Chapter 5 Case Studies
5.1 Illicit Electoral Finance
essential to mention that Alejandro Giammattei current president of Guatemala faced charges in local tribunals but was dismissed for lack of evidence in 2012 (WOLA 2015, 11).
In 2009, Famous Guatemalan lawyer, murder in Guatemala City. Controversial videos created a political crisis in Guatemala after his death in 2009. Rosenberg accused Alvaro Colom president in 2009 and first lady Sandra Colom of being related to his assassination.
CICIG then found that Rosenberg planned his death (CICIG 2014).
CICIG was able to prosecute influential politicians and high range functionaries. Alfonso Portillo, president in 2000, was syndicated of corruption in the executive branch with other high-level officials. Portillo was accused of money laundry and budgetary modification without justifications. In 2014, Portillo was extradited to the United States, which was related to money laundry $2.5 million from the government of Taiwan. Perhaps the most controversial case was revealed in 2015, the La Línea scandal was a Corruption network that involved Superintendency of Tax Administration and high-level officers. CICIG estimated that this network created $120 million of tax fraud (CICIG 2015, 22). The investigation’s findings created a historic mass protest in Guatemala discussed in a section below.
5.1 Illicit electoral finance
CICIG cases serve as a reference to a set of investigatory faculties that focus on the understanding of organized crime in Guatemala. Thus, the anti-corruption agency develops a systematic comprehension of articulated bodies founded in the state. Hidden organizations operate with a clear division of tasks and a high capacity of adaptation against new legal and political environments (CICIG 2019). CICIG investigations against impunity lead to a series of more specific investigations focus on the behavior of criminal organizations linked with the political parties’ financial structure. In this case, CIACS contain unique characteristics of coordination, articulation, and cooperation between sectors according to the corrupted interests of the ruling administration(CICIG 2019).
CIACS definition consists of multi-dimensional analyses that describe the behavior of
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the political competition and establish control inside state institutions, and the academic sector refers to this as co-optation of the state (Garay and Salcedo 2012). The ultimate purpose of every CIACS was to establish a network of corruption and criminal activities that manipulate justice to achieve complete impunity. Therefore, one of the CIACS’s main characteristics was the intense promotion, establishment, and practice of impunity in all its dimensions (CICIG 2019).
In order to illustrate CIACS behavior, the following paragraphs include an analysis based on CICIG investigations and reports presented during its mandate in Guatemala.
CICIG identify that most of the CIACS had a close relationship with the political elites and economic elites in Guatemala. It was not new but still controversial, the maintenances of power and influence that lasted since the XVIII century (Donis 2016). Unique institutions that belonged to the colonial age across Latin America, better known by historians as caciques or señores feudales, manage to adapt, survive and acquire a degree of legitimation through time. These particular figures of the region will remain as the dome of the configuration and coordination of networks founded inside the state of Guatemala.
In general, the socio-political characteristics of Guatemala, suffer from deterioration related to the relationship founded between tenancy of land, economic inequality, and criminal organizations (Donis 2016). A gain of a legal capacity legitimated every CIACS activity and benefit from this relationship. CICIG offered a detailed image of the starting point, the political parties system. Also, scholars (Balsells and Gramajo, 2008; Novales; 2016), sectors of civil society (Vasquez 2003), NGOs, think tanks (Balsells 2002) and international organizations (CICIG 2019) identify different obstacles and difficulties in the structure of Guatemalan electoral system.
The Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Supremo Electoral TSE) is the institution in charge of the administration of the electoral system in Guatemala (art.121 of LEPP), register deficiency in different aspects weak sanctioning faculty to missing audit abilities for political parties financing. CICIG identifies that the TSE is a weak institution that, combined with the
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system(CICIG 2019). According to Novales (2016), institutional failure identified in the political parties system was a product of TSE’s inability to enforce norms and laws (Novales;
2016).
By the year 2015, CICIG makes evident the abuse of the electoral system by revealing corruption dynamics related to the electoral campaigns. In the annual report of the year 2015, CICIG identifies that in 2011, at least Q300 million not reported to the TSE as part of political parties and political campaigns(CICIG 2015, 45). The international commission used four different situations to describe illicit electoral finance. There are three primary levels;
municipalities, districts, and national level; concentrate the sponsor provided by the private sector; in four different situations; those when media is involved; those related to criminal activities; and those involving the public spender to public infrastructure projects (CICIG 2015).
