Chapter 1 Introduction
1.4. Organization of This Thesis
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Hypothesis B-1: Agreement without contingency (WOC) would occur more frequently than agreement with contingency (WC).
Hypothesis B-2: Upgrading agreement is applied more frequently than preserving agreement.
(3) The Impact of Gender
Question C: Is gender an influential factor to the construction of agreement? If yes, how does it determine a Mandarin speaker’s choice of pragmatic strategies of agreement?
Question C-1: Is speaker’s gender an influential factor to the construction of agreement?
Hypothesis C-1: Speaker’s gender is a significant factor to manipulate the construction and pragmatic strategies in the performance of agreement.
Question C-2: Is hearer’s gender an influential factor to the construction of agreement?
Hypothesis C-2: Hearer’s gender is a significant factor to influence people’s construction and pragmatic strategies in agreement.
Question C-3: When both speaker’s and hearer’s genders are considered, is gender an influential factor to the construction of agreement?
Hypothesis C-3: When both speaker’s and hearer’s genders are considered, gender is a significant factor to manipulate the construction and pragmatic strategies in the performance of agreement.
1.4. Organization of This Thesis
This thesis is composed by six chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the purpose of this study and its hypotheses; Chapter 2 reviews related theories and studies on agreement;
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 3 presents the resources of data as well as the methodology of examining the conversations; Chapter 4 presents data analyses and findings in construction of agreement; Chapter 5 discusses data results of pragmatic strategies in agreement;
Chapter 6 makes the conclusion, limitation and suggestion of this study.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 2 Literature Review
In this chapter, theories and previous studies related to agreement are reviewed, including speech act theory, indirectness of speech, conversational structure, and pragmatic and social principles.
2.1. Speech Act Theory
Agreement as a speech act can be expressed directly and indirectly, which could influence the force of agreement. Thus, it is inevitable to review speech act theory and indirect speech act.
A speech act is a functional unit in communication which means people do something by saying something. The concept of speech act begins from Austin’s (1962) How to Do Things with Words, which is later discussed and expanded by many scholars, especially by Searle (1969). Austin observes that under the appropriate circumstances, the words people uttered are not merely about the referential content of sentences, but also performing particular actions which aim at influencing the hearer simultaneously. For example, when a priest announces “I pronounce you husband and wife” to a wedding couple, he is doing the act of pronouncing. After these utterances are pronounced, the wedding couple has a new social relationship.
Austin terms the utterances of this type “Performative,” in contrast with “Constatives”
which is used to denote the utterances that are employed for saying something but not doing something.
Considering the vague distinction between performative and constatives, Austin (1962) further brings out three essential components in speech act. According to Austin, utterances have three layers of actions: locutionary act, illocutionary act and
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
perlocutionary act. Locutinary act represents an act with a meaningful linguistic expression. Illocutionary act as Austin’s central innovation carries the purposes or functions in the speaker’s intention. It is performed by the conventional forces associated with them. Perlocutionary force denotes the result of effect which is produced by the context, whether intended or not. It means that in different socio-cultural contexts, the same utterances can derive various illocutionary forces. As a follower of Austin, Searle (1975) classifies illocutionary acts into the following five kinds, namely, representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.
Nevertheless, the knowledge of speech act alone is not enough for the hearer to decode the speaker’s intention successfully because the speaker’s meaning and the sentence meaning usually come apart (Searle, 1975). It means that the speaker’s true intention can be conveyed indirectly. According to Searle (1975), indirect speech act is that kind of illocutionary act that is performed by way of performing another act. In other words, indirect speech act is composed by two illocutionary acts: one Primary illocutionary act, which confers speaker’s intention, in combination with a Secondary illocutionary act, which contributes literal meaning.
For the hearer to decode indirect speech acts, Searle further brings up four kinds of knowledge which are necessary. They are the theory of speech act, the Cooperative Principle (which is reviewed below), mutually shared factual background information and the ability of making inferences.
2.2. The Cooperative Principle
As indicated above, speech act theory is not the only background knowledge for the hearer to attain the message the speaker wants to send. Conversationalists assume that there should be a universal set of rule to guide how people communicate with each other (Levinson, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987). One principle is the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Cooperative Principle (CP) proffered by Grice (1975). Following this principle, the speaker shapes their utterances and the hearer interprets the speaker’s utterances, effectively and efficiently. The four maxims of CP and examples are given below.
