Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research Objectives and Research problem
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Figure 12. Campaign date and mortification ...82
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research Objectives and Research Problem
Ever since the British government granted Singapore full internal control during our colonized days in 1959, PAP has been the dominant party since then (Lee, 2008). Till today, it has not once lost a single GE (Singh, & Wheatly, 1989; Tan, 2009; Chen, 2011). This unique nature of Singapore has made many people question Singapore’s government system. Chan (2011) says “The parliamentary republic of Singapore has been under international scrutiny for its stringent one-party rule by the People’s Action Party (PAP) and suppression of the media and minority parties that oppose its control of the government” (p. 28). However Chan (2011)
acknowledges that this system has indeed helped Singapore progressed from a malaria filled island to a financial hub. Some authors were not as kind, claiming that, “…to sustain the illusion of liberal democratic political contest within parliamentary politics, some opposition parties were permitted to exist. They were continuously harassed to keep them fractious and weak”
(Tremawan, 1996, p. 155). Other authors attributed this phenomenon to LKY. Oakley and Brown (2009) wrote that it was LKY who led the PAP to eliminate “political opposition, banning
critical publications and molding a city into a discipline, functional society built along Confucius ideals, which value the maintenance of hierarchy and social order above all things” (p. 26). They further quoted LKY in 1988 as saying “Even from my sickbed, even if you are going to lower me into the grave and I feel that something is wrong, I’ll get up”(p. 28). Therefore it is not hard to see how the outside world views Singapore’s politics.
Yet on the other hand, other researchers argue that Singapore being an Asian state holds a different stand on democracy as compared to the west. Asians unlike the west are not individuals
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but rather a culture that has its roots in family, thus “balancing their interest with those of the communities to which they belong to” (Brems, 2011, p. 42). Murkherjee (2010) argues that a western model of democracy does not work for Asians because of Asia’s strong cultural roots. It is common to see Asian politicians using these cultural roots i.e., respect for authority,
acceptance of hierarchy, social order etc. which are that of balancing the interest of the
community, during their governance. Lee Kuan Yew as quoted in 1992 during a speech entitled
“ Democracy, Human Rights and the Realities” in Tokyo, said that “With few exceptions, democracy has not brought good government to new developing countries…What Asians value may not necessarily be what Americans or Europeans value. Westerners value the freedoms and liberties of the individual. As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective and efficient.” Thus looking at Singapore’s democracy using the Asian value approach then greatly differs from if we were to take the western approach.
So did the 2011 GE marked the dwindling Asian value approach to democracy or where there underlying unhappiness with the PAP that led to their one time low election results? The young and educated Singaporeans appear to be prepared to vote for the opposition (Sentinel, 2011) as they grow increasingly frustrated with the government. Furthermore, online media has provided a platform for Singaporeans to voice out their unhappiness with PAP’s policies. The 2011 GE, showed that the once dominant party, PAP, is no longer as untouchable as they were in the early years. This proved so with the results of the 2011’s GE with the PAP winning 60.14%
(Results, 2011) of the votes, the lowest in all their election history.
This issue was not unexpected. Chan (2011) wrote that LKY did express concerns about the younger generation. He knew that if the PAP did not handle them well, they would risk being over taken by a “well-organized opposition party” (p.28). So why then did they still secure the
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lowest votes throughout their election history? This is the first election where the opposition has been able to field candidates in all 84 constituencies and where the PAP will not be returning to power without any contest (Sentinel, 2011). As the ruling party of Singapore since the British granted us full internal governance, it is therefore very important for the PAP to continue their legacy. With their 2011’s GE voting results rate hitting a onetime low in the history of Singapore, it is therefore important to analyze what happened. By analyzing their image restoration actions during the campaign in regards to the unpopular policies that affected the once credible and good governance image of the PAP, we can properly analyze the good and the bad of their 2011’s campaigning strategies.
Therefore this thesis will examine the actions of the PAP leading up to the 7th May 2011 GE By analyzing the GE related news article from the 1st of January 2011, which is the start of the GE reporting. The thesis will make use of Benoit’s Image Restoration theory as a framework in uncovering the strategies used by the PAP while facing the election crisis caused by their unpopular policies. In particular, this thesis will examine specific restoration strategies
implemented by the PAP in order to repair its tarnish image and regain the confidence and votes of the public during the 7th May 2011 GE. The thesis will first provide a background of the crisis at hand, followed by a review of Benoit’s Image Restoration theory. This will then be continued with a detailed description of the methodology used for this research and research findings.