Two major political parties Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza UNE (2008-2012) and Partido Patriota PP(2012-2015) related to CIACS description with illicit electoral financing, had strong political influence in the three branches of the state from 2008 to 2015.
PP, a political party, founded in 2002 under the direction of Otto Pérez Molina, was a retired general who served in the army during the Guatemalan internal conflict (1960-1996). The motto of PP was mano dura (firm hand) configured to appeal to the mass and vulnerable sectors that suffer from high rates of violence and crime(Sabino 2007). PP will gain a strong presence across the nation, taking two presidential campaigns to achieve the presidency.
Compare to other political parties; PP will enjoy a high level of acceptance during the first year of governance. Perez won the elections with 53.74% of votes, while Manuel Baldizon reaches 46.26%(TSE 2011). The national agenda of the party will include three main axes;
Security, Justice; and Hambre Cero (Zero hunger). Thus, candidates promoted security and employment as part of the political campaigns. During the first presidential election in 2003 and the last in 2015, PP showed strong political and financial support from the economic elites.
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In the first year of PP administration, the Ministro de Gobernación MG under Mauricio López Bonilla had a 35% increase in budget to follow the securities goals promised during the campaign(Aceña 2016, 16). By 2012, Guatemala’s alarming homicide rate was 47 per one hundred Guatemalans, and in 2010 register 33 thousand robbery and assaults complain. As a result, Otto Perez Molina, most controversial promise, was the re-establishment of the death penalty withdrawn in 2001 (Kurt 2007). Additionally, Ministerio Público MP with a high relative autonomy under fiscal Claudia Paz y Paz focused on human rights affairs (Aceña 2016).
During PP administration, the MP had a significant increase in the nationwide coverage for criminal persecution as well as institutional development. The function of coordination with the CICIG was fundamental to present the full five years progress of corruption cases in previous administrations. In the year 2014, Thelma Aldana becomes head of the office of the attorney general. It was during Aldana four-year term that CICIG and MP disclose high profile corruption cases that involved almost the entire Molina’s cabinet (Schwartz 2019).
MP and CICIG cooperation identify the CIACS structures found inside PP lines. Complex criminal structures operated across the Social Security Institute (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social IGSS), Tax and customs, and National Civil Police. Among other corruption cases that involved PP was IGSS-PISA, IGSS-Chiquimula; PP’s congressman involved in ghost squares in the legislative; and criminal networks founded in Ministerio de Desarrollo MD(CICIG 2015). Corruption in Guatemala’s customs administration system revealed with information from Juan Carlos Monzón, private secretary vice president of Roxana Baldetti. According to the information provided by CICIG in 2015, Molina and Baldetti, lead a criminal structure named La Línea, that was able to make a total of $120 million in illegal profit in one year (CICIG 2015, 23).
The disclosure of the case pushed for Molina and Baldetti’s resignations; losing immunity MP was able to process them. The TSE cancel PP after revealing the secure connections of the party with organized crime. Another case that shapes CICIG participation in Guatemala involves the social democrats’ sectors that participated in guerrilla activities during the 90s
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Before the ruling period of PP, president Alvaro Colom elected in 2008, represented the social democrat Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza UNE. Colom was known for its participation in the lines of Guatemala guerilla with his wife, Sandra Torres. The motto of UNE wasTu esperanza es mi compromiso (Your hope is my commitment). The central axis of its political campaign was the promotion of improving the healthcare system, education, and health system (Kurt 2007). During Colom’s administration, different social programs justify government actions.
Among the first programs were Tu Bolsa Solidaria (Your Solidarity Bag), this program represented a political strategy to achieve local support in rural Guatemala. Mostly, indigenous-rural regions became a substantial part of the UNE electorate. Colom’s second presidential campaign considered a success because many doubted Colom’s ability to speak in public. The UNE achieve 52.7% of the votes, compare to the Molina’s 47.3%. The green logo party achieves to build a political machine that controlled 20 of the 22 departments or municipalities.
In a report named Financiamiento de la Política en Guatemala, CICIG mentions that three criminal structures related to drug trafficking operated under UNE’s label (CICIG 2015). The figure of the private secretary of the presidency also was mentioned during these cases.
Gustavo Alejos, the private secretary of the presidency, accused of corruption and links with drug trafficking (CICIG 2015). The sister of Sandra Torres, Colom’s wife, Gloria Torres, was also involved in coordinating the collection of illegal fundraising, money laundry, and fraud (CICIG 2016). Gloria Torres, also the founder of UNE in 2001, controlled the political machine that influences decision making across the country through the municipalities.
