Literature review - 越南的中國政策 : 審視對沖策略

1. INTRODUCTION

1.2. Literature review

Given China’s re-emergence in military and economic ability with aggressive and assertive behaviours, Vietnam and other states attempt to find long-term policies to thwart Chinese ambitions which may damage their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political and economic autonomy. There have been various approaches, but which is the best option? A number of scholars have strived to answer this question, arguing that those countries have applied either balancing, bandwagoning or hedging towards a giant China.

In Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning, Walt (1987a) defines balancing and bandwagoning strategies as the best solution that help states to deter current risks.

He develops three crucial hypotheses on the phenomena of balancing and bandwagoning and what motivate such behaviours. Ross (1999) argues that small countries must either balance against China or reconcile it. Accordingly, Asian countries need to make an accurate decision on seeking cooperating with either the United States or China when a sharply bipolar power division of the United States and China has emerged in East Asia region. It also presumes that the power of state is the influential factor of how states embark on another one. Similarly, some conclude that in responding to China’s resurgence, Southeast Asian states should either balance against China by allying with other stronger powers, or coordinate with Beijing (Stuart-Fox, 2004).

Le (2013b) shows that Vietnam’s China policy after normalisation is “a multi-tiered, omni-directional hedging strategy” and explains this new strategy as a

perspicacious choice for Vietnam to manage its relations with China after examining it in many different cases. Besides, his study focuses on the role and impact of four major components of this strategy: economic pragmatism, direct engagement, hard balancing and soft balancing; then discusses how Vietnam has developed the hedging strategy towards China since normalization. The author also foreshadows challenges for Vietnam in conducting efficacious strategy. Nevertheless, despite the author’s positive assessments of strategy, cautions need to be exercised. One should not assume that economic relations between Vietnam and China have been managed and they might boost a higher level of Vietnamese economic interdependence. In the contemporary Vietnamese context, if the economic interdependence sustains continuously, the political autonomy of Vietnam cannot be secured completely.

Moreover, national security will be damaged significantly because the increasing tensions from the SCS dispute, especially after the issue of HD 981 oil rig. A drawback of this research is that the effect of strategy has not yet been determined.

This may be because not any foreign policy produces the desired effect immediately after the application. Therefore, it may take very long time before final assessments can be made.

In Hedging China? The Meaning of the ASEAN Member States’ Interests in Forging their Policies Towards China, Dobkowska (2014) also mentions that the strategy some countries chose most frequently toward China is “hedging”, and clarifies key interests that influence countries’ policy on China. While the study provides valuable information regarding the process of forming the ASEAN behaviour towards China, it has not yet explored Chinese response towards them. In short, however, the article only revolves reasons or benefits that impact on choosing

“hedging strategy”.

Colberg (2014) presents a new method for understanding hedging clearer – the three-dimensional approach and two case studies of Vietnamese foreign policy (bauxite mining in the Central Highlands and the open port policy of Cam Ranh Bay).

It is unlike Le (2013b), this study uses different ways to explain “hedging” with specific illustrations. Meanwhile Le (2013b) considers “historical experiences, domestic and bilateral conditions, as well as changes in Vietnam’s external relations and the international strategic environment” as main stimuli to decide final policy towards China, Colberg (2014) explains hedging only by three-dimensional approach:

domestic, foreign and sectoral. Additionally, the policy implications and recommendations that Colberg offered are valuable. However, the effect of strategy has not been mentioned.

In summary, most recent researches have focussed on why hedging strategy is chosen as an indispensable tool for Vietnam in dealing with China’s expansionism. It may therefore be advantageous to also investigate the effects of the strategy in light of the process of strategic development from 2006 to 2016 and assess critically debates regarding emerging or unsolved issues between Vietnam and China in economic and security sphere. Therefore, future research would be helpful to look into whether or not hedging strategy is effective in reality. This question has been surprisingly neglected until recently, as the majority of the literature on hedging has focussed on reasons for choosing hedging and how it has been developed. To appreciate the effects of hedging strategy, Vietnam must examine, in detail, the different spheres that the strategy has been applied to investigate this topic.

