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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.3 PAP election history from 1968 to 2006

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hours to reflect and decide “rationally on issues raised during the election before going to the polls “ (para 10).

1.3 PAP election history from 1968 to 2006

Ever since independence from British colonial rule and the split from Malaysia, the PAP has fought and won every single general election. The 1968 GE held on 13th April had only one opposition party and 5 independent candidates contesting 7 out of the 58 constituencies. The PAP won all the seats that year. The 1972 GE on the 2nd of September saw an increase in opposition parties. 57 out of 65 constituencies were contested but the PAP emerged victorious winning all 65 seats. Similarly in the 1976 GE, despite being contested by the same opponents, PAP won all seats. The 1980 election on the 23rd of December saw the entrance of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), however despite debates of the opposition over rights of the minority and care for the poor, the PAP still won all seats that year (GE 1968 – Singapore General

Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012; GE 1972 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012; GE 1976 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012; GE 1980 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012).

End of one party rule

The 22nd December 1984 marked the end of the one-party rule. Two constituencies, Potong Pasir and Anson were lost to SDP and Workers party (WP) respectively. The following GE on in 1988 saw the introduction of GRCs. PAP retained all GRCs but Potong Pasir, which voted SDP’s Chiam See Tong into parliament (GE 1984 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012). 1991’s GE marked the first election after Lee Kuan Yew

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stepped down as Prime Minister and PAP’s secretary-general. It was the first time Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong led the PAP in a GE. This GE was a snap election (just three years after the 1988 GE) called on by Goh to start a fresh mandate after the stepping down of LKY (Singapore Parliamentary General Election 1991, 2012). The results of the GE showed the biggest lost of the PAP at the period with them losing four seats, three to SDP (Bukit Gombak, Nee Soon Central, Potong Pasir) and one to WP (Hougang) (GE 1991 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012).

Upturn of GE results

The 1997 and 2001 GE showed an upturn of results for the PAP. In the 1997 GE, PAP won back two out of the four constituencies that they have lost i.e., Bukit Gombak and Nee Soon (GE 1997 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012). This might be due to the internal strife between SDP’s party members, disqualification of NSP’s rights to contest as well as what was at stake to voters than i.e., HDB (Singapore’s

government housing) upgrading, that aided the PAP’s upturn during the 1997 election (Singapore Parliamentary General Election 1997, 2012). The 1997 GE was also marked as a dirty chapter in Singapore’s GE history as according to Chunha (2000), this election consisted of many personal attacks both from the opposition and the PAP. In 2001, PAP faced a tough challenge as Singapore was hit by the economic crisis. However they managed to secure a high number of votes, with their promise of upgrading and revitalizing of the economy helped them retaining the constituencies they won in 1997 and increase their number of supporters, giving them the third highest voting percentage in history (Singapore Parliamentary General Election 2001, 2012).

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Reverse of fortunes of the opposition

According to Singapore Parliamentary General Election 2006 (2012), the 2006 GE held on the 6th of May mark the second time a new Prime minister was leading the PAP in the GE since the handover of the position of Prime Minister from Goh to Lee Hsien Loong in 2004. The 2006 elections was also the start of the “internet election” as according to Gomez and Han (2010), this is the year with a significant presence of political bloggers. Also there was a hot debate over the issue of “vote against upgrading” where constituencies not under the PAP were

“punished” with no government funding (Chua, 2006). The opposition this year was also

stronger more prepared than they were previously, giving the PAP a good fight, as seen from no political party forfeiting their deposits (According to Candidates' Handbook for Parliamentary Election (2011), candidates will lose their deposit if the do not get more than one eight of the total number of votes in the constituency they are running in). The wants of opposition in the cabinet by the voters were clear (Chua, 2006). Table 2 will give an overall glance of the support of the PAP from 1959 to 2011 (General Election 2011 – GE history, 2011). Table 1 shows a sharp decline of PAP’s popularity since 2006, dropping from 75% in 2001 to 66.6% followed by another more than 6% drop to 60.14 in the 2011 GE. This drop is a major concern for politicians as GE’s are not a one-time event.

Table 1

PAP election results from 1959-2011

Year Seats Won Vote percentage Opposition

1959* 43 seats out of 51 53.5% -

1963 ** 37 seats out of 51 46.6% 1. United People’s Party (UPP)

2. Barisan Sociolis (BS)

2. 5 independent candidate

1972 All 65 seats 69.2% 1. Barisan Sosialis (BS)

2. People's Front (PF) 3. Pertubohan Kebangsaan

Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 4. United National Front (UNF) 5. Workers' Party (WP)

1976 All 69 seats 72.4% 1. Barisan Sosialis (BS)

2. Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 3. Singapore Justice Party (SJP) 4. United Front (UF)

5. United People's Party (UPF) 6. Workers' Party (WP)

1980 All 75 seats 77.7% 1. Barisan Sosialis (BS)

2. Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 3. Singapore Justice Party (SJP) 4. Singapore Democratic Party

