2. REVIEW ON CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS
2.2. The Post-Cold War Era
2.2.4. China in Southeast Asia: Life and Culture
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
P a g e | 24
six dialogue partners10. RCEP is actually the extension of APT and ASEAN+6.
Therefore, RCEP accounts for one third of global GDP. Initiated at 21th ASEAN Summit, RCEP is expected to be concluded in 2015. Since 2010, it’s been debated that the best way to engage United States and Russia is EAS
(ASEAN+8). So far, ASEAN+8 meeting is held every two to three years. In 2010, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the most populous free trade zone, was
launched by China and ten ASEAN member states. The initial framework agreement was signed by the-then Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (Zhu Rongji) and the ten leaders from ASEAN nations in pursuit of closer economic relations as well as mutual political and economic benefits. Besides, following the United States, China also appointed its first ambassador to ASEAN, headquarter in Jakarta in 2012. China’s appointment of ambassador to ASEAN intends to boost the bilateral ties and upgrade its
relationship with the Southeast Asian grouping to a strategic partnership.
2.2.4. China in Southeast Asia: Life and Culture
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia can be seen in history, education, and culture in the region. Chinese culture is the oldest civilization and has a far-reaching consequence that affects the customs and traditions of East Asia. Chinese literacy plays a vital role in East Asian literary. Thanks to adjacency of geography and history, Southeast Asia states, particularly Vietnam, share many common traits of Chinese culture. Unlike other countries in Indochina Peninsula, Vietnam has been deeply and historically influenced by Chinese script, Confucianism and Taoism. Close to China and India, Southeast Asia was not only influenced by Indian, Hindu and Islamic culture, but also by Confucius and Buddhist culture.
10The Six indicates China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
For over a thousand years, Buddhism is the dominant religion in Southeast Asia, especially in Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and also has significant impacts on the daily life of people in these countries. Nowadays, Chinese government establishes Confucius Institutes worldwide to promote Chinese language and culture. Chinese government already established 554 Confucius Institutes across the world, and there are currently 34 Confucius Institutes in Southeast Asia, offering Chinese language courses and organizes Chinese cultural activities, making Chinese languages spread internationally.
(Tsai, Hung and Liu, 2011) Nevertheless, some countries once doubted that Confucius Institute intends to give inappropriate political ideology instead of simply teaching Chinese language.
Not until 1977 did a minimal number of foreign tourists paid a visit to China due to the Cultural Revolution. Tourism around 1977, however, still remained limited due to the consequence of control of Chinese government. At the end of 1977, Chinese government made tourism industry as one of Chinese major economic sectors. Consequently, the number of foreign tourists had considerably risen to 67,500 (Lew, 2012) ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea agreed that tourism is the crucial means to fortify the connectivity of people in these countries and recognize the contribution to economic and social development that tourism sector brings to the region, so the APT Tourism Ministers establish the APT e-Tourism Working Group to implement the ASEAN Ecotourism Strategic Plan.
To accelerate economic development in this region, the tourism ministers of APT member states will also sign the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on
ASEAN Plus Three Tourism Cooperation in 2015.
There are approximately 30 million overseas Chinese residing in ASEAN
‧
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
China Sea is still the center of politico-economical disputes for Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, China and Taiwan. China’s territorial claims often influenced its economic cooperative framework with ASEAN. For example, the 7th EAS in 2012 as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum at the 47th ASEAN Foreign Ministers meetings in 2014 was overshadowed due to China’s firm upholding its territorial sovereignty over South China Sea. It’s actually not the first time for China to have conflict with ASEAN member states. In 1967, the then- Burmese leader instigated racist hostility against Chinese while the
Cultural Revolution took place throughout China. The widespread discrimination had lasted for three years, forced many Chinese to move out of Burma.
anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia were triggered by racist nature and economic plight. The riots had lasted in 1998, and tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese killed. However, Indonesian government kept silent on the riots. And it was even alleged that Indonesian military was involved in the riots; while in 2014, China’s assertion of its maritime claims in South China Sea not only cast a shadow over ASEAN meetings, but also caused anti-Chinese unrest throughout Vietnam in May 2014. Many factories were looted and destroyed by rioters. The turmoil had a negative impact on Sino-Vietnam relations and Sino-Vietnam trade.
