Theoretical framework: Hedging strategy

In terms of small and medium-sized states’ foreign relations, the great powers set out perceived as a great risk to their national survival and autonomy, mainstream theories of International Relations (IR), especially Realism offer useful lenses through which statesmen might better analyze the core issues of the relationship, and then find out the most comprehensive approach to cope with problems.

The fundamental tenets of realism centered upon the anarchical nature of the international system where states are centred and tend to pursue their own self-interest. In relation to “self-interest”, these countries are self-reliant and are provoked in seeking more power to ensure security in an anarchic world. More importantly, the

“survival” factor in realism is the main concern of all nations in which they need to establish a strong military capability resulting in the security dilemma. This might be because of uncertainty of adversary’s real intentions, and then states are forced to pursue military edge.

Given the recent complexity, countries face no larger strategic challenge, tensions or potential risks in the coming decades than that posed by the rise of China.

11

Indeed, the rise of China has been affecting security and national interests of many small countries in the region. Unfortunately, these states cannot protect those things by themselves. To improve upon the situation, theories of Realism suggest important approaches: balancing against the most aggressive country; bandwagoning with it; or hedging against it.

Normally, a small country can curb a threatening state through internal balancing by building up defensive force or external balancing by entering into alliance with other great powers who could help to deter the aggressive power (Mehmetcik, 2015).

Some theorists categorize balancing strategy into hard and soft balancing which is really only a difference of degree. Hard balancing means smaller countries strive to build their military proficiency so as to match the capability of the threatening power.

Whilst they consolidate their military ability themselves, they could also establish ad hoc cooperative exercises, and/or collaboration in regional or international institutions (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2004). Despite the fact that hard balancing is assumed the most common choice for small states, it might be not encouraged in a long term as it is costly and limits “diplomatic flexibility” (Sherwood, 2016).

However, in general, if balancing is the most likely chosen strategy, powerful countries might align with others to counteract. Practically, any country who wants to dominate others will actually attract opposition. This is because weaker states might not be easy to let stronger states threaten their own self-interest. Interestingly, this is also true to the case of threatening countries, and thus, the fear of alliance will decline. For this reason, in a balancing world, statesmen will not exhort an aggression because they can foresee a resistance. Therefore, policies which curb the aggressiveness and assertiveness of powerful countries may be the best because they can minimize tensions and pressures those countries pose to weaker ones.

12

Yet, although the mighty evidences show that the support of balancing in the past, “the opposite response is more likely widespread” (Walt, 1987a). Thompson (1977) has said that “Momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement.

The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon collects those on the side-lines.” The bandwagoning policy is really a popular approach for small countries seeking to neutralize or avoid conflict with stronger powers. If a small country considers bandwagoning policy, it will have to pay deference and accept a lower status in the relationship with a stronger power. In return, it receives the guarantee of security and economic benefits. Bandwagoning may be an effective defence way in which statesmen can seek to “increase military budgets” (Walt, 1987a), and thus, their nation’s military capability might be upgraded. It may also be, however, offensive when small states try to profit by “aligning with the other side” (Sherwood, 2016).

Hence, bandwagoning is described as the smaller state’s political and military alignment with more powerful state to avoid being attacked (Walt, 1987b). On the other hand, it is also chosen by small countries with the hope of always gaining economic interests from its relationship with the stronger one (Schweller, 1994). In fact, statesmen cannot easily predict the intentions of countries and the decisions on economic, political and security policies are correlative drivers in a nation’s foreign policy. Thus, when a smaller country tries to establish good relations with a more powerful one only for economic fruits, it could be argued that this policy has security implications for the previous strategy as well (Le, 2013b). Le (2013b) explained that this may be due to smaller countries’ desire of changing perceptions of greater power.

Accordingly, if a small country attempts to intensify a favourable relationship with the greater power, it will “encourage the greater power to view the smaller state as a

13

friendly partner” (Le, 2013b). According to liberal peace theorists, a favourable bilateral relationship may also provide many economic benefits for the stronger power as well, thence deter it from taking aggressive action against the smaller one in case it is pushed into strategic relations with rival powers (Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001;

Maoz, 2009; Oneal & Ray, 1997). In other words, as far as bandwagoning is concerned as economic gains, this choice may affect security of small states.

Nevertheless, bandwagoning strategy probably is much more challenge. When small countries intend to ally with the threatening ones, it might put itself at risk because they will increase their dependence on those states. This could be aggravated if the influential powers appear both strong and potentially aggressive. It should be noted that the real goal of small countries in choosing bandwagoning is to reduce clashes and to reinforce their relationship with powerful countries aiming to ensure their national security. Unfortunately, this choice puts small countries at a disadvantage and under the influence of powers. As a result, a small country may gain security, but it would have to accept to give up other things. Moreover, those who are cornered, they will be more inclined to fight back by using force. When such a conflict happens, it will be extreme because a defeat may be the decline of one side and the dominance of the other. If policy-makers believe that bandwagoning is used widely, the tendency to use force is true for the both former – aggressors and the latter – status quo powers. While the former in the past use force because they assume that other will not be able to balance against them and they can form an alliance with them through “belligerence or brinkmanship”, the latter choose it due to the fear of their adversary’s attainments created by appearing powerful and adamant (Liska, 1962).