(SDP)

5. United Front (UF)

6. United People's Party (UPF) 7. Workers' Party (WP)

1984 77 out of 79 seats 64.8% 1. Angkatan Islam (AI)

2. Barisan Sosialis (BS) 3. Justice Party Singapore (JPS) 4. Singapore Democratic Party

(SDP)

5. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 6. Pertubohan Kebangsaan

Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 7. United People's Party (UPF) 8. Workers' Party (WP)

1988 80 out of 81 seats 63.2% 1. Angkatan Islam (AI)

2. Barisan Sosialis (BS)

3. Justice Party Singapore (JPS) 4. Singapore Democratic Party

(SDP)

5. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 6. Pertubohan Kebangsaan

Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 7. United People's Party (UPF) 8. Workers' Party (WP)

1991 77 out of seats of 81 61% 1. Justice Party Singapore (JPS)

2. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 3. People's Action Party (PAP)

Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 4. Singapore Democratic Party

(SDP)

5. Workers' Party (WP)

1997 81 out of 83 seats 65% 1. Democratic Progressive Party

(DPP)

2. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 3. Singapore Democratic Party

(SDP)

4. Singapore People's Party (SPP) 5. Workers' Party (WP)

2001 82 out of 84 seats 75% 1. Democratic Progressive Party

(DPP)

2. People's Action Party (PAP) 3. Singapore Democratic Alliance

(SDA)

4. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)

5. Workers' Party (WP)

2006 82 out of 84 seats 66.6% 1. Singapore Democratic Alliance

(SDA)

2. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)

3. Workers' Party (WP)

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2011 81 out of 87 seats 60.14% 1. Workers' Party (WP)

2. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 3. Reform Party (RP)

4. Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)

5. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)

6. Singapore People's Party (SPP)

* Denotes Britain granting Singapore full self governance

**Denotes Independence from Britain and merger with Malaysia

*** Singapore split from Malaysia in 1965, making 1968’s election the first GE for parliament

1.4 2011 Singapore General Elections

7th May 2011 is the latest GE that happened in Singapore recently. It is said by critiques to be the fiercest fight for PAP since Singapore’s independence (Lim & Sim, 2011). 2011’s GE showed the opposition contesting areas that were previously not contested before (i.e. strong PAP areas like Marine Parade which is under ex Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong). Furthermore, opposition candidates are also of high caliber with “top corporate lawyers and several former high-ranking civil servants” (para 3) representing the opposition.

PAP’s crisis – unhappiness of Singaporeans towards the PAP

What made this GE particularly difficult for the PAP was the raising unhappiness of the Singaporeans towards the PAP’s policies and governing. There was a raising concern with the property prices of Singapore, the high cost of living as well as the in flood of foreign workers into the country. Political risk consultants also pointed that these issues i.e., cost of living issues, housing prices and the competition posed by foreigners in the job market, will be prominently featured during the 2011 campaign (Chua, 2011), showing the significance it played in the 2011

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GE. The Straits Times also reported that these issues were the top concerns amongst Singaporeans (Lim, 2011). Similarly, the opposition also targeted strongly at these specific issues when attacking the PAP during the campaign period. These issues were also what weighed on voters minds when they cast their votes (Toh & Lim, 2011). Furthermore according to Benoit (2007) “policy is a more determinant of a voters vote to a candidate than character” (p. 224), therefore candidates usually target policies during a political campaign. Thus, the growing unhappiness and frustrations of Singaporeans towards the PAP’s inept policies towards tackling these issues made the 2011 GE a potential crisis in the making. It damaged the, in the minds of the people, “stable governance” (Ngerng, 2013, pp.20) of the PAP, and with people getting more

“disgruntled”, it “can be reflected in the drop in vote share in the alternating decade” (pp.22). An article from theonelinecitizen.com, shows the unhappiness of Singaporeans with the PAP with articles like “The anger of displacement” (Choo, 2010), where harsh phrases like “But our country is changing so quickly that we now feel overwhelmed and displaced, angry, in a country which is becoming harder and harder to recognize” (pp. 19), “It is hard to believe the PAP doesn’t know why Singaporeans are angry, but what does our anger mean to them? “ (pp. 20) and “Singapore is increasingly losing our physical and emotional space for love, and soon the only thing we will be able to call ours will be our Anger” (pp. 21). It is thus not difficult to see the image crisis that the PAP faces during the 2011 GE.

Immigration policy

Singapore’s foreign immigration policy has made employment and entry into Singapore relatively easy. According to the Ministry of Manpower, before the changes made to the

dependent privileges of work pass holders on 1st September 2012, foreigners need only to earn a monthly income of 2000 Singapore dollars to qualify for a S Pass i.e., a pass for mid skilled

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foreign workers (S Pass - before you apply, 2012). If their income was above 2800 Singapore dollars, they were allowed to bring their spouse, children, parents and parent-in-laws as well.

