討海人的國土與主權意識：從菲律賓漁民視野看南海爭端與菲國對中政策的演變 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧ 國. 學. Looking Beyond Sovereign State: 治政大 The Perspective of the Filipino front 立 liners in the South China Sea Dispute ‧. 討海人的國土與主權意識：從菲律賓漁民視野看南海爭端與菲國對中政策的演變 a v n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. i l C n hengchi U. MARY ANNE B. ALVIOLA Advisor: PROF CHIUNG CHIU HUANG PHD. JUNE 2018. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(2) ABSTRACT. Literatures available discussing the SCS conflict and dispute circulates in the verge of state’s power, politics and international arena. In the context of the Philippines, most discussions focus on bilateral associations, negotiations and agreements. This can be considered as a traditional form of analysis in international relations and such is what this research aims to look beyond. This study presents the Filipino civic perspective in the South China Sea (SCS) through discovering the life experiences of the people within the area specifically the fishermen. It discusses how China’s. 治政 fishing life quality of the people. By looking at the role and 大 significance of the civic perspective and communities in the issue, it立 presents a more inclusive analysis of the SCS in international arrival removed the peace and humanitarian culture in the Scarborough shoal and disturbed the. ‧ 國. 學. relations which offers the connection of foreign policy to every day politics which impacts the daily livelihood, income and resources of the people. Primarily using Brantly Womack’s theory of. ‧. asymmetric relations, this study flows on the framework of asymmetric capabilities and attentions which creates a greater problem in the Philippine’s foreign policy and eventually formulate an. er. io. sit. y. Nat. effect in domestic politics and impacts the regular people such as the fishermen.. n. al. i n C fishing life experiences and Scarboroughhshoal engchi U. v. Keywords: Asymmetric attention, asymmetric relations, Dispute impacts, Filipino fishermen,. i. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(3) 摘要. 現行文獻中南海問題多著眼於國家權力以及國際領域上的分析，而有關菲律賓的討論則多著重在雙邊關係、談判以及條約的部分，因此這份研究想要與傳統的研究形勢作出區別，想以菲律賓的人民為探討主體。這份研究從菲律賓人的觀點出發，將從人民、特別是漁民的生活經驗去探討南海衝突。它探討中國如何打破南海和平以及在斯卡伯勒淺灘的人權文化以及打擾捕魚人對生活品質。透過對人民角色、生活、社群上的影響來更全面性的分析來了解國際關係以及國際政治對人民的日常生活、收入、資源帶來何種影響。這份研究用. 政治大賓的外交政策、及對其人民所產生的影響。立. Brantley Womack 的不對等關係理論來檢視在不對稱的能力以及不對等的關注下影響菲律. ‧ 國. 學. 關鍵字詞: 不對稱的關注度，不對稱的關係，爭議的影響，菲律賓漁民，捕魚生活經歷和. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 斯卡伯勒淺灘. Ch. engchi. ii. i n U. v. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(4) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The researcher of this study is with the immense gratitude for the guidance and support of her adviser, Associate Professor Chiung Chiu Huang Ph.D., the response and further comments of committee members, Associate Professor Patrick Hou Ph.D. and Assistant Professor Chi-Ting Tsai Ph.D., participation of the Filipino fishermen of San Salvador Zambales, Philippines, the overwhelming support of her parents and family members, and the encouragement and inspiration to finish this thesis, Rich Reambonanza.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(5) TABLE OF CONTENTS. ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... I ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .......................................................................................................III CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ...................................................................................... 1 PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................ 4 LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 4. 治政大 The Philippine’s China Policy............................................................................................ 8 立 Philippine’s position in the South China Sea ................................................................... 15 The Theory of Asymmetric Relationships........................................................................... 5. ‧ 國. 學. Conclusion: The literature’s strength and weaknesses .................................................... 21 METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................. 23. ‧. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK............................................................................................. 25 FEAR AND DANGER OF CHINA ..................................................................................... 29. y. Nat. sit. DISAPPOINTMENT ON DESTROYED MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND THE SHIFT. al. er. io. OF FISHING VOLUME AND CATCH INCOME ............................................................ 33. n. SADNESS, CONFUSION AND THE CALL FOR HUMANITY AND PEACE. Ch. i n U. v. RESTORATIONS ............................................................................................................... 37. engchi. CHAPTER III: THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVENRMENT POLICES AND EXTERNAL STRUCTURE .......................................................................................... 42 BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (1990’S – 2010) ................ 42 DURING THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (2013 – 2016) .................... 45 AFTER THE RELEASE OF THE COURT’S DECISION (2016 – PRESENT) ................... 48 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER III: THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT WEAKNESS = FISHERMEN’S SUFFERING ............................................................................................ 52. iv. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(6) CHAPTER IV: THE CIVIC PERSPECTIVE INFLUENCE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND THE ROOTED PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIC RELATIONS........................................................................................................................... 54 THE FILIPINO CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SCS ............................................... 55 THE FLOP OF CIVIC PERSPECTIVE: WHY IT DOES NOT WORK? ........................ 62 THE ROOTED PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIP .......................... 63 THE PHILIPPINES CHANGING REGIMES AND FAILED DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY ............................................................................................................ 66 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER IV: ROOTING PROBLEMS OF ASYMMERTIC. 政治大 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 69 立 RELATIONS – THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE ............. 67. ‧ 國. 學. REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 74 APPENDIXES ......................................................................................................................... 81. ‧. APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE ................................................................................ 81. y. Nat. APPENDIX B: SAMPLE TRANSCRIPTED / TRANSLATED RAW INTERVIEW ...... 86. n. al. er. io. sit. APPENDIX C: RESPONDENTS SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE.......................... 91. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(7) TABLE OF FIGURES FIGURE 1: FIGURE OF ASYMMETRIC ATTENTION BY BRANTLY WOMACK....................................... 6 FIGURE 2: MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES - RED HIGHLIGHTING THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBALES) ............ 25 FIGURE 3: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................ 26 FIGURE 4: THE FILIPINO FISHING VESSEL .................................................................................... 30 FIGURE 5: THE SCARBOROUGH SHOAL IN 2010 ........................................................................... 33. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vi. i n U. v. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(8) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ARF. Asean Regional Forum. ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. BDM. Bajo De Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal / Huángyán Dǎo). CCG / CCGV. Chinese Coast Guard Vessels. DOE. Philippine Department of Energy. ECS. Extended Continental Shelf. EDCA. Expanded Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2014. EEZ. Exclusive Economic Zone. LME. Large Marine Ecosystem. NM. Nautical Mile. PCA. Permanent Court of Arbitration. United Nation. sit. y. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea United States. io. er. US. People’s Republic of China. Nat. UNCLOS. ‧ 國. UN. Philippine Navy. ‧. PRC. 立. 學. PN. 政治大. USLLTA. United States Laurel Langley Trade Agreement. VFA. Visiting Forces Agreement. WPS / SCS. West Philippine Sea or South China Sea. n. al. Ch. engchi. vii. i n U. v. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(9) CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY The South China Sea (SCS) serves half of the world’s seaborne trade1. It has a Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) which contributes to 270 million people’s socio-economic well-being.2 In the case of the Philippines, the SCS covers most of the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) aggregating 381,000 square kilometers of maritime space.3 This is larger than the total land mass area of the country which is 300,000 square kilometers. As a quintessential coastal state, 62% of. 政治大 security to the country’s 14,000 coastal community. Then again, the importance of the 立 Philippines claim in the SCS is both critical and permissible.. the Philippine’s population is considered coastal4 and the SCS is a big contributor of food. ‧ 國. 學. In 2009, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) submitted two Notes Verbales to the United. ‧. Nations Secretary General pertaining to its objections to the submission of Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint limitation of the Continental Shelf.5 Above these objections, the PRC attached. Nat. sit. y. the nine dashed line map and claims that it “enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over. io. er. relevant waters”.6 This event was believed to be the root cause of the SCS dispute which asserts a big part of the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) of Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei. al. n. and Indonesia.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1. Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin, "South China Sea: International Status," ed. Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin, The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions (Lectures, Workshops and Proceedings of International Conferences) (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016). 2 M.R. Othman, N.A. Osnin, and H.A. Saharuddin, "An Innovative Governance Structure for the Management of the Unique South China Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (Scslme)," in Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea, ed. Zhiguo Gao, et al. (Beijing, China: China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House, 2013). 3 Ibid., pp. 20 4 Aileen S.P. Baviera, "The Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute: Security and Interests," ed. Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin, The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016). 5 "Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China," ed. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) (2009). 6 Ibid., pp. 2. 1. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(10) Above from the nine-dashed line map, the filing of the Philippines case against China on 2013 in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is considered to be connected to a deeper and larger grounds. In 1988, China occupied and built a radar structure and military facilities on Subi Reef.7 This is located in the Philippine’s ECS and within the 12 Nautical Mile (NM) territorial sea of the Philippine occupied Thitu Island. Following this, in 1995, China again occupied another part known as the Mischief Reef.8 This is now located at the country’s EEZ within 125 NM of Palawan. Such further occupation of reefs and building of structures continued up to this date. Continuously, China unlawfully interfered with the rights of the Philippines through several critical impasses. In 2011, two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels (CCGV) prevented a Philippine. 政治大 located within the Philippines EEZ. The following year, a maritime standoff occurred between 立. commission ship tasked for undertaking oil and gas survey in the Reed bank.9 This is entirely the Philippine Navy’s largest ship BRP Gregorio del Pilar and China’s Marine Surveillance. ‧ 國. 學. vessels wherein it blocked the attempt of the Philippines to arrest Chinese fishermen alleged for taking protected marine species such as ‘live baby sharks, giant clams, turtles and rare corals’.10. ‧. Such undertakings and standoffs are believed to be the basis of the case.. y. Nat. sit. As such, the problem rises for the Philippine’s foreign policy which eventually creates an effect. al. er. io. on its domestic politics and people. However, such are not discussed in most information. n. available in inquiring the SCS issues. Most analysis are based in the elements of politics, dispute,. Ch. i n U. v. sovereignty and territories. It focuses on nation’s political arena of international relations, factors. engchi. and interest. Then again, it presents the traditional analysis in international relations in which scholars today should look beyond.. 7. "Before and after Satellite Images: What Has Been Buit on the Reefs That China Occupies in the Spratlys," The Strait Times 2016. 8 "Timeline: The China-Philippines South China Sea Dispute," Philippine Daily Inquirer 2016; Daniel J. Dzurek, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin China Occupies Mischief Reef In Latest Spratly Gambit. 9 "Arbitration under Annex Vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Republic of the Philippines V. People’s Republic of China, Memorial of the Philippines," ed. Permanent Court of Arbitration (2014). 10 Alistair D.B. Cook, "Unpacking the Scarborough Shoal Dispute," East Asian Policy 04, no. 03 (2012).. 2. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(11) By emphasizing the importance of civic needs and perspective, this research presents a more inclusive analysis on international politics which regards all factors in a different perspective. In the case of South China Sea, the discovery of the role and significance of civic perspective and communities looks beyond the box which considers the real individuals that is caught in the fray which livelihood, income, and resources are greatly jeopardize especially in the context of the Filipino fishermen. In the context of the fishing situation in the Philippines, aside from the country being the main exporter of fishing in the world, 39% of its fish production is contributed by the municipal group or the small-scale fisheries.11 Looking at more data, the country roughly produces 1,000,000. 政治大 Clearly, the claims of the Philippines in the SCS does not only justify 立. metric tons per year which roughly values to 500,000 USD. In 2012, the foreign trade surplus of fishing is 5 billion USD. 12. its territory but also the need and livelihood of its people.. ‧ 國. 學. Furthermore, it is important to take note that the main philosophical background of this research. ‧. lies on humanitarian needs in which it emphasizes the importance and recognition of people’s needs and situation. As it looks on the Filipino fishermen in the midst of the SCS dispute, it. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. situation of the people.. sit. brings a linked analysis of foreign policy and international relations to everyday politics and. Ch. i n U. v. Then again, a research that looks beyond international politics which emphasizes the civic. engchi. perspective in the issues of south China sea will provide a new lens of looking the conflict which will benefit not only the people but the future scholars studying the international politics effect on regular citizens. In another, discovering the fishermen’s perspective in the midst of this international dispute is shifting away from the conventional forms of analyzing international politics and delving beyond the unheard voices of the SCS controversy.. 11. "The Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines 2012-2016," ed. Fisheries Statistic Division (Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Statistics Authority, 2017). 12 "Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: The Republic of the Philippines," ed. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2014).. 3. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(12) PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION The gap of looking beyond international politics and exploring the civic perspective is the core of this study. It aims to look at the SCS politics and maritime diplomacy in a profound perspective where it focuses on the greater issues and realities of SCS phenomenon in a Philippine civic setting. Primarily, this study concentrates on Filipino fishermen as these individuals are believed to be the greater victims of such dispute. This notwithstanding the fact that the distressed fishermen are all present in the countries affected by the SCS dispute. However, for better inquiry in such phenomenon, it will cover an ethnographic research in the case of Filipino fishermen wherein it discovers respective details and perspectives through rapport building. To clearly define the research and its puzzle, below are the following question this study aims to answer:. 立. 政治大. 1. How does the South China Sea dispute affect the life stories of Filipino fishermen?. ‧ 國. 