In view of the above-mentioned facts, to establish the bilateral partnership for regional stability and prosperity requires fostering neighborly relations and harmonious regional environment between China and ASEAN. However, increasingly tense territorial issue has always been a big concern for China and Southeast Asian nations. Territorial disputes in resource-rich South China Sea began to emerge in the 1980s. Until the present, rival territorial claims in the disputed areas are still heard every now and then. Although Beijing attempts to
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
P a g e | 28
improve its relations with Southeast Asian nations, its assertive sovereignty claims over these disputed territories almost ruin the efforts.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
3. CHINA-ASEAN TIES IN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3.1. Sovereignty and Security
3.1.1. China-ASEAN Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea (SCS)
The territorial claims by the surrounding countries over South China Sea have long been disputed for years. The territorial claimants include China and five ASEAN states: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. China and Vietnam extensively claim sovereignty over the Paracel island chain, while the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia also have partial claims over the Spratly archipelago. There are multiple causes in the dispute involving oil and natural gas, fish stocks, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and strategic value. Among the factors above, the competition for natural resources like oil and natural gas is often heard. With the increasing demand for energy, China’s interest in oil and gas resources in SCS has also greatly grown.
China’s unyielding attitude toward assertive claims on SCS territory led to the escalating tension between China and Vietnam over the disputed area. In the aspect of fish stocks, SCS is considered one of the richest fishing regions in the world by Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen in particular. As global demand rises, the fish stocks have declined sharply, making the competition for fishing areas more fierce. Also, the littoral states obtained permission from UNCLOS to assert the sovereignty over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 320 km, or a continental shelf. Although the dispute becomes complicated when it gets involved in UNCLOS, the regulations of UNCLOS are considered by the surrounding SCU countries a choice to legitimize their claims since they are actually not beneficial to China. (Buszynski and Christoper, 2013)
‧
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
For example, in 2009, the U.S. surveillance vessels confronted China’s navy ships when they carried out intelligence collection, while China’s ship intended to interfere the operation. (Wu and Zou, 2013) Both China and the U.S.
attempted to control the escalating tension from the incident, which aroused the attention from both parties in freedom of navigation. The implications of the China-U.S. conflicts in SCS are the following.
First, there are critical interests for the U.S. to seek peaceful resolution to SCS maritime disputes. All the SCS claimants intended to legitimize their territorial claims by their coastlines and UNCLOS, except for China. Unlike other
claimants, China asserted its sovereignty over the disputed territory based on both historic background and legal claims, while deliberately remained
ambiguous about the meaning of 9-dashed line in SCS according to China’s map.
Yet, the freedom of navigation is one of important interests to the U.S. and other countries in this region. Even though China asserted that it agrees the freedom of navigation, the country still insists that foreign military aircrafts and vessels should request permission before sailing in China’s unlawful EEZ. China’s intention to deny the U.S. naval access to its EEZ shows its possible attempt to halt the freedom of navigation.
Secondly, the allies of the U.S. around SCS expect the U.S. to maintain the stability in free trade, secure sea lines of communication, security and peace in this region. In fact, the claimants and non-claimants all consider the U.S. military power as the necessary presence to counterbalance China. Given that the
countries around SCS lose their confidence in the U.S. to be the regional power, these countries would alternatively turn to the other regional hegemon, China. In that case, these countries would depend more on the hegemonic China, which is
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
P a g e | 32
that last thing the U.S. would expect. Besides, the circumstance would not be in the U.S. interests. Supposing that the U.S. power weaken would undermine its guarantee to broader Asia-Pacific region, Japan and South Korea in particular.
Thirdly, economic interests are also a big concern to the U.S. There is nearly
$5.3 trillion of trade volume around SCS each year, while the U.S. trade in this region accounts for $1.2 trillion. Consequently, the change of cargo ship route would influence the regional economies if a conflict happened.
Lastly, the U.S. attempts to maintain stability in its relations with China, so it could continue to cooperate with China on some regional and global issues.