1. Maxim of Quality:
Inaccurate messages and information without adequate evidences should not be conveyed. For instance, without the knowledge of where to go, people should not direct a stray to a wrong place to prevent from telling something false.
2. Maxims of Quantity:
In communication, the speaker should give as much information as needed, but no more than what is needed. For example, if people are asked for direction, it doesn’t mean that they need to tell others the details about how to go to a place, because the quantity is too much, if they do so.
3. Maxim of Relevance:
The speech given by the interlocutors should be relevant to the topic of the communication. For example, when Speaker A says, “I want to buy a drink,” and Speaker B replies, “Around the corner, there is a Seven-eleven,” it is expected that beverages are available in that Seven-eleven.
4. Maxim of Manner:
The speaker’s speech should be orderly, brief and without obscurity or ambiguity.
For instance, a story should be told chronologically because orderly arrangement makes the story more understandable.
(Adaptation from Leech, 1983) Although different societies or cultures do not use the above maxims in the same way, CP can be seen as an “‘unmarked’ and social neutral presumptive” structure of conversation (Brown and Levionson, 1987:5). Interlocutors, both the speaker and the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
hearer, would naturally abide by the principle in order to converse with each other in an efficient, rational, and co-operative way.
Moreover, Horn (1984) further proposes the Principle of Least Effort (and the Principle of Sufficient Effort) to revise Grice’s Cooperative Principle. He suggests that CP can be reduced into two principles: The first one is the Q Principle-Make your contribution sufficient, and R Principle-Make your contribution necessary. From the works of Tannen (1975, 1979) mentioned in Horn (1984: 16), there is a tendency that female obeys the Q Principle more, while male obeys the R Principle more. In other words, female is considered more hearer-oriented, while male is considered more speaker-oriented.
However, in real conversation, Grice’s Cooperative Principle is often found violated or flouted. People would rather take a risk of causing communication to fail down and break the rules which are universally known. It means that these principles mentioned above are still not enough to explain how people communicate with each other. Politeness Principle (PP) can be one of the probable explanations.
2.3. Politeness Principles
When people proffer agreement, the most efficient and effort-saving way is to utter a word, “yes” or “right.” Nevertheless, in daily conversation, the agreeing party, not afraid of being considered flattering, usually adds similar experiences or gives a justification to strengthen their agreement. It means that people would rather violate CP (Quantity in this example) for politeness’ sake. Leech (1983) suggests that when CP enables the speakers to communicate which is based on the assumption that all the interlocutors are cooperative, Grice overlooks the role of politeness in the social interactions. According to Leech (1983), being polite in words not only establishes and keeps “comity” among people, but also helps the interlocutors engaged in a
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
harmonious social interaction. When it comes to agreement, Brown and Levinson (1987) propose that agreement is a way to seek positive politeness because by agreeing, the speaker can claim common ground with the hearer. Therefore, briefly reviewing theories of politeness is necessary when conducting the analysis of agreement. The following paragraphs are about some major studies on politeness.
2.3.1. Politeness Principle by Lakoff (1973)
Lakoff (1973, 1975, 1977) is the first scholar to consider politeness from the conversational-maxim point of view. She suggests two rules of Pragmatic Competence: Be clear and Be polite. The first rule covers the maxims of the Gricean CP, while the second rule consists of three sub-rules: (a) don’t impose (distance), (b) give option (deference), and (c) be friendly (camaraderie). Lakoff (1979) further claims that these politeness rules are not in a hierarchical relationship but are points on a continuum scale, with one end stood by the Gricean CP and the other end, camaraderie. People from different cultures have different priority among these rules which could cause stylistic differences or even communication breakdown.