學. a. What are the life-fishing experiences before the Philippines filed a case against China?. ‧. b. How does the SCS dispute changed the Filipino fishermen’s case in terms of fishing experiences after the case filing?. y. Nat. sit. c. How does the following factors affect the fishing life-stories in SCS?. al. n. ii. Business or fishing experiences. Ch. er. io. i. Nationality or Identity. i n U. v. iii. Perspective on Philippine government actions iv. Environment. engchi. LITERATURE REVIEW In the exploration of related literature discussing the research topic, the literature review is divided into four different themes focusing on the following: (a) Asymmetric and bilateral relationships to establish a general and theoretical lens of the Philippines-China relations; (b) Filipino foreign policy towards China to emphasize their relations and how it developed; (c) Philippine’s position in the South China Sea to look at the country’s position; (d) Conclusion and importance of these related literature to the study.. 4. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(13) The Theory of Asymmetric Relationships The theory of asymmetric relationships presents the interaction of power and vulnerability. It covers a larger framework of state’s interaction and provides a new paradigm which looks at the international relationship of countries.13 Basically, it is recognized as an elemental unit of analyzing bilateral relationships which emphasizes the mentality of bigger states and smaller states including the roots of its interactions and on this account, it may serve as a good analytical framework in looking at the Sino-Philippine relations including its effect to the SCS / WPS dispute. As discussed by Womack (2016) the definition of asymmetric relationship is unequal but far. 政治大 in this context are “resources for sustaining, furthering, and protecting its interests, and vary a 立. from domination.14 Such is evident through the disparities of countries’ capabilities. Capabilities great deal from country to country”.15 Hence, the framework of significant difference of states’. ‧ 國. 學. capabilities is considered as an asymmetrical relationship.. ‧. This asymmetric relationship structure is further propounded by the fundamentals of locatedness of interest wherein state’s in common territories creates and shapes each other’s outlooks,. y. Nat. sit. strategies and interests. Such is primarily because of shared territories’ certain resources and. al. er. io. common opportunities for the greater population.16 Then again, this again may serve as a. n. complementary framework for the Philippines-China case in the SCS/WPS dispute as both. Ch. territories and resources are involved.. engchi. i n U. v. As this theory discusses smaller and larger state’s actions and involvement, it emphasizes the concept of asymmetric attention17 rooted in asymmetric power. As shown in Figure 1, Brantly Womack presented the salience of asymmetry through explaining the larger state (A) greater presence to the smaller state (B) in different factors. These factors may vary in the sphere of 13. Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, Kindle Edition ed. (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 14 Ibid., pp 3. 15 Ibid., pp 44. 16 Ibid., pp 40. 17 Brantly Womack, "Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China, Vietnam and Cambodia During the 1970s," Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 2 (2003)., pp.95. 5. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(14) economic power, military power, diplomatic power and so on. Because of this significant disparities in capabilities, it creates the asymmetry in giving attention. Given that a larger state (A) has greater capabilities, its main concerns, plans and strategies focuses on its domestic development or the larger international community. It does not give greater importance and emphasis to its relationship to a smaller state (B). Then again it produces under attention18.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i n U. v. Figure 1: Figure of Asymmetric Attention by Brantly Womack19. engchi. On the other hand, due to the larger state’s role and presence on the smaller state (B) arena, the smaller state (B) focuses more on larger states’ (A) interest and policies as this would determine a significant increase both in vulnerabilities and opportunities. and given that asymmetry is presence between the countries, smaller state is evidently more exposed to larger risks especially with its vulnerabilities to stronger states greater power in economy and security. This is perceived through smaller states’ economic dependency and its inability to reciprocate the. 18 19. Ibid., pp. 97 Asymmetry and International Relationships., pp. 43.. 6. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(15) possible threat of bigger states to national security.20 Because of such, smaller state focuses much on the larger state and produces over attention.21 Both over attention and under attention are the roots of asymmetry in which may create the possibility of systemic misperception22 in which Womack explains as the larger side’s highly likely to commit errors that will affect the smaller side from under-attention and the smaller side’s false interpretation of the larger sides action all because of over-attention. Further discussing the context of smaller states under attention, Womack explains that it it produces a less coordinated, intermittent and crisis-oriented policies in which both is not beneficial for the smaller country’s international relations and domestic development as it looks. 政治大 proper strategies that does not only in response to the larger tactics. 立. at the situation as always targeted by the larger country and it disables the smaller to produced. ‧ 國. 學. Meanwhile, in the context of sovereignty, the asymmetric power structure recognizes David Lake’s Hierarchy in International Relations which argues that the set of hierarchies in. ‧. international arena creates series of asymmetric relationships and a sovereign relational authority. This cause greater powers to create a flexible notion of sovereignty in which it can. y. Nat. sit. negotiate or disregard.23 On this account, it is very essential as the only factor that lessens the. al. er. io. milieu of asymmetrical relationship is distance and in the case of Philippines and China, it shares. n. the asymmetrical relationship and territories.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Above all these, the theory of asymmetric relations is chosen as the main frame to explain the connection of this study as it does not limits on the bigger country’s power and interest but rather it recognizes the smaller country’s power on bilateral associations and negotiations which exactly the situation of the Philippines with United States and Japan against China.. 20. Ibid., pp. 44. "Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China, Vietnam and Cambodia During the 1970s.", pp.96. 22 "Asymmetry Theory and China’s Concept of Multipolarity," Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 39 (2004)., pp. 360. 23 David Lake, Heirarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009). 21. 7. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(16) The Philippine’s China Policy In the past years, the Philippines and China foreign relations has its own peaks and valleys. Such relations can be traced back in 1967 when the Philippine government opened their diplomatic relations with China. The peaks of the Sino-Philippine relations According to Lim (1999) before the Marcos period, the Philippines largely based its economic trade relations to the United States Laurel Langley Trade Agreement (USLLTA).24 This made the US as the strongest trade partner of the Philippines and created the basis of its relations. He argued that the Philippines-US relations were slightly detangled because of the agreement near. 政治大 beginning of a new and strong Philippines-China relations. 立. expiration and the Philippine oil crisis in 1973.25 This crucial event was perceived to be the. ‧ 國. 學. As discussed, De Castro (2010) claims that it is also the 1960’s political economic needs of the Philippines. It crucially required the country to accelerate trade with other countries. Because of. ‧. this, he confers that the Philippines presented its new foreign policy opening its door to socialist. y. Nat. countries and promoting the new Filipinism and a wiser development diplomacy.26 This was the. n. al. er. io. Union.. sit. government’s basis in preparing and establishing its new diplomatic ties to China and the Soviet. Ch. i n U. v. Aside from this, as contended by both authors, the main objective of the Marcos administration. engchi. is largely based on trade and economy. It served as the grounds of the Sino-Philippines relations wherein it presents a sustainable economic cooperation that will contribute to the Philippines economic progress.. 24. Benito Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines," The Philippine APEC Study Center Network Discussion Paper Series 99, no. 16 (1999)., pp. 9. 25 Ibid., pp. 11. 26 Ferdinand E. Marcos, "New Filipinism: The Turing Point," in Message of His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos President of the Philippines to the Congress on the State of the Nation (Legislative Building, Manla1969).. 8. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(17) Furthermore, Baker (2004) emphasizes that the country’s economic difficulties on the rising need for petroleum products made China a demonstrated nation willing to help the Philippines through offering ‘friendship prices’.27 The result of this good economic and trade cooperation was the Marcos administration’s creation of formal diplomatic trade relations through the signing of the one China policy in 1975. Since this administration period is quite long, the good relationship of Philippines and China stayed from 1975 – 1986. Clearly, this validates scholarly arguments which claims that the failure of the US economy during this period and the rising need of the Philippines started the diplomatic occurrence.. 政治大 Such good relations were only followed after the Cory Aquino administration. It was by 1992, 立 when the new government immediately recognized the importance of China in the region. As. ‧ 國. 學. discussed by Cruz (1996), President Fidel Ramos term begun by instantaneously visiting China to reduce the damages of the previous administration. He argues that during the Ramos. ‧. administration, the Sino-Philippine relations were shaped by healthy exchange of state visit between Philippines and China officials and major agreements in tourism cooperation (1990),. y. Nat. sit. investments protection (1992), economic and technical cooperation (1993), the annual trade. n. al. er. io. protocol, the biennial cultural, tourism and science and technology protocols.28. Ch. i n U. v. Although it was slightly mangled because of the discovery of the increasing Chinese presence on. engchi. and around Mischief Reef in 1995.29 Lim’s (1999) article argues that the conflict in the SCS has no significant effect on the economic relations of the two countries. This is evident through the significant increase of the trade volume between Philippines and China despite of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.30 Then again, the conflict of Scarborough shoal and Mischief Reef did not lead to bad business relations.. 27. Carl Baker, "China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Publications (2004)., pp. 3. 28 Luis T. Cruz, "Philippine-China Bilateral Relations in the 1990s," Asian Studies Journal 31 (1996). 29 Renato C. De Castro, "Weakness and Gambits of Philippine Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century," Public Affairs, University of British Columbia 83, no. 4 (2010)., pp. 705. 30 Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines.", pp. 21.. 9. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(18) Following this good economic associations, the administration succeeding Ramos was ascribed to be employing double asymmetric relations. As reiterated by De Castro, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s foreign policy focuses on balancing economic development and military power. He asserts that the administration’s Eight Realities of Philippine Foreign Policy concentrates on enhancing the country’s economic competitiveness, covering the rising threat of domestic terrorism, balancing the major power relations (US, China and Japan) for the benefit of the Philippines and bolstering the security agenda through strengthening the US-Philippine alliance.31 This became the basis of a stronger bilateral cooperation between the Philippines and China. It even created a significant economic expansion according to Tuazon (2014) wherein the. 政治大 2010 when the Sino-Philippine trade was considered as the fastest growing bilateral trade in 立. bilateral trade between the two countries rose to forty one percent32 which was evidently seen by Southeast Asia. Creating a total of 83 bilateral agreements. Making China as the Philippine’s. ‧ 國. 學. third largest trading partner and ninth top foreign investor.33. ‧. As claimed by most academics, the Macapagal administration was considered as the Philippines and China’s golden age of partnership. Its relations were based on China’s high economic and. y. Nat. sit. political impact in the Philippines. Then again, from the mid 1960’s to 2010, literature shows. er. al. n. economic alliance.. io. that the Philippine-China Relations is rich in the field of trade and cooperation founded by its. Ch. engchi. The valleys of the Philippine-China Relations. i n U. v. From a good alliance in 1975-1986, Baker argues that the Sino-Philippine relations unexpectedly shifted to the left after the fall of the Marcos government and the end of the Martial law regime. He claims that it was because of the new government under the President Cory Aquino dismantling the established policy and political relations of the Philippines to China in order to prove the difference of its new administration. Furthermore, he stated that the country’s new. 31. De Castro, "Weakness and Gambits of Philippine Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century.", pp. 1. "Republic of China Trade ", ed. Office of the Asia-Pacific Affairs-Department of Foreign Affairs (Pasay City, Philippines2007). 33 Bobby M. Tuazon, "The Highs and Lows of Philippines-China Relations: Current Situation and Prospects," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2014)., pp. 5. 32. 10. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(19) liberal economic development was an anti-communist stance of the C. Aquino administration and a strategic plan that is designed to shift away the Philippines from China and corroborate Taiwan. Looking at other inquiries, some scholars argues that the C. Aquino administration does not have a coherent foreign policy because of the deserted damages of the Marcos law regime. 34 According to Lim (2012), the inability of the Philippine government was because of the problems left by the Martial law wherein enormous things are needed to be addressed in “government bankruptcy, double digit inflation, high unemployment, strikes and demonstration by farmers, workers, and students”.35 He argued that the only clear objective of the government. 政治大 because of the Philippine government inactivity towards strengthening relations with other 立. is to stop the graft and corruption and the military authoritarianism.36 This was evidently proven country during this period.. ‧ 國. 學. In view of this period, the Philippine’s as argued, did not pursue any action to rebuild the Sino-. ‧. Philippine relations and as claimed in Lim’s 1999 article, it was China who initiate first to revitalize the Philippines-China relations through the Cultural Agreement Executive Program.37. y. Nat. sit. However, because of its developing relationship to Taiwan and the President C. Aquino anti-. al. er. io. communist stance, Lim claims that the Philippines was employing the two-China policy. n. disregarding the previous administration signatory to the one-China policy and continuously. Ch. i n U. v. developing its trade and investment relations with Taiwan. In this regard, most scholars assert. engchi. that the period of C. Aquino administration between 1986-1992 was the first fall of Philippines and China relations.38 Such relationship fall was slightly ignited during the Ramos administration. Although it did not have significant effect on economic relations, the decline is seen in the context of military 34. Lim, "The Political Economy of the Philippines.", pp. 13 "China-Filipino Relations under the Aquino Regime: So Far," Center for People Empowerment in Governance 1-5 (2012)., pp. 13. 36 Ibid., pp. 3 37 "The Political Economy of the Philippines.", pp. 14 38 Theresa C. Cariño, "Philippine-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," Philippine-China Development Resource Center (1996). 35. 11. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(20) associations. As discussed by De Castro (2010), the friendly phase in military relations ended when the Philippines discovered the increasing Chinese presence on and around Mischief Reef in 1995.39 Such incident obliged the Philippines to shift its military strategy. As claimed, the Philippines responded the Chinese sovereignty threat by revitalizing the US-Philippine alliance through the negotiation of Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) and requesting for further military assistance to protect its territory and sovereignty. Hereafter, the Philippines and the United States signed the VFA by 199840 and ratified by the Philippine Senate in 1999. This was believed to be the first most controversial issue between the Sino-Philippine relations from 1975-2001. This strain in relations was only followed by 2011, for scholars, it was challenge by the change. 政治大 Aquino III focus less on Philippine foreign policy and was perceived to be running an ‘anything立 of administration. As discussed by De Castro (2014) and Tehankee (2016), President Benigno but-arroyo’ campaign.41 Then again, all programs and projects relating to the Arroyo. ‧ 國. 