Considering security and economy in the region, the U.S. has critical interesting in preventing different forms of disputes in SCS from military conflict in terms of the growing importance of China-U.S. relations.
On the other hand, to establish the bilateral partnership for regional stability and prosperity requires fostering neighborly relations and harmonious regional environment between China and ASEAN. However, increasingly tense territorial issue has been always a big concern among China and Southeast Asian nations.
Territorial disputes in resource-rich SCS began to emerge in the 1980s. Until the present, rival territorial claims in the disputed areas are still often heard every now and then. The territorial disputes in SCS are aggravated by the vital strategic location. Low-level conflicts took place between China and its neighboring countries from the 1980s to the 1990s. Among these conflicts, most of them were alleged vessel intrusions, fishery invasions or exploitations of oil reserves in in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that were interpreted differently by each surrounding SCS state instead of military confrontations with each other.
(Baviera, 2013) The SCS territorial disputes are posing serious problems for the
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
unity of ASEAN and the prosperous China-ASEAN relations. (Baviera, 1999) To avoid sensitive matters that would trigger maritime spats between China and ASEAN states, both sides began to shift a focus on regional dialogues on South China Sea by building cooperative mechanisms like APEC, ARF and The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in the 1990s.
China-ASEAN Summit was launched in 1996, and both sides signed a Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity on the seventh summit in 2003 to develop friendly relations, reciprocal cooperation through China-ASEAN multi-level cooperative system.
On the same occasion, China officially signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the first non-territorial disputes with ASEAN neighbors in a peaceful manner. China’s major contribution to regional security and stability was greatly appreciated by ASEAN states. To show the
determination, the then-Chinese leader, Hu Jingtao, paid his visit to the
Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei in 2005 to ensure China’s good intention. With China’s temptation toward ASEAN, such as CAFTA, China’s image of a regional threat was alleviated by its efforts. (Thuy, 2011)
3.1.2. China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and Adoption of a Regional Code of Conduct (COC)
The escalating tensions among claimant states of East and Southeast Asia over SCS dispute have been witnessed for a few years. DOC, mainly leded by China, was signed by China and the ASEAN nations at the capital of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, in 2002. Then, the countries implemented Draft of Guidelines of the Declaration of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea on island
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
P a g e | 34
of Bali, Indonesia, which was little effective at tranquilizing tensions or future conflict. In fact, the governments of ASEAN nations widely think SCS issue have brought critical challenge to the unity of association and the relevant peaceful solutions to the crisis. Since not all ASEAN members are the claimants of disputed territory in SCS, ASEAN members have difficulty in dealing with the SCS issues as a group due to the lack of trust and confidence. Furthermore, owing to different interest in SCS, each ASEAN countries have no consistency in DOC. However, the situation would favor China as there is no dispute
management mechanism in the region. (Schofield, 2011) In 2013, China and ASEAN decided to move further forward an adoption of a regional Code of Conduct (COC), planning a negotiation to institute the COC under
implementation of the DOC.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Year Incident
1974
The battle of Paracel Islands between China and Vietnam took place in January. Then, Vietnam occupied part of Spratly Islands in Feburary. China and Taiwan expressed their strong protest on Vietnam’s act, and meanwhile reclaim their sovereignty over Spratly Islands.
1988
The naval conflict between China and Vietnam happened in March. China denounced Vietnam’s occupation over Johnson South Reef, so asked Vietnam to withdraw from the
archipelago.
1991
Vietnamese forces occupied Prince Consort Bank
The Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea took place in July, which is also the first time for all the SCS claimants to discuss the SCS dispute together.
2002
《南海各方行爲宣言》簽署
In 2002, China and ASEAN states signed “the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DOC) in Phnom Penh to ensure maritime safety.
2009
Vietnam submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May, claiming its sovereignty over Paracel and Spratly Islands while China was strongly opposed to Vietnam’s act.
2013
China and ASEAN ministers agreed to hold a negotiation to institute the COC under implementation of the DOC. China and ASEAN agreed to carry out the DOC from 2013 to 2014.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
P a g e | 36
China proposed to set up a China-ASEAN maritime
emergency helpline and conduct emergency response drills.