Finally, this thesis will discuss the findings with the hope of identifying the potential strength and weaknesses of the strategies used by the PAP
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1.2 Background of Singapore General Elections
Singapore’s General Elections (GE) happens once every five years since the year 1948 when Singapore was still a British Colonial State. It was then known as the Legislative Council General Elections and was the first election that was held in Singapore. This election was not compulsory. It was only in 1959 when the British granted Singapore full internal
self-government did voting become compulsory. Nomination day happened on 25 April with the voting day set at 30May. During the 1959 elections that the People’s Action Party (PAP), which consisted of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Eurasians, won by a landslide, winning 43 out of the 51 available seats in parliament, securing 53.5% of the votes casted. This was also when Lee Kuan Yew stepped into parliament and became Singapore’s Prime Minister (Lee, 2008). After their split from Malaysia in August 7th 1965 (Singh, & Wheatly, 1989), Singapore has then since been ruled continuously by the PAP with them occupying every parliament seat from 1965 all the way to 1981 (Singh, & Wheatly, 1989; Tan, 2009), and till now (Chen, 2011).
Nomination Day
According to the official GE website, “candidates have to present their nomination papers, statutory declarations and certificate personally at the nomination centre, with their proposers, seconders and at least four assentors”(General Election 2011 - GE guide, 2011, para 1). If no one contest this nomination, the current nominated will ascend to office, however if there is a
contesting nomination in the same electoral division, polls will be taken on an assigned polling day. The Returning Officer will issue the notice of contested elections giving:
The date of the poll (not less than 9 days nor more than 8 weeks after publication of notice);
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The names of candidates, their symbols, proposers and seconders; and
The names and locations of all polling stations (para 4).
There are currently 27 Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) in Singapore. Each GRCs are made up of three to six candidates of which one must be a minority. These candidates should be from the same political group. The GRCs are:
Nee Soon
Holland-Bukit Timah
Jurong
Campaigning can only start after nomination day closes till a day before the polling day, which is known as the cooling off day. The scope of the campaign can include “house-to-house visits, distribution of pamphlets, putting up posters and banners, campaigning on perambulating vehicles, advertising on the Internet and holding election rallies and meetings”
(http://www.ge.sg/guide/, para 8). The television stations will also give each political party airtime. However, the airtime permitted is based on the number of candidates running per party.
Furthermore there is a strict rule against campaigning on the cooling of day, giving voters 24
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hours to reflect and decide “rationally on issues raised during the election before going to the polls “ (para 10).
1.3 PAP election history from 1968 to 2006
Ever since independence from British colonial rule and the split from Malaysia, the PAP has fought and won every single general election. The 1968 GE held on 13th April had only one opposition party and 5 independent candidates contesting 7 out of the 58 constituencies. The PAP won all the seats that year. The 1972 GE on the 2nd of September saw an increase in opposition parties. 57 out of 65 constituencies were contested but the PAP emerged victorious winning all 65 seats. Similarly in the 1976 GE, despite being contested by the same opponents, PAP won all seats. The 1980 election on the 23rd of December saw the entrance of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), however despite debates of the opposition over rights of the minority and care for the poor, the PAP still won all seats that year (GE 1968 – Singapore General
Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012; GE 1972 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012; GE 1976 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012; GE 1980 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012).
End of one party rule
The 22nd December 1984 marked the end of the one-party rule. Two constituencies, Potong Pasir and Anson were lost to SDP and Workers party (WP) respectively. The following GE on in 1988 saw the introduction of GRCs. PAP retained all GRCs but Potong Pasir, which voted SDP’s Chiam See Tong into parliament (GE 1984 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012). 1991’s GE marked the first election after Lee Kuan Yew
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stepped down as Prime Minister and PAP’s secretary-general. It was the first time Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong led the PAP in a GE. This GE was a snap election (just three years after the 1988 GE) called on by Goh to start a fresh mandate after the stepping down of LKY (Singapore Parliamentary General Election 1991, 2012). The results of the GE showed the biggest lost of the PAP at the period with them losing four seats, three to SDP (Bukit Gombak, Nee Soon Central, Potong Pasir) and one to WP (Hougang) (GE 1991 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012).
Upturn of GE results
The 1997 and 2001 GE showed an upturn of results for the PAP. In the 1997 GE, PAP won back two out of the four constituencies that they have lost i.e., Bukit Gombak and Nee Soon (GE 1997 – Singapore General Elections – Resource guide at National Library, Singapore, 2012). This might be due to the internal strife between SDP’s party members, disqualification of NSP’s rights to contest as well as what was at stake to voters than i.e., HDB (Singapore’s
government housing) upgrading, that aided the PAP’s upturn during the 1997 election (Singapore Parliamentary General Election 1997, 2012). The 1997 GE was also marked as a dirty chapter in Singapore’s GE history as according to Chunha (2000), this election consisted of many personal attacks both from the opposition and the PAP. In 2001, PAP faced a tough challenge as Singapore was hit by the economic crisis. However they managed to secure a high number of votes, with their promise of upgrading and revitalizing of the economy helped them retaining the constituencies they won in 1997 and increase their number of supporters, giving them the third highest voting percentage in history (Singapore Parliamentary General Election 2001, 2012).
