Soft euroscepticism

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After the 2014 European election, only six members states (Croatia, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania and Slovenia) did not have a single eurosceptic party representing them in the European Parliament. On the other hand, some countries elected three eurosceptic parties (Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain), and others even elected four (Greece and the UK). This particular redistribution cannot simply be explained by the relationship between party support and public euroscepticism. Germany has always been a member state with a high level of trust in the EU, but contrary to expectations its citizens elected three eurosceptic parties into the European Parliament. Furthermore, the 2014 European election proved that soft euroscepticism is more common than hard euroscepticism in Europe. The soft eurosceptic program is not as radical as that of the europhobes, which makes them more suitable coalition partners, or in case of electoral victory, governing parties.

4.1.1 Soft euroscepticism

SOFT EUROSCEPTICISM is where there is NOT a principled objection to European

integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ’national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory.

The discussion of soft eurosceptic parties requires mentioning the process of European integration. Many politicians from parties such as Law and Justice or Fidesz perceive the ever-closer union project to be a potential danger to their national interests. They oppose the idea of European federalization while stressing the importance of each member state's sovereignty and ability to make its own decisions without the EU's influence. Soft eurosceptic parties realize that the

61 Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart, “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States,” Sussex European Institute, (April 2002).

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EU has increasingly greater decision-making power and is able to impose its views and demands on national governments. Syriza does not want to accept the conditions of the bailout program, nor does Fidesz want to approve refugee quotas that were introduced by the European Commission.

European integration through the implementation of a common currency, the establishment of a coherent EU foreign policy, and the pursuit of EU enlargement were meant to increase the power in Brussels at the expense of individual member states. Those who oppose the idea of an ever-closer union are supporters of soft euroscepticism. However, it is essential to note that they do not want to withdraw from the EU, eurozone or Schengen area. Their ideology focuses on reforming EU structures rather than destroying them, especially when controversial issues concerning their countries arise. Depending on their origins and demands of the EU, soft eurosceptic parties can be divided into left and right wing subcategories.

Syriza (Greece) and Podemos (Spain) are undeniably two of the most important soft eurosceptic parties that represent the left wing in the EU. Their ideology is closely lined to Marxism, environmentalism, and feminism, and they originated in the aftereffects of the 2008 eurozone crisis that destroyed the Greek and Spanish economies. Syriza, led by Alexis Tsipras, won the elections to the Hellenic Parliament in January 2015 (36.3% - 149 seats) and in September 2015 (35.5% - 145 seats), as well as the 2014 European Parliamentary election, securing 26.6% of the total vote. The Greek population was extremely frustrated with the inefficient fight against unemployment, life deterioration, and social cuts because of the economic crisis, leading them to vote against mainstream parties in favor of Syriza. During Tsipras's campaign he promised humanitarian emergency reform (subsidizing food for unemployed citizens), support for same-sex marriage, the nationalization of banks, and most importantly strong opposition toward conditions imposed by creditors to pay off Greek debt. The main goal of Tsipras and his party was to renegotiate conditions with Troika and present the outcome to the domestic constituency. In the case of failure, three potential solutions were taken under consideration: refusing to pay the debt if it was

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not reduced, leaving the eurozone (Grexit), or accepting all of the conditions imposed by Troika.

The second option was an unlikely one because of the public support for a common European currency – the euro, in Greece. In the end, in July 2015, the Greek Prime Minister accepted the conditions (pension reform, child and unemployment benefits cut, etc.) for a third memorandum, which would impose harsher austerity and a 'death sentence' on Alexis Tsipras.⁶² Syriza's euroscepticism is closely related to its opposition to Troika and populist approach that enabled the party to win national and European elections. Tsipras wanted to end the austerity, which was required by the EU to fulfill all of the conditions and to receive the bailout program. Syriza exemplifies a typical soft eurosceptic, populist party which did all its best to win elections, but in the end was unable to implement all of the promises it had made during its political campaign.

In 2014, former professor of political science, Pablo Iglesias, decided to establish his own eurosceptic party – Podemos. As a leader, Iglesias repeatedly emphasized the role of Syriza as a model for ending the dominance of mainstream parties and promoting different goals for domestic and international policy. Without a clear political program, including many populist ideas like nationalization of companies and free education, Podemos was able to gain 8% in the 2014 European election (fourth place) and 20.7% in the 2015 Spanish general election (third place). Jose Ignacio Torreblanca once said that “They (Podemos) made an offer of radical change at a moment in which everyone was really fed up with the system. (…) The guys in Podemos realized that the traditional parties were not able to capture the anger of the people.”⁶³ This leads us to conclude that many eurosceptic parties are against the establishment and that most of those that represent the left wing endorse its European anti-austerity ideology. Spain, a country that was forced to meet the conditions imposed by Troika in order to receive its bailout program, created the perfect platform for the emergence of soft eurosceptic parties from the left-wing, as was the case with Podemos.

The largest number of eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament represent by the right

62 Ein Gastbeitrag von Will Denayer, “Syriza, the EU and negative integration,” Flassbeck-economics, (October 2015).

63 Jess McHugh, “European Anti-Austerity 2015: Podemos, Spain's Protest Party, Looks To An Uncertain Future After Tsipras Resignation, Dips In The Polls,” International Business Times, (February 2015).

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wing of soft euroscepticism such as Fidesz and Law and Justice. Both share the same ideology, goals concerning national and foreign policy, attitude toward the EU and importance of preserving patriotism. One may assume that right wing soft eurosceptic parties follow one particular rule while governing and campaigning: “We cannot depend on anybody but ourselves.” This sentence highlights the most important point of Fidesz and Law and Justice's political programs – national interest always comes first and securing it is crucial for a country's development. Moreover, their ideology is primarily based on anti-globalization, anti-EU, and sometimes anti-minority rhetoric and coupled with their populist approach appeals to many European citizens during such unstable times. When analyzing Fidesz's development and political program in the context of euroscepticism, one must begin from 2006, when Victor Orban's party secured second place in the national election and became an opposition party. The year 2006 was particularly special for this Hungarian party because it was the last time they lost an election. In 2010, not only did Fidesz win enough seats to govern on its own, but it also secured two-thirds of the parliament majority vote to modify the country's constitution.