The countries like Thailand and Indonesia also proposed a variety of ocean-related cooperation.
Table 3-2. Timeline of South China Sea Dispute
In Thuy’s view, the policy has some implications. First, the lack of consensus from all concerned parties or the claimants in the SCS disputes makes the
situation unacceptable for joint development. Secondly, all the concerned nations failed to reach an agreement to create a joint cooperative area for SCS energy resource. Lastly, as far as China is concerned, the successful act of implementing the DOC or the COC could help make smaller parties gain more confidence in cooperative development for SCS energy resource. (Thuy, 2011)
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
3.2. Security Cooperation
3.2.1. China-ASEAN Multilateral Platforms in Security Cooperation China and ASEAN decided to implement the “2+7 cooperation framework” in 2013. The framework indicates two-point political consensus and seven proposals for cooperation. The two-point political consensus was held on the basis of intensification of political and security cooperation and economic development between China and ASEAN, while The seven-point proposal includes the areas in the political field, business, connectivity, finance, maritime cooperation, security and the people-to-people, scientific and environmental field for further cooperation. In the framework, China expects to formulate a strategy for expansion of China-ASEAN cooperation, both sides decided to start the third plan of action (2016-2020) of the China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. China also offers a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to facilitate China-ASEAN maritime cooperation. Besides, China encouraged ASEAN defense ministers to discuss the establishment of a China-ASEAN defense hotline and hold joint exercises at the informal
ASEAN-China Defense Ministers’ Meeting in 2014 to ensure “double security”
in traditional and nontraditional areas.
There are several cooperative platforms between China and ASEAN, including EAS, ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus.
All of them build regional security extension. At the second EAS annual summit, 16 member nations signed the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security.
All members agreed to promote energy security and find substitutes for conventional fuels. The Declaration aims to provide eventual instability of energy supplies. As to the ARF, the forum makes a push to move multilateral
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
P a g e | 38
security cooperation in fields of preventive diplomacy, confidence-building, and counterterrorism, which encourages transparency in military-to-military
cooperation. (Cossa, 2010)
The Chinese National People’s Congress approved the country to join TAC in June 2003, but officially acceded to the treaty in 2005. The treaty aims to establish a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity though friendly relations among states in Southeast Asia. On the 7th ASEAN+1 Ministerial Meeting, the then Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao lay an emphasis on promoting peace and prosperity by deepening cooperation in all-round in his speech. He indicated that Chinese government would be engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation with ASEAN in specific fields. China and ASEAN are expected to strengthen the bilateral political dialogue to effectively perform dialogue and consultation mechanisms at the different levels. Both sides hoped to deepen economic and trade relations to accelerate the development in finance, service, investment, agriculture and IT industry. Besides, the two sides also look forward to security cooperation to maintain regional stability, and scientific and technological exchanges to complement each other with respective advantages.
On the other hand, China advocated the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), which intended to increase resources in the development of the Mekong Basin.
To support the IAI, China constructed of the Laotian section of
Kunming-Bangkok Highway, and sponsored missing link of the Pan-Asia Railway inside Cambodia in 2006. Since China placed importance on economic development in ASEAN, the country planned to make use of China-ASEAN Cooperation Fund to expand bilateral cooperation on human resources development. Also, to ensure the smooth cooperation with ASEAN, China
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
accelerated East Asia cooperation within the ASEAN+3 mechanisms. The diplomatic relations between both sides was, in retrospect, based on animosity due to the difference in political ideology. Today, China still has territorial disputes with some ASEAN states over SCS. But, China also needs the support from its neighboring nations to safeguard its interests in this region. Therefore, China attached importance to good-neighborly relations with ASEAN through TAC for its contribution to peace and stability in the area.
China, along with the other big power, U.S., looks forward to maintain the positive relations for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, allowing all the regional countries to share the benefits. But in addition to closer interactions
China, along with the other big power, U.S., looks forward to maintain the positive relations for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, allowing all the regional countries to share the benefits. But in addition to closer interactions