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Reverse of fortunes of the opposition
According to Singapore Parliamentary General Election 2006 (2012), the 2006 GE held on the 6th of May mark the second time a new Prime minister was leading the PAP in the GE since the handover of the position of Prime Minister from Goh to Lee Hsien Loong in 2004. The 2006 elections was also the start of the “internet election” as according to Gomez and Han (2010), this is the year with a significant presence of political bloggers. Also there was a hot debate over the issue of “vote against upgrading” where constituencies not under the PAP were
“punished” with no government funding (Chua, 2006). The opposition this year was also
stronger more prepared than they were previously, giving the PAP a good fight, as seen from no political party forfeiting their deposits (According to Candidates' Handbook for Parliamentary Election (2011), candidates will lose their deposit if the do not get more than one eight of the total number of votes in the constituency they are running in). The wants of opposition in the cabinet by the voters were clear (Chua, 2006). Table 2 will give an overall glance of the support of the PAP from 1959 to 2011 (General Election 2011 – GE history, 2011). Table 1 shows a sharp decline of PAP’s popularity since 2006, dropping from 75% in 2001 to 66.6% followed by another more than 6% drop to 60.14 in the 2011 GE. This drop is a major concern for politicians as GE’s are not a one-time event.
Table 1
PAP election results from 1959-2011
Year Seats Won Vote percentage Opposition
1959* 43 seats out of 51 53.5% -
1963 ** 37 seats out of 51 46.6% 1. United People’s Party (UPP)
2. Barisan Sociolis (BS)
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2. 5 independent candidate
1972 All 65 seats 69.2% 1. Barisan Sosialis (BS)
2. People's Front (PF) 3. Pertubohan Kebangsaan
Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 4. United National Front (UNF) 5. Workers' Party (WP)
1976 All 69 seats 72.4% 1. Barisan Sosialis (BS)
2. Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 3. Singapore Justice Party (SJP) 4. United Front (UF)
5. United People's Party (UPF) 6. Workers' Party (WP)
1980 All 75 seats 77.7% 1. Barisan Sosialis (BS)
2. Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 3. Singapore Justice Party (SJP) 4. Singapore Democratic Party
(SDP)
5. United Front (UF)
6. United People's Party (UPF) 7. Workers' Party (WP)
1984 77 out of 79 seats 64.8% 1. Angkatan Islam (AI)
2. Barisan Sosialis (BS) 3. Justice Party Singapore (JPS) 4. Singapore Democratic Party
(SDP)
5. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 6. Pertubohan Kebangsaan
Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 7. United People's Party (UPF) 8. Workers' Party (WP)
1988 80 out of 81 seats 63.2% 1. Angkatan Islam (AI)
2. Barisan Sosialis (BS)
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3. Justice Party Singapore (JPS) 4. Singapore Democratic Party
(SDP)
5. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 6. Pertubohan Kebangsaan
Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 7. United People's Party (UPF) 8. Workers' Party (WP)
1991 77 out of seats of 81 61% 1. Justice Party Singapore (JPS)
2. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 3. People's Action Party (PAP)
Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) 4. Singapore Democratic Party
(SDP)
5. Workers' Party (WP)
1997 81 out of 83 seats 65% 1. Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP)
2. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 3. Singapore Democratic Party
(SDP)
4. Singapore People's Party (SPP) 5. Workers' Party (WP)
2001 82 out of 84 seats 75% 1. Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP)
2. People's Action Party (PAP) 3. Singapore Democratic Alliance
(SDA)
4. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)
5. Workers' Party (WP)
2006 82 out of 84 seats 66.6% 1. Singapore Democratic Alliance
(SDA)
2. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)
3. Workers' Party (WP)
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2011 81 out of 87 seats 60.14% 1. Workers' Party (WP)
2. National Solidarity Party (NSP) 3. Reform Party (RP)
4. Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)
5. Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)
6. Singapore People's Party (SPP)
* Denotes Britain granting Singapore full self governance
**Denotes Independence from Britain and merger with Malaysia
*** Singapore split from Malaysia in 1965, making 1968’s election the first GE for parliament
1.4 2011 Singapore General Elections
7th May 2011 is the latest GE that happened in Singapore recently. It is said by critiques to be the fiercest fight for PAP since Singapore’s independence (Lim & Sim, 2011). 2011’s GE showed the opposition contesting areas that were previously not contested before (i.e. strong PAP areas like Marine Parade which is under ex Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong). Furthermore, opposition candidates are also of high caliber with “top corporate lawyers and several former high-ranking civil servants” (para 3) representing the opposition.