In the end, Orban rewrote the Hungarian constitution and reshaped the legal and institutional systems in Hungary – all with the support of the domestic constituency, which reelected him as Prime Minister in 2014. A single party with such a strong majority in the national parliament may pose a threat to democratic standards, which have always been strictly controlled by the European Parliament. In 2015, when Victor Orban proposed in 2015 bringing back the death penalty in Hungary, Jean-Claude Juncker (President of the European Commission) stated that: “A reason for divorce! One of my political beliefs is that there shall be no death penalty. Anyone who introduces the death penalty has no place in the European Union.”⁶⁴ This example demonstrates how conservative soft eurosceptic parties might be when using a populist approach to attract the support of the people. After the 2010 election, Orban launched a large scale ideological offensive to imprint

64 Matthew Day, “Hungary could be thrown out of EU if it brings back death penalty, says Jean-Claude Juncker,” The Telegraph, (June 2015).

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its political and aesthetic values onto Hungarian society.⁶⁵ While criticizing the EU, Fidesz mostly focused on the Syrian war, the annexation of Crimea, and the refugees crisis, an of which undermined the position of the EU in its failure to secure member states and respond to those problems quickly and effectively. Orban, who is well known for his close relations with Vladimir Putin, has expressed many times his dissatisfaction with sanctions placed on Russia because such sanctions do not produce any positive effects and only harm the Hungarian economy. When the migrant crisis occured, Hungary was the biggest transit country for refugees inside the EU. The Hungarian prime minister repeatedly criticized the EU's efforts to halt the influx of asylum seekers by resettling them in other member states. He stated that those actions would not stop refugees from coming to Europe. A recent deal between the EU and Turkey was heartily accepted by Fidesz and other soft eurosceptic political parties because in their opinions, it will produce an actual solution for the migrant crisis. Euroscepticism in Hungary is distinctly unique from that in other member states. Without the EU's financial contribution, Hungarian development and Orban's ideas would be impossible to accomplish, and citizens are aware of this.⁶⁶ Orban's party is opposed to many conditions that the EU tries to impose on Hungary, but it does not deny Hungary's EU membership, and unlike in other countries outside of the eurozone, it promotes entering it in the near future.

Surprisingly, Fidesz is a member party of the EPP group in the European Parliament, which proves that despite being a eurosceptic party, they still hold a more pro-EU attitude than others like Law and Justice and the Conservative Party. Orban's radical ideas and views have alienated him in the EPP, but that can be used to his advantage when creating public statements and respecting opinions from different political camps.

Another political party with conservative and eurosceptic views – Law and Justice, received extensive press coverage after the 2015 Polish Parliamentary election, in which they won enough seats to govern without a coalition. Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski has emphasized several times

65 Yudit Kiss, “Brave new Hungary,” Open Democracy, (September 2014).

66 Benjamin Novak, “Hegedus: Fidesz has more critics than friends in European Peoples Party,” The Budapest Beacon, (May 2014).

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that he wishes to create a second Budapest in Warsaw by following the same path of reshaping the Polish constitution and institutional system as Orban did in Hungary. Law and Justice's main campaign goal is to build a strong Poland that is based on family values, the role of the church, and social support, while at the same time promoting Polish tradition and resisting European integration.

Similar to the Hungarian government, Polish counterparts do not deny their EU membership for the same reason - without it, Poland would never have been able to accomplish such remarkable development as it has since its accession in 2004. However, they are firmly opposed to entering the eurozone, and most importantly they protest the centralized power in Brussels that often undermines the national law of each member state. Law and Justice's leadership does not make any offensive moves toward the EU, but rather they work to strengthen Polish national spirit symbolically by removing the EU's flags from some official government headquarters.

Law and Justice is strongly opposed to Russian intervention in the Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, both of which undermine national security, hence their appeal to relocate more NATO bases to Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries. They have criticized the EU for its inadequate attempts to halt Russian aggression, as well as its insufficient solutions concerning the current migrant crisis in Europe. Law and Justice is averse to Muslim refugees from Syria, which thus explains their reluctance to accept the refugee quotas proposed by the EU. Before the 2015 Polish Parliamentary election, Kaczynski appealed to potential voters by saying that “refugees were bringing cholera to the Greek islands, dysentery to Vienna, various types of parasites,”⁶⁷ which further elucidates the party's attitude toward asylum seekers. In order to understand this special kind of Polish euroscepticism, we must consider certain aspects of Polish society, such as the role of the catholic church as a patriotic force and conservative family values.⁶⁸ The EU, with its modern approach, maintains ideas that are too liberal for many Polish people coming from rural areas that support Law and Justice. They do not understand the EU as a whole

67 Alex Duval Smith, “Poland lurches to right with election of Law and Justice party,” The Guardian, (October 2015).

68 Charles Crawford, “Who are Poland's victorious Law and Justice party, and what do they want?” The Telegraph, (October 2015).

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because they embrace completely different values than parties in other member states. However, the support from the European Commission, namely its financial contribution as part of the Cohesion Policy, has made Poland a member state with a relatively high level of trust in the EU compared to other countries. It can be stated that euroscepticism in Poland originates from ignorance about EU affairs. For obvious reasons, the current government does not want to alter the peoples' attitudes, and as a result it represents their soft eurosceptic views throughout Europe.