MP and CICIG achieve significant progress in investigations that involved Colom.
Transurbano was the name of the case that involved an extensive network of public transportation in Guatemala City. This network used for money laundry purposes linked with the Colom’s administration cabinet. Similar to PP’s customs networks, during 2008 and 2012, Transurbano was able to produce $35 US millions of illegal profits (CICIG 2018).
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Despite UNE’s surrounded by corruption cases, the political party still managed to continue operating in the legislative branch as a block. It is essential to mention that turncoats a common practice in the legislative branch(Badillo 2015). During the UNE ruling period, 34.17% of the congressman change of political party (Badillo 2015, 5). The power of the political machine inside UNE was still evident in 2019, as Sandra Torres ran as a candidate for president. Alarming results in the presidential elections of 2019, indicating a new stage for UNE as a political party.
Lemus (2019) refers to this election as the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in Guatemala. UNE manages to win first place in 84% of the municipalities (Lemus 2019, 16).
The party also achieve to win third parts of the congress, becoming a dominant party at a municipality level and legislative in Guatemala.
Despite the success of UNE in the presidential elections, Sandra Torres was not able to win the elections and become president. Surround by corruption scandals, Torres primarily accused of illicit electoral finance (Cuffe 2019). After losing the election, she lost her immunity, face prosecution, and currently, a powerful ex-first lady Sandra Torres faces trial and house arrest.
5.2 Cases of Controlling over the Election of Magistrates The Parallel Commissions
One of the characteristics of the CIACS is the promotion, production, and establishment of impunity. In order to achieve a high degree of impunity, CICIG identify another form of co-optation founded in the Judiciary branch (Waxenecker et al. 2019). In other words, it is the use of political power to infiltrate in the judiciary power with the ultimate goal of manipulating justice. The first step is to coordinate a parallel commission that operates at the magistrates’ election in the Corte Suprema de Justicia y de las Cortes de Apelaciones (Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals). In Guatemala, political influence over the judiciary jeopardizes the separation of powers. According to CICIG, the manipulation of trials, evidence, and influence on the legal process is in charge of a complex network of lawyers, judges, and magistrates. During the election of the magistrates of the Supreme Court
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process, and different individuals showed related to political parties (PP, UNE, and LIDER) (Aceña 2016).As expected, law enforcement against the judiciary power presented more obstacles during the investigation process. After four years, in 2018, CICIG and MP reveal a more structured case that illustrates the way parallel commissions operated. As a result, Sergio Roberto López Villatoro identified as the key actor in the use of economic and political influence in the magistrates (CICIG 2018). Investigations also linked an active high-range general Erick Melgar Padilla accused of manipulating witnesses and judges related to his father’s assassination. Thus, the investigations against the general identification of an artificial network perpetuated crime against landowners and land theft(CICIG 2018).
The case of Melgar Padilla, involve two candidates for magistrates, Eduardo Herrera Solares and Carlos Rodimiro Paz. Also, CICIG manifests the absence of commitment by the legislative to implement critical reforms to the judiciary system. The promotion of these reforms focused on specific decrees (Decretos 32-2016 y Decreto 17-2017)of the judicial career that benefit the independence of the system of justice of Guatemala (CICIG 2018).
In the annual report of 2015, CICIG successfully established investigations and sufficient evidence to assist the MP in the persecution of five employees of the judicial system, including a magistrate (CICIG 2015). Erick Santiago de León, an active magistrate for the region of Quiche, the north-west region of Guatemala, De León, accused of using the institution for corruption and influence-peddling(CICIG 2015). Later on, the Supreme Court suspended his title of the magistrate and proceeded to trial.
The weak independence of the judiciary system in Guatemala also allows judges to build unjustified patrimonies. Two judges linked to belonging to a drug trafficking network, Jisela Yadel Reinoso Trujillo and Carol Patricia Flores. These judges accused of money laundry, illicit enrichment, and breach of duties (CICIG 2015).
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One of the most controversial cases reveal in 2015, involve Guatemalan judge Marta Josefin Sierra Gonzalez, de Stalling. The case denominated Bufete de la Impunidad (Impunity Law Firm) consisted of a set of illegal agreements linked with high officials of Otto Perez Molina administration (CICIG 2015). Stalling manage to use her faculties as a judge to benefit public functionaries’ accuse of corruption with special measures (CICIG 2015). The CICIG manages to use technology tools like communication interceptions to follow the agreements, including money transfer and manipulation of legal procedures (CICIG 2015).
