Chapter 1 Introduction
1.4 Methodology
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1.4 Methodology
Most democratic institutions have jointly emphasized the importance of using diplomacy in solving international conflicts and reaching an agreement through several negotiation stages. The history of the EU represents the role of bargaining between member states and its final success.
Since the beginning of the EU, countries have been under pressure to develop a secure and peaceful Europe. In the initial stage, it used to be relatively easy to pass and revolutionize the EU's structures because it only had six member states and the common goal to create an institution that would last.
As the EU grew, it became increasingly difficult to reach common agreements on several debated issues. It would be naive to say that all the treaties were signed immediately when presented to the EU leaders. History shows that the Lisbon Treaty in particular was extremely difficult to pass given the differing stances of most member states. In the end, thanks to the countries' willingness to negotiate and reach a compromise the treaty was signed after several negotiations stages in 2007.
That shows that international bargaining does matter and finding diplomatic solutions is the best way to satisfy participants.
In 1988, Robert Putnam introduced the Two-level games theory, which focuses on the role of international negotiation. He understands the two-level games to mean international and domestic policy. Both positions are extremely important in reaching the final agreements and solving many issues between involved actors. To lead the successful negotiation, the political leader (Prime Minister, President etc.) needs to take under consideration the international and domestic factors and demands. He or she takes part in the negotiation and attends to reach the best possible agreement that would satisfy both levels. Most of the time, the demands the political leader faces during international bargaining are divergent and he or she must be involved in simultaneous negotiations at both the international and domestic level.12
12 Robert D.Putman, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” (1988).
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Figure 1.1 The description of the level I and level II policy
The best example of failure in satisfying both international and domestic demands is the Greek bailout negotiation of 2015. The Greek PM was elected by his voters mainly due to his open criticism of the conditions set by the EU to provide yet another loan to revitalize the Greek economy. During the negotiations, he was not weighed down by the pressure from the EU to accept the proposal and was not willing to negotiate a better deal. He realized that if he had accepted the conditions set by the EU, he would have been torn apart by his domestic voters. As a result of the failed negotiations, Greece came very close to bankruptcy. Alexis Tsipras realized that the only way to save the Greek economy and remain in the eurozone was to sit one more time with the eurozone leaders and reach an agreement, which they eventually did. Consequently, he fulfilled the requirements of the first level by satisfying the international counterparts, but he failed to secure the domestic interests, which resulted in his dismissal from the position of the Greek PM. It should be stated that the Greek situation was extremely difficult to settle since both parties did not have ample time for negotiations, which resulted in one side getting less from the agreement than expected.
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Figure 1.2 The win-set strategy depending on the international and domestic interests
Successful negotiation takes place when all actors involved reach a so-called “win-set”
agreement. The entire process of international bargaining depends on the standpoint and influence of domestic voters. The higher their expectations the more difficult it is to satisfy them. This may result in the loss of their political support (in the case of reaching an unfavorable deal) or failure to sign any agreement between the international actors. The state leader is constantly under pressure from the opposition in his or her country as well as international counterparts. However, what makes a politician great is his or her ability to compromise and come back with conditions acceptable on both the international and domestic levels. That is precisely the win-set strategy, which the Greek PM could not accomplish. During his campaign, his populist approach was noted across the EU and many observers did not believe that his proposals and promises would ever come to fruition because of objections from the EU leaders.
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The author of this paper strongly believes that the strategy to confront the rise of euroscepticism in Europe should be based on the two-level games theory. The history of the EU has showed us many examples in which the member states, in the face of serious conflict, were able to reach a compromise through the negotiation process. Considering the fact that the EU countries do differ a great deal with regard to political rules, culture, tradition, and even religion, bargaining between them is always an arduous operation. Despite the differences, they must represent their nations on both an international and domestic level, which provides us yet another difficulty in achieving a binding agreement. If we consider the rise of euroscepticism as an issue to be dealt with by the EU, then solving this problem through several negotiation stages must be understood as a precise and highly complex surgery. The true challenge is finding a common way to satisfy all eurosceptic parties, or simply to diminish their popularity in their home countries. The European Commission must take into consideration the fact that no single equivalent model of euroscepticism can be applied to all political actors. We can encounter hard and soft eurosceptic parties which then can be further divided into the left-wing and right-wing. By applying the two-level games theory, the author of this paper tries to prove its efficiency in dealing with eurosceptic parties after the 2014 European Parliament Elections.