There were also Long term visitor pass and Dependent’s pass that allowed a foreigner’s

common-law spouse, handicapped children, step children and parents to enter Singapore (Long term visitor pass – Before you apply, 2012; Dependent’s pass – Before you apply, 2012). This ease of entering and staying in Singapore has according to Lim and Sim (2011), made 36.6 percent of the 5.1 million population in Singapore made up of foreign workers. This is a 16.6 percent increase from the 4 million people 10 years ago. The United States of America has a foreign population of 12.36% in the year 2010 (“Table 40”, 2010), and Taiwan has a foreign population of 2% in the year 2011 (“Foreign Residents”, 2012; “Household Statistics Data”, 2011). Therefore with over one quarter of the population being foreigners in such a small country, competition for housing and jobs, over-crowding of public transportation as well as the losing of national identity has left many Singaporeans disgruntled. Thus the lose immigration laws

currently in place, that allows foreigners to easily work in Singapore, were one of the main issues raised. Table 1.1 shows the percentage raise in foreigners versus Singaporeans from the year 2005 to 2011 (Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2012). From table 2.1 we can see the growth rate of Singaporean citizens are relatively small at less than 1,excluding years 2008 and 2009, whereas foreign immigrants continue to grow steadily throughout the years with the highest peaked at 19.0 in 2008.

Table 2.1

Percentage growth of Singapore residents from 2005-2011

Year Singaporeans Singapore PR Non-residents

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2005 0.8 8.6 5.9

2006 0.9 8.1 9.7

2007 0.8 7.5 14.9

2008 1.0 6.5 19.0

2009 1.1 11.5 4.8

2010 0.9 1.5 4.1

2011 0.8 -1.7 6.9

*Non-resident population comprises foreigners who were working, studying or living in Singapore but not granted permanent residence, excluding tourists and short-term visitors.

Cost of living –

The M shaped society theory by Kenichi Ohmae, which describes the society fracturing into extremely rich and extremely poor, was becoming a prominent sight in Singapore’s society.

Despite being one of Asia’s wealthiest nations, the median household income only rose 3.1%

despite a GDP increase of 14.5 percent in 2010. “Singapore's bottom 10 percent of households with at least one working member had an average monthly income of S$1,400 last year, versus S$23,684 for households in the top 10 percent, according to the Department of Statistics” (Lim

& Sim. 2011, para, 16). To further add to the burden of the poor, Singapore has a current inflation rate of 5.4% as of May 2012 (Koh, 2012), being one of the highest in Asia (Raghuvanshi, 2012). Table 2.2 shows the systematic rise in the consumer price index of

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Singapore from 2001 to 2011, with housing and transportation having the biggest increase over the years with a jump of 8.5 points and 13.5 points respectively. The price index has been on a sharp increase after their PAP won the previous 2006 election (Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2012).

Table 2.2

Consumer price index changes of Singapore from 2001-2011

2001 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

All Items 88.4 91.3 93.2 99.4 100 102.8 108.2

Food 83.5 88.1 90.7 97.7 100.0 101.3 104.4

Clothing and footwear 95.6 97.0 97.6 99.0 99.9 100.4 100.5

Housing 85.8 86.4 86.7 98.3 100.0 102.0 110.5

Transport 100.7 96.7 99.1 103.2 100.0 110.3 123.5

Communication 99.8 98.8 99.5 99.7 99.9 97.7 96.2

Education and stationary 84.3 94.8 96.0 99.2 100.0 102.7 105.7

Healthcare 78.9 89.2 92.9 98.0 100.0 101.9 104.3

Recreation and others 88.5 93.8 96.8 100.3 100.0 101.1 102.5

Housing

With the high inflation rate and the forming of an M society, many young Singaporeans are finding it harder and harder to buy public housing as compared to their parent’s generation.

This frustration is also taken out on the loose foreign immigration laws set by the PAP. The undersupplied housing caused by the possibility of the influx of foreigners is also a reason why housing prices has increased dramatically. The home ownership percentage of Singaporeans thus

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dipped from 92% in 2000 to 87.2% in 2010 (Key indicators of resident household, 2010). The public was demanding answers as to why the Singapore government did not “anticipated the surge in demand for Housing Board (HDB) flats that has led to the record-high resale flat prices seen today” (Cheam, 2011, para. 1). Also, some have criticized the government from profiting from public housing even though it should be for the public good. The opposition party made use of this and demanded the PAP to reveal the price breakdown of building a flat (Kor, 2011).

Despite still winning the election, the low vote count showed evidently the decline in popularity of the PAP with it’s public. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, we will be looking at the crisis caused by the issues mention above and how the PAP tried to restore it’s image and get back the votes during the 2011 GE. This political event would mean that we would be narrowing our scope of crisis to that of the above-mentioned issues. That means, the accusation of the PAP to be over welcoming of foreigners, the high cost of living as well as the unaffordable and insufficient housing.

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