China-ASEAN Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea

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3. CHINA-ASEAN TIES IN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3.1. Sovereignty and Security

3.1.1. China-ASEAN Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea (SCS)

The territorial claims by the surrounding countries over South China Sea have long been disputed for years. The territorial claimants include China and five ASEAN states: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. China and Vietnam extensively claim sovereignty over the Paracel island chain, while the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia also have partial claims over the Spratly archipelago. There are multiple causes in the dispute involving oil and natural gas, fish stocks, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and strategic value. Among the factors above, the competition for natural resources like oil and natural gas is often heard. With the increasing demand for energy, China’s interest in oil and gas resources in SCS has also greatly grown.

China’s unyielding attitude toward assertive claims on SCS territory led to the escalating tension between China and Vietnam over the disputed area. In the aspect of fish stocks, SCS is considered one of the richest fishing regions in the world by Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen in particular. As global demand rises, the fish stocks have declined sharply, making the competition for fishing areas more fierce. Also, the littoral states obtained permission from UNCLOS to assert the sovereignty over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 320 km, or a continental shelf. Although the dispute becomes complicated when it gets involved in UNCLOS, the regulations of UNCLOS are considered by the surrounding SCU countries a choice to legitimize their claims since they are actually not beneficial to China. (Buszynski and Christoper, 2013)

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For example, in 2009, the U.S. surveillance vessels confronted China’s navy ships when they carried out intelligence collection, while China’s ship intended to interfere the operation. (Wu and Zou, 2013) Both China and the U.S.

attempted to control the escalating tension from the incident, which aroused the attention from both parties in freedom of navigation. The implications of the China-U.S. conflicts in SCS are the following.

First, there are critical interests for the U.S. to seek peaceful resolution to SCS maritime disputes. All the SCS claimants intended to legitimize their territorial claims by their coastlines and UNCLOS, except for China. Unlike other

claimants, China asserted its sovereignty over the disputed territory based on both historic background and legal claims, while deliberately remained

ambiguous about the meaning of 9-dashed line in SCS according to China’s map.

Yet, the freedom of navigation is one of important interests to the U.S. and other countries in this region. Even though China asserted that it agrees the freedom of navigation, the country still insists that foreign military aircrafts and vessels should request permission before sailing in China’s unlawful EEZ. China’s intention to deny the U.S. naval access to its EEZ shows its possible attempt to halt the freedom of navigation.

Secondly, the allies of the U.S. around SCS expect the U.S. to maintain the stability in free trade, secure sea lines of communication, security and peace in this region. In fact, the claimants and non-claimants all consider the U.S. military power as the necessary presence to counterbalance China. Given that the

countries around SCS lose their confidence in the U.S. to be the regional power, these countries would alternatively turn to the other regional hegemon, China. In that case, these countries would depend more on the hegemonic China, which is

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that last thing the U.S. would expect. Besides, the circumstance would not be in the U.S. interests. Supposing that the U.S. power weaken would undermine its guarantee to broader Asia-Pacific region, Japan and South Korea in particular.

Thirdly, economic interests are also a big concern to the U.S. There is nearly

$5.3 trillion of trade volume around SCS each year, while the U.S. trade in this region accounts for $1.2 trillion. Consequently, the change of cargo ship route would influence the regional economies if a conflict happened.

Lastly, the U.S. attempts to maintain stability in its relations with China, so it could continue to cooperate with China on some regional and global issues.

Considering security and economy in the region, the U.S. has critical interesting in preventing different forms of disputes in SCS from military conflict in terms of the growing importance of China-U.S. relations.

On the other hand, to establish the bilateral partnership for regional stability and prosperity requires fostering neighborly relations and harmonious regional environment between China and ASEAN. However, increasingly tense territorial issue has been always a big concern among China and Southeast Asian nations.

Territorial disputes in resource-rich SCS began to emerge in the 1980s. Until the present, rival territorial claims in the disputed areas are still often heard every now and then. The territorial disputes in SCS are aggravated by the vital strategic location. Low-level conflicts took place between China and its neighboring countries from the 1980s to the 1990s. Among these conflicts, most of them were alleged vessel intrusions, fishery invasions or exploitations of oil reserves in in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that were interpreted differently by each surrounding SCS state instead of military confrontations with each other.

(Baviera, 2013) The SCS territorial disputes are posing serious problems for the

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unity of ASEAN and the prosperous China-ASEAN relations. (Baviera, 1999) To avoid sensitive matters that would trigger maritime spats between China and ASEAN states, both sides began to shift a focus on regional dialogues on South China Sea by building cooperative mechanisms like APEC, ARF and The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in the 1990s.

China-ASEAN Summit was launched in 1996, and both sides signed a Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity on the seventh summit in 2003 to develop friendly relations, reciprocal cooperation through China-ASEAN multi-level cooperative system.

On the same occasion, China officially signed the Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the first non-territorial disputes with ASEAN neighbors in a peaceful manner. China’s major contribution to regional security and stability was greatly appreciated by ASEAN states. To show the

determination, the then-Chinese leader, Hu Jingtao, paid his visit to the

Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei in 2005 to ensure China’s good intention. With China’s temptation toward ASEAN, such as CAFTA, China’s image of a regional threat was alleviated by its efforts. (Thuy, 2011)

3.1.2. China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the