explain the interconnection of the Philippine government policies’ changes and shifts towards China, the South China Sea and its boundless effects to the real living life experiences of the victims of the dispute which are the Filipino fishermen of Scarborough shoal.
BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (1990’S – 2010)
As reiterated in the literature review, the beginning of the South China Sea dispute is traced in the 1970s wherein China’s actions in the South China Sea is counteracted by the Philippine through diplomatic partners, relations and strategies. Throughout the history, the very start of China’s expansionist strategy created a deepening conflict in territorial claims between the
88 Rachel Briggs, "The Impact of Foreign Policy on Local Communities," Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) (2010).
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Philippine relations and despite this, both countries maintained a close and friendly cooperation covering a strong economic, trade and cultural relations which evidently grows for years.89 This good relations in the past may or may not maintained the “peace” in the SCS. However, it is evident that such close cooperation contributed to the both government’s progress towards development and did not disturb the regular individuals working and living within the grounds of the SCS. Such was observed on the earlier case of the Filipino fishermen of Scarborough shoal as they recall the SCS fishing industry way before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) case and China’s expansionist strategies in its greatest and unsurpassed point. With a reflection of a peaceful situation, it was considered as best period for high quality of fish catch, volume, income and experiences and as discussed in Chapter II, this period was filled with serenity and humanitarian exchanges wherein people regardless of nationality shares and access the shoal without conflicts.
Clearly, the evident problems on borders and territories in the SCS left the Filipino fishermen’s livelihood and experiences untouched as they still exercise their rights to fishing access in their traditional fishing grounds without any conflict and preconditions. That the undisturbed SCS before its case on the PCA directly connects to a good fishing life experience for the Filipino fishermen.
While other scholars may characterize this as the reflection of the good economic and diplomatic relations of the Philippines and China before the PCA Case since such relations goes beyond the problems of territorial dispute and towards the development of both economies,90 It can be deliberated that the conventional position of the Philippines in the SCS during this “good
relations” is a manifestation of the asymmetrical relationship between China and the Philippines which stands on the basis of a bigger country’s concerns, attention and interests and the smaller country’s needs.91
89 Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines.", pp. 21.
90 Ibid., pp. 18; De Castro, "Weakness and Gambits of Philippine Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century."
91Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships.
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As further supported by Womack (2016) he argues that each country acts and reacts within its own parameters. In the context of asymmetrical relationship between two countries, the key role in managing the association of benefits lies on the bigger country as it can handle the relationship based on its own interest and with its greater capabilities, it knows more information on the smaller country’s goals, interests, strength and weaknesses. That said, as far as the bigger country’s concern does not impacts the smaller country’s status, the smaller country is on good state.92
Furthermore, since the 1990’s China as the rising regional power in Southeast Asia has been establishing a good economic and trade relations with the Philippines constructing a great deal of economic dependency in the future. As a developing nation, the Philippines settles more on the importance of economic progress and development93 wherein most of its international
agreements and affairs largely focuses on expanding and increasing its economic growth
including the maintenance of the country’s good relations with China as it largely influences the country’s economic progress. For this reason, despite of the Philippine government’s knowledge on the threats and risks in the SCS grounded from the 1988 reclamation of Subi Reef, 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef and China’s continuous assertion of its sovereignty, the Philippine government failed to prioritize the development of strategic actions in the SCS including the improvement of its maritime security wherein sooner or later creates a cascade effect on the regular Filipinos working within the SCS.
By the 2011 harassment incident of Chinese patrol boats to a Philippine government tasked vessel, the country was highly unprepared and ill-equipped to fight and protects its maritime jurisdiction. This was according to scholars as the drastic fall between the two countries
relations94 and the beginning of all the suffering pertaining to the fishing life experiences of the Filipino fishermen of Kalburo.
92 Ibid., pp. 42.
93 Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines."
94 De Castro, "The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions.";Tehankee, "Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Tim."
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With limited capabilities to contest the Philippine’s maritime territory, the country aside from yearning towards the US security umbrella, responded the expansionist activities through solely confiding to its soft power and diplomacy by taking part on the creation of an international cooperation in the SCS between the ASEAN nations and Peoples Republic of China forming the
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”.95 But this unbinding agreement did not stop China’s endeavors and expansions in the SCS nor the military agreement with the US.
Such uncontrolled behavior of China and weakness of the Philippine government to safeguard its maritime territory and jurisdiction gravely affected the lives of regular people especially the Filipino fishermen of Scarborough shoal. Evidently, the bigger problem rises on the failure of the Philippine government to protect the rights of their people.