2.3.2. Politeness Principle by Brown and Levinson (1978)
Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) politeness theory is derived from Goffman’s (1967) notion of face. They propose that face, emotionally invested, is something that people can lose, maintain or enhance. In conversation, people cooperate with each other in order to maintain face in interaction. Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) further suggest that every individual has two faces: negative face and positive face. Negative face means the desire for freedom of action and freedom from being imposed, while positive face means the eager to be complimented and approved of in social interaction. Based on the concept of face, they find the intrinsic nature of the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
addressee’s and the speaker’s face wants runs contradictory with each other. The contradiction inspires them the face-threatening acts (FTAs) which mean acts threatening face intrinsically. Figure 1 shows five strategies for dealing with FTAs.
on record with redressive action Do the FTA 4. off record
5. Don’t do the FTA
Figure 1. Possible strategies of dealing with FTAs
Among five possible responses to FTAs, positive politeness is highly related to this study. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 70), positive politeness is oriented to the hearer’s positive face which means the positive self-image that the hearer claims for self. Positive politeness is “approach-based;” When focusing on positive politeness to deal with FTAs, the speaker intends to express that he/she wants the hearer’s want. For example, the speaker would treat the hearer as a friend or family member whose wants or personality are known and liked. And agreement is one of the sub-strategies of positive politeness for the speaker to claim common ground with the hearer (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 112). Agreeing with the evaluation which the hearer has made in the previous context satisfies the hearer’s want to be “right” and to be verified in his/her opinions. Therefore, agreeing with others can be taken as a social accelerator which indicates the speaker wants to be more intimate with the hearer.
1. Without redressive action, baldly
2. positive politeness 3. negative politeness
‧
2.3.3. Politeness Principle by Leech (1983)
Another powerful Politeness Principle is brought up by Leech (1983). He proposed six maxims of his Politeness Principle (PP) (1983: 132) which are summarized below.
1. TACT MAXIM
(a) Minimize cost to other; (b) Maximize benefit to other 2. GENEROSITY MAXIM
(a) Minimize benefit to self; (b) Maximize cost to self 3. APPROBATION MAXIM
(a) Minimize dispraise of other; (b) Maximize praise of other 4. MODESTY MAXIM
(a) Minimize praise of self; (b) Maximize dispraise of self 5. AGREEMENT MAXIM
(a) Minimize disagreement between self and other (b) Maximize agreement between self and other 6. SYMPATHY MAXIM
(a) Minimize antipathy between self and other (b) Maximize sympathy between self and other
Among the six maxims, the first four are in pairs with bipolar scales, while the last two deal with unipolar scales. Leech (1983: 133) further suggests that not all of the maxims and sub-maxims are equally important. For example, Tact Maxim is more important than Generosity Maxim, while Approbation Maxim is more important than Modesty Maxim. Further, every sub-maxim (a) is more important than the sub-maxim (b). In other words, negative politeness is considered weightier than positive politeness. However, when it comes to socio-cultural differences, this unequal relationship may not be true in Chinese society. Chinese people are considered the group emphasizing both negative politeness and positive politeness. And when it comes to Agreement Maxim, the analysis of this research can provide some evidences that Chinese people use many strategies to maximize their agreement.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Besides Agreement Maxim, the other two relevant maxims for this paper are the Tact Maxim and the Generosity Maxim. When the speaker enforces their agreement by agreement markers and supportive moves, such as account or elaboration, he or she increases cost for self and benefit for other. The speaker makes effort to talk a lot, while the hearer is benefited because of receiving more information.
For politeness principles within the discussion of this study, Brown and Levinson’s face theory and Leech’s PP are taken into account because these principles are highly related to the agreement act. In addition, these two theories take both the speaker and the hearer into consideration. Lakoff’s theory focuses more on the speaker’s aspect so that it is excluded.
2.4. Conversational Structure: Adjacency Pairs
Before the introduction of preference organization, it is inevitable to discuss the concept of adjacency pairs first. Human conversation is not composed by random utterances; instead, it is systematically constructed. One of the most obvious evidence is “adjacency pairs.” According to Schegloff and Sacks (1973), adjacency pairs are sequences of two utterances which are produced by different speakers and ordered as a “first part” and a “second part.” It means that the current speaker who proffers the first part must stop somewhere, and next speaker must produce a second part to the same pair. Some prototypical pairs are question-answer, greeting-greeting and offer-acceptance, etc. However, not all of the second parts to a first part stand equally (Levinson, 1983: 307). In other words, there is at least one preferred and one dispreferred category of response. For example, granting a request is more preferred than rejecting a request.
The concept of preference is first proposed and expanded by Sacks (1973). He suggests that the preference of some responses rather than others should be taken as
‧
part of the structural organization of talk. Levinson (1983:332) further demonstrates that the notion of preference is not intended as a psychological claim about speaker’s or hearer’s desires; instead, it is closely related to the linguistic concept of markedness.