學. administration is dismantled including the growing Sino-Philippine partnerships. Adversely, for some analyst, the strained Philippines-China relations during the B. Aquino. ‧. administration was largely based on political current events. As emphasized in Tuazon (2014), the beginning of sparred Philippines-China relations was because of the government’s. y. Nat. sit. mishandling of the Rizal Park hostage crisis in 2011 which resulted to the killings of eight. al. er. io. tourists from Hong Kong and the Philippine president’s refusal to express an apology to. n. authorities.42 This was further magnified by the rejection of the PRC government to the. Ch. i n U. v. pleadings of the Philippines to grant clemency to the three Filipinos sentenced to death for drug. engchi. 39. De Castro, "Weakness and Gambits of Philippine Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century.", pp. 705. 40 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Treatment of the United States Armed Forces Visiting the Phiilippines," (Manila1998). 41 Julio C. Tehankee, "Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Tim," SAGE Publications 32, no. 3 (2016); Renato C. De Castro, "The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions," Pacific Affairs 87, no. 1 (2014). 42 Tuazon, "The Highs and Lows of Philippines-China Relations: Current Situation and Prospects.", pp. 6.. 12. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(21) trafficking.43 It was believed to be responded by President B. Aquino through his instruction to skip the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony honoring imprisoned Chinese dissident Liu Xiabo.44 Clearly, these scholars all argued that such relations in the B. Aquino III administration started in a series of mishaps and from then on, it was labeled as the lowest point of the countries diplomatic relations following the first C. Aquino administration incident. Furthermore, De Castro (2012) believed that this mangled alliance was further lightened because of the March 2011 incident. As highlighted, such territorial stance involves two (2) CCGV harassing and preventing a Philippine commissioned ship tasked for undertaking oil and gas. 政治大 between the two countries. However, in the later part, China responded aggressively to the 立. survey in the Reed bank (Recto Bank).45 At first, it was followed by subsequent talks and protest Philippines claiming that it should “stop harming China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and. ‧ 國. 學. interests, which leads to unilateral actions that can expand and complicate South China Sea dispute.”46. ‧. The Philippine government counterbalance such claim by bringing back the eagle card and. y. Nat. sit. pulling out its security umbrella. As stated by Linao (2011), this incident was the basis of the. al. er. io. clarification of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 between the Philippines and the United States. n. which later turned into as the Expanded Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) of 2014.47. Ch. i n U. v. Primarily, it was believed as a strategic way to inform China that the US will protect the country in the case of armed confrontations.. engchi. Because of this, scholars claim that the active support of the US government to the country is a push factor of filing a case against the PRC. Essentially, its defense cooperation further. 43. Renato C. De Castro, "The Philippines in 2011: Muddling through a Year of Learning and Adjustment," Asian Survey 52, no. 1 (2012)., pp. 215. 44 Jam Sisante, "Palace Exec Denies Phl Sending Representative to Nobel Rites," GMA News Public Affairs 2010. 45 "Arbitration under Annex Vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Republic of the Philippines V. People’s Republic of China, Memorial of the Philippines." 46 De Castro, "The Philippines in 2011: Muddling through a Year of Learning and Adjustment." 47 Girlie Linao, "Philippines Boosts Defence near Disputed Spratlys," German Press Agency 2011.. 13. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(22) amputated China’s assertiveness in SCS wherein it ruined the Sino-Philippines relations. Furthermore, these same scholars asserts that such partnership re-opened the geopolitics in Southeast Asia by acknowledging the US and challenging China’s policy.48 In the end, the B. Aquino III administration created a deep lesion in the Philippine-China relations. The way ahead relations Preceded by a mangled Philippine-China relation from the previous administration, President Rorigo Duterte was believed to be aiming to restore the Sino-Philippine relations. As discussed by Baviera (2012), he started this new foreign policy by declaring the independent foreign policy of the Philippines under his administration. Such policy radically shifts from the long-standing. 政治大. PH-US alliance and opens its door to the “countries on the other side of the ideological barrier”49. 立. which is China and Russia.. ‧ 國. 學. Correspondingly, other scholars argue that President Duterte was employing the same strategy of the Arroyo administration – the equi-balancing policy to China– where its inclined to a close. ‧. security policy with China disregarding the territorial defense and focusing on domestic security. y. Nat. issues such as drug trafficking, terrorism and insurgencies.50 This was further conferred by the. sit. claims of Tehankee (2016) nad Katigbak (2016) through highlighting Duterte’s claim in the SCS. al. er. io. insisting that the territorial conflict is purely a bilateral issue between the 2 countries and not an. n. international matter. That, the Philippines could open the doors for bilateral talks and other. Ch. i n U. v. several issues. Aside from this, both authors argued that the government continuously favored. engchi. China through the termination of the joint PH-US military operation and exercise in the SCS as China see this as “a provocative acting, making it more difficult to peacefully resolve territorial disputes”.51 48. De Castro, "The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions." 49 Baviera, Aileen (2016), “President Duterte’s Foreign Policy Challenges,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 38, 2, 202–207 in "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 18, no. 4 (2016); "The Philippines in 2011: Muddling through a Year of Learning and Adjustment."; Lim, "China-Filipino Relations under the Aquino Regime: So Far." 50 Tehankee, "Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Tim." 51 Jose Katigbak, " Philippines Eyes Talks with China Sans Preconditions," Philippine Star 2016.. 14. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(23) Such employment of equi-balancing strategy covers the Philippine territory in the SCS by relying to Japan instead of the US. As deliberated in De Castro’s article, Philippines is reinforcing a strengthened security partnership with Japan and plays the diplomatic gambit of equi-balancing52 in Southeast Asia where it opened several opportunities of memorandum of agreements and development assistance. Although still in process, President Duterte evidently shows the shift of the Philippine foreign policy to China which generates several major infrastructure and investment projects. Such shift can also resort to bilateral negotiations and joint explorations that may solve the dilemma in the. 政治大 fosters a security partnership with Japan – China’s rival in East Asia. 立. SCS.53 Strategically, while building a fresh relationship with China, his administration also. ‧ 國. 學. Philippine’s position in the South China Sea. ‧. Characterizing security, one of De Castro’s article contends state’s two ways in addressing. y. Nat. security concerns. It is between autonomous defense capabilities or alliances.54 As conferred,. sit. states can pursue both. However, according to him, in the context of a third world country like. n. al. er. io. the Philippines, it will seek the cheapest and most available – alliances.. Ch. i n U. v. This was argued by academes as the main frame of the Philippines national security and its claim. engchi. on the SCS. As thoroughly deliberated by De Castro (2005), the alliance of the Philippines to the US can be traced back in the 1940s through the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, Military Assistance Program of 1947 and Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951.55 Such alliance, was the only basis of President Marcos when the PRC started invoking its right in the SCS.. 52. De Castro, "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China.", pp. 19. 53 Ibid., pp. 156. 54 "Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?," Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (2005)., pp. 401. 55 Ibid., pp. 406.. 15. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(24) This beginning of the SCS dispute was tackled in Lim’s 2012 article where he emphasized the first claim of the Philippines during the 1970’s. It was when the Marcos administration sought to enter a contract to a Swedish company tasked to drill oil and natural gas in Reed bank. However, he argues, that due to the fear of military confrontation and to lose the benefit of buying oil in friendship prices with China, President Marcos dropped the Reed bank project. Although some scholars deliberates the Philippine government consideration of the US military protection in the worst case scenarios, Lim insisted that the dropping of the project is because of the treaty critiques which states that it covers only “the metropolitan territory of either of the parties, on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean”.56 It was believed as a. 