Eventually, both balancing and bandwagoning strategies are dangerous, because once policies that work for one case it will be counterproductive in the other. If a

14

small country use the balancing policy in a bandwagoning world, their humble responses and disregard of threats will encourage their allies to leave them isolated against an overwhelming coalition. Conversely, following the bandwagoning in a world of those who regularly employ power and threat - balancers - will lead others to against you more and more vigorously (Jervis, 1976). Therefore, forms of balancing and bandwagoning are difficult to pursue for small countries.

In order to maximize choices for countries who want to against threatening powers, theorists have proposed another strategy called “hedging”, which has been interpreted in many different ways by International Relation scholars (Goh, 2006;

Medeiros, 2005; Roy, 2005). Basically, hedging can be elucidated as a strategy in which a country simultaneously pursues several different and, sometimes, contradictory policies toward other countries, in order to avoid a sole strategic consideration. Hedging strategy has been chosen under the uncertainty of the future, in which people do not know how the behavior of the other countries will look like.

For example, hedging strategies may include both competition and cooperation, both prevention and deterrence, factors for taking the benefits of collaborative relationship, and preventing the strategic risks in the future from the partner countries. The selection of hedging depends on push and pull factors and the national interests to which influence a country’s approach. Owing to the diversity and convertibility of this policy, countries can be easily manipulated according to the level of development in their bilateral relations as well as changes in the international environment (Le, 2013b). Therefore, in severe cases, a country can switch to balancing or bandwagoning strategies without a reconstruction of its foreign and security policies.

Consequently, hedging offers countries the flexibility to best deal with their partners’

15

uncertainty in behaviour while allow them to receive the most in the existing relationship.

As described in “one of the great dramas” (Ikenberry, 2008), the rise of China has surprised Southeast Asian countries for its dramatically increases in economic and military power in the twenty-first century. The remarkable economic growth and active external policies of China are already affecting those countries and they may see greater increases in Chinese power and potential implications. Moreover, the rise of China has been predicted to bring less opportunity as well as put more pressures and challenges on regional countries by experts from various countries. To cope with the uncertainties associated with China’s ascendancy, Southeast Asian nations have been responding in various policies, which unquestionably reflects the diversity of the above discussed theories. Particularly, in Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning, Walt (1987) defines balancing and bandwagoning strategies as the best solution that helps states to deter current risks. He develops three crucial hypotheses on the phenomena of balancing and bandwagoning and what motivate such behaviors.

However, Friedberg (1993) argues that the end of the Cold War transformed international order of bipolarity into multipolarity which bloomed both positive and negative impacts for Asia, in which elite politics dominates and other regional countries can lean on balancing as the major solution to handle emerging threats, including those posed from China’s rise. Meanwhile, Ross (1999) argues that again small countries must either balance against China or reconcile it. Accordingly, Asian countries need to make an accurate decision on seeking cooperating with either the United States or China when a sharply bipolar power division of the United States and China has emerged in East Asia region. He also presumes that the power of state is the influential factor of how states embark on another one. Another argument is that

16

Asian countries should only employ bandwagoning strategy to deal with an emerging China. This is because China, as the core in regional order, one believes that Asia can grow in peaceful and stable future despite the emergent and benign of ambitious China (Kang, 2003). These perceptions, however, have been criticized as too simplistic (Acharya, 2004). As discussed above, both the balancing and bandwagoning strategies still encounter many risks.

As a result, hedging has been regarded by many scholars as the judicious choice that regional countries can pursue to manage Chinese assertive behaviour in recent years (Goh, 2016; Korolev, 2016; Kuik, 2008; McDougall, 2012; Medeiros, 2005;

Mochizuki, 2007; Roy, 2005; Thayer, 2011). In Southeast Asia, the term of “hedging”

is also considered as an alternative to “balancing” and “bandwagoning” in the selection of small states’ strategies towards a powerful country. Nevertheless, due to the difference of each country’s position and its main interests, as well as the significance of particular tools applied in the strategy, the adoption of hedging varies from country to country (Goh, 2005; Kuik, 2008). In the case of Vietnam, several scholars at home and abroad have directly or indirectly argued that the country has been employing the hedging strategy in order to constrain China (Colberg, 2014; Goh, 2005; Le, 2013b; Roy, 2005; Thayer, 2008).