8 1.3. Concept of hedging

For each country, foreign policy is made to preserve a range of goals and to choose the suitable policy accordingly. It may depend on the historical experience of country with the other, and/or that nation’s current context. For instance, a small state like Vietnam usually combines engagement and deference because it is helpful to expand economic ties as well as enhance military exchanges but the country still maintains its independence and autonomy. However, it sometimes uses hard and soft balancing policy to contain Chinese threats; yet hard balancing might not be encouraged in a long term as it is costly. Despite this, the general strategy of balancing is the most common choice for small state such as Vietnam. Nevertheless, since China’s emergence as a superpower in recent decades has intensified anxieties in the Asia-Pacific region, “hedging strategy” has become a buzz word in making foreign policy in many nations. In fact, hedging behaviour is the norm of international relations in which it is argued that countries adopt a kind of insurance policy in order to build military relationships with other countries and simultaneously avoid perpetrating confrontational stances toward other states. Some other scholars argue that pursuing hedging behaviour by some countries in the Asia-Pacific region is mounted integration and engagement along with balancing strategies in the external security cooperation. A good example for this assumption is that Japan’s increasing economic and security collaborations with Vietnam and the Philippines in order to hedge against China in terms of territorial disputes with him.

Notwithstanding, hedging may create “a geopolitical insurance strategy” which allows a state to constrain as well as diminish the threats from the regional powers without confronting them. In practice, it simultaneously empowers this nation to manage cooperative and competitive policies to guard against another state that is in

ascendance (Medeiros, 2005). Whilst security benefits may be considered as a reason why many countries in the Asia-Pacific region recently pursue hedging policy, it is an unsatisfactory interpretation for strategic hedging that occurs when China’s unceasing efforts have been increased dramatically in seeking military modernization, economic development and power projection ability.

More broadly, Goh (2006) identifies “hedging” as “a set of strategies” in case of contingencies in which “states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality” (p.1). Instead of doing this, they should avoid selecting one side at the expense of another by promoting a middle position. In spite of trying to pursue hedging, some assume that it is not easy to cultivate a middle ground. Rather, countries take opposite positions. Hemmings (2013) insists that the basic assumption of hedging means states both prepare for the worst and the best by reinforcing a large and powerful military ability, strengthening as many alliances as possible and building many trade ties, diplomatic links, binding multilateral frameworks.

In general, hedging can be elucidated as a strategy in which a country simultaneously pursues several different and, sometimes, contradictory policies toward other countries, in order to avoid a sole strategic consideration. Hedging strategy has been chosen under the uncertainty of the future, in which people do not know how the behaviour of the other countries will look like. For example, hedging strategies may include both competition and cooperation, both prevention and deterrence, factors for taking the benefits of collaborative relationship, and preventing the strategic risks in future from the partner countries.

With a giant neighbour like China, Vietnam has been experimenting various policies which may help in understanding its giant friend better and find out the most

appropriate strategy to manage its assertive behaviour in recent years. As such, hedging is chosen as Vietnamese final card to vis-à-vis China because it provides Vietnam with the far more flexibility to tackle China’s uncertain behaviour in the future while enabling Vietnam to gain meritorious outcomes out of the present relationship. Hedging strategy requires a flexible implementation of bandwagoning and balancing. If hedging is not considered in Vietnam’s China policy, the likelihood of the detriment to national security and interests (sovereignty, territorial integrity, political and economic autonomy) would be very difficult to prevent.

1.4. Theoretical framework: Hedging strategy

In terms of small and medium-sized states’ foreign relations, the great powers set out perceived as a great risk to their national survival and autonomy, mainstream theories of International Relations (IR), especially Realism offer useful lenses through which statesmen might better analyze the core issues of the relationship, and then find out the most comprehensive approach to cope with problems.