政治大 protection, he emphasized that the Philippines cannot secure its own territory because of its 立 critical stance as the US will not support the extended structure in SCS and without such limited defense capability.. ‧ 國. 學. Furthermore, Rosen (2014) claims that instead of military power and strategies, the Philippines. ‧. tactically covered its territory by diplomatic strategy through the signing of Presidential Decree No. 1599 in June 11 1978 establishing a 200 Nautical Miles EEZ measured from the country’s. y. Nat. sit. baseline57 and the country’s approval of the LOS convention in 1982 and its ratification by 1984. al. er. io. where the Philippines continuously stated that it “intends to harmonize its domestic legislation. n. with the provisions of the Convention” and that it “will abide by the provisions of the said Convention”.. 58. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Such conflict was reawakened by 1988 when the PRC started building a radar structure and military facilities in Subi Reef (PH: Zamora Reef; PRC: Zhubi Reef). It is a Low Tide Elevation (LTE) outside the Philippines EEZ but within the country’s Continental Shelf (CS)59 and according to the article of Medeiros, et., al, (2008), this awakened the Philippine government to 56. Lim, "China-Filipino Relations under the Aquino Regime: So Far.", pp. 02. "Limits in the Seas No. 142 Philippines Archipelagic and Other Maritime Claims and Boundaries," ed. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs (U.S. Department of State, 2014). 58 Ibid., pp. 3. 59 Mark E. Rosen, "Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis," CNA Occasional Paper (2014). 57. 16. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(25) improve its defense capabilities. By doing so, the following year, the Philippine Senate encourages the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to formulate a 15-year development and modernization plan. Primarily focusing to the development of the Philippine Navy (PN) in patrolling and securing the country’s maritime sovereignty and territory. However, as De Castro state, the removal of the US military bases in 1992 severely affected the AFP modernization program as the Bush administration reduced the $200 million economic and military aid they provide annually by 60%.60 This covers most of the AFP acquisition and maintenance cost which cannot be economically replaced by the Philippine government. Aside from this, the lack of proper legislation for the AFP modernization program disable the government to provide specific budget.. 立. 政治大. Therefore, from 1960 – 1994, literatures and scholars show that the Philippines failed to develop. ‧ 國. 學. and modernize its defense capabilities despite of the threats to its territory and maritime security. This was considered to be rooted to the country’s dependence to the US and the US influence. ‧. during Johnson and Nixon administration.. y. Nat. sit. Above all the actions of the Philippine government, analyst claims that the best SCS response the. al. er. io. country did was when it discovered the increasing PRC construction in Mischief Reef. As. n. discussed by Lim (2005) and Rosen (2014), the weak military capabilities and the US military. Ch. i n U. v. withdrawal in 1992 created a cardinal point for the Philippines to rethink its strategy and. engchi. eventually build an airstrip in Thitu Island (PH: Pag-asa Island, PRC: Zhongye Dao island) During this time, the government assessed such actions as the cheapest strategy.61 As further claimed by De Castro, the Philippine government responded the aggressive and expansionist actions of the PRC by pushing the congress to approve and establish the military. 60. De Castro, "Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?.", pp. 412. 61 Rosen, "Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis.", pp. 5.. 17. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(26) modernization plan. However, such military development strategy failed again because of the economic incapacities of the Philippine government and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.62 Then again, even after such critical circumstances, the Philippines is unable to develop its military power and recognizing this weakness, Baker (2004) asserts that this was the Philippine government waking point realizing the importance of the US military presence to the country’s security and the region’s balance of power. Hence, the signing of the 1997 VFA between the PHUS and its ratification by 1998. In this time, he claims that the Philippines military defense capabilities are again supported by the US security umbrella.. 政治大 balancing policy wherein it builds its economy with China and protect its security through the 立 By 2001, De Castro, Lim and Baker believed that the Philippines is employing the equiUS umbrella. Upon this period, these scholars argue that since the VFA signing and the. ‧ 國. 學. continuous US-Philippines military exercise in the SCS, the number of bilateral interactions increased between the Philippines and China.63 Furthermore to this, they believed that in addition. ‧. to the country’s strategy, the government worked to internationalized the SCS issue through the United Nations (UN), Asean Regional Forum (ARF), and with its partners to the ASEAN.. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Such inactivity of the Philippines was argued by Labrador (2001) as a week position in SCS.. n. This is primarily because of its failure to create a concrete plan for the country’s maritime. Ch. i n U. v. territory and security despite all discovered Chinese constructions and its high reliance to the US support.64. engchi. Meanwhile, other scholars claim that the Philippine’s strategy only changed when the March 2 2011 incident rose where two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship task by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) for oil explorations in Reed Bank (Reed Tablemount / Recto. 62. De Castro, "Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?.", pp. 413. 63 Baker, "China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation.", pp. 7.; De Castro, "The Philippines in 2011: Muddling through a Year of Learning and Adjustment."; Lim, "China-Filipino Relations under the Aquino Regime: So Far." 64 Mel C. Labrador, "The Philippines in 2000 in Search of a Silver Lining," Asian Survey 41, no. 1 (2001).. 18. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(27) Bank). This part of the SCS is located 150 kilometers East of the Spratly Islands and 250 West of Palawan, Philippines.65 According to De Castro, the Philippine government led a protest demanding for the incident’s further explanation. In response, the PRC government insisted their right and sovereignty over the Island as it is part of their maritime territory. It even further necessitated the Philippines to seek permits and approval to its government from conducting such activities in SCS as this is part of the PRC’s territory. This was counterbalance through public announcement. As discussed by Linao (2011) the Philippine government responded China’s claim by its official announcement of enhancing and safeguarding the country’s maritime security by increasing its military presence in Palawan,. 政治大 Furthermore to this, Linao claims that such conceited and arrogant 立. deploying survey ships for oil explorations and allocating $186 million USD to acquire new patrol boats and aircraft.66. response of China awakened the Philippines to develop its military capabilities. By this time, it. ‧ 國. 學. created an improved 15-year AFP modernization plan program aimed to challenge China in the SCS. The long-term goal, according to the 2011 AFP’s Strategic Intent, is to maintain a “credible. ‧. deterrent posture against foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while allowing free navigation to prosper”.67. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. However, for the third time, because of the financial limitation of the Philippine government, the. n. only military modernization it can acquire is through credible defense posture and not for war. Ch. i n U. v. fighting purposes. Then again, the country is again searching for the lining of the US military defense.. engchi. Such critical incident was further followed a year after, in April 2012 a Philippine navy surveillance craft sighted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside the Scarborough Shoal (PH: Bajo de Masinloc, PRC: Huángyán Dǎo) illegally carrying numerous endangered turtles,. 65. "Arbitration under Annex Vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Republic of the Philippines V. People’s Republic of China, Memorial of the Philippines."; Rosen, "Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis." 66 Linao, "Philippines Boosts Defence near Disputed Spratlys." 