DURING THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (2013 – 2016)
With no other measures to take against China’s disobedience and noncompliance to the ASEAN declaration, the last resort of the Philippines to contest its rights is to file against China fighting for the country’s territorial claims, rights and access.96
As argued, such actions of the Philippine government challenged the regional power and portrayed an offensive measure to the Chinese government. 97 Although ideally a peaceful stance, China responded by enforcing a stronger claim in the SCS controlling all the access and control to all Filipino flagged vessel trying to access the area. Evidently, the filing of case against China worsen the life condition in the SCS as the Chinese government acted angrily. Such is validated in the grave shift of the Filipino life experiences wherein the deepening of all nightmares and struggles are traced back to the Philippines filing a case against China.
95 "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," ed. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia2012).
96 "Arbitration under Annex Vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Republic of the Philippines V. People’s Republic of China, Memorial of the Philippines."
97 De Castro, "The Philippines in 2011: Muddling through a Year of Learning and Adjustment."
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Way before the PCA case, the Filipino fishermen of Kalburo enters the shoal and usually
conducts a week-long fishing operation. Seemingly having a “fiesta”98 of fish stocks, the Filipino fishermen exercises their fishing rights and access wherein they actively manage and forms a sufficient fish income and catch within a week. From this short period, the quality and quantity of fish gathered are adequate enough to support all of their expenses.
After the filing of the case and during its process, China with great provocation from the Philippines, coercively took control of the Scarborough shoal, supervised all types of activities and regulated all entries. This started the cry of the Filipino fishermen for fishing access as the week-operation inside the Scarborough, turned into a month-long operation outside the shoal and eventually to no fishing operations within its parameters. Although during this time, abuse and life-hazards are not yet present, the control of the SCS still deeply aggrieved the life-experiences of the Filipino fishermen as the counterparts of no shoal access is joblessness.
Such situation would be exceedingly different through an effective maritime self-defense capacity. However, given that the Philippines has limited economic capacities, its civilian law enforcement has inadequate abilities in protecting the lives and properties at sea. With only a limited number of vessels and a thousand sea borders to consider, the Philippines maritime enforcement is highly weak and inadequate to uphold the fishermen’s livelihood and to monitor its claims in the SCS. Because of these shortcomings, it left the Filipino fishermen unprotected in their fishing operations and deprived from their rights and access.
Although most scholars argue that the triggering factor of China’s bad relations to the Philippines was the filing at the PCA case, it should be considered that the regime under the Benigno Aquino III administration started from a series of mishaps including the removal of most government programs tied with China’s government as a response to the campaign against corruption from the previous administration.
98 A celebration for a very well or great amount.
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Aside from this, the shift of the Philippine’s close relations from China to the United States (US) clearly outraged the struggle of superpowers in its dominance in Southeast Asia and created a bigger problem for the geopolitics between China and the US.99 Furthermore, the actions of the Philippines to enhance its defense capabilities through the signing of Expanded Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) of 2014 and the continuous joint military or “Balikatan”100 exercises in the SCS displayed an additional play of power against China as it ignited the SCS tensions which resulted to a more excessive and exaggerated maritime and territorial claims.
As literature explains, it is natural for a smaller country to limit its exposure when a bigger country disrespects its autonomy and vital interest. Through restricting the relationship and balancing it with other relationship, the smaller country can be protected by relying on its
“friends”.101 However, if the actions are considered “unfriendly” by the bigger state, it might take pleasure which can cause severe damages to a smaller state in which other threats and use of force awakens the smaller country’s anxiety as it has no idea how far the power of the larger country can go. 102
This was the evident case of the Philippines as its unfriendly actions are counteracted by a series use of threat and power. On one hand, it creates an effect on the greater suffering of the
Philippines as the regional power of China is elevated in the context of economy in which the country could not lose. On the other, such distress goes beyond the small roots of the nations which affects the regular people working primarily the Filipino fishermen of the SCS.
In the end, the crisis during the processing of the case in PCA still portrays the realities of a small country’s limited power facing a powerful regime wherein the real effects of the conflict and dispute rests on the regular people every day trying to survive the course of life.
99 Linao, "Philippines Boosts Defence near Disputed Spratlys."
100 Shoulder to Shoulder
101 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships., pp. 52.
102 Ibid., pp. 49.
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AFTER THE RELEASE OF THE COURT’S DECISION (2016 – present)
The effect on struggle for territory and access was further materialized by 2016 when the Hague gave its ruling favoring the Philippines rights and destabilizing China’s claim on “historic rights”
to both territory and resources in the South China Sea. Although it is momentously celebrated by the Filipinos worldwide claiming it was a victory and its importance to further address the dispute,103 the greater problem rises on what measures to consider in order to recover the reclaimed territory and for the regular fishermen of Kalburo, the bigger question lies on the retrieval of fishing access and volume.
During this period of new-fangled difficulty, the Philippine government administration is shifting a regime from Benigno S. Aquino III to the current President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. In the
beginning, the new head of the Philippines displayed and supported the PCA ruling claiming a strong stance against China’s actions and reclamation in the SCS. This generated a strong
‘nationalist’ collective perspective amongst the Filipino nation. Specifically, for the Filipino fishermen of Kalburo, such stance of entitlement and declarations created a strong hope for the future repossession of the country’s Bajo De Masinloc or in the fishermen’s case, their
traditional fishing ground.