The fundamental tenets of realism centered upon the anarchical nature of the international system where states are centred and tend to pursue their own self-interest. In relation to “self-interest”, these countries are self-reliant and are provoked in seeking more power to ensure security in an anarchic world. More importantly, the

“survival” factor in realism is the main concern of all nations in which they need to establish a strong military capability resulting in the security dilemma. This might be because of uncertainty of adversary’s real intentions, and then states are forced to pursue military edge.

Given the recent complexity, countries face no larger strategic challenge, tensions or potential risks in the coming decades than that posed by the rise of China.

Indeed, the rise of China has been affecting security and national interests of many small countries in the region. Unfortunately, these states cannot protect those things by themselves. To improve upon the situation, theories of Realism suggest important approaches: balancing against the most aggressive country; bandwagoning with it; or hedging against it.

Normally, a small country can curb a threatening state through internal balancing by building up defensive force or external balancing by entering into alliance with other great powers who could help to deter the aggressive power (Mehmetcik, 2015).

Some theorists categorize balancing strategy into hard and soft balancing which is really only a difference of degree. Hard balancing means smaller countries strive to build their military proficiency so as to match the capability of the threatening power.

Whilst they consolidate their military ability themselves, they could also establish ad hoc cooperative exercises, and/or collaboration in regional or international institutions (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2004). Despite the fact that hard balancing is assumed the most common choice for small states, it might be not encouraged in a long term as it is costly and limits “diplomatic flexibility” (Sherwood, 2016).

However, in general, if balancing is the most likely chosen strategy, powerful countries might align with others to counteract. Practically, any country who wants to dominate others will actually attract opposition. This is because weaker states might not be easy to let stronger states threaten their own self-interest. Interestingly, this is also true to the case of threatening countries, and thus, the fear of alliance will decline. For this reason, in a balancing world, statesmen will not exhort an aggression because they can foresee a resistance. Therefore, policies which curb the aggressiveness and assertiveness of powerful countries may be the best because they can minimize tensions and pressures those countries pose to weaker ones.

Yet, although the mighty evidences show that the support of balancing in the past, “the opposite response is more likely widespread” (Walt, 1987a). Thompson (1977) has said that “Momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement.

The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon collects those on the side-lines.” The bandwagoning policy is really a popular approach for small countries seeking to neutralize or avoid conflict with stronger powers. If a small country considers bandwagoning policy, it will have to pay deference and accept a lower status in the relationship with a stronger power. In return, it receives the guarantee of security and economic benefits. Bandwagoning may be an effective defence way in which statesmen can seek to “increase military budgets” (Walt, 1987a), and thus, their nation’s military capability might be upgraded. It may also be, however, offensive when small states try to profit by “aligning with the other side” (Sherwood, 2016).

Hence, bandwagoning is described as the smaller state’s political and military alignment with more powerful state to avoid being attacked (Walt, 1987b). On the other hand, it is also chosen by small countries with the hope of always gaining economic interests from its relationship with the stronger one (Schweller, 1994). In fact, statesmen cannot easily predict the intentions of countries and the decisions on economic, political and security policies are correlative drivers in a nation’s foreign policy. Thus, when a smaller country tries to establish good relations with a more powerful one only for economic fruits, it could be argued that this policy has security implications for the previous strategy as well (Le, 2013b). Le (2013b) explained that this may be due to smaller countries’ desire of changing perceptions of greater power.

Accordingly, if a small country attempts to intensify a favourable relationship with the greater power, it will “encourage the greater power to view the smaller state as a

friendly partner” (Le, 2013b). According to liberal peace theorists, a favourable bilateral relationship may also provide many economic benefits for the stronger power as well, thence deter it from taking aggressive action against the smaller one in case it is pushed into strategic relations with rival powers (Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001;

Maoz, 2009; Oneal & Ray, 1997). In other words, as far as bandwagoning is concerned as economic gains, this choice may affect security of small states.