People try to give preferred response which is unmarked, simple and without delay, while they avoid proffering dispreferred action which is marked, complex and delayed.
Levinson (1983: 336) gives the following table to illustrate some adjacency pairs with preferred and dispreferred second parts.
Table 1. Correlations of content and format in adjacency pair seconds (Adapted from Levinson, 1983)
First Parts Second
Parts
Request Offer/Invite Assessment Question Blame Preferred
responses Acceptance Acceptance Agreement Expected
answer Denial Dispreferred
responses Refusal Refusal Disagreement
Unexpected answer or Non-answer
Admission
As indicated in Table 1, agreement and disagreement are not symmetrical, unprejudiced alternative responses. Instead, agreement is socially preferred to disagreement (Hayano, 2007). Pomerantz (1984) makes a deep research on the relationship between the preference organization and the structure of the turns expressing agreement as well as disagreement. Agreement/disagreement appears as the second part of the adjacency pair which is preferred or dispreferred according to the context. In a friendly talk, agreement is often as the preferred action because participants are oriented toward interpersonal coordination, and thus toward consensus (Baym, 1996). Pomerantz even terms agreement as a “preferred next action”. But when the first assessment is made to self-deprecate, agreement is as a dispreferred action because it would be interpreted as implicit criticism. When the agreement is preferred, because responses are organized to permit ‘stated
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
disagreements to be minimized and stated agreements to be maximized,’ agreement is often stated strongly, simply and directly (Mulkay, 1985). In this study, the data of agreement as the preferred action are examined, while the data of dispreferred agreement are excluded.
2.5. Agreement as a Speech Act
In this section, agreement as a speech act would be introduced. Definition of Agreement, Speech Act Analysis of Agreement, Pragmatic Strategies and Social Constraint of Agreement, and Linguistic Features of Agreement would be presented.
2.5.1. Definitions of Agreement
Although many studies have discussed about the construction of agreement, few of them make definition of agreement (Pomerantz, 1984; Hornero et al., 2008).
According to Cambridge Dictionary (2011), agreement occurs “when people have the same opinion, or when they approve of or accept something.” It means that when an agreement is made, two parties, who view the same referent in the same way, are needed. Pomerantz (1984) suggests that when a recipient agrees with the prior assessment, he or she shows his or her assessment which focuses on the same referent and the viewpoint is consistent with the first assessment. Hornero et al. (2008) adopts Tsui’s (1994) studies and defines agreement from the structure of discourse acts.
Hornero et al. claim that agreement is a response produced after assessings, reports, elicitation of agreement as well as confirmation, and before follow-ups, such as endorsement, concession and acknowledgement. It means that Pomerantz’s agreement occurs as the second part of the adjacency pair of conversation mentioned above, while Hornero et al.’s agreement shows up in a three-turn organization.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
In this study, Pomerantz’s definition of agreement is adopted for several reasons.
First, Pomerantz’s definition is coordinated with the dual-turn organization mentioned by many scholars in the section of “Preference Organization,” while Hornero et al.’s three-turn organization cannot fit in the concept of adjacency pairs. Second, after the examination of the data, the follow-ups do not always occur so that the third turn is not obligatory but optional. For example, it is optional for the speaker who gives the evaluation acknowledges that he/she hears agreement from the other speaker.
Therefore, Pomerantz’s definition of agreement which is in the structure of the adjacency pair is adopted, while Hornero et al.’s version is not.
2.5.2. Speech Act Analysis of Agreement
As what have been reviewed above, Austin (1962) proposes three essential components in speech act: locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act.
As for illocutionary act, Searle (1975) classify it into five kinds: representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. Agreement, accordingly,
belongs to the category of “expressives” because the utterances of this kind “have the function of making known the speaker’s psychological attitude towards a state of affairs which the illocution presupposes” (Leech, 1983: 106). In agreeing with others, the speaker reveals his/her compatible attitudinal judgment to the hearer to support them.
Nevertheless, not all of agreements are proffered directly. Agreements can be an indirect speech act. As for indirect speech act, two illocutionary act compose it:
Primary illocutionary act, and Secondary illocutionary act. For example, the speaker
Primary illocutionary act, and Secondary illocutionary act. For example, the speaker