Chapter 5: Analysis of PLA Army Strategic Goals and Military Reform
5.1. PLA Strategists and White Paper Guidelines
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Chapter 5: Analysis of PLA Army Strategic Goals and Military Reform
5.1: PLA Strategists and White Paper Guidelines
Section 4.1 and Figure 4 briefly covered the reform goals of the PLAA from various White Paper sources. To recap, in addition to the overarching objectives to improve PLAA technological innovation, structural organization, military training – the PLAA seeks to become more modular and mobile, improving capabilities for “multi-dimensional offense and defense”. These capabilities are meant to promote the PLAA ability to conduct swift
maneuvers between theaters to promote operational characteristics such as “shock value”,
“surprise/exploitation”, “quicker tempo and massing concentration”.183
According to the most recent edition of the Science of Military Strategy, as a more maneuverable and modular force, the PLAA will be conducting reform to more effectively perform the following strategic objectives:
#1. Participate in large-scale operations in major strategic directions and maintain national unity. The Army is the foundational element of joint operations and will
participate in blockade operations, fire strikes, island operations, and defense operations.
In particular, during the joint landing on the island, the Army will undertake important tasks such as landing on the beach, assault on the island, urban aggression, and post-war stability. This is an important role in safeguarding the national reunification war.
This strategic task requires PLAA reforms in joint operations with other service branches to conduct blockade, fire, island and defense operations. The security threat is primarily focused on the potential separation movement of Taiwan’s independence movement.
#2. Implement counterattacks on border self-defense to defend the security of the land and the territory. China has a large number of neighboring countries on land, with a border line of more than 22,000 kilometers. Although the possibility of a large-scale land-based invasion war is relatively small, some border delimitation issues remain unresolved. Some frontier areas have been devastating the struggle against
encroachment, rubbing, and anti-friction for a long time. The turmoil in neighboring
183 See Appendix table for U.S. Army Characteristics
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countries threatens the security of our border areas. The threat cannot be ruled out. With border self-defense, the Army units will unite with other military arms, and carry out combat operations such as border control, defense, fighting, intervening in depth, attacking troops, and occupying the control board according to the battlefield and characteristics of different strategic directions. We will actively improve our defensive posture, resolutely safeguard our territorial sovereignty, and restore peace and stability in the border areas.
This strategic objective requires PLAA reforms in maneuverability across trans-theater regions to quickly deploy units from multiple strategic directions on the border areas.
Modularity and multi-functionality allows the PLAA to be more flexible regardless of the battle landscape and environmental conditions. This objective focuses mainly on non-traditional security threats from the border nations of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Myanmar. As referred to in section 4, these nations pose moderate risks due to internal domestic turmoil that China perceives as a potential threat to borders. In addition, this objective refers to the nations of Vietnam and India, countries that still have ongoing border issues with China. While border control typically evokes images of the 1.5 million strong paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP), it should be remembered that the PAP is fundamentally separate from the PLA and focuses on non-traditional internal security threats.184 These are not necessarily the same threats that the PLAA is trained for, even though the PAP may be used to augment PLAA forces.
#3. Participate strategically in defensive operations. With the development of potential adversaries' long-distance capabilities, combat forces, and the improvement of precision strike capabilities, strategic locations such as the capital of China may become the key targets of enemy strategy raids in the war. In the strategic defense of the future, the army will be responsible for important protection objectives. While shielding heavy armed groups and preventing the penetration of anti-enemy special forces and other
ground-184 Kristin Huang, “China Brings People’s Armed Police Under Control of top Military Chiefs,”
South China Morning Post, December 28, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2125880/china-brings-peoples-armed-police-under-control-top
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based defense combat tasks, the Army also deploys air-to-surface missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and other air defense weapons, and cooperate with the support of the Air Force, Navy, and the Second Artillery (renamed the Rocket Force) to counter enemy air raids and ensure that anti-airstrike operations are won.
This strategic objective requires major technological military advancements in missiles, anti-air defense, and ground-defensive combat tasks. This objective focuses on the threat of major military powers such as the United States, Japan, and India. It is likely that the proliferation of ICBMs, the radar capabilities of THAAD’s, and the impact of U.S. Special Forces in recent engagements has pushed the PLAA to seek military reform. These threats, despite the low likelihood of actually acting on China, points China’s own military weaknesses and where reform needs to occur.