67 2011 AFP Strategic Intent in De Castro, "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China.". 19. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(28) baby sharks, giant clams and a large amount of corals on board. Claiming for the territory, the Philippine government aimed to apprehend the fishermen through a Philippine Navy Ship, BRP Gregorio Del Pilar. However, two Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessel prevented such actions. Hereafter, China sent their Maritime Surveillance Aircraft to encircle at the vicinity of the shoal. Such standoff continued for months. The Philippines vessels were only pulled out on July 15 due to the incoming typhoon in the BDM. The Philippine responded to this critical standoff by seeking the US for military assistance. As claimed by De Castro, the result is the Framework Agreement on Enhanced Rotational Presence and Agreement which facilitates the American troops and created to control the increasing. 政治大 through filing against China in the Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the 立 tension in the SCS dispute. 68 Moreover, a diplomatic action was made by January 22 2013. Law of the Sea asking for the entitlement of the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief. ‧ 國. 學. Reef, and other land features within its 200-mile EEZ through the guide of UNCLOS.. ‧. While the ruling is still in process, De Castro repeatedly emphasized in his works that the Philippine government resolve its military defense capabilities through the signing of the April. y. Nat. sit. 28 2014 Expanded Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US which aims to develop. al. er. io. the country’s defense capabilities.69 As further acknowledge by academes, this agreement. n. deployed a strong diplomatic stance to the PRC gallantly stating the US protection to the Philippines.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. By July 12 2016, the result of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) came and legally favored the Philippines. According to De Castro (2016) article, the new administration under President Duterte reacted by strongly insisting Philippines maritime claim and territory. However, due to internal and external factors in which he failed to discuss, the Philippine shifted. 68. Ibid., pp. 12 "Weakness and Gambits of Philippine Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century.";"The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions."; "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China.". 69. 20. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(29) and started sending signals to the PRC that it is open for bilateral negotiations.70 Heydarian (2017) claims that this was because of the governments realization of its limited military and naval capabilities and the possible negative effect to the millions of Filipino fishermen fishing in the South China Sea. 71 Meanwhile, for Cigaral (2011) President Duterte is potraying a pro-China stance as he was argued to be employing an equi-balancing strategy to Southeast Asia using Japan. This was evident because of President Duterte’s state visit in Japan last October 2016, where he signed Japan’s development assistance to the Philippines provisioning large scale patrolled vessels to be delivered to the Philippine Coast Guards (PCG) aim to prevent provocative actions in the SCS. 政治大 government further even signed the Memorandum of Implementation and Letter of Arrangement 立 and enhance the country’s maritime patrol and law enforcement operations. The Philippine. for the transfer of Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF)’s training aircraft TC-90. ‧ 國. 學. maritime reconnaissance planes for the Philippine Navy (PN).72. ‧. Overall, conferring to the latest events of the Philippines position, academes argues that the Philippine government is shifting away from its strong position in the South China Sea to be able. y. Nat. sit. to build a closer relation with China. This is grasped in Romero and Laude’s 2017 article where. al. er. io. they highlights the Philippine’s discovery of new PRC reclamation structures in the SCS and. n. President Duterte’s reliance on China’s promises of non-reclamations.73. Ch. engchi. Conclusion: The literature’s strength and weaknesses. i n U. v. The literature gathered relating this research provided a good foundation of the Philippines and China relations. Primarily, most scholars’ emphasis on the Sino-Philippine relations are based on. 70. "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China." 71 Richard Javad Heydarian, "Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy," Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017). 72 Cigaral in De Castro, "The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration’s Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China." 73 Alexis Romero and Jaime Laude, "More Chinese Island-Building? Rody Relies on ‘Good Faith’," The Philippine Star 2017.. 21. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(30) economic and military associations. Such studies tackle the traditional forms of relationship development through trade and economic cooperation, investments, agreements and alliances. In the context of the Philippines position in the SCS, most scholars focus on the Philippines military strategy, national position and its developing military affairs to China and the United States. Such literatures continuously portray the anarchic international structure of the world politics and the interdependence of the Philippines towards states. Primarily, most of these studies focuses on how states in the SCS interacts by pursuing each of its own political ambitions and national interest. It concentrates on power, politics, interactions, and military strategies which provided in a conventional form of analysis engrained in the anarchic system and realist. 政治大. perspective of international relations. It failed to look outside the box and understand the social. 立. perspective of such phenomenon.. ‧ 國. 學. Then again, there is an increasing literature gap on the civic perspective which can be argued as the real victims of most political conflict especially in the South China Sea. This issue and. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. perspective will be the goal of this research to discover and fulfill.. Ch. engchi. 22. i n U. v. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(31) METHODOLOGY This study employs qualitative designs through Combinative ethnography. It is defined by Baszanger and Dodier (2004), as a “type of ethnography [that] sought to identify certain cases by ethnographer’s participation in life activities”. This ethnographic method was argued as the only way to understand the political impacts of policies in international relations. Primarily, it is rooted from the interactionist perspective in which it employs a wide range of data collection through field access, participant observations, interviews and focus group discussions.74 The primary method gathering data is through fieldwork wherein access to field is only employed by rapport building. It is the establishment of mutual trust in which according to. 政治大 It is a vital factor for data gathering as the respondent’s. Baszanger and Dodier, a methodology that enables the researcher to gain access to the real. 立. meanings of the subject’s situation.75. ‘sense of trust’ is essential to the truthfulness and realities of the gathered data. Likewise,. ‧ 國. 學. participant observations will be applied in understanding the fishermen’s situation and such is documented in the process of field notes.. ‧. y. Nat. In the context of interviews, this research follows Warenn (2004) definition that it is a “verbal. sit. conversation between two people with the objective of collecting relevant information for the. al. er. io. purpose of research”.76 Primarily, this study will employ semi-structured questions to seek in-. n. depth information to the participants experiences, feelings and perception without imposing and. Ch. i n U. v. structurally altering the possible results of the answer of such phenomenon that usually exists in. engchi. structured interviews as argued by Crabtree (2006). 77 The draft of interview guide is attached in Appendix A of this research in which it presents a thematic, topic centered and flexible structure of questions that can be raised in the process.. 74. Isabelle Baszanger and Nicolas Dodier, "Ethnography: Relating the Part to the Whole," in Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, ed. David Silverman (London: SAGE Publications, 2004). 75 Ibid., pp. 36. 76 Carol A. Warenn, Discovering Qualitative Methods: Field Research, Interviews, and Analysis (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2010). 77 Cohen D. Crabtree, "Qualitative Research Guidelines Project," Robert Woof Johnson Foundation (2006).. 23. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(32) Interview respondents are also chosen through snowballing process in “which contact is made with participants appropriate for your research through whatever access route you can find, and through these first participants you are introduced to others of similar/ relevant characteristics for your research”.78 Such process was also argued as an integral part of ethnography in which the researchers spend a number of time in the community and which integrates the sense of respondent’s trust. Meanwhile, the data gathered from this study will be examined through Discourse Analysis. It is a type of analysis which “seeks to capture the inevitable changes in representations of reality” as claimed by Neuman (2008).79 Basically, its goals in general are to describe, discover and explain. 政治大 preconditions for it happening, demonstrating concurrently that the outcome might have been 立 a specific phenomenon where it starts with a “specific outcome and demonstrate the different”.80. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 78. Rosalind Edwards and Janet Holland, ‘What Is?’ Research Method Series, ed. Graham Crow, What Is Qualitative Intewviewing? (New York, USA: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013). 79 Iver B. Neumann, "Discourse Analysis," in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)., pp. 62. 80 Ibid., pp. 63.. 24. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(33) RESEARCH FRAMEWORK The primary goal of this research is to unravel and understand the rising issues beyond state politics in the SCS dispute. As it looks on the civic perspective, this research aims to discover the SCS conflicts effects on the people’s living experiences. As such discovery and documentation of this phenomenon may contribute and create an understanding to the real conflict and the current people’s situation in which can further formulate an effect to at least domestic political change. Focusing more on Filipino fishermen, the target subjects of this study are from Zambales, Philippines. A province in the Philippines located in the Central region in the island of Luzon. 政治大 Philippines in which the major industry 立 is fishing. Furthermore, the traditional fishing grounds of (Figure 3) which lies on the Philippine West Coasts. It is one of the coastal communities in the fishermen is located in the SCS wherein they utilize the Scarborough Shoal (PH: Bajo de. ‧ 國. 學. Masinloc, PRC: Huángyán Dǎo) which is 240KM far from the coast of Zambales.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2: Map of the Philippines - Red highlighting the Province of Zambales)81. 81. Google Maps (n.d.) [Google Maps Province of Zambales, Cetral Luzon, Philippines]. Retrieved November 28, 2017, from https://www.google.com.tw/maps/place/Zambales,+Philippines/@15.2948623,118.4240338,8z/data=!4m 5!3m4!1s0x339426ea3ea3fa11:0xa5fb501f93d0f77a!8m2!3d15.5081766!4d119.9697808. 25. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(34) Such location is exactly what this research needs especially targeting the fishermen that are always affected by the dispute. In one way, these individuals may provide a valuable data on the fishermen’s perspective on the South China Sea, the dispute and its policies and strategies. Aside from this, it is presumed in this study that fishermen’s perspective is shaped by two factors. Presented in figure 4, the first factor which influence the fishermen’s perspective are the Philippine government policies towards its people, China and the SCS. It creates a direct link on the fishermen’s real-life experience as these serves as the result of such policies. These real-life experiences in the midst of the dispute is what this research aims to unravel and understand wherein it looks beyond the conventional inquiries in international relations. Following this, it. 政治大 policies wherein the possibilities of civic perspective influence to the governmental policies can 立 also considers the indirect link from the fishermen’s perspective to the Philippine government be evident.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 3: Research Framework. The second factor assumed by this research includes the external structure and regional events. These are the situations happening between states where regional power change and disputes between the Philippines and China is considered. Primarily, it creates the link between these events and the current situation at sea which creates a direct link on the living experiences of the fishermen in the midst of the SCS dispute. Furthermore, it showcases how such dispute and conflict between states reflects on the real people experiences and lives.. 26. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(35) CHAPTER II: THE FISHERMEN’S PERSPECTIVE AND LIFE STORIES Over the most contested water way in the world, the Scarborough Shoal (PH: Bajo de Masinloc, PRC: Huángyán Dǎo) as claimed by studies presents the best scenario of overlapping claims of territorial sovereignty dispute.82 As such, both domestic and international actors including its politics creates a repercussion in which individual’s life experiences and stories are greatly affected. Such cases were evidently seen in the Filipino fishermen of Scarborough shoal. Locally known as Kalburo, the community of fishermen in San Salvador Island, Zambales remembers the shoal as the heaven of marine life and ecosystem in which various marine species. 政治大 Scarborough shoal served as the traditional fishing ground and the basis of their traditional form 立 including giant clams and varieties of corals can be found. Utilizing it for decades, the. access to the shoal is always the basis of their income generation.. 學. ‧ 國. of livelihood. As fishing is distinguished and acclaimed to the community of San Salvador, the. ‧. Living in a developing country, most of the Filipino Fishermen’s conditions limits their access to proper education and further development. With such, instead of degree completions, these. y. Nat. sit. individuals are often exposed early to the fishing industry which limits the possibility of other. al. er. io. life choices. Because of this, the beginning of their fishing life experiences can be traced from. n. the childhood to adolescent life stages which should be enjoyed for most individuals. Starting as. Ch. i n U. v. early as twelve, their fishing knowledge and skills are developed through their parent’s teachings. engchi. and guidance as past fishermen of Scarborough shoal.. Clearly, this situation creates fishing as a local and traditional culture wherein the basis of the individual’s knowledge, skills, techniques and other methods aside from experiences is developed and passed from one generation to another. However, such traditions, life conditions and limitations create a stronger attachment and foundation to fishing as the only community recognize source of good income and without having further options, the importance of fishing in the Scarborough shoal is profound. In the case of these fishermen, their situation is a strong 82. Joseph Anthony Reyes, "Scarborough Shoal Standoff: The Curious Case of the Disappearing Giant Clams, Rare Corals, Baby Sharks, and Turtles," Journal of International Relations Research 3 (2013).. 27. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.

(36) reflection of a developing community and country in which according to them are the strangles of systematic poverty. From then on, these fishermen created a life circling around the fishing industry with limited resources and funds. As a result of, most of them belongs to a chartered boat fishing in which the fishing vessel is hired through an agreement with the owner and the fishermen who rent the vessel/s are solely responsible for all operating expenses, port expenses, insurances and maintenance.83 Primarily, the fishermen who chartered the boat are both legally and financially responsible in all costs. With a regular routine of 2 consecutive days to arrive and another 2 to go back, a fisherman from San Salvador island roughly earns 4 – 6 USD a day per person and about. 政治大 other costs, the earnings of fishing today in the Scarborough shoal barely covers enough and 立. 24 – 40 USD per vessel per day. Subtracting the charter boat payment, operational expenses and adding the rising conflict in their traditional fishing ground could sum a fishing life in a great. ‧ 國. 學. struggle.. ‧. Despite of the rise of issues and further exposure to greater dangers beyond the regular fishing endeavors, most Filipino fishermen of Scarborough decided to continue fishing and accessing the. y. Nat. sit. shoal because of limited livelihood availabilities and bounded sources of income and from all of. al. n. strategies of China started the people’s biggest dilemma.. Ch. engchi. er. io. their fishing life experiences, the narratives of their stories shows that the arrival, actions and. i n U. v. 83. Mark Huber, "Chartering and Operations," in Tanker Operations: A Handbook for the Person-inCharge (Pic) (Cambridge, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 2001).. 28. DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.005.2018.A06.