PAP’s crisis – unhappiness of Singaporeans towards the PAP
What made this GE particularly difficult for the PAP was the raising unhappiness of the Singaporeans towards the PAP’s policies and governing. There was a raising concern with the property prices of Singapore, the high cost of living as well as the in flood of foreign workers into the country. Political risk consultants also pointed that these issues i.e., cost of living issues, housing prices and the competition posed by foreigners in the job market, will be prominently featured during the 2011 campaign (Chua, 2011), showing the significance it played in the 2011
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GE. The Straits Times also reported that these issues were the top concerns amongst Singaporeans (Lim, 2011). Similarly, the opposition also targeted strongly at these specific issues when attacking the PAP during the campaign period. These issues were also what weighed on voters minds when they cast their votes (Toh & Lim, 2011). Furthermore according to Benoit (2007) “policy is a more determinant of a voters vote to a candidate than character” (p. 224), therefore candidates usually target policies during a political campaign. Thus, the growing unhappiness and frustrations of Singaporeans towards the PAP’s inept policies towards tackling these issues made the 2011 GE a potential crisis in the making. It damaged the, in the minds of the people, “stable governance” (Ngerng, 2013, pp.20) of the PAP, and with people getting more
“disgruntled”, it “can be reflected in the drop in vote share in the alternating decade” (pp.22). An article from theonelinecitizen.com, shows the unhappiness of Singaporeans with the PAP with articles like “The anger of displacement” (Choo, 2010), where harsh phrases like “But our country is changing so quickly that we now feel overwhelmed and displaced, angry, in a country which is becoming harder and harder to recognize” (pp. 19), “It is hard to believe the PAP doesn’t know why Singaporeans are angry, but what does our anger mean to them? “ (pp. 20) and “Singapore is increasingly losing our physical and emotional space for love, and soon the only thing we will be able to call ours will be our Anger” (pp. 21). It is thus not difficult to see the image crisis that the PAP faces during the 2011 GE.
Immigration policy
Singapore’s foreign immigration policy has made employment and entry into Singapore relatively easy. According to the Ministry of Manpower, before the changes made to the
dependent privileges of work pass holders on 1st September 2012, foreigners need only to earn a monthly income of 2000 Singapore dollars to qualify for a S Pass i.e., a pass for mid skilled
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foreign workers (S Pass - before you apply, 2012). If their income was above 2800 Singapore dollars, they were allowed to bring their spouse, children, parents and parent-in-laws as well.
There were also Long term visitor pass and Dependent’s pass that allowed a foreigner’s
common-law spouse, handicapped children, step children and parents to enter Singapore (Long term visitor pass – Before you apply, 2012; Dependent’s pass – Before you apply, 2012). This ease of entering and staying in Singapore has according to Lim and Sim (2011), made 36.6 percent of the 5.1 million population in Singapore made up of foreign workers. This is a 16.6 percent increase from the 4 million people 10 years ago. The United States of America has a foreign population of 12.36% in the year 2010 (“Table 40”, 2010), and Taiwan has a foreign population of 2% in the year 2011 (“Foreign Residents”, 2012; “Household Statistics Data”, 2011). Therefore with over one quarter of the population being foreigners in such a small country, competition for housing and jobs, over-crowding of public transportation as well as the losing of national identity has left many Singaporeans disgruntled. Thus the lose immigration laws
currently in place, that allows foreigners to easily work in Singapore, were one of the main issues raised. Table 1.1 shows the percentage raise in foreigners versus Singaporeans from the year 2005 to 2011 (Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2012). From table 2.1 we can see the growth rate of Singaporean citizens are relatively small at less than 1,excluding years 2008 and 2009, whereas foreign immigrants continue to grow steadily throughout the years with the highest peaked at 19.0 in 2008.
Table 2.1
Percentage growth of Singapore residents from 2005-2011
Year Singaporeans Singapore PR Non-residents
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2005 0.8 8.6 5.9
2006 0.9 8.1 9.7
2007 0.8 7.5 14.9
2008 1.0 6.5 19.0
2009 1.1 11.5 4.8
2010 0.9 1.5 4.1
2011 0.8 -1.7 6.9
*Non-resident population comprises foreigners who were working, studying or living in Singapore but not granted permanent residence, excluding tourists and short-term visitors.
Cost of living –
The M shaped society theory by Kenichi Ohmae, which describes the society fracturing into extremely rich and extremely poor, was becoming a prominent sight in Singapore’s society.
Despite being one of Asia’s wealthiest nations, the median household income only rose 3.1%
despite a GDP increase of 14.5 percent in 2010. “Singapore's bottom 10 percent of households
despite a GDP increase of 14.5 percent in 2010. “Singapore's bottom 10 percent of households