Nevertheless, bandwagoning strategy probably is much more challenge. When small countries intend to ally with the threatening ones, it might put itself at risk because they will increase their dependence on those states. This could be aggravated if the influential powers appear both strong and potentially aggressive. It should be noted that the real goal of small countries in choosing bandwagoning is to reduce clashes and to reinforce their relationship with powerful countries aiming to ensure their national security. Unfortunately, this choice puts small countries at a disadvantage and under the influence of powers. As a result, a small country may gain security, but it would have to accept to give up other things. Moreover, those who are cornered, they will be more inclined to fight back by using force. When such a conflict happens, it will be extreme because a defeat may be the decline of one side and the dominance of the other. If policy-makers believe that bandwagoning is used widely, the tendency to use force is true for the both former – aggressors and the latter – status quo powers. While the former in the past use force because they assume that other will not be able to balance against them and they can form an alliance with them through “belligerence or brinkmanship”, the latter choose it due to the fear of their adversary’s attainments created by appearing powerful and adamant (Liska, 1962).

Eventually, both balancing and bandwagoning strategies are dangerous, because once policies that work for one case it will be counterproductive in the other. If a

small country use the balancing policy in a bandwagoning world, their humble responses and disregard of threats will encourage their allies to leave them isolated against an overwhelming coalition. Conversely, following the bandwagoning in a world of those who regularly employ power and threat - balancers - will lead others to against you more and more vigorously (Jervis, 1976). Therefore, forms of balancing and bandwagoning are difficult to pursue for small countries.

In order to maximize choices for countries who want to against threatening powers, theorists have proposed another strategy called “hedging”, which has been interpreted in many different ways by International Relation scholars (Goh, 2006;

Medeiros, 2005; Roy, 2005). Basically, hedging can be elucidated as a strategy in which a country simultaneously pursues several different and, sometimes, contradictory policies toward other countries, in order to avoid a sole strategic consideration. Hedging strategy has been chosen under the uncertainty of the future, in which people do not know how the behavior of the other countries will look like.

For example, hedging strategies may include both competition and cooperation, both prevention and deterrence, factors for taking the benefits of collaborative relationship, and preventing the strategic risks in the future from the partner countries. The selection of hedging depends on push and pull factors and the national interests to which influence a country’s approach. Owing to the diversity and convertibility of this policy, countries can be easily manipulated according to the level of development in their bilateral relations as well as changes in the international environment (Le, 2013b). Therefore, in severe cases, a country can switch to balancing or bandwagoning strategies without a reconstruction of its foreign and security policies.

Consequently, hedging offers countries the ﬂexibility to best deal with their partners’

uncertainty in behaviour while allow them to receive the most in the existing relationship.

As described in “one of the great dramas” (Ikenberry, 2008), the rise of China has surprised Southeast Asian countries for its dramatically increases in economic and military power in the twenty-first century. The remarkable economic growth and active external policies of China are already affecting those countries and they may see greater increases in Chinese power and potential implications. Moreover, the rise of China has been predicted to bring less opportunity as well as put more pressures and challenges on regional countries by experts from various countries. To cope with the uncertainties associated with China’s ascendancy, Southeast Asian nations have been responding in various policies, which unquestionably reﬂects the diversity of the above discussed theories. Particularly, in Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning, Walt (1987) defines balancing and bandwagoning strategies as the best solution that helps states to deter current risks. He develops three crucial hypotheses on the phenomena of balancing and bandwagoning and what motivate such behaviors.

However, Friedberg (1993) argues that the end of the Cold War transformed international order of bipolarity into multipolarity which bloomed both positive and negative impacts for Asia, in which elite politics dominates and other regional countries can lean on balancing as the major solution to handle emerging threats, including those posed from China’s rise. Meanwhile, Ross (1999) argues that again

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