However, acting accordingly both to the PCA ruling and the Philippines claim, China deployed additional Chinese Coast Guard Vessels (CCGV) tasked to control, regulate and monitor the area of the Scarborough shoal. As observed by the Filipino fishermen’s of Kalburo, from a regular number of five to seven ships, it rapidly increases to ten to sixteen CCGV. This does not limit to monitoring but also include the constant abuse, life hazards and threats to the Filipinos accessing the shoal and wish to abide China’s dominance. Clearly, China is sending a message of its power and capabilities in the SCS.
These fishermen exploitation was characterized by scholars as one of the points considered by President Duterte in shifting its foreign policy, strategies and tactics in the SCS.104 Such also
103 Nahginpao Kipgen, "The Philippine’s South China Sea Flip-Flop," in The Diplomat (Washington D.C.: Diplomat Media Inc., 2017).
104 De Castro, "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China.", pp. 147
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includes the questions towards the credibility of US military support as its defense strategies moving towards “low-cost, low-risk, strike-and-leave operation”105, weakness of the Philippines maritime security institutions such as the Philippine Navy (PN) and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), instability of the domestic crisis and the limited economic capacities of the country itself.
Using these facts, realizations are considered that the Philippines has no capacity to implement the PCA ruling on its own.106 Then again, the best strategic policy for Duterte was bilateral negotiations with China.
Following the grasp, President Duterte immediately created a series of actions pushing for a warmer Sino-Philippine relation by announcing the Philippines openness for bilateral negotiations including the possibility of joint maritime explorations. Three months after the pronounced decision of the PCA, Duterte visited Xi Jinping through China’s invitation wherein the two leaders signed 13 bilateral deals in areas of infrastructures, investments, trade, tourism and drug prohibitions. Immediately, “China has improved relations with President Duterte and set up a way to settle the South China Sea disputes peacefully”.107
As argued by De Castro, President Duterte “would follow former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s national security policy of gravitating close to China while ignoring territorial defense and focusing on neutralizing domestic security challenges such terrorism and insurgencies”108 and although the SCS crisis is just beginning in this period, the people are not affected by such relations.109
However, due to strong criticization of most domestic leaders to Duterte’s weak core duty to protect its territory on behalf of its people and discovering the results from a national survey
105 David Rosenberg, "The South China Sea: A Crucible of Regional Cooperation or Conflict?," The China Journal, no. 78 (2017).
106 De Castro, "Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?.", pp. 18
107 Jane Perlez, "Rodrigo Duterte Gets Closer to China, and the Neighbors Notice," The New York Times 2016.
108 De Castro, "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China.", pp. 12
109 Tina Clemente, "Understanding the Economic Diplomacy between the Philippines and China,"
International Journal of China Studies 7, no. 2 (2016).
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disclosing that 85% of the Filipino population wants a stronger assertion on its rights and claims in the SCS,110 President Duterte shifted again his ladders by announcing a visit in Thitu Island (PH: Pag-asa Island, PRC: Zhongye Dao island) and personally raising a Philippine flag in the disputed area. China in response, warned the Philippines for such actions creating a reheating relation in which in the end instigating the cancellation of Duterte’s visit. 111
Clearly, the beginning of President Duterte’s administration is inconsistent in many factors.
Because of such, it formulated an unreliable fishing livelihood in the Scarborough shoal which created the rise of confusions and frustrations to the Filipino fishermen. As reiterated in Chapter II, after the PCA award, China with its authorities from time to time allows the Filipino to access the shoal and also continue to haunts and harass them without any known cause.
While the so called “access” was publicly announce in media and newspapers showcasing the integrity of China as they completely allowed the Filipino fishermen to reinstate their livelihood at the shoal, the realities of the Fishermen’s real experiences are not complete access but rather inconsistent and unstable fishing experiences. Although such can be argued as a reflection of the Duterte’s foreign and security policies, the instability goes beyond even after the closer Sino-Philippine relations. Hence, with no complete control to China’s action, the Filipino fishermen will always be considered as the front liner of the SCS crisis.
After the concurrent instabilities of the country’s policies, President Duterte consistently courted China with the hopes of winning business, investments and development assistance. By showing a coherent and consistent pro-China stance, the relationship is founded on the basis of mutual trust and confidence. This notwithstanding the shift away from the country’s traditional ally and the new stance away from the importance of SCS dispute by doing little oppositions to China’s
After the concurrent instabilities of the country’s policies, President Duterte consistently courted China with the hopes of winning business, investments and development assistance. By showing a coherent and consistent pro-China stance, the relationship is founded on the basis of mutual trust and confidence. This notwithstanding the shift away from the country’s traditional ally and the new stance away from the importance of SCS dispute by doing little oppositions to China’s