The investigations and communications interceptions serve as a tool to identify an extensive network of judges and lawyers that provide the service of impunity in exchange for economic transactions (CICIG 2015). Bufete de la Impunidad integrated by six lawyers, including Stalling son, Roberto Stalling Sierra, who charged with the crimes of passive bribery (cohecho pasivo) (CICIG 2015). Despite the evidence provided by the MP, both Stalling mother and son benefited with special measures, later the CICIG and MP appeal the resolution granted by the judge.
5.3 The Public Response
On April 16, 2015, after the CICIG and the MP presented the first part of La Línea , mass protests registered at different points of the country. The demography of this protest included members and leaders of the civil society in Guatemala. Students from private and public universities, sectors concern humans rights in Guatemala, movements concern with violence against women, organizations that study economic development, and community leaders from rural Guatemala began to join mass mobilizations. However, the majority of the participants were male students that belong to the middle class and lived in the metropolitan area (C. Ortiz 2016).
Traditional forms of communication like national TV channels and radio broadcasted the protests across the country. However, digital media serve as a space of coordination and organization (C. Ortiz 2016). As a result, new phenomena emerge like trending topics, hashtags, pages, and cyber events taking place in online platforms like Facebook. Serving as essential links between CICIG and MP cases with the citizens (Aceña 2016), some popular
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hashtags used on online social media like Twitter include #CasoLaLinea, #Paro27A,
#EstoApenasEmpieza, #PlazasFantasmas, #NoTeToca, #JuevesDeCICIG, #RenunciaYa, and
#JusticiaYa.
On the one hand, these protests mobilize to the public plaza in the capital city, representing historic expression for a society with an authoritarian past (Donis 2016). The coordination and organization of the protest remain to practice a peaceful tone and avoid any violence. La Plaza as protesters label it was the playground for singing the anthem and expressing the concerns about the corruption scandals reveal by CICIG and MP. Parallel to the protest during September and October, the event better known as the third great reform of the electoral law of political parties will be produced (CICIG 2019)
The presentation of the case of La Línea broadcasted through television, Facebook live, Twitter Live, and Instagram live. The transmission serves as a signal of each investigatory stage of the legal process. Thus, organizations of civil society and NGOs have a better understanding of ongoing corruption in the country (Schwartz 2019).
In order to provide a better image of the 2015 mass mobilization, this thesis considers essential to include the survey created by National Democratic Institute NDI, a Guatemala-based NGO. The response of Guatemalans is summarized in four central questions related to the protests. It is essential to address that Guatemala’s absence of robust data jeopardizes the country’s understanding of mass mobilization. The NDI survey sample consisted of 1,600 individuals divided into groups of 200 for different regions of Guatemala.
One of the interesting findings is that the majority of the individuals heard about the protest and responded to agree with the mass mobilization.
Mass mobilization in different parts of the country was one of many expressions of the public response. After CICIG and MP continue working, four out of ten Guatemalans trusted CICIG (Donis 2016). Guatemalans level of trust in the political institution, police, judiciary power, and TSE register historic low performance. Less than 11% deposit of Guatemalans deposit their trust in state institutions (Donis 2016, 46).
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Another response after the corruption scandals, scholars and policymakers had a better estimation of distrust toward the political parties. 91% of Guatemalans mention being highly disappointed with the political organizations (Donis 2016, 56). Contrary, some authors identify that the protest in 2015 confirmed the excessive trust Guatemalans have with presidents and not in institutions. E. Ortiz (2016) confirmed that the caudillismo culture, more Guatemalans confirm that they protested to request the resign of Baldetti and Molina.
Only 42% of confirming the protest is against the corrupted system (E. Ortiz 2016, 60).
Thus, the author also underlines that CICIG and MP are part of the same social phenomenon.
During each case presentation, Thelma Aldana (attorney general) and Ivan Velasquez (CICIG’s commissioner) became the center of attention (C. Ortiz 2016). Interestingly, MP and CICIG became the two institutions more trusted between Guatemalans, position level of trust never register before: 54.1% of the survey mentions trusting in these institutions (NDI 2016). In contrast, the high levels of distrust towards the political parties considered as a problematic response since Guatemalans lack incentives to participate inside a political organization (E. Ortiz 2016; Zapata 2016; Mejía 2016). It is clear that the fight against corruption folded the trust significantly higher than trust levels in institutions like the army or the church (Chang 2016).
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