#4. Participate non-war military operations. Emphasize characteristics of the Army’s adaptability, strong military strength, diversity of arms, flexibility, quick response, and strong control, to assist the relevant state agencies, and to protect against events such as terrorism, unrest, and major natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods to ensure social stability and the safety of people’s lives and property. At the same time, the Army is gradually expanding its participation in overseas non-war military operations such as international peacekeeping, international rescue, protection of overseas evacuation, protection of overseas assets and strategic channels, effectively supporting the country.
expanding interests and shaping a favorable strategic situation.
This last objective, is the PLAA’s attempt to improve their civil-military and international military relations by demonstrating to the global community that their capabilities can be positively utilized to the benefit of others. This task requires specific training and budget allocations to prepare soldiers for non-traditional “war tasks”.185
While the listed tasks from the 2013 SMS are not official statements from China’s Ministry of Defense, they represent a nuanced compilation of the opinions of China’s top strategists. After meticulously examining security threats to the PLAA in the previous section,
185 Major security objectives translated from军事科学院军事战略研究部, 战略学, (北京市:
Academy of Military Science, 2013), 198-199.
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this chapter will qualitatively analyze the various reforms that the PLAA has undergone.
Understanding the relationship between China’s external security environment and the PLAA reforms will reveal the quality of China’s arming decision.
5.2: Structural and Professional Advances in PLAA: Manpower
The PLAA structural command has made extensive changes to the PLAA organization in the past decade. In part, these reforms have been part of a political move to reconsolidate power under the CPC, the CMC and President Xi Jinping.186 Internal discord and corruption practices in such large forces, especially in the PLAA, are likely to also play a role in
President Xi Jinping’s decision to reduce PLA size and to centralize his Party’s authority over the military institution. Practically, these structural changes have been necessary to reduce overhead costs as well as the inefficiency of several million troops.
Force Reductions
According to Premier Li Keqiang in 2018, the PLA has already finished its most recent manpower reduction to 2 million soldiers.187 However, it seems unclear how many troops are actually in the PLAA. According to the 2017 Military Balance release by IISS, the PLAN numbers 235,000 soldiers, the PLAAF numbers 398,000 soldiers, the PLASSF numbers 100,000 soldiers, and the PLA Reserves number 510,000 soldiers.188 While some these
186 "CMC Issues Guideline on Deepening the Reform of National Defense and Armed Forces,"
International College of Defense Studies, May 16, 2016, accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.cdsndu.
org/html_en/to_articleContent_article.id=40288a8553c564450154ec08fb690409.html.
187 "China to Be More Open to Foreign Investment, Speed up Beijing-led Trade Bloc and Strengthen Its Military: Li Keqiang," South China Morning Post, March 06, 2018, accessed May 13, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2135619/what-will-chinas-
parliamentary-session-reveal-about-its.
188 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2017 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies), 240.
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numbers are sourced from a 2013 CCP White Paper, the PLAN, PLAF, and PLASSF
manpower have most likely not changed much. This is because the simultaneous emphasis on these services and overall manpower reduction would prevent sudden increases or decreases in those three services. Common logic assumes that the land forces of the PLAA and the PLA Reserves will most likely face the largest reductions.
Figure 9 - PLA Manpower Table
2007189 2016190 2017/18191
PLAA 1,600,000 (IISS) 1,600,000(IISS) 850,000 (2013 White Paper)
1,150,000 (IISS) Est. 600,000-800,000 (Recalculated) PLAN 255,000 (IISS) 255,000 (2013
White Paper)
235,000 (IISS)
PLAF 400,000 (IISS) 398,000 (2013 White Paper)
398,000 (IISS)
PLASSF Unknown 100,000 (IISS) 100,000 (IISS) PLARF Unknown Est. 150,000 150,000 (IISS) PLA
Reserve
Unknown 510,000 (IISS) 510,000 (IISS) Est. 410,000-510,000 Total Force 2,500,000 (CMC) 2,300,000 (CMC)
2,843,000 (IISS)
2,000,000 (CMC) 2,693,000 (IISS)
This table lists manpower estimates of PLA forces over the years. As seen, there seems to be a fairly large discrepancy of number between what the IISS estimates and the numbers that the CMC releases periodically. In addition, it becomes even more confusing when new sites
189 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2007 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies), 347.
190 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2016 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies), 278.
191 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2017 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies), 240.
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and research articles start using multiple numbers from different sources during inconsistent years. This makes it difficult to estimate the PLAA’s actual manpower, as it seems to fluctuate about 40-50% depending on what source is used. This phenomenon is quite troublesome since the belief that China has the largest military in the world is widespread threat perception, and one that may not be necessarily true depending on the sources.
If we follow official Chinese sources (MOD, CMC, State Sponsored news sites), the PLAA is estimated to have between 600,000-800,000 active duty soldiers after the 2016 manpower reduction. Since researchers also do not have access to accurate PLA reserve, PLASSF, or PLARF numbers – the 600,000 is merely an estimate that assumes the majority of the completed 300,000 reductions to have been within PLAA ranks. The IISS does not name a source in its force estimates, making it difficult to substantiate their numbers.
Command Reorganization
Reducing sheer manpower to cut down on inefficient force management is one of many steps that the PLAA has taken to increase efficiency and maneuverability. President Xi Jinping has also taken steps to regroup the current seven regional military area commands (MAC) into new theater commands (TC) managed by the CMC. In February 2016, the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central TCs were established with senior PLAA officers at the head of each TC.192 Each new theater command is set up with a joint operation headquarters in an attempt to separate combat commanding function from troop management
192 "President Xi Announces Establishment of Five PLA Theater Commands,"
ChinaMil.com.cn, February 1, 2016, accessed May 19, 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/01/content_6884069_4.htm.
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and administrative functions.193 In this manner, each individual service organ (Army, Air Force, Navy, Rocket Force, SSF) under the TCs will be able to better prepare their individual units. These actions will separate decision making, enforcement, and supervision power to create a more sophisticated checks and balances system.194
In 2016, the PLAA also was finally outfitted with an independent official headquarters comparable to other service headquarters. Prior to this change, the four General Departments were in charge of the PLAA Headquarters. According to the 2013 SMS, the old system of China’s leading service organs being commanded by four headquarters and military regions in charge of their respective units is generally ineffective at handling a joint operational command system.195 This change signifies a shift in attitude to the PLAA by treating as a distinct service rather than an amalgamation of multiple services.196
The 2013 SMS lists out three major reasons for the new reorganization of command and unit structure:
#1. Classification based on combat function. Battlefield environments can divide
different types of troops into amphibians, mountains, deserts, plains, cities, cold regions, and plateaus. Southwestern troops will focus on the construction of mountainous and plateau type units. Southeastern coastal areas will focus on the construction of
amphibious, light, and airborne types of troops. The northeast will focus on the
193 “Army adjustment and establishment completed in five Theater Commands,”
ChinaMil.com.cn, February 4, 2016, accessed May 19, 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm
194 "Xi Urges Breakthroughs in Military Structural Reform," Xinhua.net, November 26, 2015, accessed May 15, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm.
195 军事科学院军事战略研究部, 战略学, (北京市: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 198-208.
196 Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, Jr. "The PLA’s New
Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown and Speculation, Parts 1 & 2," Jamestown.org, accessed May 12, 2018,
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Updated_The_PLA_s_New_
Organizational_Structure_-_What_is_Known__Unknown_and_Speculation_Parts_1_and_2.pdf.
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construction of alpine and heavy forces, and the north will focus on the construction of traditional troops moving on plains.
#2. Classification based on task nature. Larger garrison troops such as heavy brigades that target specific areas of combat operations may be deployed in various mission areas to independently perform tasks such as maintaining the situation and responding to medium and low-intensity conflicts. Medium and lighter brigade-level units will deploy from strategic locations and transportation hubs to carry out support missions and temporary assignments.
#3. Classification according combat readiness. Troops are divided into task forces and mobile units, with periodic rotations to promote proper usage of troops.197
The 2013 SMS makes it clear that the organizational changes are specific in nature and targeted to achieve precise objectives. Troops will be trained to be versatile and effective in their respective threat environments. These classifications and organizational reforms indicate a shift of focus for the PLAA. Reforms are conducted in response to specific threat
environments rather for the sake of simple arms-building. In April 2017, it was announced that the previous 18 army groups will be reorganized into 13 army groups in an attempt to emphasize quality over efficiency.198 By reducing large group armies and shifting from a corps-division-regiment-battalion to a corps-brigade-battalion structure, the PLAA is able to better achieve their goal of a more mobile force across trans-theater regions to combat threats from all strategic directions.199
197 军事科学院军事战略研究部, 战略学, (北京市: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 201-202.
198 "China to Regroup PLA Army," Chinamil.com.cn, April 27, 2017, accessed May 16, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-04/27/content_7580712.htm.
199 军事科学院军事战略研究部, 战略学, (北京市: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 201.
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5.3: Technological Advances in PLA Army: Equipment
Military technological reform immediately evokes images of new J-20 stealth fighters and the very impressive Liaoning aircraft carrier. Since the PLAAF and PLARF and PLAN are all on cutting edge of new-domain battle technology, the scale of their military reforms is much different than the PLAA. After all, the majority of PLAA individual soldiers only carry a QBZ-95 5.8mm carbine.200 Over the past decade, by comparing statistics between the 2007 and 2017 PLAA inventory, there has been an overall decrease in active equipment. Rather as a sign of weakness, by watching how the weapon types have changed – there is a trend towards effective and modern weaponry over defunct and old equipment.201
The development of the PLAA’s equipment structure is crucial to reducing what the Chinese call the “"代差" – which is the act of weakening weapons as other countries develop their military capabilities. The 2013 SMS lists out three major tasks to accelerate the
development of Army weapons and equipment.
#1. Improve Army’s equipment structure. Use active research and development to increase proportion of new types of mechanized equipment. Upgrade systems to realize equipment informationization, increase Army’s early warning systems, air defense systems, rocket artillery, precision strike forces, development of special operation, information network warfare equipment, aviation helicopters etc.
#2. Highlight integration of command system by improving network systems.
Create compatible systems between multiple service branches: PLAN, PLAAF, PLARF.
(summarized to improve command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or C4ISR, the systems used to collect and disseminate information).
200 Ben Lowsen, “Overview: China’s People’s Liberation Army Equipment at a Glance,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2016, accessed May 12, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/overview-chinas-peoples-liberation-army-equipment-at-a-glance/.
201 Overview of PLAA Equipment from The Military Balance 2007-2017
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#3. Improve Army’s equipment management mechanism. Establish a standardized R&D model for required weapons and equipment. Reduce number of similar weapons, achieve standardization and adaptability of current Army equipment, increase ease of use and maintenance of weaponry.
These next few sections will explore the status of current major weapon systems and have they have slowly changed to adapt to PLAA security threats and strategic objectives over the years.
Tanks: “The armored component has strengthened the development of digitized units, accelerated the
mechanization of motorized units, and improved its combat system, which combines heavy, light, amphibious and air-borne assault forces.”202
Current conflicts in the Middle East have shifted the focus from traditional tank warfare into urban operations and
Special Forces units. However, in a defensive war for China, tank warfare would likely be a great asset. China is considered to be a “tank heavy” army, with an estimated 7,390 tanks in their equipment inventory. 6740 of these are Main Battle Tanks, and the other 650 are Light Tanks.203
Even though the PLAA has a large tank inventory, only about 50% of their tanks, Type
202 "China's National Defense in 2010," Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, March 2011, accessed May 10, 2018,
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778206.htm.
203 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2017 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies), 280.
IISS, The Military Balance 2017
Figure 10 - PLAA Tank Graph
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96, Type 98, and Type 99 are considered to be modern tanks. The PLAA will likely continue to procure more modern tanks to phase out older types. Advanced drone research being done on driverless tanks boasts capabilities that could be equipped with artificial intelligence.204 In addition, many of the PLAA’s lighter tanks are being developed to be used as fire support weapons that can traverse difficult terrain such as along the Indian border in the Himalayas or in forest terrain near Vietnam and Myanmar.205 This tank, supposedly named ZTQ-105, is a leader in its field of lighter armored fighting vehicles in rough terrain and will provide the PLAA a strong asset against border tensions.206
Mechanized Vehicles
Despite their prowess on the battlefield, tanks are often heavy and unwieldy – a detrimental characteristic to the PLAA’s desire to become flexible and maneuverable. The PLAA’s Mechanized Infantry Units have
made great progress in recent years by combining Chinese and Russian technology to create
made great progress in recent years by combining Chinese and Russian technology to create